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SUMMARY 
The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the 
Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm 
of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, 
the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive 
validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme 
Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the 
power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive 
validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. 
This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the 
transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional 
supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution 
of 1993. 
The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a 
greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the 
human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights 
provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a 
system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative 
supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the 
legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the 
Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, 
which are in conflict with it 
The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and 
mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the 
constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a 
Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and 
open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the 
nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the 
iii 
Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme 
Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A 
purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and 
approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights 
are suggested in the thesis. 
Key Words 
Constitution; Legislative supremacy; Legal positivism; Constitutional 
supremacy; Bill of Rights; Judiciary; Judicial review; Constitutional 
interpretation; Purposive approach; Purposive and generous approach. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. General 
"Tue world must construe according to its wits. Th.is court must construe according to the law. 111 
These words, spoken by Sir Thomas More during his trial, epitomise the 
nature of the judicial function. Sir Thomas More was reminding his triers that 
the process of judicial construction must be based on the law. 2 This reminder, 
however, also begs the question as to what Jaw the court must regard as 
paramount in carrying out its task of judicial construction: Is it the law 
handed down to society by the ruler, 3 or is there some other superior law 
according to which the court must construe? 
To refuse to enforce the Jaw of the ruler is to question its validity; it is to 
question the ruler's exercise of his power. It is to subject his Jaw to some 
higher norm with which it must conform in order to be valid law. 
Questions surrounding the exercise of state authority and the control of the 
exercise of such authority are not of recent origin. They are closely associated 
with the idea of constitutionalism or limited government and have featured 
1Robert Bolt A Man for All Seasons (1962) 152. 
2Sir Thomas More went on to remind the court that "the Jaw is a 
causeway upon which so Jong as he keeps to it a citizen may walk safely". 
3The ruler in this sense may either be a single person, such as a monarch, 
or a body of persons, such as Parliament. 
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prominently in the development of Anglo-American constitutional law. 
The development of the state from an ancient entity into a modem state4 with 
increased legislative and executive functions accentuated the need to limit the 
exercise of state authority and to afford the individual a life of freedom within 
a state governed by law. 5 The principle of constitutionalism or limited 
government came to be regarded as a means whereby the exercise of 
government authority could be restricted by law, as opposed to being 
arbitrary. 6 
In England, John Locke was the first theorist to advocate the limitation of the 
exercise of government authority when he reacted against royal absolutism. 7 
According to Locke the state came into existence when man in his natural 
condition of freedom, entered into a social contract of society. In entering into 
this contract man did not transfer his rights to the state; the state was entitled 
to demand obedience only as long as it respected man's natural rights and did 
not abuse its power. 8 
Central to Locke's idea of limited state power was the distribution of state 
4See in this regard Chapt. 2, infra. 
5Klaus Stern "The Genesis and evolution of European-American 
constitutionalism: some comments on the fundamental aspects" 1985 CILSA 
187 at 188. 
6See C.H Mcilwain Constitutionalism and the Changing World 
(1939) at 266 et seq. 
11. Locke Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett ed (1967). 
80p cit. at 324. 
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functions. As Locke put it, 
" ... whoeVer has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwea1th, is bound to 
govern by established standing Laws, promulgated and known to the people and not 'by 
Extemporary Decrees; by Indifferent and uprighUudges, who are to decide Controversies by those 
Laws and to employ the force of the Community at home only in the Execution of such Laws, or 
abroad to prevent or redress Foreign Injuries, and to secure the Community from Inroads and 
Invasions 11 • 9 
Although Locke. referred to the function of judging, he did not regard this 
function as a separate power within the state authority; this function was to 
him rather " a general attribution of the state. "10 Moreover, Locke's thesis 
of the distribution of state functions did not amount to a theory of the 
separation of powers as it is understood to mean today, namely as one of the 
pillars of modem constitutionalism. 11 He instead regarded the legislative 
power as supreme over the executive and judicial functions, both of which, 
according to him, had to be utilised in the execution of the laws adopted by 
the legislative authority. 12 
The idea that the legislature was supreme was taken up and propagated by 
English constitutional law writers, notably Blackstone13 and Dicey;14 these 
•Ibid. at 371. 
10Ibid. at 118. 
11Ibid. at 117-118. 
12Ibid. at 118. 
13Sir William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765). 
14A. v Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
-4-
writers were influenced by Austin's theory of unlimited sovereignty and 
formulated the concept of parliamentary sovereignty .15 Dicey stated, 
emphatically, that the British Parliament can make or unmake any law 
whatsoever, 16 including the laws which constitute the Constitution itself. 17 
In England the sovereignty of Parliament came to be associated with the 
incompetence of the courts to override or set aside laws made by 
Parliament; 18 it was reasoned that were the courts to have the competence to 
set aside Acts of Parliament, Parliament would no longer be sovereign. Courts 
of law are bound to apply Acts of a sovereign Parliament, irrespective of 
whether they affect the rights of individuals negatively or are considered by 
the courts to be constitutionally indefensible or unjust. 19 
Circumstances prevailing in the Americas were much different from those in 
England. The colonists had resisted British authority and displayed a distrust 
of unrestrained government. Great documents like Magna Carta, though not 
Constitution 10th ed (1975). 
15See Chap!. 4 for a discussion of the development of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
16Dicey op cit. at 39. See also E.C.S Wade, G. Phillips and A.W 
Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (1977) at 59. 
17For an analysis of the meaning of "constitution" see K.C Wheare 
Modern Constitutions (1966) Chapt. l; C.F Strong Modern 
Constitutions (1966) at 11-12. 
18Dicey op cit. at 39; Wade, Phillips & Bradley op cit. at 59. 
19See T.R.S Allan "Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law 
Democracy and Constitutionalism" 1985 CW 111 at 116. 
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coonstitutionally entrenched, provided the antecedent of a written fundamental 
law20 through which the exercise of state authority could be limited; French 
writers such as Rousseaau, however, largely influenced American ideas. The 
United States of America which emerged from the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787 was based on a written Constitution. The supremacy of the 
Constitution of the United States was expressly provided for in article VI, 
para. 2, of the Constitution of the United States. 21 Article VI(2) provides that 
the Constitution of the United States is 
11 the supreme law of the land; and judges in every state sha11 be bound thereby. anything 
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding 11 • 
There had, however, been earlier instances where the courts of some states 
which later became part of the United States of America had declared certain 
state laws to be invalid on the basis that they were in conflict with the state 
Constitution. 22 However, neither the Constitution of the United States nor the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which created the national judiciary, specifically gave 
the judiciary the power to invalidate legislation. The power to review 
legislation and to invalidate legislation was later developed by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Antecedents concerning judicial control of acts of Congress existed even 
before the Supreme Court asserted its power of judicial review. In 
20Coke had regarded Magna Carta as the "fountain of all fundamental 
laws of the realm". It was according to him fundamental " ... not for the 
length or largeness of it . . . but . . . in respect of the great weightiness and 
weighty greatness of the matter contained in it". 
21Article VI is known as the supremacy clause. 
22E.g Holmes v Walton (New Jersey, 1780); Trevettv Wheeden 
(Rhode Island, 1786). 
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Hayburn's case23 the Pennsylvanian circuit court had refused to enforce 
a statute of Congress which it deemed to be contrary to the Constitution. In 
Van Horne's Lessee v Dorrance24 Justice Paterson was more specific 
when he held, with reference to the nature of the British Constitution25, that 
"[w]hatever may be the case in other countries, ... there can be no doubt that 
every act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely 
void. "26 A similar view was expressed in Cooper v Telfair'n. 
It was, however, not until the celebrated judgment of Chief Justice Marshall 
in Marbury v Madison28 that the principles of the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the courts' power to review legislation on the basis thereof 
became firmly established in the United States of America. 
Marbury v Madison29 was concerned with the question whether the 
232 Dallas 409 (1792). 
242 Dallas 304 (1795). 
25Justice Paterson referred specifically to the supreme power of 
Parliament, the incompetence of the courts to question or inquire into the 
validity of Acts of Parliament and the fact that the British Constitution was 
largely unwritten and did not enjoy any supremacy above other laws. 
26At 308. 
272 Dallas 14 (1800) at 19. 
281 Cranch 137 (1803). 
29Supra. For a detailed analysis of Marbury v Madison see Harold 
Burton "The Cornerstone of Constitutional Law: Marbury v Madison" 1950 
Am. Bar Ass. J 805. 
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Supreme Court could, in accordance with the Constitution, exercise the power 
given to it by the Judiciary Act, 1789 to issue writs of mandamus to public 
officials. 3° Chief Justice Marshall held that the issue of the writs would not 
be in accordance with the Constitution. He reasoned that, by incorporating the 
writ into the Judiciary Act, Congress had through its legislation increased the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, something which was not 
sanctioned by the Constitution and therefore contrary to it. 31 In his view the 
Constitution was supreme and any Act of Congress which was contrary to it 
was void. 
Chief Justice Marshall found that the principle of the supremacy of the 
Constitution was based on the "original right" of the people to determine and 
to establish the fundamental principles according to which they wished to be 
governed. These principles organised the state, prescribed its functions and 
determined and delimited the sphere of the state's authority in relation to the 
citizens32 • According to Chief Justice Marshall these fundamental principles 
defined and limited the legislative powers of Congress. 
The principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, as opposed to the 
supremacy of the legislature, provided a sound basis for Chief Justice 
Marshall to come to the conclusion that, in terms of the Constitution, the court 
was empowered to review legislation in order to determine whether such 
30A writ of mandamus has its origin in English law. It is a judicial order 
directed to a public official, commanding him to perform his official, 
ministerial, non-discretionary duty. 
31Article III, the relevant article of the Constitution which dealt with the 
judicial branch and prescribed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not 
include the issuing of writs of mandamus. 
32See Stem op cit. at 187. 
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legislation was enacted in accordance with the Constitution. Chief Justice 
Marshall reasoned that since the Constitution is supreme law, 
11 [i]t is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret the rule ... 
A law repugnant to the Constitution is void; ... courts as well as other departments are bound by 
that instrument 11 • 33 
The nature of the Constitution of the United States as alluded to, its 
supremacy and the power of the judiciary, as a separate and co-equal branch 
of government, to keep in check the exercise of state authority illustrate the 
concept of modern constitutionalism, namely the idea of a government which 
is limited by a supreme Constitution in accordance with which the courts can 
declare to be invalid laws which are in conflict with its provisions. The 
inclusion of a justiciable Bill of Rights which sets out the rights and freedoms 
of citizens34 resulted in the judiciary having to play a fundamental role in the 
process of constitutionalism; this fundamental role involves the resolution of 
conflicts between the state authority in the exercise of its power and the 
citizen in the exercise of his constitutional rights and freedoms, and implies 
that the courts can strike down any legislation which is in conflict with the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
33Marbury v Madison (supra). 
3
"The Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Constitution by means of 
amendments brought about in terms of article V of the Constitution. The first 
10 amendments which constitute the Bill of Rights were proposed on 25 
September 1789 and ratified on 15 December 1791. The 14th amendment, 
ratified in 1868, introduced the 'due process of law' clause in respect of life, 
liberty and property. The 15th and 19th amendments, ratified in 1870 and 
1920 respectively, extended the franchise to people of all races and colour 
and to both sexes. 
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The nature of the British and American constitutional systems illustrates two 
different positions concerning the role of the judiciary in a modem state. 
Within the context of the British constitutional system, Parliament is supreme 
and the courts do not have the power to question, inquire into or override 
legislation enacted by Parliament. Within the context of the American 
constitutional system, the Constitution is supreme and the court has the power 
to review legislative and executive acts and to strike down such acts which are 
in conflict with the Constitution. 
The British constitutional tradition has had a profound impact on the 
constitutional development of South Africa. The doctrine of legislative 
supremacy and the absence of judicial review of parliamentary legislation were 
virtually transplanted into South Africa. 35 
The role of the judiciary under a system of legislative supremacy and a system 
of constitutional supremacy respectively is of particular significance for the 
future constitutional development of South Africa. A study of the role of the 
judiciary within the context of a tradition of legislative supremacy, in 
comparison with a transition from such a tradition to a system of constitutional 
supremacy, becomes particularly relevant in the light of the new constitutional 
dispensation, which is based on the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
protection of human rights and freedoms in a justiciable Bill of Rights. 
2. Purpose and Approach. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the South African 
judiciary, in particular, in the light of a tradition of legislative supremacy and 
a shift from this tradition to a system of constitutional supremacy and judicial 
';See in general C.J.R Dugard Human Rights and the South 
African Legal Order (1978) at 27-28. 
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review of legislative and executive acts in terms of the Constitution and its 
guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, and to attempt a prognosis of 
the future role of the judiciary. 
Much has already been written about the performance of the judiciary within 
the context of the South African legal order. Corder36 and Forsyth, 37 for 
example, have written pioneering works on the South African judiciary. 
Although both works cover a wide range of subjects, they are confined mainly 
to the role and attitudes of the judiciary during certain specific periods38 and 
do not deal specifically with the constitutional role of the judiciary and the 
influence of the doctrine of legislative supremacy in relation to this role. 
36 H. Corder Judges at Work - The Role and Attitudes of the 
South African Appellate Judiciary (1984). 
37C.F Forsyth In Danger for their Talents - A Study of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa 
(1985). 
38Corder's work covers the period 1910 to 1950, Forsyth's the period 
1950 to 1980. The importance of these works lies in the fact that the period 
1910 to 1950 constitutes the formative era of the role of the South African 
Appellate Division, while the period 1950 to 1980 covers the performance of 
the South African Appellate Division after the coming into power of the 
National Party Government and the manifestations of grand apartheid. With 
the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1950 the Appellate Division 
became the final court of appeal. At the close of the 1970s the South African 
judiciary had acquired a 'pro-executive' label : see Forsyth op cit. at 37 and 
225-226. 
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Many of the other available assessments of the judiciary have focused largely 
on the credibility of the judiciary39 and the associated theme of the moral 
dilemma facing a judiciary which operates within a system considered to be 
unjust. 40 
The studies that have focused on the attitudes, 41 policies42 and 
backgrounds43 of the judiciary have shed much light on the influence these 
factors have had on the process of judicial decision-making. There is still, 
however, a dearth of studies on the constitutional role of the judiciary in South 
Africa, particularly with regard to the relationship between the legislature and 
39See for example E. Cameron "Nude Monarchy : The Case of South 
Africa's Judges" 1987 SAJHR 338; A. Lubowski "Democracy and the 
Judiciary" in H. Corder (ed) Democracy and the Judiciary (1989) 13. 
40See for example R. Wacks "Judges and Injustice" 1984 SAW 266; 
C.J.R Dugard "Should Judges Resign? A Reply to Professor Wacks" 1984 
SAW 286; R. Wacks "Judging Judges : A Brief Rejoinder to Professor 
Dugard" 1984 SAW 295; D. Dyzenhaus "Judges, Equity and Truth" 1985 
SAW 295; M.K Robertson "The Participation of Judges in the Present Legal 
System" in Corder(ed) op cit. (1989) 67. 
41See for example Corder and Forsyth's studies of the Appellate Division 
op cit notes 36 and 37. 
42See for example C. Hoexter "Judicial Policy in South Africa" 1986 
SAW 436. 
43See Corder op cit. (1984) at 13-17 and Chapt. II; Forsyth op cit. at 
38-46. 
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the judiciary in the light of the constitutional protection of individual rights 
and liberties and factors which affect the role of the judiciary in a politically 
sensitive atmosphere. 44 
This thesis attempts to explore judicial trends and approaches in constitutional 
adjudication. In order to stimulate constitutional development, the exploration 
takes into account the constitutional system within which the judiciary has 
operated in the past, as well as other factors which affect the constitutional 
role of the judiciary; with the help of a comparative study of other countries, 
a prognosis of the role of the South African judiciary in a new constitutional 
dispensation is then given. Important aspects which form the core of the thesis 
are the doctrine of legislative supremacy, the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and the associated principle of judicial independence, the concept of 
modern constitutionalism, the constitutional guarantee of individual rights and 
freedoms and judicial review of legislation. 
The approach which is followed is both analytical and normative. The study 
44For an allusion to some of these factors see M.K Robertson in 
Corder(ed) op cit.(1989) at 72-73. See also E. Mureinik "Dworkin and 
Apartheid" in H. Corder(ed) Essays in Law and Social Practice in 
South Africa (1988) 181. In another article Mureinik draws attention , for 
example, to the fact that "in legal reasoning the convictions available for 
interpretation are not the convictions of private scruple, or communal practice, 
or sacred text, but the convictions of the legal system itself" and that "such 
convictions take the shape of decisions; usually legislative and judicial 
decisions". ( "Law and Morality in South Africa" 1988 SALJ 457 at 459). 
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is preceded by a brief analysis of the theoretical concepts which form the core 
and subject matter of the thesis. A historical survey of the constitutional 
tradition within which the formative role of the South African judiciary in 
constitutional adjudication began is then presented, with particular reference 
to the Westminster tradition, the doctrine of legislative supremacy as a 
dominant characteristic of South African constitutional development and the 
role of the judiciary in relation to this. This tradition is contrasted with the 
feature of constitutional entrenchment as a means of making provision for 
constitutional guarantees, and the role of the judiciary in this context. 
A comparative survey of the role of the judiciary in countries which have a 
tradition of legislative supremacy but have moved away from this tradition to 
a system of constitutional supremacy and judicial review of legislation is also 
undertaken. The countries which are surveyed are Canada, the former 
Bophuthatswana (now part of South Africa once again) and Namibia. These 
countries were chosen because, like South Africa, they share a common 
tradition of legislative supremacy but moved to a system of constitutional 
supremacy, the entrenchment of fundamental human rights and judicial 
review. 
The comparative survey is aimed at affording a realistic assessment of the 
opportunities available to, and the difficulties which may face, the South 
African judiciary as it makes a transition from a system of legislative 
supremacy to a new constitutional dispensation which has as its main features 
the supremacy of the Constitution, the entrenchment of fundamental human 
rights and judicial review. The solutions to problems encountered by the 
judiciary in those countries that have already made a transition from a system 
of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy, the entrenchment 
of fundamental human rights and substantive judicial review provide a starting 
point for our judiciary in the resolution of the problems that we may 
encounter. 
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3. Theoretical Framework. 
The essence of the judicial function is the adjudication of concrete legal 
disputes in accordance with the rules of an existing legal system. The process 
of judicial adjudication involves an identification of the rule or rules applicable 
in a given case and the application of the rule or rules so identified to the 
case. These rules are existing, expressed or primary normative principles. 45 
The difficult task which faces the judiciary is to determine which rule is 
applicable in a given case. 
According to Kelsen' s hierarchy of rules a legal system is premised upon an 
ultimate rule, the Grundnorm, on which all other rules are based. 46 It is 
essentially the Grundnorm which prescribes the constitutional role of the 
judiciary within a legal system. Where the supremacy of the legislature 
45H.L.A Hart has constructed a system of rules which consists of what 
he terms "primary rules" and "secondary rules". Primary rules are those rules 
which are actually applied to the facts of a specific case in order to arrive at 
a decision; secondary rules are those rules which prescribe how a judge should 
act in deciding which primary rule he will apply to the case at hand : H.L.A 
Hart The Concept of Law (1961) at 77-96. 
46See W.J Hosten, A.B Edwards et al. Introduction to South 
African Law and Legal Theory (1995) at 153-161. For a critical 
analysis of Kelsen's theory of law see R.W.M Dias Jurisprudence (1970), 
Chap!. 15. Although Kelsen propounded his 'pure theory of law' along 
positivistic lines, it provides a useful description of a legal system : see 
Hosten, Edwards et al. op cit. at 91. 
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constitutes the Grundnorm, the courts are constrained to apply the enactments 
of the legislature without questioning their validity; where the supremacy of 
the Constitution is the Grundnorm, the courts have to give the provisions of 
the Constitution precedence and can on that basis declare any law or act which 
is inconsistent with such provisions to be invalid. 47 
The fact that the Grundnorm prescribes the constitutional role of the judiciary 
does not, however, tell much about the actual role of the judiciary in 
constitutional adjudication. This role is better understood in the light of the 
theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Past South African literature on constitutional adjudication has largely not 
exhibited any specific theory of constitutional interpretation. 48 There has been 
a tendency to regard a process such as constitutional interpretation as being 
self-evidently embodied in existing constitutional forms and institutions. This 
may be explained in terms of the operation of the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy and the inability of the courts to play a significant role in the 
substantive review of legislation. The fact that previous Constitutions did not 
enjoy supremacy over ordinary legislation resulted in their interpretation being 
subject to the ordinary rules of interpretation.49 Approaches to the 
interpretation of the Constitution have therefore tended to focus on the literal 
47This aspect is discussed in detail in Chap!. 10, infra. 
48See M. Wiechers "The Fundamental Laws Behind Our Constitution" in 
E. Kahn (ed) Fiat Justitia - Essays in Memory of Oliver Deneys 
Schreiner (1983) at 383 and 384. 
49See C.J.R Dugard "Judicial Power and a Constitutional Court" in L. 
Boulle & L. Baxter (eds) Natal and Kwazulu : Constitutional and 
Political Options (1981) at 196. 
-16-
meaning of words in a statute,50 with little or no consideration of the values 
of the society within which the Constitution and statutes operate. 51 A 
supreme Constitution on the other hand, especially one which contains a 
50There have been some authorities, however, who have advocated a 
purposive, rather than a literal interpretation even in ordinary legislation: see 
D. Basson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (1988) at 
264-266; C.J.R Dugard "Some Realism about the Judicial Process and 
Positivism: A Reply" 1981 SAL.J 372; E. Cameron "Legal Chauvinism, 
Executive-mindedness and Justice - L.C Steyn's impact on South African 
Law" 1982 SAL.J 38 at 59-60. See Chapt. 10 for a detailed discussion of this 
approach and the authorities who have advocated it. 
51 A number of publications on constitutional interpretation in the light of 
constitutional values and norms have appeared in the past few years; before 
that there was virtually nothing: see inter alia C. F Forsyth "Interpreting a Bill 
of Rights: The Future Task of a Reformed Judiciary" 1991 SAJHR 1; S.M 
Trengove "Judicial Ideologies in the Interpretation of a Bill of Rights in South 
Africa" 1992 Responsa Meridiana 118; L.M Du Plessis & J.R De Ville 
"The Bill of Rights: Interpretation in the South African Context - Diagnostic 
Observations" 1993 Stellenbosch LR 59; L.M Du Plessis "The 
Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa: Taking Stock" in J. Kruger 
& B. Currin (eds) Interpreting a Bill of Rights (1994) at l; J. Kruger 
"Towards a new Interpretive Theory" in J. Kruger & B. Currin (eds) 
Interpreting a Bill of Rights (1994) at 103. 
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justiciable Bill of Rights52, would require judges to make value judgments, 
which would in tum lead to a crystallisation of specific theories of 
constitutional interpretation in terms of which constitutional values ought to 
be identified, defined, evolved and applied. 53 
52The (interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 
1993 contains a justiciable Bill of Fundamental Rights in Chapter 3. In terms 
of section 4 the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and binds the 
legislative, executive and judicial organs of state at all levels of government. 
53Basson & Viljoen have laid a sound basis for the development of a 
theory of constitutional adjudication. According to them the approach to 
constitutional issues should be value-oriented and should take into account the 
existing circumstances within a particular dispensation at a given time: Basson 
& Viljoen op cit. at 1-13. See also D .A Basson "Staatsregteorie en 
werklikheid" 1983 De Jure 307. In his work on the interpretation of 
statutes, Devenish also provides a theoretical framework to statutory 
interpretation which could be helpful in developing a theory of constitutional 
interpretation: see G.E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 
Chapt. 2. One of the most important works to appear in the past few years on 
constitutional interpretation is that of T.J Kruger, Die Wordingsproses 
van 'n Suid-Afrikaanse Menseregtebedeling, unpublished LLD 
thesis, PU for CHE (1990). Kruger (at 249-256) proposes a step by step 
approach to the interpretation of a supreme Constitution's Bill of Rights; this 
approach takes into account the special nature of a Constitution as the supreme 
law of the land and as a system of values and norms against which all other 
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A theoretical perspective adopted in relation to constitutional adjudication 
subsumes a theory of the role of the judiciary in government, as well as the 
nature and extent of judicial review of state action. In his duty to apply the 
law the judge must of necessity interpret and expound the rules that constitute 
the law. Within the context of legislative supremacy, the judicial role is 
limited by the will of the legislature; the judge is not empowered to interpret 
and expound the law in such a way that the will of the legislature of the 
legislature is overridden. On the other hand, within the context of 
constitutional supremacy and substantive judicial review, the judge must 
interpret and expound the law in such a way that the superior law of the 
Constitution is carried out, because lex superior derogat legi inferiori. 
The central problem surrounding a theory of constitutional adjudication is that 
of clearly defining and ascertaining the boundaries of permissible 
interpretation. Since it is mainly the interpretation of the Constitution which 
determines the limits and extent of the exercise of state authority in relation 
to the rights and freedoms of the individual and the interests of the community 
as represented by the state, a proper solution to this problem is essential. 
In American constitutional law there are three main schools of thought which 
dominate theories of constitutional interpretation, namely the 'original intent' 
school, the 'democratic principles' school and the 'living document' school. 54 
According to the 'original intent' school of thought, the court must in 
construing the Constitution seek and give effect to the intent of those who 
laws must be weighed. 
54See H. Bownes "The Interpretation of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights : The Role of the Judge and the Lawyer" 1987 New Hampshire 
Bar J 301 at 303-304. 
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drafted and ratified or adopted it. 55 The main thrust of this approach is that 
in determining a constitutional issue, the court must analyse the relevant 
clause of the Constitution in order to find what the framers thought about the 
issue and then carry out such intention. 56 A number of problems arise here, 
the most serious ones being, first, that it is not always easy to ascertain what 
the intention of the framers was and secondly, that issues which come up for 
consideration may be issues that the framers may never even have thought of. 
The shortcoming inherent in the original intent approach is that while it may 
be a noble idea to adhere to the original intention of the framers of a 
Constitution and to be guided by such an intention, the intention may have 
fallen far behind the modem day realities with which the court has to deal. 57 
The second school of thought, the political process school, is based on 
democratic principles. According to this approach, the fundamental values 
which regulate the affairs of society must be determined by the people's 
55In the South African context this approach corresponds to the approach 
which requires the courts to give effect to the intention of the legislature, 
without a consideration of fundamental societal values : See in this regard 
Venter v R 1907 T.S 910 at 913; Seluka v Suskin and Salkow 
1912 TPD 256 at 265-266. For extra-curial support of this approach in South 
African statutory interpretation see L.C Steyn "Regsbank en Regsfakulteit" 
1967 THRHR 101 at 106-107; N. Ogilvie Thompson "Centenary 
Celebrations of the Northern Cape Division of the Supreme Court" 1972 
SAIJ 23 at 32-34. 
56Bownes 1987 New Hampshire Bar J at 303. 
57The 'original intent' approach is discussed in detail in Chap!. 10, 
infra. 
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elected representatives and not by the courts. In terms of this view it is 
therefore improper to leave the determination of important constitutional issues 
entirely in the hands of an unelected branch of government. 58 The 
justification advanced in support of this school of thought is that it is a tenet 
of representative democracy that value judgments which regulate the affairs 
of society should be left in the hands of elected representatives, who can be 
voted out of office if their selection of values is not popular; the courts ought 
therefore, as a result, to defer to the will of the elected organs of 
government. 59 The fallacy inherent in this view is that it seeks to leave 
constitutional issues which affect entrenched rights to a major party to the 
dispute, namely the legislature or the executive. Appointed judges, on the 
other hand, stand aloof from party politics and do not have a personal interest 
in the outcome of cases; they are therefore in a better position to make an 
objective assessment of competing claims between state organs and the 
individual. 
The third school of thought views the Constitution as a living document which 
embodies fundamental values that are applicable to issues which arise as 
society develops. 60 According to this school, the meaning of a Constitution 
is not fixed but changes over time; a constitutional clause, especially one 
which deals with individual rights and freedoms, is open to various 
interpretations; it is the function of the judge to seek out and apply that 
meaning which most accords with the provisions of the Constitution and the 
58Bownes 1987 New Hampshire Bar J at 303. 
59For a defence of this justification and a criticism of judicial creativity 
and law-making in constitutional interpretation see J.H Ely Democracy 
and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). Ely is the main 
representative of the political process school of thought. 
60Bownes loc cit. 
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circumstances prevailing at the time of interpretation. The Constitution is 
viewed as an enduring document which accommodates changing circumstances 
and the values of society as it evolves.61 Within this context the function of 
the judiciary, as an institution to which the application of the law is entrusted, 
is to discover , define, proclaim and apply society's fundamental values as 
embodied in the Constitution.62 
It will be argued in this thesis that a value-oriented approach to constitutional 
adjudication and interpretation, that is, one which regards the Constitution as 
a living document intended to deal with the affairs of society in accordance 
with the values, ideals and aspirations of society as embodied in the 
Constitution, at any given time, takes into account the purpose of law in 
society and seeks to harmonise such purpose with the whole legal system is 
the proper approach to the interpretation of a new Constitution which has as 
its features the principle of constitutional supremacy, the entrenchment of 
fundamental human rights and judicial review of legislative and executive acts. 
A value-oriented approach, as will be shown, does not allow excessive 
legalism and encourages the interpretation of the Constitution in the light of 
society's fundamental values as embodied in the Constitution and discoverable 
from its provisions and its larger objects, and not according to a strict literal 
61See T. Sandalow "Constitutional Interpretation" 1981 Michigan LR 
1033. 
62Sandalow 1981 Michigan LR at 1037. For a discussion of judicial 
constitutional interpretation and fundamental values see Chapt. 10, infra. The 
value-oriented approach which is advocated by Sasson & Viljoen op cit. at 
1-4 is consistent with the approach which regards constitutional interpretation 
as a discovery of fundamental values of society. 
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meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions. It takes into account the 
importance of constitutional values and the ideals and aspirations of society; 
it recognises that a supreme Constitution is a deliberately enacted document 
which contains human rights provisions which are based on fundamental 
values such as justice, fairness and freedom. It enables the judiciary to 
interpret the Constitution in such a way that results which foster fundamental 
societal values are striven for. 63 
63For a detailed discussion of these aspects see Chap!. 10. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE. 
The existence of a state presupposes a community of people within a specific 
territory and organised in a particular way, over whom the state exercises 
authority. The exercise of authority is a fundamental feature of the state 1 and 
is associated with the idea of Jaw as a medium through which the state 
exercises its authority. State authority is not completely unified but is divided 
into the legislative, the executive and the judicial authority ,2 i.e the law-
making authority, the law-implementing authority and the law-enforcing 
authority. 
The idea of authority within the state postulates a relationship and an interplay 
between the state, law and society, and the question of the existence and 
desirability of boundaries between the spheres of state authority and the 
interests of society's individual members is central to this relationship. The 
fundamental role of the judicial authority within this relationship is 
adjudicative or dispute resolving. Many administrative organs of the state, 
however, also exercise an adjudicative or dispute-resolving function, for 
example administrative tribunals and regulatory agencies. 
1. The Concept of the State. 
The concept of the state is of interest not only to the jurist but also to scholars 
of political, social and economic theory; to each one of these scholars the 
10. Basson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law 
(1988) at 21. 
2See Chap!. 4. 
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state is "a comprehensive concept with many facets"3 • The layman also 
attaches a certain meaning to the state; to him it may appear to be a colossal 
entity which exercises authority that affect him in his daily life, and though 
he may sometimes feel that it exacts undue obedience from him, imposes 
duties on him and encroaches upon his private domain, he also consciously or 
unconsciously realises that he cannot live outside the framework of its 
organisation. 
Of particular interest to the constitutional lawyer is the meaning of the state 
as an institution which through its various organs stands in a specific 
relationship to legal subjects. The relationship between the state and legal 
subjects is better understood in terms of the development of the state. 
1.1. The Development of the State. 
Assertions about the origin of the state are based largely on conjecture. The 
world's oldest known 'state' is probably Jericho4 • More well-known and well 
documented 'states' are the Greek polis5 and Rome6• Although these 
political entities were in reality not states in the modern sense of the word, but 
were rather city-states consisting of large clusters of people brought together 
by social, military and economic exigencies, some relationship existed 
between the city-state and its citizens. The citizens owed allegiance to the city-
state and the city-state was in tum obliged to offer its citizens protection in 
times of war. The citizens had a say in law-making. The concept of state had 
3Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 16. See also I.M Rautenbach & E.F.J 
Malherbe Constitutional Law (1994) who point out (at 1) that "every 
meaning of the word 'state' represents a particular feature or element of the 
state". 
4See J. Mellaart The Dawn of Civilisation (1962) at 41-58. 
5See in general L.J Du Plessis Die Moderne Staat (1941) at 9-10. 
6Du Plessis op cit. at 11-13. 
-25-
not yet, however, developed at this stage. 
The origin of the state can be traced back to medieval times. The emergence 
of the state as a distinctive impersonal institution persisting in time and place, 
with a binding authority and demanding the loyalty of all subjects residing 
within its territory falls between the period 1100 and 16007 • The word 'state' 
itself dates back to the Renaissance, between the 14th and 15th century8, and 
is derived from the Latin word status9 ; it was also at this stage that the state 
began to emerge as an institution exercising jurisdiction over a specific 
territory, over an identifiable community of people, with authority exercised 
on its behalf by an organised government consisting of specific persons who 
hold defined official positions. 10 
With the culmination of its development the state emerged as a network of 
structural relationships, with a more clearly defined set of institutional 
arrangements for rule. In this development its organisation and its relationship 
with subjects became more complex; as a result it became clearly 
distinguishable from the ancient state. It increasingly became charged with tlie 
making of law as a means of governing, the maintenance and execution of 
laws, the promotion of the common good and public order and the 
administration of public affairs through its various organs. As the only 
7See J. Strayer On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 
(1973) at 12 et seq. 
8Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 16-17; L.G Baxter "The State and other 
Basic Terms in Public Law" 1982 SALJ 212 at 216-218. 
9G. Carpenter Introduction to South African Constitutional 
Law (1987) at 3; Baxter op cit. at 214 and 216. 
1
°The idea of the state as a seat of government developed after the 
appearance of Machiavelli's political works on government: Carpenter op cit. 
at 3; Baxter op cit. at 217. See also in this regard J.P VerLoren van 
Themaat Staatsreg 3rd ed. by M. Wiechers (1981) at 5. 
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institution with authority over all people within its territory, its laws affected 
all sections of society. In the end, the relationship between the state and the 
people within its territory became one of sovereign and subject11• 
1.2. The Modern State. 
The development of the state over the years into a complex network of 
institutional arrangements and structural relationships brought with it a 
diversity and multiplicity of state functions. The extent to which these 
functions affected the individual in tum became so complex that it became 
necessary and desirable to set out clearly the structure, organisation and mode 
of operation of the authority of the state, and to delineate the relationship 
between the state and its citizens12• It is this distinctive pattern which marks 
out today's state as the modern state. 
An important characteristic feature of the modern state is that its existence is 
based on a clearly defined framework of fundamental principles which 
determine its structure, its functions and its relationship with the individual13 • 
This framework is usually deliberately formulated and often owes its existence 
to an act of collective will and deliberation. In many instances the framework 
is embodied in a comprehensive constitutional enactment14• 
The idea of a constitutional framework which determines the structure and 
11Du Plessis op cit. at 71. 
12See J.D van der Vyver "The State, the Individual and Society" 1977 
SALJ 291 at 297. 
13Klaus Stern "The genesis and evolution of European-American 
constitutionalism Some comments on the fundamental aspects" 1985 
CILSA 187. 
14See G. Poggi The Development of the Modern State (1978) at 
95. 
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functions of the state and its relationship with the individual is the foundation 
of the concept of constitutionalism. According to this concept, the exercise of 
state authority should be limited by a constitutional framework which defines 
and limits the extent of state power. 
The constitutional framework may be based on a single enactment15 or a 
number of enactments16 , but no matter what form it takes, the state operates 
in accordance with, and with reference to, the principles embodied in it; these 
principles usually represent some end or function to which the state is 
instrumental. The end or function does not, however, entirely encompass all 
facets of social existence; in other instances the state co-ordinates and 
harmonises ends or functions which are of a private nature17• The state is 
able to co-ordinate and harmonise these private ends and functions through its 
adoption, execution and control of policies18 • 
The state harmonises and co-ordinates the ends and functions to which it is 
instrumental through its governing components, namely the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary. The importance of the legislature is that it enacts 
the policies which represent the ends or functions to which the state is 
instrumental into laws; the judiciary controls these policies by adjudicating 
disputes, arising from these policies, between individuals and the state and 
between individuals among themselves. 
15 As in the case of the Constitution of the United State of America, 1787. 
16As in the case of the British Constitution which consists of a 
conglomeration of customs or conventions and a number of acts, such as the 
Act of Settlement, 1701, the Representation of the People Acts, the Judicature 
Acts and the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949. 
17Private ends or functions are catered for in, for example, the family, 
religious, cultural, social and economic organisations, which the state then 
harmonise and complement: see Poggi op cit. at 96-97. 
18Poggi op cit. at 96-98. 
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In South Africa the control function of the judiciary became watered down as 
a result of the adoption of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In 
consequence of this doctrine, it was accepted that courts of law did not have 
the power to override an Act of Parliament where an individual alleged that 
the Act violated any of his rights. 
As in England, parliamentary sovereignty became the Grundnorm of the 
South African Constitutional system. Dicey, 19 referring to the British 
constitutional system, called the'sovereignty' of Parliament "the very 
'keystone' of constitutional law in this country." 
2. The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
Etymologically, the word 'sovereignty' means superiority. Sovereignty as a 
concept owes its origin to the idea that within and outside the area of its 
authority the state has no superior and is subject to no other authority. This 
means that internally the state is the ultimate political institution, with final 
and absolute authority;20 externally, it is independent and is not subject to 
the authority of other states. 21 
The term 'sovereignty' is open to more than one interpretation. As a concept 
indicating the absence of any other external authority it is a concept of 
international law which denotes the relationship between a state and other 
19 A. v Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution 10th ed (1975) at 70. See also W.I Jennings The Law and 
the Constitution (1959) at 144; o. Hood Phillips Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 6th ed. (1978) at 27. 
20See F.H Hinsley Sovereignty (1986) at 26. 
21See L. Openheim International Law - A Treatise Vol. 1, 8th 
ed.(1985) at 118; H. Booysen Volkereg en sy Verhouding tot die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1989) at 135. 
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states. 22 As a concept relating to the exercise of authority within the state it 
is a concept of constitutional law which implies the existence of some superior 
person or organ wielding authority on behalf of the state. In England the 
monarch in earlier times wielded real political power and as a result came to 
be known as the 'sovereign'. 23 When Parliament finally emerged as the only 
organ with power to make any law whatsoever and whose enactments no other 
person or body could question or override, the word 'sovereignty' came to be 
associated with the supreme legislative power of Parliament. 
According to Hood Phillips,24 
11 [t]he doctrine of sovereignty in the theory of municipal Jaw as opposed to international 
law, however, is now out of fashion ... A body may have supreme (highest) power without 
necessarily being sovereign (unlimited) ... 1125 
In his view the use of the term 'sovereignty' in relation to the legislature tends 
to prejudice a discussion of its law-making powers. For this reason he prefers 
the phrase 'the legislative supremacy of Parliament'. 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament or the legislature is a 
supreme legislative body which has the competence to legislate on any matter 
whatsoever; it also implies that since it is an omnipotent body, no other organ 
can declare Acts of Parliament to be invalid.26 There is, however, also 
another aspect of the legislative supremacy of Parliament, namely that, as the 
only organ of the state which is charged with making of laws, there is no 
22Idem. 
23W. Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England 4th ed. 
(1876) at 164. 
240p cit. at 42. 
25ldem. 
26Dicey op cit. at 70. 
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other organ which is superior to Parliament in the making laws for the 
governance of the state .27 
2.1. The Origin of the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
The origin of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is associated with the 
development of the concept of sovereignty. Authority, a fact on which the 
doctrine of sovereignty is based, is as old as society itself. 28 Questions about 
who wields final authority within the state could, however, only begun to arise 
after the emergence of the state. 
Rationalisations about authority within the state were not rife in Greece, the 
most well-known ancient 'state'. It was generally accepted that individual 
interests did not take precedence over those of the 'state'. 29 Aristotle, the 
prominent Greek political philosopher, did not concern himself with the 
question of who wielded final and absolute authority within the 'state'; he was 
more concerned with the classification of governments according to the 
numbers of those who exercised state authority. 30 Greek political theory did 
not make any distinction between society and state,31 so that questions about 
who actually wielded authority on behalf of the 'state' could hardly have 
arisen. The Greek word polis, which is today rendered as 'state', represented 
city, state and society combined. In Greek political theory the political 
community was the highest form of human association which embraced all 
institutions and pursued the common good. 
27See Carpenter op cit. at 330; Boulle, Harris & Hoexter op cit. at 126. 
28Hinsley op cit. at 1. 
29See Carpenter op cit. at 134. 
30Hinsley op cit. at 27-28. 
31See G.H Sabine A History of Political Theory 3rd ed. (1961) at 
100-101. 
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The idea that there must be some supreme power within the political 
community, had its early origin in the Hellenistic monarchies32, where 
territorialism and imperialism Jed to an association between the community 
and a leader or ru\er33 . The latter came to be seen as a personification of 
law, with the result that he ultimately also came to be regarded as being 
supreme and above the Jaw. However, there was at this stage as yet no clear 
distinction between the community and the state; the idea of sovereignty had 
not yet emerged34• 
The concept of sovereignty began to emerge in the period of the Roman 
Empire. The Romans regarded the authority of the state as having been vested 
in the populus Romanus35; the imperium or authority was at first exercised 
by the comitia and later, during the imperial period, by the princeps36 . In 
theory, final and absolute authority resided in the Roman people, who in turn 
delegated it to the emperors37 • The theory about the origin and seat of 
authority later changed under the influence of Christianity; sovereignty came 
to be regarded as deriving not from the people but from God. The idea that 
sovereignty was based on Jaw only came Jater38• 
After the fall of the Roman Empire, Byzantium alone retained the notion that 
32These monarchies consisted of the Kingdom of Ptolemy in Egypt, the 
Kingdom of the Seulucids in Syria and Mesopotamia and a conglomeration of 
Macedom and mainland Greece : see Hinsley op cit. at 32. 
33Hinsley op cit. at 32-36. 
34ldem. 
35Hinsley op cit. at 37; VerLoren van Themaat - Wiechers op cit. at 
14; Carpenter op cit. at 134. 
36Carpenter op cit. at 134. 
37ldem. 
38ldem. 
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the emperor wielded authority on behalf of the people. 39 In contrast, the 
Germanic view in the West was that authority was based solely on law, which 
was regarded as immutable and supreme.40 The application of the law by the 
state was, however, limited; the individual was allowed to take the law into 
his own hands, except in times of peace, either the peace of the assembly 
(ding, fylkisthing, folk-moot) when all the men came together to discuss the 
law or to take important decisions, or the peace of the family or household, 
or when war had been declared. 41 Actual state authority was as yet unknown 
and only developed later. 
2.2. The Emergence and Development of the Modern Doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
The struggle between the Pope and the emperors during the early Middle Ages 
did not provide sufficient fertile ground for the emergence of a distinctive 
doctrine of sovereignty. Although there was general consensus that state 
authority is derived from God, there was no unanimity regarding the bearer 
of the authority within the state. 42 While the Pope claimed absolute authority 
in ecclesiastical matters, the emperors claimed absolute authority in all earthly 
matters, including the church and the clergy. 
The struggle between the Pope and the emperors culminated in a victory for 
39Hinsley op cit. at 45-46. 
40VerLoren van Themaat - Wiechers op cit. at 14; Carpenter op cit. at 
134. In its modern day form the idea that the authority of the state is based 
on law is found in the doctrine of the rule of Jaw and the Rechtsstaat idea : 
see Chapt. 9 infra. 
41VerLoren van Themaat - Wiechers op cit. at 14-15. The prohibition of 
self-help during wartime was probably aimed at concentrating all efforts on 
the war at hand, which would ensure victory and therefore peace for the tribe. 
42Carpenter op cit. at 135. 
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the emperors. The emperors had based their claim of absolute authority on 
Roman law, maintaining that they were the sole universal authority; they 
claimed that the Empire alone, which they represented, was a true respublica, 
with a true public law. 43 The emperors' claims were taken up by imperial 
propagandists and bolstered by the views of anti-papal thinkers. According to 
Bartolus, an imperial propagandist, the emperor was vested with supreme 
authority and was subject only to natural law;44 on the other hand, anti-papal 
thinkers, among them Dante, Marsilius of Padua, William of Occam and 
Nicholas of Cusa, propagated the view that the church was simply a body of 
the faithful and that the Pope, as its head, was merely an administrator of 
sacraments, with no power over temporal matters. 45 The anti-papal thinkers 
argued that the basis of all political power was natural law as embodied in 
divine reason.46 
With the rise of independent nation states during the middle of the 13th 
century, national writers began to propagate the view that the monarch was 
the supreme authority within the state and that he was vested with the power 
to interpret existing law and to make new law .47 This view was associated 
with the idea that the monarch was a representative of the community and 
governed with the consent of the community; the community was bound to 
43Hinsley op cit. at 79. 
44Hinsley op cit. at 81-82; VerLoren van Themaat -Wiechers op cit. at 
16; Carpenter op cit. at 135. 
45Hinsley op cit. at 83. 
46Hinsley op cit. at 84. Anti-papal thinkers could not, however, develop 
a doctrine of sovereignty mainly because of their inconsistencies regarding the 
nature of the empire; they assumed that Christendom was a body politic in 
respect of which the Empire retained supremacy : Hinsley op cit.at 84-86. 
47Hinsley op cit. at 87-88. In England Bracton wrote in his De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1260-1260) that the King was 
subordinate to no man but subject only to God and the Jaw. 
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obey him as long as he observed the law .48 
The concept of sovereignty acquired a new meaning when it came to be 
associated with the state itself during the 17th century. Although the monarch 
was in earlier times regarded as the sovereign, he was not necessarily 
sovereign in the legislative sense; he was merely an organ of the state, so that 
sovereignty resided in the state itself. 49 The idea that the state is the ultimate 
bearer of sovereignty has its origin in the notion that the people who reside 
within the state and to whom it owes its existence are the real sovereign. 50 
According to Rousseau, the state came into being as a result of a compact 
between individual members of society and the state, whereby members of 
society relinquished a part of their natural freedom and transferred their 
sovereignty to the state in return for greater security and a better life. 51 
The modern understanding of the concept of sovereignty is generally attributed 
to the French political philosopher, Jean Bodin. With the appearance of 
Bodin's work, Six Livres de la Republique, in 1577, the concept of 
sovereignty acquired a new meaning. According to Bodin, it was the presence 
of a sovereign within a state that distinguished it from other social 
institutions. 52 He defined sovereignty as the power to exercise the highest 
authority in the state, unrestrained by any other authority, or by human law 
48Hinsley op cit. at 102-103. 
49Lord Dennis Lloyd The Idea of Law (1987) at 172. 
50This view later found universal favour and was adopted by the founding 
fathers of the United States as the core of the American Constitution. During 
the early development of South Africa the Boer Republics also ascribed 
sovereignty to 'the people'. 
51Even before Rousseau, political thinkers like Hobbes and Locke had 
attempted to trace the origin of the political community to some form of an 
agreement between individual members of the community and a ruler : See 
Sabine op cit. at 417-419 and 467-473. 
52VerLoren van Themaat - Wiechers op cit. at 23. 
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or by time; the sovereign was subject only to the ius divinum and the ius 
naturale. 53 Sovereignty therefore became an absolute concept which implied 
freedom from the laws; it no longer referred to 'superanus' or 'superior' but 
to 'supreme' .54 In Bodin's view the sovereign was a single person or a group 
of persons;55 sovereignty therefore, according to him, did not vest in a state 
but in a specific person or group of persons. 56 
There has been no unanimity among modern political thinkers about the exact 
nature and extent of Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty. According to 
Dooyeweerd57, Bodin's doctrine advocates a concept of absolute sovereignty; 
according to him it signifies, a sovereign endowed with sole and absolute 
power to make any law, restrained only by divine law and natural law. On the 
other hand, Mcllwain's view58 is that Bodin made a fundamental distinction 
between the ordinary laws, which did not bind the sovereign and were 
alterable by him, and the fundamental principles which constituted the 
government and upon which the sovereign's authority rested, so that the 
sovereign in Bodin' s doctrine could not exceed the limits set out in these 
fundamental principles without destroying the very foundation of his authority. 
It would seem, however, that Bodin's doctrine was no more than an earnest 
attempt to harness the hitherto legally unfettered authority of the sovereign 
within permissible limits in accordance with what he and his contemporaries 
53lbid. 
54Carpenter op cit. at 136. 
55ldem. 
56ldem. 
57H. Dooyeweerd De Crisis in die Humanistische Staatsleer 
(1931) at 28, 149 and 169; H. Dooyeweerd Die Strijd om bet 
Soewereniteitsbegrip (1950) at 5, quoted by Carpenter op cit. at 136. 
58C.H Mcilwain Constitutionalism in a Changing World (1939) 
at 73, quoted by Carpenter op cit. at 136. 
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considered to be right and proper. 59 
The significance of Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty is that it facilitated a clear 
distinction between the state and all other institutions of human existence; it 
helped to secularise and to concentrate state authority in a juridical sense and 
thus gave impetus to the emergence of the modern state. In a wider sense, it 
gave rise to the idea of the unity and indivisibility of the sovereign and, in the 
final analysis, the unity of the state. More importantly, however, it gave rise 
to the idea that the positive law was the express or implied will of the 
sovereign and that all legislative power ultimately depended on the will of the 
sovereign. 60 
Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty was well received both on the continent of 
Europe and in England but did not develop along similar lines in the two 
continents. The reception of the doctrine on the continent of Europe Jed to a 
period of absolutism. 61 In England, however, its reception culminated in the 
sovereignty of Parliament. 
2.3. The Development of Parliamentary Sovereignty in England. 
In England the idea that the King was sovereign had already taken root by the 
13th century. According to Bracton, the King had no equal or superior in 
temporal matters; he was subject only to God and the Iaw.62 The King 
continued to wield exclusive supreme power until the emergence of Parliament 
as a representative of the people and contender to the exercise of state 
59H. Quaritsch Staat und Souverinitat (1970) at 393, quoted by 
Carpenter op cit. at 136. 
60Carpenter op cit. at 137. 
61See Hinsley op cit. at 87-88 and 92. 
62F. w Maitland Constitutional History of England (1941) at 100. 
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authority. 63 
In its rudimentary form, 'Parliament' was not fully representative; it was 
rather a Council (the Great Council or Magnum Concilium) which 
represented the interests of the feudal and clerical nobility. Four 
representatives from each county were later added to the Great Council by 
King John in 1213.64 
In reaction to the tyranny of John, the Great Council forced him to sign the 
famous Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1215. Magna Carta was later 
interpreted by Sir Edward Coke and others as a means of putting the King 
under the law, of limiting the exercise of his authority by the collective will 
of the people and of ensuring parliamentary control of the King's power, 
particularly through Parliament's consent in regard to taxation. 
The first true Parliament developed out of the reconstituted Great Council 
during the 13th century. 65 It consisted of the three estates of the realm, 
namely the clerical nobility, the secular aristocracy and the communities or 
commons. Although Parliament could control the King through its consent for 
the levying of taxes, it still did not have full legislative powers at that stage. 
The recession of the feudal order during the 14th century brought with it the 
emergence of Parliament as a strong contender to the exercise of authority. 
Parliament began to assert its authority over the King, and the King's powers 
were in turn steadily curtailed. By the end of the 15th century Parliament had 
already gained an upper hand in legislative matters, especially in relation to 
63See A.F Pollard The Evolution of Parliament 2nd ed. (1926), 
Chapt. 2. 
64See F.W Maitland Selected Essays (1936) at 68. 
65See J. Bryce Studies in History and Jurisprudence (1901) at 
763. 
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taxation. 66 
The idea that Parliament was supreme had already begun to emerge during the 
16th century. Sir Thomas Smith wrote in his De Republica Anglorum, 
written in 1565 and published in 1583, that the Parliament of England, which 
represented the whole nation, possessed power over the whole realm, both the 
head and the body of the realm.67 However, although some writers on 
English constitutional law have taken the view that Sir Thomas Smith's 
writings on the power of Parliament constituted a theory of parliamentary 
supremacy, 68 it would seem that he was not referring to Parliament as a 
legislative body but to 'Parliament' as it was then, namely a court against 
whose decisions no further appeal Jay. 69 
The supremacy of Parliament in England became firmly established after the 
struggle between Parliament and the Stuart Kings. This struggle was triggered 
off by the Stuart monarchs' claim to rule by divine birthright; they rode 
roughshod over the rights and will of Parliament. The struggle was brought 
to an end by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a bloodless revolution which 
brought about a new constitutional order. 
The new order was given greater legitimacy by the adoption of a Declaration 
66See J.E.A Joliffe The Constitutional History of Medieval 
England 4th ed. (1961) at 490. 
67De Republica Anglorum, Book 2 (edited by Alston, 1906) at 48-
49. See also F.W Maitland op cit. note 62 at 225. 
68See F.W Maitland Constitutional History (1911) at 255 and 298; 
F. Pollock The Science of Politics (1911) at 57 et seq. 
69See 0. Hood Phillips op cit. at 43; Sabine op cit. at 449-450. The 
English Parliament of the Middle Ages was not a purely legislative body; it 
was in reality a High Court of Parliament : C.H Mcilwain The High 
Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy 2nd ed. (1934) at 109. 
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of Rights which was statutorily embodied in the Bill of Rights of 1689.70 The 
Bill of Rights provided, inter alia, that it was illegal for the royal authority 
to suspend laws or the execution of laws without the consent of Parliament; 
that it was illegal for the royal authority to levy money without the grant of 
Parliament; that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in 
Parliament ought not to be questioned in any court or out of Parliament and 
that it was obligatory for sessions of Parliament to be held frequently to 
ensure that grievances were redressed and laws amended, strengthened and 
preserved. The effect of the Bill of Rights was that Parliament became the 
dominant partner in the exercise of state authority. 
2.3.1. The Concept of Parliamentary or Legislative Supremacy.11 
Early opinions about the supremacy of Parliament did not always subscribe to 
the view that Parliament was the bearer of absolute sovereignty. Jn his famous 
judgment in Bonham's case72 Coke expressed the view that Acts of 
Parliament could be controlled by the common law: 
"[I]n many cases, the common law will control acts of Parliament, and sometimes 
adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an act of Parliament is against common right and reason 
or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge such act 
to be void 11 • 73 
71
'This Bill of Rights was not a bill of fundamental rights in the modern 
sense of the term; it was not procedurally entrenched and was mainly intended 
to curtail the King's powers and to secure the position of Parliament as an 
important component of government. 
71See Chap!. 4 for a detailed discussion of the nature of legislative 
supremacy. 
72Bonham v Atkins (1610) Coke's Reports 113b at 118a ( 77 E.R 
646 at 652). 
73Coke's Reports at 118a; 77 E.R at 652. For a commentary on 
Coke's dictum see J.W Gough Fundamental Law in English 
Constitutional History (1955) at 31-35. 
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Coke's opinion in Bonham's case was, however, obiter and did not 
represent the view prevailing at the time. 74 Although Bonham's case was 
referred to and approved in the later case of Rowles v Mason, 75 the view 
that the common law was supreme over Acts of Parliament did not take hold 
in English constitutional law. Further propagation of the view, per Chief 
Justice Hobart in Day v Savadge76 , that " ... even an Act of Parliament 
made against natural equity, as to make a judge in his own case, is void, for 
jura naturalia sunt immutabilia and they are leges legum, "77 and a further 
reference to Bonham's case in City of London v Wood,78 some 
twelve years after the Glorious Revolution, did not do much to dampen the 
prevailing view that Parliament was vested with supreme legislative authority. 
The supreme legislative authority of Parliament was judicially affirmed in 
Lee v Bude and Torrington Railway. 79 
The formulation and popularisation of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty was, however, largely the work of English constitutional law 
scholars. 80 The work of Dicey81 is perhaps the most outstanding on the 
74See L.B Boudin Government by the Judiciary (1932), Vol. I at 
485-517. Coke himself later acknowledged in his Institutes that Parliament 
was vested with supreme legislative authority and that its legislation was 
inviolable : 4 Institutes 36. 
75(1612) 2 Brown). 192 at 198; 123 E.R 892 at 895. 
761615 Hob. 85. 
77Chief Justice Hobart stated this view without directly referring to 
Bonham's case. 
78(1701) 12 Mod. 669 at 687; 88 E.R 1592 at 1602. 
79(1871) L.R 6 C.P 576 at 582. 
80See R.F.V Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law 2nd ed. (1964) 
at 1-4. 
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nature of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Dicey explained parliamentary sovereignty in the following terms: 
11 The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, 
namely that Parliament has under the English constitution the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and. further. that no person or body is recognised by the Law of England as having the 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 1182 
In accordance with this view the legislative supremacy of Parliament means 
that Parliament has absolute legislative power and that its legislative 
competence is not subject to any legal limitations. Parliament can legislate on 
any subject and the courts are incompetent to question the validity of Acts of 
Parliament and to declare them invalid.83 
The view propounded by Dicey is absolutist. He subscribed to the view that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors. 84 This view is based on the reasoning 
that a successor Parliament would no longer be supreme if limitations on its 
legislative competence were imposed by a predecessor Parliament. 85 It is still 
held by some English constitutional law authorities. 86 
There are, however, other English constitutional law authorities who do not 
81A.V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution 10th ed. (1975). 
82Dicey op cit. at 39-40. 
83E.C.S Wade, G. Phillips & A.W Bradley Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (1977) at 59. 
84Dicey op cit. at 67-68. 
85Wade, Phillips & Bradley op cit. at 59. 
86See H.W.R Wade "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty" 1955 CU 172; P. 
Mirfield "Can the House of Lords Lawfully be Abolished?" 1979 LQR 36. 
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subscribe to the absolutist view of parliamentary supremacy. According to 
Gray, 87 successor Parliaments are bound by the rules regarding their 
composition and legislative procedure imposed by a predecessor Parliament. 
Jennings88 is also of the view that Parliament is bound to legislate in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the law; it is supreme only in so 
far as it legislates in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the law. 
The more recent debate about the nature of the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament is centred around the 'continuing' and 'self-embracing' views. 89 
According to these views, if the supremacy of Parliament is 'continuing' then 
Parliament cannot bind its successors, either as regards the scope of future 
legislation or as regards its composition or manner of legislating. If, on the 
other hand, the supremacy of Parliament is 'self-embracing', then Parliament 
may limit its legislative competence or that of future Parliaments as regards 
its composition or manner of legislating, although not as regards the scope of 
legislation. The latter view implies that the judiciary may review Acts of 
Parliament as regards their form or the manner in which they were enacted.90 
3. The Judiciary. 
In its ordinary sense the term judiciary has a narrow scope and refers to the 
higher courts, such as the Supreme Court of a country. The judiciary, in this 
87W. Gray "The Sovereignty of Parliament Today" 1953 CW 54. 
881. Jennings The Law and the Constitution (1959) at 163. 
89See Chapt. 4, infra, for a detailed discussion of these views. On the 
terms 'continuing' and 'self-embracing' see H.L.A Hart The Concept of 
Law (1961) at 146. 
90See G. Winterton "The British Grundnorm : Parliamentary Supremacy 
Re-examined" 1976 LQR 591 at 608. 
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sense, is an institution of government which consists of appointed judges91 • 
According to Shetreet92 the judiciary is 
11 
an organ of government not forming part of the legislative organs of government, which 
is not subject to personal, substantive and collective controls and which performs the primary 
function of adjudicating legal disputes between the state and legal subjects and between individuals 
among themselves 11 • 
The function of adjudication may be by way of a direct resolution of disputes, 
by way of review of other adjudicative decisions or by means of hearing an 
appeal from other adjudicative judicial organs. This definition excludes 
magistrates, military tribunals and officers who preside in administrative 
tribunals from the scope of the term 'judiciary'. The judiciary may be 
specifically defined in a Constitution93 • The Constitution may also outline the 
extent and scope of judicial power94 . 
The judgments of Greenberg J.A and Schreiner J.A in Minister of 
Interior v Harris95 provide some indication of some of the attributes of 
91L. Boulle, B. Harris & c. Hoexter Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (1989) at 18. 
92S. Shetreet "Judicial Independence : New Conceptual Dimensions and 
Contemporary Challenges" in S. Shetreet & J. Deschenes(eds) Judicial 
Independence : The Contemporary Debate (1985) 590 at 597-598. 
93For example, section 68(1) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act, 110 of 1983; article III, section 1 of the Constitution of the United 
States. Section 96(1) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 200 of 
1993 defines the judiciary as "the courts established by this Constitution and 
any other law"; however, the emphasis seems to fall on the Constitutional 
Court and provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court, all of which 
are staffed by appointed judges. 
94For example, article III, section 2 of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
951952(4) SA 769 (A). 
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a court of law. According to Schreiner J.A, a court is 
"manned by full-time judges trained in law, who are outside party politics and who have 
no personal interest in the cases that come before them~ whose tenure of office and emoluments 
are protected by law and whose independence is a major source of the security of the state. [Its 
jurisdiction] is general as to subject matter; [it is] available to an disputants who claim they have 
legal rights to maintain and before [it] all interested parties are entitled to present their evidence 
and their arguments 11 • 96 
In his judgment Greenberg J.A emphasised the impartiality of members of the 
judiciary and the principle that no one should be a judge in his own cause as 
important attributes of a judiciary97• 
The judiciary does not, however, operate as an isolated branch of government. 
Its existence and operation are largely dependent on other branches of 
government. The legislature makes laws which the judiciary has to execute; 
the remuneration of members of the judiciary, their conditions of service and 
other related matters are dealt with by the legislature. More importantly, the 
judiciary relies on the executive branch for the enforcement of its judgments. 
4. Judicial Review of Legislation. 
Judicial review of legislation refers to the power of the judiciary to inquire 
into and pronounce upon the validity of legislation, whether procedural or 
substantive validity or both. 98 Judicial review of legislation constitutes one 
of the effective ways of checking the exercise of authority by the legislature. 
96At 789A-C. 
97At 786B-C. See also Centlivres C.J's analysis of the 'High Court of 
Parliament' and the glaring differences between this 'court' and a court of law 
: at 783E-784C. 
98There are other forms of judicial review, namely review by a court of 
law of administrative action and review by a superior court of the proceedings 
of inferior courts. 
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Judicial review of legislation does not exist in a system where the absolutist 
point of view or the 'continuing' view of parliamentary supremacy is 
followed. The courts in England have, for example, time and again held that 
they are incompetent to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of Acts 
of Parliament. 99 
On the other hand, the relative or 'self-embracing' view of parliamentary 
supremacy permits limited judicial review of Acts of Parliament. According 
to this view the courts are competent to inquire into the question whether 
Parliament has, in enacting legislation, followed the procedure prescribed for 
legislating and to invalidate an instrument which has been enacted contrary to 
the prescribed procedure; they are not competent, however, to inquire into and 
pronounce upon the substantive validity of Acts of Parliament. 100 
Judicial review of legislation is closely related to the nature of the 
Constitution. A supreme Constitution which requires all legislative acts to 
accord with its provisions opens the door to judicial review of the substantive 
validity of legislation. This form of judicial review constitutes the backbone 
of the American constitutional system. 101 
Judicial review within the American context means that the courts have the 
power to "pass Qudgment) upon the constitutionality of legislative acts which 
fall within their normal jurisdiction to enforce ... to refuse to enforce such as 
99See inter alia Lee v Bude & Torrington Railway (1871) 
(supra) at 582; Mortensen v Peters (1906) 8 S.C 93 at 100-101; R v 
Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B 171. 
100Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 101. 
101The 1993 Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) introduces the concept of 
judicial review, both substantive and procedural, into the South African 
constitutional system : sections 98(2)) and 101(3), read with sections 4 and 
7(4)(a). 
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they find to be unconstitutional and hence void. "102 Although the 
Constitution of the United States did not expressly establish the power of 
judicial review, this power was deduced from the nature of the Constitution 
in Marbury v Madison103 . In this case, the fact that the Constitution 
was a supreme and fundamental law which was superior to all other laws was 
held to imply that in interpreting and applying laws, judges were bound to 
refuse to enforce laws which were in conflict with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 104 The power of judicial review in the American context vests 
the judiciary with supremacy in regard to the constitutionality of all acts of 
congress, Constitutions and statutes of the states, all acts of the government 
and of the administration and even of the judiciary itself. 105 
A Constitution need not, however, be supreme to permit judicial review of 
legislation. The presence of constitutional entrenchments which make 
provision for a special, as opposed to the ordinary, procedure or mechanism 
of amending or repealing the Constitution, may render legislative instruments 
reviewable, even though the Constitution is not supreme. This form of judicial 
review is purely procedural; it does not permit judicial review into the 
substantive validity of legislation. 
Pursuant to the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act, 1909 the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, in Harris v 
102E.S Corwin "Judicial Review" Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 
(1932) at 457. 
1031 Cranch 137 (1803). 
104E.S Corwin "Marbury v Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial 
Review" 1914 Michigan LR at 538. See also United States v Butler 
297 U.S 1 (1936). 
105A.R Brewer-Carias Judicial Review in Comparative Law 
(1989) at 138. 
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Minister of the lnterior,106 Minister of the Interior v 
Harris107 and Collins v Minister of the Interior'°", inquired 
whether Parliament had followed the special prescribed procedure or 
mechanism when passing certain legislation. 109 This form of judicial review 
is not necessarily inconsistent with the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament. 110 Its importance lies in the task of the judiciary to ensure that 
Parliament legislates in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the 
Constitution. 
The entrenchment of a special procedure or mechanism for legislating does 
not, however, on its own constitute an effective way of limiting the exercise 
of legislative authority, in particular with regard to the rights and freedoms of 
individuals. Such rights and freedoms are effectively protected through their 
entrenchment in a Constitution which operates as the supreme law of the 
land. 111 
The entrenchment of individual rights and freedoms in a Constitution affords 
individuals effective judicial protection against government excesses. As 
guardians of the Constitution, the courts would be able to inquire whether a 
legislative or executive act is in conflict with constitutional provisions which 
guarantee individual rights and freedoms and to invalidate any Act of 
Parliament which is found to be in conflict with the constitutional provisions. 
This form of judicial review enables the judiciary to fulfil the fundamental 
1061952 (2) S.A 428 (A). 
1071954 (4) S.A 769 (A). 
1081957 (1) S.A 552 (A). 
109See Chapt. 4 for a full discussion of these cases. 
110See Chapt. 4 infra. 
msee Chapt. 9 and Chapt. 10 infra. 
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role of ensuring that the legislative and executive authorities stay within their 
constitutional limits in relation to the rights and freedoms of individuals. 112 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 
In this chapter the constitutional development of South Africa is analysed. The 
purpose of this analysis is to trace the development of the doctrine of 
legislative supremacy in South Africa and the role of the judiciary in the light 
of this development. An interesting phenomenon in this development is the 
active role of the judiciary during the period of the Boer Republics, especially 
in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
The constitutional development of South Africa may be divided into four main 
periods, namely the period before 1910, the period between 1910 and 1961, 
the period between 1961 and 1983 and the period between 1983 and 1993. All 
these periods are marked by a particular trend concerning the role of the 
judiciary and the influence which a tradition of legislative supremacy has had 
on the role of the judiciary. 
Before the occupation of the Cape by the Dutch-East India Company in 1652, 
parts of what bas become South Africa were inhabited by indigenous Black 
people. The occupation of the Cape by the Dutch-East India Company was not 
for the establishment of a government but mainly for commercial purposes. 1 
Jan van Riebeeck, who effected the occupation, was not a representative of the 
1The occupation was for the establishment of a refreshment station for the 
Company's ships en route between Holland and the East Indies : See C.F.J 
Muller Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa ( 19 71) 
at 21; D. Marais Constitutional Development of South Africa 
(1987) at 4. 
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Dutch government but of the Company.2 Until the Batavian period,3 the 
government or rule that obtained in the Cape was confined mainly to servants 
of the Company .4 
Between 1652 and 1795 the Cape was governed by a Governor, who was the 
chief representative of the Dutch-East India Company. Legislative, executive 
and judicial authority vested in a single body, the Political Council. 5 The 
Political Council performed its judicial functions as the Council of Justice. A 
High Court, which replaced the Council of Justice, was established in 1785 .6 
Constitutional development began in earnest with the second occupation of 
South Africa by the British in 1806, after which, and until 1910, the Cape of 
Good Hope became, without interruption, a British Colony. 7 During this 
period the British system of government gradually found its way into South 
Africa and eventually became the cornerstone of the South African 
constitutional system.8 
1. Constitutional Development before 1910. 
2Marais loc cit. 
3The Batavian Government (1803-1806) was a popular government which 
replaced the monarchy in Holland after the French conquest. During this 
period the Cape ceased to be a trading post; it was regarded as a Colony, 
governed by officials with public responsibility regarding legislative and 
executive matters: Marais op cit. at 11. 
4See in general Marais op cit. at 4-5. 
5Marais op cit. at 7. 
6Marais ibid. at 6-7. 
7Marais op cit. at 12. 
•Idem. 
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Real constitutional development in the Cape of Good Hope began in 1825 with 
the establishment of a nominated Advisory Council, consisting of the Chief 
Justice and some leading officials. Legislation was by way of ordinances of 
the Governor-in-Council. However, the Council enjoyed very limited control 
over the Governor and was far from being a representative body. 9 
In 1834 the new Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, introduced a new 
Constitution. In terms of the new Constitution, government was by an 
Executive Council, consisting of the four most senior officials and the 
Governor; the Governor presided at meetings of the Council. The same 
officials , together with the Attorney-General and from five to seven nominees 
of the Governor, also constituted the Legislative Council. 10 The legislative 
powers of the Council were, however, very limited; these powers were 
restricted to a limited number of topics. 11 
From 1836 onwards the Voortrekkers gradually began to leave the Cape and 
settled in Natal, the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers, and in the 
Transvaal. 12 At an assembly held in 1836 at Thaba'nchu, the Voortrekkers 
elected seven 'judges' to act as a court of landdrost and heemraden; they 
also established a legislature which was to be bound by the rules made at a 
general meeting of the people. 13 
9See H.R Hahlo & E. Kahn The Union of South Africa: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution (1960) at 51; G. 
Carpenter Introduction to South African Constitutional Law 
(1987) at 59. 
10Idem. 
"Idem. 
12Marais op cit. at 21. 
13Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 59; Carpenter op cit. at 61. 
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In 1838 the Voortrekkers established the Republic of Natalia. Although there 
was a House of Assembly (the Volksraad), supreme authority was exercised 
by the people at mass meetings. 14 Elected representatives and government 
officials were directly responsible to the peopleY Natal was annexed by the 
British in 1843 and remained a British colony until Union. 16 
A new Constitution, founded on letters patent of 1850, came into force in the 
Cape Colony in 1853.17 The new Constitution was based on the British 
model; it made provision for a Parliament consisting of the Governor, an 
upper House (the Legislative Council) and a lower House (the House of 
Assembly). The upper House consisted of the Chief Justice, who acted as its 
president, and fifteen members elected in single electoral divisions; the lower 
House consisted of forty-six elected representatives. As the Constitution was 
based on the British model, parliamentary legislation enjoyed a higher status; 
courts of law were incompetent to override or set aside parliamentary 
legislation. 
The area between the Orange and Vaal rivers, the Orange River Colony, was 
annexed by the British in 1849. It gained its independence from British rule 
in 1854, in terms of the Bloemfontein Convention. Its Constitution provided 
for a unitary state with a popularly elected unicameral legislature composed 
only of white adult males. The President was elected by popular vote; he was 
the head of the executive but not a member of the legislature; although he 
14Marais op cit. at 21. 
15See E.W.F Gey van Pittius Staatsopvatting van die 
Voortrekkers en die Boere (1958) at 12. 
16Natal was initially (from 1843 to 1856) governed as an extension of the 
Cape. It was then later, from 1856 to 1893, governed as a Crown Colony: see 
Marais op cit. at 21. 
17The Constitution was in the form of Ordinance No. 2 of 1852, as 
amended and confirmed by Order-in-Council of 11 March 1853. The 
Constitution took effect as from 1 July 1853. 
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could initiate legislation, he had no power to veto its enactment. 18 
The South African Republic (Transvaal), which was established in 1853, did 
not have a clearly identifiable Constitution. Some form of a 'constitutional' 
document was produced in 1860. There was no certainty as to whether this 
'Constitution' enjoyed the status of fundamental law, with supremacy over 
enactments of the legislature; neither was any express provision made for its 
amendment. Indications were that supremacy was vested in the people and not 
in the legislature. 19 The 'Constitution' made provision for inequality 
between whites and non-whites; only adult white males were eligible to elect 
the unicameral legislature. The State President was elected by popular vote. 
No provision was made for the constitutional guarantee of civil rights.20 
There had already been some indications of a unification of the colonies at the 
turn of the century. Some movement towards a federation of the Orange River 
Colony and the Transvaal had occurred. 21 It was not until 1910, however, 
that the four colonies were unified, after the National Convention of 1908 and 
the adoption of the South Africa Act, 1909. 22 
1.1. The Legislative Authority before Union. 
The legislative authority in the Cape colony had been based on the British 
model since 1853 . 23 Parliament consisted of a Governor and two houses, the 
"Carpenter op cit. at 64. 
19Carpenter op cit. at 67. 
2
°Carpenter op cit. at 68. 
21Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 115-118. 
229 Edw. 7 C.9. 
23The system was parliamentary in nature. 
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Legislative Council and the House of Assembly. Since the Cape was a British 
colony its Parliament was, however, not sovereign in the international sense. 
However, save for the fact that the Cape Parliament was subordinate to the 
British Parliament it could legislate with a free hand; no court of law was 
competent to inquire into or to question the validity of acts of the legislature. 
A similar position also obtained in Natal. 
The position in the Orange Free State and the South African Republic 
(Transvaal) was quite different. The constitutional systems of these two 
colonies were a marked departure from the British constitutional model. While 
the Orange Free State Constitution was rigid and consistently adhered to, the 
Transvaal Constitution was less rigid and constantly flouted. 
The Orange Free State Constitution, having been adopted by a Volksraad 
(people's assembly) specially elected for that purpose, was accepted as a 
supreme law. 24 Although the Volksraad was not supreme it possessed "the 
highest legislative authority". 25 Its function was "to make the law, to regulate 
the government and the finances of the country" .u, 
The Volksraad's legislative power was limited in two respects. In the first 
place, amendments to the Constitution had to be adopted by a three-quarters 
majority at three successive annual sittings (later amended to two sittings in 
1866). 27 Secondly, there was a guarantee of certain rights, which could not 
be abrogated by means of ordinary legislation as long the law was not 
contravened in their exercise. The rights which were guaranteed were the right 
24L.M Thompson "Constitutionalism in the South African Republics" 1954 
Butterwortbs SA Law Rev. 49 at 51. 
25 Article 3 : "Het hoogste wetgewend gezag berust bij den Volksraad" 
see Thompson 1954 Butterwortbs SA Law Rev. at 52. 
u,Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 76; Carpenter op cit. at 65. 
27Carpenter op cit at 65. 
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to peaceful assembly and petition, the right to equality before the law, the 
right to property and freedom of the press. 28 Although freedom of worship 
was not precluded, it was restricted in that those who stood for public office 
had to belong to the 'Nederlandsche Hervormde Kerk' .29 
Although the legislature was subject to constitutional limitations, no effective 
machinery existed for the enforcement of these limitations. There was no 
provision for a trained independent judiciary. Cases were tried by the courts 
of landdrosts and heemraden; no specific qualifications were required for 
appointment as judicial officers in these courts. The landdrosts were 
appointed by the President, subject to the approval of the Volksraad; they 
could be suspended from office by the President and tried and sentenced for 
a number of crimes by the Volksraad.30 The President and the Volksraad 
could therefore in theory override the constitutional limitations without fear 
of any effective control by the courts; this, however, rarely happened in 
practice. Although the independence of the courts was not entrenched in the 
Constitution, it was recognised and respected. 
The Constitution of the Transvaal was strikingly different from that of the 
Orange Free State, both in the manner of its establishment and its form. 31 
Unlike the Orange Free State Constitution, the Transvaal Constitution was not 
in the form of an ordinary or superior law created by a recognised supreme 
law-making body. According to Thompson, the Transvaal Constitution 
"had rather the nature of a oontract between hosti1e factions, prescribing the conditions 
of their amalgamation into a single political society; and it derived its authority from its approval 
Wfhompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 53. 
29Carpenter op cit. at 65. 
30Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 53. 
31See Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 58-59; Hahlo 
& Kahn op cit. at 84-90. 
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by bodies specially convened for that purpose - the Krygsraad, the Committee Raad and the 
Volksraad 11 • 32 
Originally, legislative authority vested in the Volksraad, which consisted of 
'representatives of the people'. 33 The Volksraad was the 'highest authority 
in the country.'34 Its power was, however, restricted in a number of respects. 
In the first place, legislation had to be enacted in a prescribed manner. Draft 
laws had to be published in the Government Gazette three months before 
their introduction to the Volksraad; this was intended to give people an 
opportunity to air their views on the proposed legislation. Proposals for the 
adoption of legislation were made by the President; a three-quarters majority 
of recorded votes was required for all decisions of the Volksraad. Laws could 
only come into force a month after publication. 35 Secondly, members of the 
Volksraad were obliged to take an oath to adhere to the Constitution. Thirdly, 
there were indications that supremacy in reality vested in the people and not 
in the Volksraad. 
It can be argued, from the nature of the Volksraad, that although this body 
was the highest legislative authority it was not supreme. It owed its legislative 
authority to an implied delegation from the people.36 In essence, the authority 
of the Volksraad emanated from an agreement of the people to unite in a 
Republic (a pactum unionis) and to delegate the power of making laws to a 
national assembly; the Volksraad could therefore legitimately exercise its 
32Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 59. 
33The 'representatives' were male burghers of between the ages of thirty 
and sixty years, enfranchised for three years and belonging to the 
Nederduitsch-Hervormde Church and possessing immovable property in the 
Republic : see Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 91. 
34Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 60. 
35ldem. 
36Gey van Pittius op cit. at 14-16. 
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authority only as long as it respected the agreement. The Constitution, which 
was an actualisation of the agreement, was therefore in principle superior to 
the legislature. 
The constitutional system of the Transvaal underwent a radical change in 
1890, when a second Volksraad was created; the old legislature was 
transformed into a First Volksraad. Of the two bodies, the First Volksraad had 
more power. The second Volksraad could legislate only on a limited number 
of topics; its legislation was subject to approval by the First Volksraad. In 
addition, the President was granted the power to veto legislation. 37 
1.2. The Relationship between the Legislature and the Judiciary 
before Union. 
The Cape and Natal did not produce any noteworthy cases of constitutional 
importance concerning the relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary. This can largely be ascribed to the fact that the constitutional system 
in these colonies was based on the British model, with specific emphasis on 
the legislative supremacy of Parliament and the incompetence of the courts to 
question or inquire into the validity of acts of Parliament. Sufficient 
opportunity therefore did not arise for the judiciary to express itself on 
constitutional issues touching upon the exercise of legislative authority. The 
position in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal was, however, quite 
different. 
In the Orange Free State judicial authority was at first vested in the courts of 
landdrosts and heemraden; these courts were, however, inferior courts which 
were not manned by trained judicial officers. The Executive Council acted as 
37See Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 104 et seq; Carpenter op cit. at 69. 
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a court of appeal from the Ianddrosts' circuit court. 38 A High Court, 
manned by trained judicial officers, was later established by Ordinance No. 
2 of 1875. 39 The ordinance was not part of the Constitution and could 
therefore be amended with ease, just like any other ordinary law. The 
judiciary, however, enjoyed a large measure of independence and did not 
hesitate to inquire into the validity of legislation when the opportunity 
arose. 40 Moreover, the rigidity of the Constitution provided a sound basis for 
judicial activity in constitutional matters. The position of the judiciary was 
strengthened further when the Constitution was amended to recognise the 
courts as the sole judicial authority .41 
The first indication of judicial activity in relation to the exercise of legislative 
power came after the Volksraad had adopted Rules of Order in which it was 
proposed to give the Volksraad the power to arrest, try and imprison members 
of the public for breach of its privilege; it was also proposed to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the courts. Legislation to give effect to the proposal was 
abandoned when Chief Justice Melius de Villiers pointed out to the Chairman 
of the Volksraad that the proposed legislation would be unconstitutional.42 
In 1890 the Volksraad passed a law which prohibited Asiatics from settling in 
the Free State. The validity of this law was challenged in Cassim and 
Solomon v The State.43 It was argued that the law was in conflict with 
38Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 54. 
39This Ordinance was later substituted by Ordinance No. 1 of 1887. 
40Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 77. 
41Article 48 : see Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 
55. 
42Thompson op cit. at 55. 
431892 Cape W 58. 
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article 58, which guaranteed equality before the law, and therefore 
unconstitutional. The court rejected this argument and held that "the article of 
the Constitution that 'the laws were equal for all' had not the meaning 
contended for, and that the Ordinance was not ultra vires of the 
Constitution. "44 The court's view was clearly based on fact that the Boer 
Republics did not recognise the rights of persons other than white; the 
Constitution accommodated whites only. 45 
Chief Justice Melius de Villiers had from the outset made his views on the 
constitutional role of the judiciary clear. He was a firm believer in respect for, 
and submission to, constitutional principles. In his view the Constitution had 
the force of law; it was, according to him, the function of the courts to 
interpret the Constitution, just as it was the function of the courts to interpret 
any other law: 
"The law-giver wiHs. the judge interprets. To the business of interpreting the laws the 
judge has been educated; he is an expert in it; and thereto he is appointed" .46 
The question whether the Volksraad possessed untrammelled legislative power 
came up for decision in The State v Gibson.47 In this case the accused 
had published some material which severely criticised the Volksraad; he was 
as a result charged with crimen Iaesae majestatis. In giving judgment in 
favour of the accused, Hertzog J held that the Volksraad did not possess 
majestas. Hertzog J's view was that although the Volksraad was the highest 
441892 Cape LJ 58, as quoted by Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA 
Law Rev. at 55. 
45This was also the attitude which prevailed in the Transvaal and at the 
National Convention which led to the formation of the Union of South Africa. 
46Melius de Villiers "The Relation of the Judiciary to the Legislative 
Authority" 1897 Cape LJ at 38-39, as quoted by Thompson 1954 
Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 56. 
471898 Cape LJ 1. 
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law-making body in the republic, it was not supreme since it was controlled, 
and its legislative power limited, by the Constitution. The Constitution was an 
embodiment of the sovereign will of the people; it was therefore morally and 
legally superior to the institutions which it had created. 48 
The constitutional tradition of the Orange Free State therefore exhibited 
substantial constitutionalism. The legislative authority of the Volksraad was 
limited by the Constitution. This limitation was strengthened by the active role 
of the judiciary in ensuring that the legislature stayed within the limits of the 
Constitution. 
The position in the Transvaal was somewhat different. Although the 
independence of the judiciary was recognised, the relationship between the 
legislature and the judiciary was unstable. The High Court often found itself 
faced with the task of deciding whether resolutions of the Volksraad were 
valid laws. 
Starting with N abal v Bok'9 the court had held, per Burgers J, that it was 
not competent to determine the validity of a resolution of the Volksraad. This 
decision was based on a strict interpretation of article 2 of the 1859 
addendum to the Constitution, which required the courts to regard all 
resolutions of the Volksraad as law. Following this interpretation the court had 
also held in McCorkindale's Executors v Bok50 (per Kotze C.J, with 
Burgers J concurring ) that a resolution of the Volksraad had the force of law. 
The Court's view was that although the judiciary was free and independent in 
carrying out its functions, it had no authority to. reject a resolution of the 
Volksraad which had been duly adopted as law. 
48See Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 57. 
49(1883) 1 S.A.R 60. 
50(1884) 2 S.A.R 202. 
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A subtle change in the Court's view regarding the validity of resolutions of 
the Volksraad became noticeable in Dom's Trustees v Bok51• Although 
the majority opinion (Kotze C.J and Esselen J) was that resolutions of the 
Volksraad had the force of law, Jorissen J gave a dissenting opinion. As an 
advocate in McCorkindale v Bok52 Jorissen J had argued that a 
resolution of the Volksraad did not have the force of law. He pursued this 
argument in the Dom's Trustees case, holding that the Volksraad was 
bound by the Constitution and that the Court was entitled to inquire into the 
question whether the provisions of the Constitution had been complied with. 
He came to the conclusion that the resolution of the Volksraad in issue was 
not law and therefore invalid. 
An obiter dictum of Kotze C.J in Hess v The State53 carried with it the 
first sign of the Court's willingness to exercise the power to declare legislation 
invalid on the ground that constitutional procedures for the passing of 
legislation had not been followed. 54 Obiter dicta by Ameshoff and Jorissen 
JJ in Snuif v The State55 similarly indicated that legislation which was 
passed contrary to constitutional procedures would be invalid. 
51(1887) 2 S.A.R 187. 
52Supra. 
53(1895) O.R 112. 
54Kotze C.J had held, however, that the proper course to take was to leave 
the matter with the legislature to decide whether the procedure in issue, 
namely three months notice before the adoption of a resolution, could be 
dispensed with on the ground of urgency. This view was also the ratio of the 
majority judgment in the later case of Langermann v Johannesburg 
Liquor Licensing Board (1897) 4 O.R 137. However, Ameshoff J had 
held in a dissenting judgment that the court was entitled to decide that issue 
too. 
55(1895) 4 O.R 294. 
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The court finally expressed an unequivocal opinion in Brown V Leyds.56 
It declared a resolution of the Volksraad invalid. According to Kotze C.J the 
people alone possessed supreme power which they had, in a specified and 
limited manner, entrusted to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as 
set out in the Constitution. The Constitution was, according to the Chief 
Justice, a fundamental law which laid down the procedure to be followed for 
the enactment of valid legislation. The Court was, in his opinion, competent 
and obliged to invalidate legislation which had been passed contrary to 
constitutional procedures. The procedure had not been modified by the 1859 
addendum, because any subsequent law which was in conflict with the 
Constitution had to yield to the fundamental law. 57 
The Court's opinion was not well-received by either the executive or the 
legislature. The decision of the court not only placed a question mark on the 
authority of the Volksraad58 but also meant that the 1858 Constitution, which 
made no provision for a method of amendment, could not be validly amended 
by means of ordinary law. According to Thompson,59 "there were no legal 
means by which the situation could be remedied". 
The decision of the Court in Brown v Leyds60 precipitated a 
confrontation between President Kruger and Chief Justice Kotze. The 
Volksraad passed a law which declared that resolutions of the Volksraad were 
valid laws; the law also expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the courts in 
56(1897) 4 0.R 17. 
57Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 65. 
58According to a commentator who wrote in the Cape LJ 15 (1898) at 
107 "[t]he second Volksraad was swept into the limbo of vanities" : see Hahlo 
& Kahn op cit. at 108. 
591954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 65. 
00Supra. 
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cases where the validity of resolutions of the Volksraad was in issue.61 
Thenceforth, all judges and landdrosts were required to swear an oath, before 
taking office, that they would not test the validity of legislation of the 
Volksraad. 62 
In reaction to the violation of their judicial independence, the judges adjourned 
the High Court sine die and, despite mediation by Chief Justice Sir Henry de 
Villiers of the Cape judiciary, President Kruger eventually triumphed over the 
judiciary. 63 
The constitutional history of the Cape, the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal illustrates different traditions concerning the relationship between 
the judiciary and the legislature, and the role of the judiciary within the 
context of that relationship. In the Cape the doctrine of legislative supremacy 
prevented the judiciary from inquiring into the validity of legislation; the 
judiciary did not therefore play any significant constitutional role. 
The tradition prevailing in the Orange Free State shows that a rigid written 
Constitution can serve to limit the exercise of legislative authority and that the 
judiciary can fulfil the fundamental role of ensuring compliance with the 
Constitution. Like the United States judiciary, the Orange Free State judiciary 
played a significant role in the review of legislation in terms of constitutional 
principles. The Orange Free State Constitution was to a large extent a 
61Law 1 of 1897. 
62President Kruger later showed his extreme dislike of judicial review of 
legislation at the swearing in of the new Chief Justice when he said that " [ t ]he 
testing right is a principle of the Devil." : J.G Kotze Memories and 
Reminiscences (1949) at xii - xiii. 
63Thompson 1954 Butterworths SA Law Rev. at 108-109; J. 
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 
(1978) at 21-22; E. Kahn "The History of the Administration of Justice in the 
South African Republic" 1958 SAW 294 at 397; 1959 SAW 46. 
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reflection of the American Constitution and, to a lesser extent, of the French 
Constitution of 1848 which was in turn to some extent influenced by the 
American Constitution. 64 
The tradition prevailing in the Transvaal, on the other hand, illustrates the 
uncertainty that may arise when the Constitution is flexible and is not 
respected by both the legislature and the executive; judicial control of the 
exercise of legislative power is not encouraged and there is a tendency to lean 
towards the supremacy of the legislature as opposed to the supremacy of the 
Constitution. Although influenced by the Orange Free State Constitution to 
some extent, the Transvaal Constitution was largely based on the Constitution 
of the Batavian Republic of 1798 and early Voortrekker legislation;65 it did 
not have the strong roots of American constitutionalism. 
2. Constitutional Development from 1910 to 1961. 
The formation of the Union of South Africa under the South Africa Act, 
190966 brought into existence a new constitutional order. With effect from 
31 May 1910 South Africa became a unitary state with responsible 
government. The system of government was moulded along the lines of the 
British model. There was a constitutional or ceremonial head of state,67 an 
executive council (the Cabinet) whose members held seats in Parliament and 
were charged with the administration of state departments, and a legislature 
(Parliament) consisting of two houses, namely an upper house (the Senate) and 
a lower house (the House of Assembly). 
64Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 72-73. 
65Hahlo & Kahn op cit. at 84-85. 
669 Edw. 7, c9. 
67The constitutional or ceremonial head of state was the King of the British 
Empire, who was represented in South Africa by the Governor-General. 
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A Supreme Court was established for the whole of the Union, with the former 
colonial upper courts becoming provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa; an appeal lay from decisions of the provincial and local 
divisions to an Appellate Division, sitting in Bloemfontein. Final appeal lay 
to the Privy Council in Britain. The incompetence of courts of law to override 
or set aside Acts of Parliament ensured that Parliament remained supreme in 
the sphere of legislation. 
2.1. The Status of the Union Parliament. 
The Union Parliament was internally supreme in the sense that it could make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of South Africa. It was, 
however, still subject to certain limitations and was to that extent a 
subordinate legislature. In theory, the British Parliament could legislate for the 
Union; it could also repeal or amend any legislation of the Union 
Parliament. 68 The South Africa Act was a creature of the British Parliament 
and that Parliament could abolish it at any time. 
The fact that the South Africa Act was a statute of the British Parliament also 
constituted a limitation; the Union Parliament could not legislate contrary to 
provisions of the South Africa Act. The entrenched provisions, which laid 
down a special procedure for legislation, constituted a serious impediment to 
the legislative powers of the Union Parliament; Parliament was bound to 
follow the prescribed procedure when legislating on matters that related to the 
entrenched provisions. 
68See RV McChlery 1912 AD 199 at 218 where Innes J.A declared: 
"The British Parliament is a sovereign body entitled to legislate for the whole 
Empire. Unfettered by a written Constitution, it is clothed with supreme 
legislative capacity ... But all other law-giving bodies within the Empire are 
subordinate. They derive their authority, not from an ancient right, but from 
the instruments which create them." 
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The Statute of Westminster of 193169 removed the fetters to which the Union 
Parliament had hitherto been subject;70 it elevated the status of the Union 
Parliament and removed all doubts there may have been concerning the 
supremacy of the Union Parliament. The Status of Union Act of 193471 
formally incorporated the Statute of Westminster into South African law and 
declared that the Union Parliament was the 'sovereign legislative authority' in 
and over the Union. 72 
The elevation of the status of the Union Parliament to a 'sovereign legislative 
authority' raised the question whether Parliament could ignore the special 
procedure for legislating in relation to matters concerning the entrenched 
provisions and the related question whether courts of law were competent to 
inquire into or pronounce upon the question whether Parliament was 
competent to ignore the entrenched provisions. 73 
2.2 The Entrenched Provisions. 
The South Africa Act contained two sections which protected the voting rights 
of certain Blacks and Coloureds, then existing in the Cape,74 and the equality 
6
"The Statute of Westminster was an Act of the British Parliament which, 
inter alia, gave a dominion Parliament the power to repeal or amend any 
legislation of the British Parliament which was applicable in that dominion. 
'"The doctrine of repugnance, in terms of which laws of a colonial 
legislature which were in conflict with an Act of the British Parliament were 
invalid, was removed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. In terms of 
the Colonial Laws Validity Act a colonial legislation would be invalid on the 
ground of repugnancy to an Act of the British Parliament only if that 
Parliament had intended the Act to apply in that colony. 
71Act 69 of 1934. This Act was enacted by the Union Parliament. 
72Section 2 of the Act. 
73See Chapt. 4 for a discussion of these questions. 
74Section 35 of the South Africa Act, 1909. 
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of the English and the Dutch languages.75 These sections were entrenched by 
section 152 of the South Africa Act, 1909, which provided that no law which 
sought to repeal or alter the two sections would be valid unless it was agreed 
to by a two thirds majority of all members of Parliament at a joint sitting of 
both Houses of Parliament. Section 152 itself could only be repealed or 
altered by following the same procedure. 
The concept of constitutional entrenchment as a means of restraining the 
legislative competence of Parliament was a feature which was foreign to the 
British constitutional tradition, a tradition which the Union of South Africa 
followed. 76 The entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act, 1909, raised 
two important questions concerning the supremacy of the Union Parliament 
and the relationship between the Union legislature and the judiciary. First, the 
question arose whether the Union Parliament was fully supreme, just like the 
British Parliament and could, if so, override constitutional restraints on its 
legislative competence. Second, whether the courts were competent to declare 
that laws which were passed in contravention of constitutional restraints were 
invalid and of no force and effect. 
The questions concerning the effect of the entrenched provisions, the 
legislative competence of the Union Parliament and the relationship between 
Parliament and the judiciary became the main features of the constitutional 
crisis of the 1950s. This constitutional crisis, and the decisions of the courts 
associated with it, is discussed in a separate chapter. 77 
The constitutional crisis of the 1950s culminated in the abolition of the voting 
rights of Coloured persons; these rights were still entrenched in section 35 of 
75Section 137 of the South Africa Act, 1909. 
76The British Parliament had never been subject to any constitutional 
restraints. 
77See Chapter 4, infra. 
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the South Africa Act, 1909. 78 The Union of South Africa continued to exist 
until the adoption of a new Constitution in 1961. The new Constitution, the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act79 established a Republic of South 
Africa. 
3. The 1961 Constitution. 
The legislative supremacy of Parliament was a fait accompli at the end of the 
constitutional crisis of the 1950s. The 1961 Constitution merely formalised the 
status of Parliament as a sovereign law-making body. In terms of section 59(1) 
of the Constitution, Parliament was the sovereign legislative authority in and 
over the Republic and had full power to make laws for the peace, order and 
good government of the Republic. Section 59(2) provided that no court of law 
was competent to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of an act of 
Parliament, save only in relation to the question whether the prescribed 
procedure had been followed in instances where an Act of Parliament had the 
effect of amending or repealing sections 108 and 118 of the Constitution. 
Section 108 guaranteed the equality of the English and Afrikaans languages; 
section 118 was the entrenching provision. 
Apart from sections 108 and 118 the 1961 Constitution did not contain any 
other entrenched provisions which required a special procedure for their 
amendment or repeal. However, the Constitution did contain certain 
unentrenched provisions in respect of which a special procedure of legislating 
was imposed. Section 114(a) provided that Parliament could not alter the 
boundaries of a province, unless the province whose boundaries were affected 
had requested the alteration; section 114(b) provided that Parliament could not 
abolish any provincial council or abridge its powers, except at the request of 
78The voting rights of those Black persons who qualified to vote had been 
effectively abolished by the Representation of Natives Act, 1936. 
79 Act 32 of 1961. 
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the provincial council concerned. 80 
The fact that the South African constitutional system was largely a 
transplantation of the British constitutional system characterised it as a 
Westminster prototype. A parliamentary system of government, the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament and the protection of basic human rights by the 
ordinary courts applying the ordinary law of the land, as opposed to a 
protection of fundamental rights in a justiciable bill of rights, constituted the 
most important features of the Westminster system of government. 
4. The Westminster Tradition in the South African 
Constitutional System. 
4.1. The Nature of the Westminster System. 
The Westminster system is capable of being understood in two senses, namely 
the narrow sense and the broad sense.81 In its narrow sense it is the British 
system of government. 82 In its broad sense it is a system which is largely 
based on the British system of government; such a system has the 
characteristic features of the British constitutional system.83 The previous 
South African constitutional system was regarded as falling within the latter 
80See Chap!. 4 for a discussion of the unentrenched procedural provisions 
of the 1961 Constitution. 
81See S.A de Smith The New Commonwealth and its 
Constitutions (1964) at 77-78; G. Carpenter op cit. at 74; D. Basson & 
H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (1988) at 207. 
According to Boulle South Africa and the Consociational Option 
(1984) at 4, no precise constitutional or political meaning can be attached to 
the term 'Westminster system'. 
82Carpenter op cit. at 74; Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 207. 
83 Idem. 
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category. 84 
De Smith85 has identified the following as some of the features of the 
Westminster system in the narrow sense: 
1) a constitutional head of state who is not the effective head of 
government; 
2) a Prime Minister who is the effective head of government and presides 
over a Cabinet composed of Ministers; the Prime Minister has a substantial 
measure of control in the appointment and removal from office of Ministers; 
3) a parliamentary government, in the sense that Ministers must be 
members of the legislature; 
4) collective and individual responsibility of Ministers to a freely elected 
and representative legislature. 
The following characteristic features of the Westminster system in the narrow 
sense can be added to those mentioned by de Smith: 
1) the legislature is composed of two chambers, an upper House and a 
lower House. The upper House is non-elected, while the lower House 
is elected. Members of the lower House are elected on the basis of territorial 
representation in single member constituencies, with voters electing their 
representatives on the basis of universal franchise; 
2) the Prime Minister is the leader of the party which has the majority 
support in the lower House; the party with the second largest support in the 
lower House becomes the official opposition; 
3) there is a distinction between the legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities, although the principle of the separation of powers is not 
maintained with consistency; 
84See for example the reports of the Theron Commission (RP 38/1976, 
para. 178) and the Schlebusch Commission (RP 68/1980 at 4). 
85De Smith op cit. at 77-78. See also D.H van Wyk "The Westminster 
System" in D.J Van Vuuren & D.J Kriek (eds) Political Alternatives for 
South-Africa: Principles and Perspectives (1983) at 259-273. 
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4) the legislature (Parliament) is supreme; its legislative competence is 
virtually unrestricted and courts of law are incompetent to inquire into or 
pronounce upon the validity of enactments of the legislature. Parliament is, 
however, bound to observe non-enforceable conventions; 
5) basic human rights are protected by the ordinary courts applying the 
ordinary Jaw of the land; there is no formal protection of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms in a rigid Constitution. 86 
According to Boulle87 the Westminster system in the broad sense is a 
reflection of the main elements of the British system of the government as it 
underwent a process of evolutionary development. In this sense, the 
Westminster system of government is characterised by a constitutional head 
of state, a bicameral legislature, parliamentary government, an independent 
judiciary and a politically neutral civil service. The most important 
characteristic feature of government, however, is the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament. 88 
The constitutional system which was introduced in South Africa after the 
second British occupation of the Cape in 1806 was essentially based on the 
Westminster system as it obtained in Britain. The Westminster tradition 
continued under the 1909 Constitution (the South Africa Act, 1909) and the 
1961 Constitution (the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1961).89 
86See Carpenter op cit. at 75-78; J.D van der Vyver Die Grondwet 
van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika (wet 110 van 1983) at 3-5. 
87Boulle op cit. at 217-218; L.J Boulle "The Second Republic: Its 
Constitutional Lineage" 1980 CILSA at 1-34. 
88D.A Basson & H.P Viljoen South African Constitutional Law 
(1988) at 207; Boulle, Hoexter & Harris op cit. at 117. 
89 According to Van Wyk "Westminsterstelsel - requiescat in pace? of: kan 
'n luiperd sy kolle verander?" 1980 THRHR 105 at 107, the Westminster 
system was established in South Africa in a fairly untainted form. 
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The characteristic features of the Westminster system as it obtained under the 
1961 Constitution were that there was a State President who was not the 
effective head of the government; the effective head of government was a 
Prime Minister who was the leader of the party with a majority of members 
in Parliament and who presided over a Cabinet consisting of Ministers 
appointed by him; there was a bicameral Parliament which consisted of a 
House of Assembly and a Senate, with members of the House of Assembly 
being elected on the basis of territorial representation in single member 
constituencies; there was a distinction between the co-ordinate branches of 
government, namely the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, 
although the principle of the separation of powers was not consistently 
maintained; the relationship between the co-ordinate branches of government 
was largely determined by conventions; and, most importantly, the principle 
of legislative supremacy operated. 90 
The South African constitutional order, however, manifested a number of 
deviations from the Westminster system of government in the narrow sense. 
In the first place, the South African constitutional order was largely based on 
a written Constitution. 91 Secondly, the entrenched provisions of the South 
Africa Act and the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1961 restricted 
the legislative competence of Parliament in that a special and more difficult 
procedure was required for the amendment or repeal of some of the 
constitutional provisions. 92 A further deviation occurred when, after the 
abolition of the Senate in 1980, Parliament was made up of only one House 
from 1980 to 1984. All these features are completely foreign to the 
Westminster system in the narrow sense. The provincial system of 
government, which was not a deviation per se, was also another feature which 
90See Carpenter op cit. at 80. 
91Although written, the Constitution took the form of an ordinary statute 
and did not have the status of supreme law. 
92See Boulle 1980 CILSA 9-30. 
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differentiated the South African prototype from the Westminster system in the 
narrow sense. 
Boulle93 mentions some other important deviations from the Westminster 
system proper, namely the restriction of the parliamentary franchise to whites 
only, communal representation for those excluded from the parliamentary 
franchise, separate development within the same constitutional unit for 
different population groups, and a disregard for the rule of law. It may be 
argued that the features mentioned by Boulle were in essence not only 
deviations from the Westminster system but also deviations from recognised 
democratic principles. 
The South African electoral system had been racially based since the abolition 
of the voting rights of Coloured persons. Only persons classified as white in 
terms of South Africa's race classification laws were entitled to vote.94 
4.2. The Judiciary and the Protection of Human Rights under the 
Westminster System. 
The doctrine of legislative supremacy, as a central characteristic feature of the 
Westminster system limits the role of the judiciary in the protection of basic 
human rights and freedoms against legislative encroachment. The legislature, 
as the supreme law-making body, can freely enact legislation that has the 
effect of abolishing or curtailing basic human rights; the judiciary would in 
such instances be incompetent to inquire into or pronounce upon the 
substantive validity of such legislation. 
Traditionally, the protection of human rights under the Westminster system of 
0
'1dem. 
94Sections 2 and 3 of the Electoral Act, 45 of 1979. 
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government is enhanced by the operation of the rule of law. 95 Dicey% lists 
three characteristic features of the rule of law, namely (i) the adjudication of 
legal disputes by the ordinary courts of the land before a person can be 
punished or his rights may be violated; (ii) the subjection of everybody to the 
law as a means of ensuring equality of treatment and (iii) the protection of 
citizens' rights through the processes of the ordinary courts of the land. 
Dicey regarded the rule of law as an important safeguard against the violation 
of the rights of citizens by those who exercise the authority of the state. His 
formulation of the rule of law is, however, inadequate in relation to the 
protection of the individual's rights and freedoms. As a doctrine which 
complements parliamentary sovereignty, its application is limited by the fact 
that any rule upon which it is based may be abolished by Parliament. The 
common law of the land, which Dicey viewed as the most important vehicle 
through which the courts can protect the rights of individuals, can be made 
ineffective by enactments which take away or limit those rights which are 
recognised at common law. 97 
In the United Kingdom the operation of the rule of law in relation to the 
protection of human rights is facilitated by at least two constraints which 
indirectly regulate the content of legislation. Firstly, civil rights are generally 
respected; the British public has generally exercised tolerance and political 
compromise. Secondly, the United Kingdom has a good track record of 
participatory democracy based on universal suffrage; an unpopular government 
is unlikely to be voted back into office. This has not always been the case in 
95 A. v Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law and the 
Constitution (1975) at 183 et seq. See Chapt. 4 for a discussion of Dicey's 
view of parliamentary sovereignty. 
96Loc cit. 
97See Wade's introduction to Dicey op cit. at (i) et seq; Basson & 
Viljoen op cit. at 222. 
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South Africa. According to Boulle98 the rule of law in South Africa "has not 
performed the crucially important role of qualifying the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy as should be the case in the Westminster system of 
government." 
The traditional protection of human rights under the common law has, 
however, been found to be inadequate even in Britain. There has in recent 
times been an increasing support for the protection of human rights in a 
justiciable bill of rights. 99 The United Kingdom's entry into the European 
Economic Community (established by the Treaty of Rome), and its 
ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights has strengthened the 
protection of human rights and may very well lead to a new constitutional 
order in the United Kingdom, with legal guarantees of fundamental human 
rights. 100 
The provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights can be enforced 
by the European Court for Human Rights; the British Parliament has without 
exception changed the law so as to bring it in line with those decisions of the 
Court in which it was decided that English law is in conflict with the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. 101 
98Boulle 1980 CILSA at 30. 
99See L. Scarman English Law - The New Dimension (1974), 
especially at 18-21; M. Zander A Bill of Rights? (1979), Chapt.l. 
100Scarman op cit. at 9-27; L. Scarman "Fundamental Rights: The British 
Scene" 1978 Columbia LR 1575 at 1580 et seq.; A. Lester "Fundamental 
Rights in the United Kingdom : The Law and the British Constitution" 1976-
1977 Univ. of Pennsylvania LR 337 at 356 et seq. 
101N. Bratza European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights - Selected Cases, paper delivered at the International 
Human Rights Seminar, Magaliesburg, 27-29 July 1986 Background 
Materials, Legal Resources Centre, University of the Witwatersrand, vol. 2 
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Modem writers have developed an expanded or dynamic concept of the rule 
of law. This concept attempts to free the rule of law from the limits implicit 
in Dicey's view. 
According to Beinart102 the rule of law is a political rather than a juridical 
concept. In his view the rule of law has two meanings; firstly, in a formal 
sense, it is synonymous with law and order within a state and, secondly and 
most importantly, it implies legality in the sense that the creation of legal rules 
must be in terms of acceptable legal rules. In this sense the rule of law does 
not constitute a mechanism for the effective protection of the rights and 
freedoms of the individual but merely provides a code of conduct in relation 
to those rights which the government thinks are worth protecting. Van der 
Vyver103 also shares the view that the rule of law merely implies 
legality. 104 He feels that the rule of law is inadequate in the protection of 
fundamental individual rights and freedoms; all it does is to require that both 
the government and the citizens must be subject to law. 
According to Mathews, 105 the rule of law is characterised by, firstly, the 
absence of arbitrary exercise of power over individuals, secondly, equal 
liability before the law for both individuals and those who exercise the 
authority of the state and lastly, the presence of effective legal remedies which 
provide protection for the individual. 
at 51 et seq. 
102B. Beinart "The Rule of Law" 1962 Acta Juridica 99. 
1031.D van der Vyver Seven Lectures on Human Rights (1976) at 
106 et seq. 
"
14Legality in this sense implies adherence to acceptable legal rules. 
105A.S Mathews "A Bridle for the Unruly Horse?" 1964 SAW 312 et 
seq. 
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Mathews106 has identified four theoretical approaches to the rule of law. The 
first approach, the law enforcement approach, is no more than rule by law in 
a legally ordered society; the second approach, the procedural . justice 
approach, sets out certain standards of legality in terms of which the state 
authority must function; the third approach, the material justice approach, 
seeks to attain social and political justice. The fourth approach, the protection 
of basic rights approach, affords the citizen full protection of his basic rights 
and freedoms. 
Mathews rejects the first two approaches as falling short in the protection of 
the rights of the individual; he regards the material justice approach as 
insufficient in that it is too all-embracing.107 He supports the protection of 
basic rights approach because it recognises the vulnerability of human rights 
in relation to the exercise of state authority and seeks to provide a full 
protection of these rights. 
Mathews bases his support for the protection of basic rights approach on the 
relationship between basic rights and legality or formal justice. 108 In terms 
of this relationship legality means more than a formal adherence to rules; it 
means that basic rights must be equally guaranteed to all and protected by 
regular courts applying pre-announced, general, durable and reasonably 
precise rules; it also means that basic rights must be limited only in terms of 
rules which conform to the requirements of legality. The scope of restrictions 
on the rights and freedoms must furthermore be limited.109 
106A.S Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law 
(1986), Part I. 
107 Apart from being too all-embracing, the material justice approach, if not 
premised on principles of a material Rechtsstaat, would encourage too much 
policy-making on the part of the judiciary. 
108Qp cit. (1986) at 16-17. 
109lbid. at 20. 
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Mathews's reformulation of the rule of law recognises the intrinsic worth of 
rights and freedoms and the values inherent in them. According to him, the 
basic rights which the reformulated rule of law seeks to realise and protect 
through adherence to legality are "simultaneously substantive rights to be 
realised for their own sake and instrumental rights through which social 
objectives can be expressed and achieved." 110 He views legality not only as 
a set of rules but also as something which "facilitates constant reassessment 
of current policies and the re-evaluation of social purposes, needs and 
consequences. "111 
Sanders112 views the rule of law as a legal-political code of conduct with 
respect to fundamental claims of subjects; it is characterised by, inter alia, 
legal certainty, restricted government, equality before the law, effective legal 
remedies, minimum standards of justice and an independent judiciary. 
Viewed in the sense of legality, the rule of law therefore means that basic 
standards of clarity, certainty, accessibility, generality, equality etc must be 
observed by those who exercise the authority of the state when the rights and 
freedoms of individuals are in issue. In its modern extrapolated sense, the rule 
of law therefore means that "human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law". 113 This is the more dynamic concept of the rule of law. 
The rule of law does not guarantee the protection of fundamental individual 
1101dem. 
111Idem. 
112A.J.G.M Sanders "Die Rule of Law - 'n Gemeenregtelike Westerse 
gedagskode" 1971THRHR164 et seq. 
113Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
International Commission of Jurists adopted the concept of 'rule of law' as a 
collective term for those legal principles which it regards as essential for the 
implementation of the doctrine of human rights: Van der Vyver op cit. at 
112. 
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rights and freedoms even in its modern extrapolated sense. Its significance is 
that it serves as a procedural mechanism through which the protection of 
individual rights and freedoms can be enhanced. In this sense it means, in 
relation to a supreme Constitution which guarantees fundamental rights, that 
when the authority of the state is exercised in relation to fundamental rights 
which are guaranteed in the Constitution standards of clarity, certainty, 
accessibility, generality, equality etc must be observed. 114 
The function of the rule of law in relation to judicial interpretation of a 
supreme Constitution is that it requires the judiciary to be committed to the 
primacy of law, especially the law of the Constitution. Law in this sense 
means the totality of legal rules, principles and fundamental values which 
constitute the whole legal system and are necessary for the attainment of 
man's basic needs and happiness in society. These are rules, principles and 
values which materially or tangibly, and not merely sufficiently, enhance the 
life of man in society. 
5. The 1983 Constitution. 
The 1983 Constitution115 was adopted with the intention of moving away 
from the Westminster system of government and of accommodating persons 
classified as 'Coloureds' and 'Indians' in decision-making in matters affecting 
the interests of these population groups. 116 It made provision for three 
racially based legislatures, namely the House of Assembly for Whites, the 
House of Representatives for Coloureds and the House of Delegates for 
1140. Beaty "The Rule (and Role) of Law in a new South Africa : Some 
Lessons from Abroad" 1992 SALJ 409 at 423. 
"
5Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 of 1983. 
"
6See the speech of the Minister of Constitutional Development and 
Planning at the second reading in Parliament of the Constitution Bill 
Hansard, House of Assembly Debates No. 15, 16-20 May 1983, col. 
7053. 
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Indians. The three Houses legislated together on matters of general interest but 
legislated independently on matters which were the exclusive concern of the 
population groups they represented. 
The Constitution brought about some changes to the Westminster tradition in 
South Africa. It introduced a somewhat feeble form of consociationalism. 
Properly understood the concept of consociationalism has four main 
characteristic features, namely government by a grand coalition of all political 
leaders who enjoy the support of the significant political sections of the 
community, the existence of a right of veto, the principle of proportionality 
in representation, value allocation and appointments to the civil service, and 
a high degree of autonomy for each segment of the community in matters of 
own affairs. 117 
Under the 1983 constitutional dispensation some consociational features were 
reflected , firstly, in the tricameral Parliament. The coalition element was, 
however, restricted to the leaders of the majority parties representing three 
population groups and did not encompass all leaders of the significant political 
segments of the community. Secondly, the distinction between 'own affairs' 
and 'general affairs' 118 was based on the principle of segmental autonomy. 
The principle of proportionality and the veto right were virtually absent from 
the dispensation. The 1983 Constitution did not, therefore, successfully 
introduce a consociational democracy. 119 
117See A Lipjart Democracy in Plural Societies : A 
Comparative Exploration (1977) at 25 et seq; Boulle "Federation and 
Consociation : Conceptual Links and Current Constitutional Models" (op 
cit.) at 236 et seq. 
118Sections 14 and 15 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 
110 of 1983. 
'
19See J.D van der Vyver Die Grondwet van die Republiek van 
Suid-Afrika (op cit.) at 74-83; Basson & Viljoen op cit at 201-206. 
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Under the Westminster system proper a distinct line is drawn between the 
leader of the party which enjoys majority support in Parliament and forms the 
government of the day, and the leader of the opposition party, which is the 
party with the second largest majority in Parliament; coalitions rarely occur. 
The principles of proportionality and segmental autonomy are completely 
foreign to the Westminster system of government. 
There is no general consensus whether the consociational element in the 1983 
constitutional dispensation amounted to an abandonment of the Westminster 
tradition. According to Van der Vyver,120 the 1983 Constitution completely 
abandoned the Westminster system. He points out to the comprehensive 
competences of the executive State President in the executive and legislative 
spheres121 and the unqualified power of judicial review in respect of all 
procedural requirements contained in the Constitution Act122 as factors which 
undermined the important Westminster notion of the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament. 
Booysen and Van Wyk123 , on the other hand, are of the view that the 1983 
Constitution did not completely abandon the Westminster tradition but retained 
it, especially in relation to own affairs. They point to the fact that, as is the 
case under the Westminster system, the State President acted on the advice of 
the three own-affairs cabinets (the Ministers' Councils) in the exercise of his 
executive powers in regard to own affairs and the fact that the concept of 
ministerial responsibility still remained. A strong element of the Westminster 
1ZOVan der Vyver ibid. at 6-8. 
121See section 5.1 infra. 
122See section 5 .2 infra. 
123H. Booysen & D. van Wyk Die '83 Grondwet (1984) at 61 et seq. 
and 78 et seq. See also Carpenter op cit at 282-285; L. Boulle, B. Harris & 
c. Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) at 167-
168; D.H van Wyk "The new Constitution" 1983 SAYIL 111. 
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system which still remained, albeit in a watered-down form, was the concept 
of legislative supremacy; the Constitution still did not enjoy the status of 
'higher law' in relation to other statutes. Territorial representation, a high 
degree of overlap between the legislature and the executive, and unitary 
characteristics124 were also retained. 
It seems proper to regard the 1983 Constitution as representing a marked 
departure from the Westminster system. Boulle125 points out that the South 
African version of the Westminster system has always deviated from the 
Westminster-proper model. The 1983 Constitution continued with this 
traditional deviation, albeit in a more pronounced way than in the past; it 
contained both Westminster and non-Westminster characteristics. 
The 1993 Constitution124 , on the other hand, represents a clear departure 
from the Westminster System. It is a supreme Constitution which entrenches 
fundamental human rights and freedoms and largely follows the American and 
German constitutional traditions; 125 the protection of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms in a supreme Constitution is foreign to the Westminster 
system. 
5.1. Legislative Authority under the 1983 Constitution. 
Legislative authority was vested in the State President and Parliament, 
consisting of the three Houses. 126 The distinction between own and general 
124The distiction between own affairs and general affairs and the degree 
of autonomy enjoyed by the various population groups in matters affecting 
each group exclusively were the only traits of federalism. 
125Boulle 1980 CILSA at 1-2. 
124The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993. 
125See Chapter 9 for a discussion of the 1993 Constitution. 
126Section 30. 
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affairs, 127 however, essentially amounted to a division of the legislative 
authority of Parliament. Legislative authority in regard to general affairs was 
shared by the three Houses; legislative authority in regard to own affairs was 
vested exclusively in the House concerned. Each House had exclusive 
'supreme' legislative authority in the sphere of own affairs. Despite the 
division of its legislative authority, Parliament nevertheless remained, in terms 
of section 30, the "sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic." 
The 'sovereignty' of Parliament still affected the courts' power to review 
parliamentary legislation. 128 
The supremacy of Parliament was, however, watered down in that the State 
President and the President's Council had pivotal roles in the legislative 
process. 129 More importantly, however, the nature and extent of 
constitutional entrenchment limited the legislative supremacy of Parliament in 
regard to the procedural and structural requirements for legislating. 
Unlike the 1961 Parliament the 1983 Parliament was fettered by a large 
number of justiciable procedural provisions. 130 The power to repeal or 
127Section 14 and section 15. 
128See infra. 
129In terms of section 16(l)(a) the State President was empowered to 
decide whether a matter was an own affair or a general affair, so that he had 
a crucial role in determining whether an issue falls within the legislative 
competence of Parliament or not. The President's Council, which was neither 
part of the legislature nor a representative body, could act as a substitute 
legislature in instances where the Houses disagreed whether a bill should 
become a law or not; in such instances the State President was empowered to 
refer the bill to the President's Council and once the Council had made its 
decision the bill was deemed to have been a law passed by Parliament and 
could be presented to the State President for his assent: section 32(4). 
130In terms of section 34(2)(a) of the 1983 Constitution any division of the 
Supreme Court was competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the 
question whether the provisions of the Constitution have been complied with. 
The reference to the provisions of the Constitution was a reference to the 
procedural provisions and not to the substantive validity of legislation: see 
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amend these provisions was restricted by two types of entrenchment; both the 
procedural provisions and the entrenchments essentially placed upon the courts 
the fundamental role of ensuring that Parliament legislated in accordance with 
the prescribed procedures. 131 These procedures did not, however, serve any 
meaningful purpose in the protection of individual rights. 
The first type of entrenchment was more rigid and required a two-thirds 
majority of members of every House132 • The second type of entrenchment 
was less rigid and required more than half the total number of members of 
each House for the repeal or amendment of some 45 procedural 
provisions. 133 In essence, these provisions implied that each House of 
Parliament had a veto right to prevent the repeal or amendment of any one of 
the entrenched provisions. 134 However, the entrenchments amounted to 
merely a restriction as to the manner and form of legislation; Parliament 
retained its supremacy in respect of the area of its power. 
The protection of basic human rights had been proposed but rejected. The 
President's Council had stated in its second report that the entrenchment of 
human rights "runs counter to the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament". 
The rejection of the protection of human rights in a Bill of Rights was based 
on three main considerations. First, it was considered that there was no 
acceptable judicial standard in terms of which basic human rights could be 
classified; secondly, it was thought that the entrenchment of human rights 
would amount to the imposition of stringent restrictions on future generations; 
infra. 
131See infra. 
132Section 99(2). This section entrenched itself and section 89; section 89 
guaranteed the equality of the English and Afrikaans languages. 
133Section 99(3). 
134Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 197. 
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and thirdly, it was thought that the determination of the constitutionality of 
legislation in terms of a Bill of Rights would be time consuming and would 
lead to legal uncertainty. 135 
5.2. Judicial Review of Legislation under the 1983 Constitution. 
Section 34(2)(a) of the Constitution provided that the Supreme Court was, 
subject to the provisions of section 18, 136 competent to inquire into and 
pronounce upon the question whether the provisions of the Constitution had 
been complied with. In terms of section 34(3) no court of law was competent 
to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament, save 
as provided in section 34(2)(a). 
Section 34(2) cannot be construed as also having empowered the courts to 
inquire into and pronounce upon the substantive validity of Acts of 
Parliament. A proper reading of section 34(2)(a) and a consideration of the 
position before the 1983 Constitution suggest that the reference to 'the 
provisions of this Act' in the section was a reference to those provisions of the 
Constitution that dealt with the manner and form of legislation and not to the 
content of legislation.137 An intention to include judicial inquiry into the 
135See H.J Coetsee "Hoekom nie 'n Verklaring van Menseregte nie" 1984 
TRW 5 et seq. For a critique of these objections to the entrenchment of 
human rights see D.H van Wyk "The New Constitution" 1983 SAYIL 111 
et seq. 
136Section 18(1) empowered the court to inquire into the question whether 
the State President had consulted the Speaker of Parliament and the Chairmen 
of the respective Houses before issuing a certificate in respect of a Bill of own 
affairs; section 18(2) provided that except for the competence provided for in 
section 18(1) the court was not empowered to inquire into a decision by the 
State President that a matter is an own affair. These sections did not relate to 
'supremacy' issues but to the exercise of executive power. 
137See J.D van der Vyver "Judicial Review under the new Constitution" 
1986 SALJ 236 at 238. According to van der Vyver "the verb used by the 
legislature in the phrase 'whether the provisions of this Act were complied 
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content of legislation would have been expressed in clear and unambiguous 
terms. Section 34(3) also clearly showed an intention to exclude judicial 
inquiry into the content of Acts of Parliament, including the Constitution 
itself. 
The absence of a Bill of Rights and the exclusion of judicial inquiry into the 
content of legislation resulted in a very limited role of the judiciary in 
controlling legislation which violated basic human rights. The only 'right' in 
respect of which the courts would have been able to exercise a power of 
review, and only with regard to the question whether the prescribed procedure 
had been followed, was the provision guaranteeing the equality of the English 
and Afrikaans languages. 138 
The 1983 Constitution did, however, remove the uncertainty that existed 
regarding the question whether the courts' testing right was restricted only to 
the entrenched provisions of the Constitution or included the unentrenched 
procedural provisions as well. The approach of the courts has been extremely 
formalistic in this regard. 139 Section 34(2)(a) of the 1983 Constitution 
extended the courts' testing right to all the procedural provisions of the 
Constitution. These provisions, however, largely dealt with governmental 
structures and did not in any way protect fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. 
The guarantee of fundamental human rights in a Bill of Rights under the 1993 
Constitution places the protection of individual rights and freedoms on firmer 
ground. Under the new constitutional dispensation the judiciary has a cardinal 
role to play in ensuring that the legislature and the executive respect 
with' (my emphasis) has a procedural connotation". 
138Section 89. Section 89 was entrenched by section 99(2). 
139See Chapt.4 for a discussion of the relevant cases and the views of some 
of the writers. 
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constitutional guarantees. 140 The cardinal role of the judiciary in controlling 
the exercise of legislative and executive power and ensuring compliance with 
the provisions of the Constitution is a clear indication of the abandonment of 
the Westminster system of government. 
140See Chapt. 9 infra. 
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CHAPTER4 
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND THE 
JUDICIARY IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 
1994. 
Within the context of the concept of the separation of powers and checks and 
balances, 1 the fundamental function of the judiciary is to control the exercise 
of authority by the legislature and the executive. 2 This control function stems 
from the fact that both the governed and those who govern must obey the law; 
to ensure that this goal is achieved the judiciary must interpret and apply the 
law. The controlling function of the judiciary therefore implies that the 
judiciary may be called upon to look into the question whether a piece of 
legislation complies with the law. 
Legislation has constitutive and procedural components as well as a 
substantive component. The constitutive and procedural components relate to 
the form and manner in which legislation is enacted, that is the structural 
composition of the legislative organ and the prescribed procedures which the 
legislature has to follow when legislating; the substantive component relates 
to the content of legislation, that is whether it is reasonable or unreasonable, 
fair or unfair, moral or immoral. 3 Whether, in a given constitutional system, 
the judiciary has the control function in relation to any of these components 
1See Chapt. 5 infra for a discussion of the separation of powers. 
2D. Basson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law 
(1988) at 169. 
'Idem. 
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depends on the nature of the Constitution and the relationship between the 
legislature and the judiciary. 
In this chapter, the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary in 
South Africa, before the coming into operation of the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act of 19934, as it pertains to the courts' power to review 
the validity of legislation is examined. Cases relevant to this relationship, in 
particular those cases which fall within the period of the constitutional crisis 
of the 1950s, and the views of some leading constitutional writers, are 
examined. This examination is aimed at illustrating a strain that exists between 
the doctrine of legislative supremacy and the constitutional guarantee of the 
rights of individuals, as well as the role of the judiciary in easing this strain. 
l. Legislative Supremacy and Judicial Review of Legislation. 
By its very nature, the doctrine of legislative supremacy is not compatible 
with the courts' power to inquire into and pronounce upon the substantive 
validity of legislation. Were the courts to have the power to review the 
substantive validity of legislation, it would mean that the legislature is not 
omnicompetent and does not possess supreme law-making powers. 5 
The question whether, in a system of legislative supremacy, the courts have 
the power to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of legislation is 
essentially associated with the nature and limits of legislative supremacy. 
1.1. The Nature and Limits of Legislative Supremacy. 
The original understanding of the doctrine of legislative supremacy is 
4Act No 200 of 1993. 
5Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 170. 
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generally associated with the absence of legal restraints on the legislative 
competence of Parliament. This implies, first, that Parliament is competent to 
legislate on any matter whatsoever and secondly, that courts of law are 
incompetent to pass judgment upon Acts of Parliament. 6 
The idea that Parliament can legislate on any matter whatsoever is, however, 
not completely true. The concept of law contains within it certain essential 
limitations on the regulatory powers of law-creating agencies. In the first 
place, the legislature cannot legislate beyond the characteristic essence of the 
aspect of reality; the legislature cannot, for example, pass a law which alters 
the natural characteristics of things. Secondly, the efficacy of legislation is 
limited by certain fundamental substrata that constitute an integral part of the 
structural make-up of the law, such as territorial limits, a basic power 
structure to support the implementation of law, and a social setting. Thirdly,· 
external stipulations of legality, such as geographical setting, prevailing social 
conditions and economic structure may affect the feasibility of legislation. 
Lastly, Parliament may itself impose, or have imposed upon it by another 
superior body, substantive or procedural restraints. 7 
The last type of limitation, namely the imposition of substantive or procedural 
restraints, constitutes a major doctrinal problem in the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy. A legislature with restraints imposed on its legislative powers can 
no longer be said to have supreme legislative powers. The imposition of 
substantive restraints, in particular, materially impairs the supremacy of 
Parliament, in the sense that Parliament is not allowed to pass legislation 
•A. v Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (1975) at 39; E.C.S Wade, G. Phillips & A.W Bradley 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (1977) at 59. 
7J.D van der Vyver "Parliamentary Sovereignty, Fundamental Freedoms 
and a Bill of Rights" 1982 SAW 557 at 565-566. 
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which is in conflict with the substantive limitations. 8 
In its modern context, the concept of legislative supremacy is amenable to two 
views, namely the absolutist or 'continuing' view and the relativist or 'self-
embracing' view. The expressions 'continuing' and 'self-embracing' are used 
in current English constitutional law literature and are therefore preferable. 9 
1.2. The 'Continuing' View of Legislative Supremacy. 
The assertion that Parliament cannot be subject to legal restraints essentially 
means that the legislative competence of successor Parliaments cannot be 
limited by enactments of a predecessor Parliament; if such a limitation were 
possible it would mean that future Parliaments would no longer have 
legislative omnipotence. 10 Legislative supremacy is therefore said to reside 
in Parliament as a continuing institution.11 
The 'continuing' view of legislative supremacy has the effect of limiting the 
control function of the judiciary. According to Wade12, a strong proponent 
of the 'continuing' view, legislative supremacy is a political fact. Proponents 
of the 'continuing' view argue that, since legislative supremacy is a political 
fact, the courts are constrained to enforce whatever Parliament enacts, without 
8See Chapt. 9 for a discussion of the entrenchment of fundamental human 
rights and the effect it has on the legislative powers of Parliament. 
9The expressions 'continuing' and 'self-embracing' derive particularly 
from H.L.A Hart The Concept of Law (1961) at 146. 
10Dicey op cit. at 67 and 68; Wade, Phillips and Bradley op cit. at 59. 
See also H.W.R Wade "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty" 1955 CW 172 at 
190. 
11L. Boulle, B. Harris & C. Hoexter Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (1989) at 127. 
12Wade 1955 cw at 188. 
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questioning whether such an enactment 1s good or bad, procedural or · 
unprocedural. 13 It is also said that the rule that the courts cannot question 
Acts of Parliament can only be altered by a revolution, when the courts refuse 
to give effect to Acts of Parliament. 14 In essence, therefore, according to the 
'continuing' view, the legislative supremacy of Parliament is illimitable and 
unalterable; 15 Parliament is unable to limit either the area of power or the 
manner and form of legislation of future Parliaments - each Parliament has 
exactly the same powers as its predecessor. 16 According to this view, the 
only instance where a subsequent expression of the will of Parliament will 
have superior authority over an earlier expression of the same will is when the 
earlier expression is repugnant to the subsequent expression. 17 
The 'continuing' view not only has an impact on the competence of the courts 
to inquire, in any manner whatsoever, into the validity of Acts of Parliament; 
neither can Parliament itself pass an Act which would have the effect of 
empowering the courts to inquire into or to pronounce upon the validity of 
Acts of Parliament; such an empowerment would have the effect of limiting 
the legislative omnipotence of Parliament and its successors. 
13ldem. See also P. Mirfield "Can the House of Lords Lawfully be 
Abolished?" 1979 LQR 36 at 42. 
141dem. 
15Wade 1955 CLJ at 190. O. Hood Phillips Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (1973) at 69; W.A Weynes Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (1976) at 546. 
16Dicey op cit. at 67 and 68; Wade, Phillips & Bradley op cit. at 59. 
17Cf Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Government of Kwazulu 1983 (1) SA 164 (A). 
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Mirfield18, another proponent of the 'continuing' view, has examined this 
view in relation to the question whether the House of Lords, a component of 
the British Parliament, can lawfully be abolished, the effect of which would 
be to alter the composition of Parliament. He comes to the conclusion that the 
composition of the British Parliament cannot lawfully be abolished, either 
under the procedure of the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 or through an 
ordinary bill purporting to abolish it. He opines that such an abolition could 
only be possible by means of a technical revolution. 19 Mirfield does concede, 
however, that Parliament can redefine itself20 or transfer its legislative 
supremacy to another body. 21 
The concession by proponents of the 'continuing' view that an omnipotent 
Parliament can transfer its legislative supremacy to another body is inherently 
paradoxical. It raises the question whether a Parliament which has entirely 
transferred or abdicated its power over a portion of its territory can later enact 
legislation through which it takes back the power it has transferred or 
abdicated. 22 Wade23 has recognised the paradox inherent in the concession 
that Parliament can transfer its supremacy over a portion of a territory over 
which it has legislative authority. He has, with reference to Dicey24, 
18Mirfield 1979 LQR at 36 et seq. 
19Mirfield 1979 LQR at 45 and 47. 
20Ibid. at 38. 
21Ibid. at 39. 
22See G. Winterton "The British Grundnorm : Parliamentary Supremacy 
Re-examined" 1976 LQR 591 at 600-603. 
23Wade 1955 CW at 196. 
24Dicey stated that although Parliament cannot bind its successors it can 
abdicate or transfer its 'sovereignty' altogether : Dicey op cit. at 69. 
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acknowledged that "freedom once conferred cannot be revoked. "25 
The rigidity of the 'continuing' view of the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament limits Parliament's capacity to adapt the Constitution to current 
exigencies. 26 Wade27 has suggested that this rigidity could be overcome by 
requiring judges to take a new judicial oath in terms of which they are bound 
to recognise and give effect to the new constitutional order. Although this 
solution does not deviate from the 'continuing' view of the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament, it does not resolve the difficulties inherent in it. 
Winterton28 points out that such a solution would be ineffective because the 
Act requiring judges to take a new judicial oath could itself either be expressly 
or impliedly repealed or amended. He also points out that requiring judges 
to take a new oath could in the long run lead to a weakening of judicial 
independence. 29 
1.3. The 'Self-embracing' View of Legislative Supremacy. 
The concession that Parliament can legally abdicate or transfer its power 
altogether essentially amounts to admitting that Parliament can bind itself in 
at least one area. If Parliament can bind itself in one area, there seems to be 
no reason why it should not be able to bind itself or its successors in other 
areas. 30 
25See Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 1937 AD 229 at 237. 
26See G. Winterton "Parliamentary Supremacy and the Judiciary" 1981 
LQR 265 at 270. 
27H.W.R Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) at 37. 
28Winterton 1981 LQR at 271. 
29lbid. at 273. 
30See Winterton 1976 LQR at 603. 
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In contrast to the 'continuing' view, the 'self-embracing' view permits 
limitations of a juridical nature on legislative supremacy. According to the 
'self-embracing' view, Parliament is not altogether precluded from imposing 
limitations on itself or its successors; 31 it can impose limitations as regards 
the constitutive and procedural components of legislation. The essence of this 
view is that the legislative supremacy of Parliament includes the power to 
prescribe the composition of Parliament and the manner and form of 
legislating. 32 
The 'self-embracing' view has as its basis the distinction between the area and 
scope of Parliament's legislative powers on the one hand, and the manner and 
form of legislating on the other. 33 Without detracting from the illimitability 
of Parliament's powers in so far as the area and scope of those powers are 
concerned, the 'self-embracing' view recognises the possibility that Parliament 
may redefine itself for the purpose of legislating about certain matters or 
subjects. 34 It may do so by prescribing a special manner and form of 
legislating, as opposed to the ordinary manner, in relation to certain specified 
matters or subjects. 35 
31See Winterton 1976 LQR at 604-608; G. Winterton "Is the House of 
Lords Immortal?" 1979 LQR 386 at 389. 
32ldem. 
33 A distinction is made between the content of legislation and the 
procedure for its enactment. 
34Winterton 1976 LQR at 604. 
35The view that Parliament may redefine itself for the purpose of 
legislating in relation to certain matters or subject matters came about as a 
result of the sovereignty problem in the former British colonies, where the 
Constitutions prescribed certain procedural requirements for legislating. In the 
Irish case of Moore v Attorney-General for the Irish Free State 
1935 AC 484 and the Canadian case of British Coal Corporation v the 
King 1935 AC 500 the Privy Council decided that Parliament was not bound 
to follow the prescribed procedure; in contrast, the Privy Council decided in 
the Australian case of Attorney-General for New South Wales v 
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By recognising that Parliament may prescribe a specialised manner and form 
of legislating over and above the ordinary manner, the 'self-embracing' view 
is more flexible than the 'continuing' view. However, as Winterton36 points 
out, the dividing line between the manner and form of legislating and the area 
and scope of the legislative power of Parliament is one of degree only. 
Parliament may effectively limit the legislative power of future Parliaments by 
imposing stringent procedural requirements. 37 Whether these would be 
effective would, however, depend on the courts' approach to the question 
whether they have the power to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity 
of legislation which was passed contrary to the prescribed procedure. 
This question arises pertinently in relation to the 'self embracing' view. It is 
a recognised rule that, in applying the law to cases before them, the courts 
must ensure that what purports to be an Act of Parliament has in fact been 
enacted by the prescribed components of Parliament. 38 
The rule that in applying what purports to be an Act of Parliament the courts 
must satisfy themselves that the instrument in issue has been passed by an 
Trethowan 1932 AC 526 that Parliament was bound to follow the 
prescribed procedure; a similar conclusion was arrived at by the South African 
Appellate Division in the Harris cases (see infra for a discussion of these 
cases). No sovereignty problems arose in Britain until the move to join the 
European Community. 
361976 LQR at 605. 
37 A requirement that legislation must be approved by 99 per cent of the 
electorate would effectively limit the area and scope of Parliament's legislative 
power. 
38Winterton 1976 LQR at 608. See also The Prince's Case (1606) 
8 Coke's Reports la at 20b; 77 ER 481 at 505; Stockdale v Hansard 
(1839) 9A & E 1 at 108; 112 ER 1112 at 1153-1154; Bowles v Bank of 
England (1913) 1 Ch. 57. 
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authorised body is part of the rule of law. 39 Winterton cautions, however, 
against readily assuming that the courts will necessarily do what the rule of 
law requires them to do. 40 
The question whether an instrument which purports to be an Act of Parliament 
has been passed by an authorised body, revolves around the definition of 
Parliament for the purpose of legislating. The manner and form of legislating 
on any specific matter or subject does not restrict the legislative competence 
of Parliament in so far as the content of legislation is concerned; it merely 
determines what Parliament is for the purpose of legislating on that specific 
subject. 41 A rule which prescribes the manner and form in which Parliament 
must legislate merely determines how Parliament must function in order to 
declare its supreme legislative will; such a rule is not directed at Parliament 
as a supreme legislator but at the non-supreme constituent parts of 
Parliament. 42 
2. Legislative Supremacy and Judicial Review of Legislation 
in South Africa before 1994. 
The question whether Parliament can ignore procedural provisions laid down 
for legislating, and the role of the judiciary to review legislation passed 
contrary to these provisions, arose pertinently in relation to the entrenched 
provisions of the South Africa Act, 1909. 43 
'"Winterton 1976 LQR at 608-609. 
40ldem. 
418. Beinart "Sovereignty and the Law" 1952 THRHR 101at126-134. 
42Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 175. 
43See Chapt. 3 for a discussion of the entrenched provisions of the South 
Africa Act. 
-98-
However, before the decisions concerning the entrenched provisions of the 
South Africa Act, 1909 there had been some South African decisions, decided 
before the formation of the Union, in which South African courts had 
indicated that the court would be competent to inquire into and pronounce 
upon the validity of legislation. In Hess v The State"" Kotze CJ had in 
an obiter dictum intimated that the court could declare that an instrument 
which had not been passed according to constitutional procedures was not 
valid law. The same Chief Justice also held in Brown v Leyds45 that a 
besluit (informal decision) of the legislature (the Volksraad) which had not 
been adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution had no 
force of law. 46 
Although the first important constitutional case that followed after the coming 
into operation of the South Africa Act, 1909, namely R v Ndobe47, was 
concerned with the entrenched provisions of that Act, it did not deal 
pertinently with the question whether Parliament could ignore the procedure 
prescribed for legislating. Parliament had in fact followed the prescribed 
procedure. The case did indicate, however, that the court would be competent 
to inquire into and pronounce upon the question whether an Act of Parliament 
had been passed in accordance with the law. 
44(1895) 2 OR 112. 
45(1897) 4 OR 17. 
46For a discussion of Hess v The State (supra) and Brown v 
Leyds (supra) see Chapt. 3. It should be noted, however, that the old 
Transvaal 'Constitution' was completely different, both in form and content, 
from the South Africa Act; the old Transvaal and Orange Free State judiciary 
had been exposed to the idea of substantive judicial review of legislation. 
471930 AD 484. 
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RV Ndobe48 was concerned with the validity of the Native Administration 
Act, 1927, an Act of the Union Parliament which empowered the government 
to appoint a Commission to investigate into and determine the right of 
occupation of land granted to Africans under certain titles. Ndobe, an African 
who owned land under such title, was subpoenaed by the Commission to give 
evidence and to produce his title-deeds; he refused to comply with the 
subpoena, contending that the appointment of a Commissioner under the Act 
was ultra vires of the Parliament of the Union. He was charged before a 
magistrate for failing to produce his title-deeds and convicted. In a later appeal 
to the Appellate Division against the conviction, it was contended on behalf 
of Ndobe that since, under the Native Administration Act, 1927, his grant of 
title could be revoked and a substituted deed of grant containing new 
conditions be issued, his voting rights, based on land ownership, would be 
affected. 49 The essence of the contention was that the new conditions that 
might be inserted could have the effect of disqualifying Ndobe from being 
registered as a voter on the ground of his race or colour, contrary to the 
provisions of section 35 of the South Africa Act. 
Section 35 of the South Africa Act protected the voting rights of those 
Africans and Coloureds who were qualified to vote; a two-thirds majority of 
members of both Houses of Parliament at a joint sitting was required for its 
amendment or repeal. 50 It was contended on behalf of Ndobe that since the 
Native Administration Act, 1927 could have the effect of disqualifying him as 
a voter on the basis of his race or colour, it should have been passed in 
accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Appellate Division considered 
itself competent to inquire into and to pronounce upon the question whether 
the Native Administration Act, 1927 had been passed legally, and came to the 
••Supra. 
49The voting rights of certain Africans were based on a property 
qualification. 
50Section 152 of the South Africa Act, 1909. 
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conclusion that the Union Parliament was bound to follow the procedure 
prescribed in the South Africa Act. The Appellate Division decided, however, 
that the Native Administration Act did not fall within the scope of section 35 
of the South Africa Act. 
It is submitted that in coming to the conclusion that the Native Administration 
Act did not fall within the scope of section 35, the Appellate Division adopted 
a narrow view of the right to vote. Although the Act did not directly impair 
the right to vote, its effect was that its provisions could be used by the 
government to revoke Ndobe's title deed and to substitute for it a deed of 
grant containing conditions which disqualified him from being registered as 
a voter simply on the ground of his race or colour. 51 The right to vote 
involves an exercise of the franchise in an unimpaired, free and fair manner; 
the Native Administration Act treated Ndobe unfairly and as a result impaired, 
albeit indirectly, his right to exercise the franchise. 
The question whether the Union Parliament, as a supreme law-making body, 
was bound to follow the procedure prescribed in the South Africa Act arose 
pertinently for the first time in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr,52 after the passing 
of the Statute of Westminster. 
The question in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr was whether the Representation of 
Natives Act, 1936, the effect of which was to remove from the common 
voters' roll certain Africans who were entitled to vote, had been validly 
passed by Parliament. The Act had been passed at a joint sitting of the two 
Houses of Parliament, with a two-thirds majority of both Houses as prescribed 
5
'In Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957(1) SA 552 (A) 
Schreiner JA also took the view that if Parliament may not do something 
directly, it may not do it indirectly either: see infra for a discussion of the 
Collins case. 
521937 AD 229. 
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in the South Africa Act, 1909.53 
It was argued somewhat ingeniously on behalf of Ndlwana, one of the 
disenfranchised Africans, that since the Statute of Westminster had removed 
all the fetters to which the Union Parliament was subject, the Representation 
of Natives Act should have been passed in accordance with the ordinary 
procedure which required a simple majority of the two Houses sitting 
separately. The argument was, in essence, that a Parliament with supreme and 
omnipotent legislative competence was not bound to follow a special 
procedure laid down for legislating. 
In dealing with the argument thus raised, the Appellate Division opted not to 
follow its earlier decision in R v Ndobe54 . Stratford ACJ held that the 
decision in R v Ndobe was no longer applicable. The decision was, in 
Stratford ACJ's opinion, rendered inapplicable by the passing of the Statute 
of Westminster. The Union Parliament had with the passing of the Statute of 
Westminster become fully 'sovereign' and could therefore adopt any procedure 
it liked. 
Stratford ACJ square! y faced the question whether the courts were competent 
to inquire into and to pronounce upon the validity of legislation and declared: 
11 Parliamenfs will, as expressed in an Act of Parliament cannot now in this country. as it 
cannot in England, be questioned by a court of law whose function is to enforce that will. not to 
question it. "55 
53Sections 35 and 152 of the South Africa Act, 1909. 
54Supra. 
55 At 237. Stratford ACJ confused the sovereign power within a state and 
the sovereignty of the state itself: see D.V Cowen The 'Entrenched 
Sections' of the South Africa Act (1949); B. Beinart "Sovereignty and 
the Law" 1952 THRHR 101 at 123. 
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Stratford ACJ's approach is consistent with the 'continuing' view of legislative 
supremacy and inconsistent with the 'self-embracing' view. In accordance with 
the 'continuing' view, a Parliament with supreme and omnipotent legislative 
competence cannot be bound by its predecessors; Parliament could therefore, 
as Stratford ACJ stated, "adopt any procedure it thinks fit; the procedure 
implied (in the South Africa Act, 1909) in so far as the courts of law are 
concerned is at the mercy of Parliament like everything else .... ". 56 Such a 
conclusion was, according to Stratford ACJ, logical because, if Parliament 
possessed omnipotent legislative competence, "it is obviously senseless to 
speak of a sovereign law-making body as ultra vires. There can be no 
exceeding of power when that power is limitless". 57 
The idea that the legislative power of Parliament is limitless is inconsistent 
with the modern concept of legislative supremacy, namely that supremacy in 
this sense refers to the position of Parliament as the only highest law-making 
body in the country and not to Parliament as an omnipotent law-making body. 
Since the entrenched sections imposed procedural limitations on the Union 
Parliament in respect of its manner of legislating, its legislative power was in 
essence not limitless. This position was recognised by the Appellate Division 
in the entrenched sections trilogy. 58 
2.1. The Entrenched Sections Trilogy. 
The decision of the Appellate Division in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr" came 
56ldem. 
57ldem. 
58Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952(2) SA 428 (A); 
Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952(4) SA 769 (A); Collins v 
Minister of the Interior 1957(1) SA 552 (A). 
59Supra. 
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to be regarded as having settled beyond doubt the status of the Union 
Parliament and the relationship between it and the judiciary .60 The Union 
Parliament was 'sovereign'; it possessed supreme and omnipotent legislative 
competence and no court of law was competent to inquire into or pronounce 
upon the validity of its legislation. It was generally accepted that the 
entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act had lost their efficacy and that 
Parliament could as a result adopt any procedure it liked. 
The government's law advisers had also advised that the entrenched provisions 
no longer constituted an impediment and that Parliament could adopt any 
procedure it liked. The National Party government, who had won the 1948 
general election, then proceeded to initiate legislation which was aimed at 
removing Coloured voters residing in the Cape Province from the common 
voters' roll; this was in pursuance of the National Party's policy of racial 
segregation. 
In 1951 the Union Parliament passed the Separate Representation of Voters 
Act. 61 The Act was passed by both Houses sitting separately and with a 
simple majority, and not in accordance with the special two-thirds majority 
procedure at a joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament. It made provision 
for the compilation of two separate voters' rolls, one for whites and one for 
non-whites; whites were entitled to elect members of the House of Assembly 
and Provincial Councils whereas non-whites were entitled to elect, separately, 
only four white representatives in the House of Assembly and two 
representatives in the Provincial Council. 
The validity of the Separate Representation of Voters Act was challenged in 
60See H.J May The South African Constitution (1955) at 48; G. 
Marshall Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth 
(1957) at 151. 
61No. 46 of 1951. 
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the Cape Provincial Division by one Harris, a Coloured voter.62 The full 
bench of the Cape Provincial Division felt itself bound by the decision of the 
Appellate Division in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr63 and held that as long as the 
enrolled Act showed that the constituent parts of Parliament had functioned, 
the courts were bound to accept the instrument as an Act of Parliament; they 
were not competent to question its validity .64 Harris appealed to the 
Appellate Division. 
There had been convincing argument by some writers which suggested that the 
view held by the government's law advisers was wrong and that Ndlwana 
V Hofmeyr was wrongly decided. Cowen,65 in particular, had argued in 
a brief but forceful essay that the entrenched provisions of the South Africa 
Act were still binding on the Union Parliament. While Cowen did not deny 
the essence of the legislative supremacy of Parliament and the incompetence 
of the courts to question the substantive validity of duly enacted Acts of 
Parliament, the gist of his argument was that Parliament could only declare 
its supreme will in accordance with the rules which prescribed the manner and 
form of legislating.66 
62Harris v Donges NO 1951 (4) SA 707 (C). 
63Supra. 
64Ndlwana's case was in fact distinguishable. In that case Parliament had 
followed the prescribed procedure, so that there was really no question of 
Parliament having acted ultra vires. Stratford ACJ's conclusion that the 
legislative power of Parliament was limitless and that it could therefore adopt 
any procedure it liked was unfortunate. 
65D. v Cowen Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Entrenched 
Sections of the South Africa Act (1951). This essay was an expansion 
of the views expressed by the same author in an earlier article entitled "The 
'Entrenched Sections' of the South Africa Act", which appeared in The 
Commercial Law Reporter, June 1949 at 359 et seq. 
66lbid. at 42. 
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The entrenched provisions did not, according to Cowen's argument, limit the 
legislative power of Parliament but merely prescribed the manner in which 
Parliament should exercise its supreme legislative power; in other words, the 
entrenched provisions merely described what Parliament was for the purpose 
of exercising its supreme legislative power in certain instances.67 As 
Cowen68 put it: 
11 It is of the essence of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty that when the 
constituent elen1ents of Parliament have duly declared their will in an Act of Parliament, the 
authority of that Act, no 1natter what it decrees, cannot be questioned in the Courts. But this resu]t 
follows only when the constituent e]ements of Parliament have observed the rules which prescribe 
what mu._~ be done in order that their will may be duly declared. 11 
2.1.1. Harris v Minister of the Interior69 
There were two major issues with which the Appellate Division was faced in 
Harris v Minister of the Interior, namely the nature of the Union 
Parliament, that is its structure, its manner of legislating and its powers, and 
the relationship between the Union Parliament and the courts. Both these 
issues were relevant to a determination of the validity of the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act. 
Counsel for the Minister had advanced two lines of argument. It was argued, 
in the first instance, that the removal of Coloured voters from the common 
voters' roll did not amount to a disqualification within the meaning of section 
35 of the South Africa Act. The gist of this argument was that the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act did not prejudice any voter in the exercise of his 
voting right but merely made provision for an alternative and more generous 
67See Marshall op cit. at 156. 
680p cit. at 42. 
69Supra. 
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form of representation. The court did not have any difficulty in rejecting this 
argument. It was clear, the court found, that by removing Coloured voters 
from the common voters' roll and placing them in a separate and inferior roll, 
the Act disqualified voters on the ground of race or colour in contravention 
of the provisions of section 35 of the South Africa Act. 70 · The Separate 
Representation of Voters Act sanctioned the drawing of separate registers 
drawn on the basis of race or colour. Section 35, on the other hand, made 
provision for "a guarantee of defined rights, not their equivalents". 71 
The second line of argument advanced by counsel for the Minister was that 
even if the Separate Representation of Voters Act did in fact disqualify voters 
on the basis of race or colour, Parliament had acted within its powers in 
passing the Act without following the prescribed special procedure. It was 
contended that, with the passing of the Statute of Westminster, the entrenched 
provisions of the South Africa Act had lost their efficacy and that the Union 
Parliament could as a result adopt any procedure it liked. The court was urged 
to follow the decision in Ndwlana v Hofmeyr. 72 
The thrust of the second line of argument was that the efficacy of the 
entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act depended entirely on the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865; it was argued that since the Statute of 
Westminster had rendered the Colonial Laws Validity Act no longer binding 
in so far as the Union Parliament was concerned, all fetters to which the latter 
was hitherto subject had fallen away;73 the Union Parliament, so ran the 
argument, was free to amend the entrenched provisions either expressly or by 
70At 454-455. 
71At 455. 
12Supra. 
73See Chapt. 3 for a discussion of the effect of the Statute of Westminster 
in so far as the Union Parliament was concerned. 
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implication; it could amend the entrenched provision by implication by simply 
not following the procedure laid down in section 152 of the South Africa Act. 
The implication of the second line of argument was two-fold. It implied, in 
the first instance, that the passing of the Statute of Westminster had rendered 
the Union Parliament fully 'sovereign', so that its status was much the same 
as that of the British Parliament. As a body with supreme and omnipotent 
legislative competence, the British Parliament could make any law whatsoever, 
and the courts would be incompetent to inquire into and pronounce upon the 
validity of such law. Secondly, if the status of the Union Parliament was 
similar to that of the British Parliament, it followed that the relationship 
between the Union Parliament and the judiciary had become identical to that 
between the British Parliament and the judiciary in England; the South 
African judiciary would therefore be incompetent to inquire into and 
pronounce upon the validity of acts of the Union Parliament. 
The court approached the question of the effect of the Statute of Westminster 
from the viewpoint of the meaning of 'Union Parliament'. The meaning of 
'Parliament' in relation to the Union had to be sought in the South Africa Act: 
11 When it (the Statute of Westminster] refers to a law made by a Dominion, such law 
means in relation to South Africa a Jaw made by the Union Parliament functioning bicamerally 
or unicamerally in accordance with the requirements of the South Africa Act74 . . . It is [the 
South Africa Act] and not the Statute of Westminster which prescribes the manner in which the 
constituent elements of Parliament must function for the purpose of pasfilng legislation. "75 
The court found that although the Statute of Westminster had in a number of 
respects increased the powers of the Union Parliament, it had not altered the 
definition of Parliament and its manner of legislating as prescribed in the 
74At 462. 
75At 464. 
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South Africa Act. 76 Once it became clear that 'Union Parliament' meant 
Parliament functioning in accordance with the South Africa Act, the Statute 
of Westminster did not take the matter any further. 77 
The court did not find the decision in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr to be an 
obstacle. A survey of the authorities78 showed that the court would be 
entitled to depart from its previous decision if it was convinced that the 
decision was wrong. 79 Centlivres CJ found that Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 
was wrongly decided and that the court was not bound to follow it. It is 
submitted, however, that the court could simply have distinguished the 
Ndlwana case. In the Ndlwana case Parliament had in fact followed the 
prescribed procedure, so that Parliament had within that context properly 
exercised its supreme legislative powers; no court of law was therefore 
competent to question the exercise of such powers. 80 In Harris v 
Minister of the Interior, on the other hand, Parliament had not followed 
the prescribed procedure and was thus, as then constituted, not empowered by 
the South Africa Act to exercise its supreme and omnipotent legislative powers 
76 At 460-462. 
77At 465. 
78 At 452-454. 
79 At 452-454. 
80In the Ndlwana case Stratford ACJ had opined that Parliament could 
"adopt any procedure it thinks fit. .. ". This opinion was unfortunate; the 
learned Acting Chief Justice could simply have disposed of the matter by 
holding that the Union Parliament was, in terms of the South Africa Act, 
bound to enact the Representation of Natives Act, 1936 in accordance with the 
prescribed special procedure. Contrary to the argument advanced by counsel 
for Ndlwana, the prescribed special procedure was in fact necessary for a 
disqualification of Ndlwana on the basis of his race or colour. This view is 
consistent with the decision of the court in Harris v Minister of the 
Interior (supra) : see in particular the remarks of Centlivres CJ at 470G-
H. 
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in relation to the entrenched provisions. 
In Harris v Minister of the Interior the Appellate Division directly 
considered the question whether the prescribed special procedure had been 
followed and found itself competent to inquire into this question. The court, 
however, simply found that it was competent to inquire into and pronounce 
upon the question whether an Act of Parliament had been passed in 
accordance with the prescribed procedure, without analysing or stating the 
origin of this competence. 
It is clear that had the court boldly stated its competence to test the validity 
of legislation it would have opened itself to a charge of controlling the 
exercise of legislative power; all that the court purported to do was to declare 
and apply the law as laid down in the South Africa Act. 
Centlivres CJ simply relied on R v Ndobe81 for the proposition that the 
courts were competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the question 
whether an instrument which purported to be an Act of Parliament had been 
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. According to the Chief 
Justice, once it became clear that the Statute of Westminster had left the 
entrenched provisions intact, it followed that 
11the principles enunciated in Rex v Ndobe [were] still sound law, namely that courts of 
law have the power to declare Act 46 of 1951 invalid on the ground that it was not passed in 
conformity with the provisions of secs. 35 and 152 of the South Africa Act. "82 
The Appellate Division ordered, in terms of the appellant's prayer, that "the 
measure known as Act 46 of 1951 is invalid, null and void, and of no legal 
force in terms of and by virtue of section 35 and 152 of the South Africa Act, 
1909, as amended". 
81Supra. 
82At 469E. 
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2.1.2. Minister of the Interior v Harris'" 
The decision of the court in Harris v Minister of the Interior• was 
not well received by the government. Shortly after the decision of the court 
the Prime Minister, Dr Malan, issued a statement which was not only a 
denunciation of the judgment of the court but also brought into sharp focus the 
relationship between the Union Parliament and the courts. 
In his statement the Prime Minister made known the government's intention 
to introduce, as soon as possible, legislation which would ensure, first, that 
the 'sovereignty' of Parliament would be placed beyond all doubt, secondly, 
that the courts of the country would not have the right to test the validity of 
acts of Parliament and thirdly, that the courts of the country would not be 
involved in constitutional issues of a political nature. 85 
It was clear that the government's intention was to reverse the position 
brought about by the judgment of the Appellate Division in Harris v 
Minister of the Interior and to reinstate the effect of the judgment in 
Ndlwana v Hofmeyr.86 
Following upon its resolve to reverse the judgment of the court in Harris v 
Minister of the Interior, and to remove Coloured voters from the 
common voters' roll, the government proceeded to enact, through the ordinary 
83Supra. 
84Supra. 
85May op cit. at 57. 
86Supra. 
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bicameral procedure, the High Court of Parliament Act, 1952.87 The Act 
created a High Court of Parliament, which was composed of members of 
Parliament; its function was, inter alia, to review any past or future judgment 
of the Appellate Division in which an Act of Parliament was declared 
invalid.88 In due course the High Court convened to review the decision of 
the court in Harris v Minister of the Interior; it reversed the decision 
of the court and upheld the validity of the Separate Representation of Voters 
Act, 1951. 89 
The validity of the High Court of Parliament Act was challenged in the Cape 
Provincial Division by the successful parties in Harris v Minister of the 
Interior. The judges of the Cape Provincial Division felt themselves bound 
by the judgment of the Appellate Division in Harris v Minister of the 
Interior and held that the High Court of Parliament Act was invalid as it in 
effect undermined the efficacy of the provisions of the entrenched provisions 
of the South Africa Act. Ironically, the government appealed to the very same 
Appellate Division whose testing right it had sought to deny. 
The question which the Appellate Division had to consider in Minister of 
the Interior v Harris was whether the Union Parliament had, in enacting 
the High Court of Parliament Act through the ordinary bicameral procedure, 
acted in contravention of the provisions of the South Africa Act. It also 
became necessary, however, to decide whether the court was in fact entitled 
to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of the High Court of 
Parliament Act. 
87 Act 35 of 1952. 
'"Section 2, Act 35 of 1952. 
89See in general May op cit at 60. 
-112-
The validity of the High Court of Parliament Act was associated with the 
nature of the High Court of Parliament. The court did not have any difficulty 
in finding that the High Court of Parliament was not a court of law but simply 
Parliament in disguise; it did not possess any of the recognised qualities of a 
court of law.90 Parliament could not, by passing an Act giving itself the 
name of a court of law, take any decision the effect of which would be to 
destroy the efficacy of the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act 
without following the prescribed procedure. The court unanimously decided 
that the High Court of Parliament Act was invalid. 
In Harris v Minister of the Interior the courts' testing right had been 
implicitly acknowledged in Centlivres CJ's judgment, but had not been 
explicitly stated. In Minister of the Interior v Harris the judges of 
appeal openly expressed the view that the courts were entitled to inquire into 
and pronounce upon the question whether an Act of Parliament had been 
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 
Cent!ivres CJ found the basis of the courts' testing right in the constitutional 
entrenchment of certain rights. In the Chief Justice's opinion, the 
constitutional entrenchment of the right to vote gave an affected individual 
11 the right lo cal] on the judicial power to help him resist legislative or executive action 
which offends against [the entrenchment]. 1191 
By making provision for a special procedure for the amendment or repeal of 
the right to vote the Constitution (the South Africa Act), also implicitly 
enjoined the courts to ensure that the prescribed procedure was followed; this 
they did by reviewing the legislation in issue and declaring it invalid if it was 
found to have been passed without following the prescribed procedure. The 
90See in particular the judgments of Centlivres CJ, at 783 and Greenberg 
JA, at 786. 
91At 779. 
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Constitution envisaged the sanction of invalidity as a means of making a 
constitutional safeguard effective; this sanction could only be applied by a 
court of law.92 Until legislation which was validly passed took away the duty 
of the courts to protect and render effective the entrenchment of rights 
contained in the Constitution, that duty remained to be fulfilled .93 
The Chief Justice sought support for his assertion of the courts' testing right 
.in his earlier opinion in Swart NO v Garner and Others'" and in the 
opinion of Lord Wright, sitting in the Privy Council, in James v 
Commonwealth of Australia. 95 In Swart's case Centlivres CJ had 
held that section 137 of the South Africa Act, one of the entrenched 
provisions, conferred rights and privileges which were enforceable in courts 
of law. 96 In the James case Lord Wright had quoted97 from a judgment of 
Lord Selborne in The Queen v Burah98 , a case dealing with the powers 
of the Indian Legislature under the Act of the Imperial Parliament; there it 
was stated that 
"the established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits 
have been exceeded, must of necessity detennine that question. 1199 
Greenberg JA's view was that "under section 152 the citizen is entitled to 
92At 779-780. 
93At 779. 
941951 (3) SA 589 (A). 
951936 AC 578. 
96At 602 and 611. 
97James v Commonwealth of Australia (supra) at 613. 
98[1878] 3 AC 889. 
99At 904. 
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have recourse to courts of law for a decision as to whether any legislation is 
invalid because of that section ... ''. 100 It was, in his opinion, implicit in 
section 152 that the authors of the South Africa Act provided the safeguard of 
recourse to courts of law and that they must have had in mind courts which 
formed part of the existing judicial system. Although Greenberg JA based his 
opinion on what he considered to be what the authors of the Constitution (the 
South Africa Act) must have had in mind, he made no attempt, however, to 
examine what exactly was the original intention of the authors. 101 
Van den Hcever JA essentially based his assertion of the courts' testing right 
on the doctrine of the trias politica or the separation of powers and checks 
and balances. In his opinion the South Africa Act created a system of checks 
and safeguards. 102 Section 152 made provision for a check upon the exercise 
of legislative power in relation to constitutionally protected rights; 103 this 
check was safeguarded and made effective through the courts' right to test the 
validity of legislation which affected the entrenched provisions. 
Van den Heever JA found the doctrine of the trias politica and judicial power 
to enforce the entrenched provision implied in the second preamble of the 
South Africa Act: 104 
"From the second preamble of the South Africa Act it is clear that the authors of our 
constitution had in mind the doctrine of the trias politica and the existence of some judicial power 
to enforce the constitutional guarantees. lbat seem~ 10 follow by necessary intendment. 11 
It could have been that the authors of the South Africa Act did not 
100At 785. 
101For a discussion of the concept 'original intent of the framers' see 
Chapt. 10 infra. 
102At 790. 
103At 791. 
104At 792. 
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contemplate that the judicial power to safeguard the entrenched provisions 
would forever be exercised by courts constituted in a specific manner; it could 
also have been contemplated that Parliament would have absolute freedom in 
the creation of the courts; however, whatever Parliament created, it had to be 
a court, that is a body other than Parliament and capable of passing judicial 
judgment on disputes between Parliament as ordinarily constituted, or even in 
joint session, and subjects who complain that they have been unconstitutionally 
deprived of their rights. 105 
In his judgment Van den Heever JA showed a keen awareness of the 
fundamental difference between the constitutional protection of individual 
rights and the operation of the doctrine of legislative supremacy and the role 
of the judiciary in relation to it. The judge expressed the following view: 
11 It is quite another matter, however, if the stanue we have to interpret expressly applied 
curbs on legislative powers in the interest of the subject and has entrusted to the courts, if their 
aid be invoked, the duty of protecting the rights of the subject against the enactment of measures 
which purport in excess of such power to deprive citizens of guaranteed constitutional rights. In 
such a case the Court would not be doing its duty if by mechanical adherence to words it allowed 
the patent intention of the constituent legislature to be defeated and the rights to be 
proscribed. 11106 
Hoexter JA found that "the testing right is the very essence of the 
constitutional guarantee contained in section 152. Without the testing right 
there is no protection whatever for the citizen whose entrenched rights are 
being assailed". 107 
Schreiner JA found that the South Africa Act made no express provision for 
a determination of the validity of legislation as regards the entrenched 
105Idem. 
106At 794A. 
107At 794F. 
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provisions; this meant, in his opinion, that such a determination was left to the 
ordinary courts of the land.108 In Schreiner JA's view the entrenched 
provisions were capable of protection only through the sanction of invalidity 
implemented by a court of law exercising judicial review .109 
It is significant to note that the assertion of the courts' testing right by all five 
judges of appeal was mainly confined to the question whether the High Court 
of Parliament Act was passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 
The nature and structure of the High Court of Parliament as created by the 
Act was examined in order to determine whether the High Court of Parliament 
was a court of law for purposes of dealing with legislation falling within the 
purview of the entrenched provisions. The substantive validity of the Act was 
not in issue; what the court was called upon to do was to look at the 
procedure followed for its enactment. 
2.1.3. Collins v Minister of the lnterior110 
The government's reaction to the decision of the court in the Harris 
cases111 was that the cases had been wrongly decided; it maintained that the 
correct position was that laid down in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr'12. Some 
108Schreiner JA's judgment is remm1scent of Chief Justice Marshall's 
approach in Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Although the 
Constitution of the United States did not expressly confer the testing right on 
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that ihe court possessed 
the power to review acts of Congress because the function of applying the 
law, including the law of the Constitution, to cases at hand was entrusted to 
the courts. 
109At 787. 
110Supra. 
111Supra. 
112Supra. 
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constitutional law writers, notably VerLoren van Themaat113 and Wade114, 
also took the view that the Harris cases were incorrectly decided. 
The argument for criticising the decision of the court in the Harris cases was 
that the question whether the entrenched sections were still entrenched after 
the passing of the Statute of Westminster was not a legal one but a political 
one which could only be resolved by the legislature itself; it was contended 
that the court invalidated the legislation in issue by creating "new law in a 
situation which should strictly be called revolutionary" .115 
In 1955 the government introduced legislation to increase the number of 
judges of the Appellate Division and the number of members of the Senate, 
the upper House of Parliament. The Appellate Division Quorum Act116, 
which was passed by a simple majority of members of the two houses of 
Parliament sitting bicamerally, increased the quorum of the Appellate Division 
from five to eleven in any case where the validity of an Act of Parliament was 
in issue. The Senate Act117, which was also passed by a simple majority of 
members of the two houses of Parliament sitting bicamerally, increased the 
number of members of the Senate from 48 to 89. The government's intention 
was, according to Marshall118 to '"fix the courts' and then to 'fix 
Parliament'". 119 
113J.P verLoren van Themaat Staatsreg (1956) at 450-451. 
114Wade 1955 CLJ at 173. 
115Jdem. 
116Act 27 of 1955. 
117Act 53 of 1955. 
118Marshall op cit. at 232. 
119The Senate was 'packed', largely through the nomination of additional 
members, in such a way that the government would have a clear two-thirds 
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The reconstituted Parliament proceeded to pass the South Africa Act 
Amendment Act120 through the special unicameral procedure prescribed in 
section 152 of the South Africa Act; a comfortable two-thirds majority of all 
members of both houses of Parliament was obtained. The Amendment Act 
consisted of only five sections; it retroactively validated the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act121 and effectively precluded the courts from 
inquiring into or pronouncing upon the validity of an Act of Parliament, save 
one which sought to amend or repeal section 137 ( the equality of the English 
and Afrikaans languages provision) and section 152 (the entrenching 
provision) of the South Africa Act. 122 
The validity of the Senate Act and the South Africa Act Amendment Act was 
challenged by one Collins and one Brikkels, Coloured voters who claimed that 
the Senate Act, either read on its own or read together with the Amendment 
Act, had the effect of abolishing their voting right contrary to the provisions 
of sections 35 and 152 of the South Africa Act. 
The application to have the two Acts declared invalid was dismissed by the 
Cape Provincial Division. Collins and Brikkels appealed to the Appellate 
Division. The enlarged Appellate Division considered the appeal and upheld, 
by a majority of ten to one, the validity of the Senate Act and the Amendment 
Act. Schreiner JA delivered the lone dissenting judgment. 
2.1.3.1. The Majority Opinion. 
majority at a joint sitting of the two houses of Parliament: see May op cit. 
at 73-75. 
iwAct 9 of 1956. 
121Section 1, Act 9 of 1956. 
122Section 2, Act 9 of 1956. 
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The judgment of the majority was delivered by Centlivres CJ. Hoexter , 
Fagan, De Beer, Reynolds, De Villiers, Brink, Beyers and Hall JJA 
concurred; Steyn JA delivered a separate but concurring judgment. 
There was little doubt that the object of enacting the Senate Act was to 
provide the government with the required two-thirds majority to pass an Act, 
the effect of which was to abolish the voting rights of persons classified as 
'Coloureds'. However, the majority of the judges of appeal decided that 
neither the Senate Act nor the South Africa Act Amendment Act was invalid. 
They held that the Senate Act did not repeal or amend the entrenched 
provisions; the Amendment Act was passed in accordance with the prescribed 
procedure. 123 
The real issue, however, was not whether the Senate Act directly repealed or 
amended the entrenched provisions but what its ultimate effect, taken together 
with the Amendment Act, was. Although Centlivres CJ was throughout 
conscious of the fact that the purpose of enacting the Senate Act was to 
provide the government with the required two-thirds majority at a joint sitting 
of the two houses of Parliament to validate the Separate Representation of 
Voters Act124, he held that such a purpose was not relevant because 
Parliament possessed the power to legislate on any matter. 125 
Counsel for the appellants had argued that it could never have been the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution (the South Africa Act) that 
Parliament could, by means of a legislative scheme, side-step the prescribed 
procedure to abolish the rights of voters on the basis of colour; it was argued 
that such an abolition could only take place by means of a genuine two-thirds 
majority at a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament as originally composed. 
123At 564. 
1241dem. 
125At 565. 
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Centlivres CJ found, however, that the Senate Act did not purport to affect the 
appellants' voting rights and that it did not therefore abolish those rights. A 
further legislative step was necessary to abolish the appellants' rights, but such 
a step was in conformity with the provisions of section 152 of the South 
Africa Act. 126 
The possibility that the framers of the South Africa Act might well have been 
aware that Parliament could try to circumvent the entrenched provisions by 
reconstituting either or both of the houses of Parliament for the sole purpose 
of obtaining the required two-thirds majority at a joint sitting was not ruled 
out; Centlivres CJ opined, however, that it was possible that the framers of 
the South Africa Act realised that 
11 the supreme Jegislative power (of Parliament) in relation to any subject is always 
capable of abuse, but it is not to be presumed that it wi11 be improperly used; if it is, the only 
remedy is an appeal to those by whom the legislature is elected. 11127 
Centlivres Cl's opinion that the framers could have intended that the remedy 
for abuse of legislative power should be with the electorate is open to 
criticism. It is equally arguable that the framers of the South Africa Act 
envisaged that any amendment or repeal of the entrenched provisions would 
be effected through the prescribed procedure in a single legislative process and 
not through a multiple legislative scheme whereby the government first 
reconstituted the composition of the houses of Parliament and then proceeded 
to do what it had previously failed to achieve. 
It may be argued that it was also the function of the court, and not only of the 
electorate, to ensure that Parliament did not abuse its powers in so far as the 
procedural exercise of such powers was concerned. Had the court adopted a 
126At 569. 
127 At 567. In his judgment Centlivres CJ did not make any distinction 
between purpose and motive. See infra for a discussion of this distinction. 
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purposive or teleological approach it would have found that the purpose of 
enacting the entrenched provisions was to provide a real protection of the 
Cape franchise; the purpose of the Senate Act, which was to take away the 
franchise indirectly, was completely inconsistent with the purpose of the 
entrenched provisions. 128 
If the framers of the South Africa Act indeed envisaged that a government 
would be able to side-step the entrenched provisions through a multiple 
legislative scheme then it becomes difficult to see why in the first place they 
chose to enact these provisions as a guarantee of the Cape Coloured voting 
rights.It is submitted that to argue that the framers envisaged that Parliament 
could indirectly abolish the Cape franchise amounts to acknowledging that the 
efforts of the framers to preserve this franchise was not a serious exercise 
intended to have a binding effect. 129 
Moreover, the abolition of the voting rights of Collins and Brikkels took away 
the very same remedy which Centlivres CJ spoke of when he said that the 
framers of the South Africa Act could have intended that the only remedy 
would be an appeal to the electorate; in so far as the appellants' voting rights 
had been taken away they could no longer show their disapproval, in an 
election, of Parliament's conduct. 
Ccntlivres CJ's approach was a marked departure from his earlier approach 
in Minister of the Interior v Harrisno While in that case he 
meticulously examined whether the High Court of Parliament was a court of 
law for purposes of dealing with the entrenched provisions and concluded that 
128See infra for a discussion of the judgment of Schreiner JA, who 
followed the teleological approach. 
129See C.R.M Dlamini "The Senate Case Revisited" 1988 SALJ 470 at 
473. 
130Supra. 
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it was clearly not a court of law, he was reluctant in the Collins case131 
to find that the reconstituted Senate was not the real Senate, as envisaged by 
the framers of the South Africa Act, for purposes of dealing with the 
entrenched provisions. 132 
The majority of the judges of appeal took the view that the court was not 
competent to question the propriety of legislation or the policy of the 
legislature where the provisions of the law were clear; the duty of the court 
was to interpret and administer the law as it was. 133 
Steyn JA gave different reasons for his supporting judgment. He based his 
decision purely on an interpretation of the proviso to section 152 of the South 
Africa Act. In his opinion the reconstituted Senate was a 'House of 
Parliament' within the meaning of section 152; there was no room for reading 
into the section words such as 'as ordinarily constituted' so as to qualify 
'House of Parliament'. According to Steyn JA, no matter what the purpose of 
reconstituting the Senate was, the body so created was a Senate competent to 
perform its functions at a joint sitting with the House of Assembly in terms 
of the proviso to section 152. The purpose for which the legislation 
reconstituting the Senate was enacted was, in Steyn JA's opinion, irrelevant. 
2.1.3.2. The Judgment of Schreiner JA. 
The judgment of Schreiner JA stands in sharp contrast to the judgment of the 
majority and is more in line with the approach of the Court in Minister of 
131Supra. 
132See C.F Forsyth In Danger for their Talents (1985) at 75; 
Dlamini 1988 SAW at 472. 
133At 567. 
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the Interior v Harris.134 As opposed to the formalistic approach of the 
majority, Schreiner JA adopted a functional or teleological approach which 
underlies the essence of the role of the judiciary in relation to the question 
whether legislation has been constitutionally enacted. 135 Instead of merely 
inquiring into the manner and form in which the Senate Act was enacted, 
Schreiner JA felt it necessary to inquire into the purpose, as opposed to the 
motive, 136 for which the Senate Act was enacted and the circumstances 
surrounding its enactment in order to determine whether the reconstituted 
Senate was a House of Parliament within the meaning of section 152 and for 
purposes of dealing with the entrenched provisions. 
In Schreiner JA's opinion, the crucial question was whether 'Houses of 
Parliament' in the second proviso to section 152 included a House created by 
Parliament ad hoc, a House created with the main aim of obtaining by 
nomination or similar device a two-thirds majority at a joint sitting in 
mind. 137 Schreiner JA took the view that the reconstituted Senate was 
prima facie not a House of Parliament within the meaning of the proviso. He 
found that 
"the proviso was intended to furnish a real and not merely a theoretical protection against 
parliamentary majorities acting bicamerally. Prima facie the framers of the Constitution did not 
intend that Parliament, that is in effect the government acting through its majority, should have 
the power by bicameral legislation to convert an insufficient majority in a joint session into a 
sufficient one, merely by invoking the procedure of nomination or its equivalent. 11138 
134Supra. 
135See Chap!. 9. 
136See infra for a discussion of the distinction between purpose and 
motive. 
"'At 571. 
138At 574pr-A. 
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It would have been quite in order for Parliament to reconstitute the Senate for 
general purposes; however, to reconstitute it as part of a clearly preconceived 
scheme to bypass the protection contained in section 152 amounted to a 
subversion of the entrenched provisions, something which the framers of the 
South Africa Act could never have intended to be achieved indirectly. 
The gist of Schreiner JA's judgment was that the Senate Act was enacted with 
the specific purpose of setting in motion the removal of Coloured voters from 
the common voters' roll; this purpose was achieved by reactivating the 
Separate Representation of Voters Act. Although the enactment of the 
individual Acts was perfectly within the powers of Parliament they were, 
viewed jointly, a subversion of the entrenched provisions because "once 
legislation in the one field is used as a stage preparatory to legislation in the 
other, there ceases to be real separation and in substance they become one 
field". 139 It was therefore the purpose behind the enactment of the Senate 
Act which rendered it invalid. In Schreiner JA's opinion the Senate was 
reconstituted ad hoc for the purpose of subverting the entrenched provisions; 
it was therefore not a House of Parliament within the meaning of section 152 
and for the purpose of dealing with the entrenched provisions. 
According to Wiechers140, the judgment of Schreiner JA was correct in 
principle. When the government unilaterally reconstituted the Senate in order 
to increase its own majority it went against the fundamental rule on which 
Parliament was based and from which it derived its ultimate legitimacy, 
namely that the people who conferred power on Parliament should be freely 
represented in the legislature to participate through their representatives in the 
139 At 575B-C. 
140M. Wiechers "The Fundamental Laws Behind our Constitution-
Retlections on the Judgment of Schreiner JA in the Senate Case" in E. Kahn 
(ed) Fiat Justitia - Essays in Memory of Oliver Deneys 
Schreiner (1983) at 383. 
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exercise and distribution of that power. 141 In essence, the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament was limited by the grant of power which it received 
from the people, who arc the political sovereign. In granting power to 
Parliament as constituted by the Senate and the House of Assembly, the 
people intended that the Senate would be a body of revision and control, the 
composition of which could not be altered for the first ten years after Union 
and whose proportional structure would reflect the electoral support both in 
the provinces and in the House of Assembly .142 To reconstitute the Senate 
by nominating additional members or by means of some such similar process 
amounted to exceeding the powers conferred by the political sovereign. 
There is no authoritative source to which reference can be made to ascertain 
the nature and scope of the rule that Parliament is bound by the grant of 
power from the people or the political sovereign; 143 it is a rule of political 
morality which developed during the evolution of medieval, absolute 
monarchies into modern representative governments; the basic tenet of a 
representative government is that since the government exercises its authority 
on behalf of the people, the people must be freely represented in the decision-
making process. 144 Should the government not comply with the popular 
demands of the people, they are able to replace it in periodic elections. 145 
141lbid. at 389. This rule is one of the basic rules of democratic 
government : see infra. 
142ldem. 
143The existence of fundamental rules such as these can be gleaned from 
"works on constitutional law or on constitutional or political history or the 
biographies of public figures, more especially where they deal with crises of 
one type or another" : Halsbury Laws of England 4th ed (1973) 8 818. 
144See Sasson & Viljoen op cit. at 82. 
145See J.D van der Vyver "Political Power Constraints and the American 
Constitution" 1987 SAW 416 at 418. 
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Fundamental rules of the Constitution such as the one that the people who 
conferred power on Parliament should be freely represented in the legislature 
are generally not enforceable by the courts; 146 they owe their existence and 
validity to general acceptance. 147 Their importance lies in the fact that they 
ensure the continuity of the foundations on which the Constitution rests. 148 
They are found in all types of Constitution. 
It has been opined that the judgment of the majority in the Collins case was 
in reality inevitable149 ; a further invalidation of an Act of Parliament would 
have dragged the courts into a political controversy, especially in the light of 
the government's firm resolve to remove Coloured voters from the common 
voters' roll. 
According to Wiechers, 150 although the judgment of Schreiner JA was 
correct in principle in that it sought to enforce a fundamental rule behind the 
Constitution, the issue it sought to address was a political question151 which 
146Certain fundamental rules of the Constitution may be enshrined in a 
justiciable Constitution, in which event they become enforceable. Section 6 of 
the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993 in essence enshrines the rule 
that the people who conferred power on Parliament should be freely 
represented in the legislature. 
147See in general Verloren van Themaat - Wiechers op cit at 172-178 and 
G. Carpenter Introduction to South African Constitutional Law 
(1987) at 175-179 where conventions are discussed. 
148Wiechers (Kahn (ed)) op cit. at 389-390. 
149See H.W.R Wade "The Senate Act and the Entrenched Sections of the 
South Africa Act" 1957 SALJ 160 at 166. 
150Wiechers in E. Kahn (ed) (1983) op cit. at 393-394. Wiechers prefers 
the judgment of Steyn JA. 
151See Chapt. 10 infra for a discussion of the 'political question' doctrine 
and the role of the judiciary in the determination of constitutionality in cases 
which raise 'political questions'. 
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could only be properly resolved by the electorate and not by the courts. 
Dlamini152 argues that this view ignores, in relation to the South Africa Act, 
the fact that both the electorate and legislature were not truly representative 
of all the people of South Africa, a situation which justified judicial 
intervention. Although this argument has some merit in it, in the sense that in 
a democratic state the judicial authority has the decisive function of controlling 
the exercise of government authority, it loses its force if regard is had to the 
fact that the view of the court itself in relation to the question whether 
Parliament had acted constitutionally or not was decisive. 153 
Wiechers154 submits that since judges are not representatives of the nation 
or the political sovereign and do not control armies or other forces of 
coercion, they cannot be protectors of the state and its fundamental laws. It 
may be argued, however, that although judges are not true representatives of 
the nation or the political sovereign, they are an integral part of the state 
machinery and as such representatives of the state; they have down the ages 
been charged with interpreting and applying the law and, in a constitutional 
state, play the fundamental role of resolving disputes, not only between 
citizens among themselves but also between citizens and all organs of the 
state; in performing this fundamental role they protect the interests of both the 
citizens and the state and help to maintain the integrity of the state. 155 
152See Dlamini 1988 SAW at 473. 
153In the light of the relationship between Parliament and the courts in the 
Westminster-type system of parliamentary sovereignty, it is doubtful whether 
any other court would have departed from the view of the majority. Schreiner 
JA was simply far ahead of his time: see VerLoren van Themaat-Wiechers 
op cit. at 317 and 319. 
154Wiechers in E. Kahn (ed) (1983) op cit. at 394. 
155See Chapt. 11 where the legitimacy and democratic character of judicial 
review are discussed. 
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2.1.4. An Evaluation of the Entrenched Sections Trilogy. 
Judicial review of legislation has in the past not been readily accepted in South 
Africa; this has been so despite the fact that the Appellate Division has on 
previous occasions exercised the power to review parliamentary 
legislation. 156 Although the Appellate Division had in Harris V Minister 
of the Interior exercised the power to review an act of Parliament, the 
court did not examine or deal with the basis and the nature of its power of 
judicial review. 157 
The subsequent judgment of the court in Minister of the Interior v 
Harris was significant in that the court explicitly acknowledged for the first 
time that the courts were vested with the power to inquire into and pronounce 
upon the question whether Parliament had legislated in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed in the Constitution; this power to review legislation was 
implicit in the constitutional provisions which guaranteed certain rights. The 
court in essence acknowledged that the judiciary has the fundamental role of 
ensuring that Parliament respects constitutional guarantees. 
The court's acknowledgement of its power to inquire into the question whether 
Parliament had legislated in accordance with the prescribed procedure did not 
in any way amount to a new approach to the validity of legislation. In both the 
Harris cases the court adopted a positivistic and legalistic approach which 
156Cf Ndlwana v Hofmeyr (supra). In line with the earlier decision 
of the Appellate Division in R v Ndobe (supra) the government took the 
view that the courts were incompetent to review Acts of Parliament. 
157The court simply inquired into the validity of the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act and declared that the Act was invalid on the 
basis that Parliament did not follow the prescribed procedure, without laying 
any foundation or basis for its power to test the validity of legislation. 
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involved a mechanical application of known legal rules to the facts of the 
case. 158 In both cases the court avoided a policy-based interpretation. 
However, once the court had assumed the role of constitutional adjudicator in 
relation to constitutionally protected rights, it might as well have engaged 
itself in a policy-based interpretation. Indeed, the courts do in fact perform a 
policy-making function in the process of developing the Jaw and adjusting it 
to the ever-changing needs and aspirations of society .159 According to 
Bell 160 "the judge as a representative of the State has to pay some attention 
in resolving the dispute to the fairness and social consequences of his decision, 
and this amounts to giving direction to society to some extent". By following 
a narrow and legalistic approach in the Harris cases the court foreclosed a 
creative policy oriented approach for itself. 
Schreiner JA's judgment in the Collins case, on the other hand, introduced 
a fresh approach to the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The 
judgment transcends the purely mechanical and legalistic approach of the court 
in the two Harris cases and of the majority in the Collins case. Schreiner 
JA adopted a functional or purposive approach which epitomises the role of 
the judiciary in relation to constitutional guarantees; 161 this approach seeks 
to give effect to the essence of constitutional guarantees, rather than merely 
giving effect to known legal rules in a mechanical fashion. 
158See Chap!. 10 for an analysis of this approach. 
159See M.M Corbett "Aspects of the Role of Policy in the Evolution of the 
Common Law" 1987 SAW 52 at 54; P.C.A Snyman "Public Policy in 
Anglo-American Law" 1986 CILSA 220; C. Hoexter "Judicial Policy in 
South Africa" 1986 SAW 436. See also Chap!. 10 for a discussion of this 
aspect. 
160J. Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) at 7. 
161See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of the purposive approach. 
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A possible explanation of the majority's refusal to examine the purpose of the 
government's legislative scheme in the Collins case is that they failed to 
make a distinction between purpose and motive and therefore refused to 
examine purpose. In relation to legislation, purpose refers to what the 
legislature is directly aiming at; motive, on the other hand, refers to the 
reasons for so aiming. 162 In determining the validity of the legislative 
scheme it was the scheme itself and what Parliament was aiming at, and not 
the reasons behind the scheme, which were relevant. Motive was irrelevant 
simply because there is a presumption that the legislature acts in good 
faith. 163 
The reluctance of the court to engage in a policy interpretation is not difficult 
to understand. The Constitution was not rigid and only made provision for a 
procedural guarantee, as opposed to a substantive one. The Constitution did 
not contain any extensive value-based justiciable guarantees upon which the 
court could have properly engaged in a policy interpretation; a direct policy 
interpretation could have dragged the court into political controversies. 164 
Yet, the question may be asked whether the court could have succeeded in 
making the entrenched provisions effective without at least looking into the 
purpose of legislation which affected these provisions; it was after all the 
purpose of the legislation which was more likely to determine its nature and 
effect. 165 
2.2. The Section 114 Decisions. 
162Marshall op cit at 243. 
163See Chapter 10 for a discussion of this presumption. 
164See Chapt. 9 for a discussion of the new constitutional dispensation 
which includes a justiciable Bill of Rights containing fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. 
165See Chapt. 10. 
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The provisions of section 114 of the 1961 Constitution166 also became 
relevant in relation to the courts' testing right. As was the case with the 
entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act, the courts' testing right in 
relation to section 114 of the 1961 Constitution was confined to whether the 
procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with. 
In terms of section 59(2) of the 1961 Constitution, no court of law was 
competent to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of an Act of 
Parliament, save in so far as it concerned whether the special procedure for 
legislating in relation to the entrenched provisions was followed was. 167 The 
courts' incompetence to inquire into and to pronounce upon the validity of 
Acts of Parliament was in line with the idea that Parliament was 
'sovereign'. 168 
Section 114 of the 1961 Constitution contained a procedure which had to be 
followed for the alteration of the borders of a province of South Africa169 
or for taking away the legislative competences of a Provincial Council. 170 
In terms of section 114 a petition of the Provincial Council concerned was 
required for the alteration of the borders of a province in respect of which 
such Provincial Council had jurisdiction or for taking away its legislative 
competences. Section 114 was not entrenched. 
The question whether the South African Parliament could alter the borders of 
a province without following the procedure laid down in section 114 arose 
166The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 32 of 1961. 
167The 1961 Constitution contained only two entrenched provisions, 
namely section 108 which made provision for the equality of the English and 
Afrikaans languages and section 118, the entrenching provision. 
168Section 59(1) of the 1961 Constitution. 
169Section 114(a). 
170Section 114(b). 
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pertinently after the alteration of the borders of the Cape Province when the 
then Bophuthatswana was created as an 'independent state'. This question also 
raised the further question whether the courts were competent to inquire into 
and pronounce upon the validity of legislation the effect of which was to alter 
the borders of a province. 
In Nasopie (Edms) Bpk en andere v Minister van Justisie111 
the court held that Parliament could disregard the procedure laid down in 
section 114 since the section was not entrenched. This view was based on the 
argument that a Parliament with supreme and omnipotent legislative 
competence was not bound to follow the procedure laid down in section 114 
and could impliedly repeal the section by simply ignoring it. 172 It implied 
that the court would in such an event have been incompetent to declare an act 
of Parliament passed contrary to the provisions of section 114. 
In Cowburn v Nasopie (Edms) Bpk173 Van den Heever J (as she 
then was) seemed to favour the view that Parliament could not ignore the 
provisions of section 114 when she stated that it could be argued that as long 
as Parliament left section 114 unamended, it was bound by the rules which it 
itself had determined in connection with the alteration of the boundaries of the 
provinces; it would therefore be open to the courts, notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 59(2) of the Constitution Act, to decide in suitable 
circumstances that legislation which was passed contrary to the provisions of 
section 114 was invalid. According to Van den Heever J section 59(2), in so 
1711979 (4) SA 438 (NC). 
172See C.W.H Schmidt "Section 114 of the Constitution and the 
Sovereignty of Parliament" 1962 SALJ 315 at 319-321; E. Kahn "Republic 
Outside the Commonwealth" 1961 Annual Survey of SA Law at 12-14. 
See also May op cit. at 385 in regard to section 149 of the South Africa Act, 
which was similar to section 114 of the 1961 Constitution. 
1731980 (2) SA 547 (NC). 
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far as the procedure for legislating was concerned, placed a limited restriction 
on the courts. This was unfortunately an obiter dictum. 
Implicit in Van den Heever J's opinion are the fundamental laws of 
democracy174 which limit the legislative supremacy of Parliament and also 
give the courts the right to inquire into and pronounce upon the question 
whether Parliament has legislated in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in the Conslitution. 175 The judge laid down a basic framework for a system 
of fundamental constitutional principles in terms of which the courts should 
play a key role in ensuring that, in the interests of justice, Parliament adheres 
to fundamental constitutional law principles. 176 
However, Van den Heever J later held, in Mpangele v Botha and 
others(!), 177 that since section 114 was not entrenched, Parliament could 
ignore its provisions; in her opinion the observance of the provisions of 
section 114 depended on good faith, the electorate and public opinion; the 
courts were incompetent to ensure its observance. It is significant to note, 
however, that what was in issue in Mpangele v Botha (1) was section 
l 14(b ), which dealt with the taking away of the legislative competences of a 
Provincial Council; the operation of section 114(b) was limited by section 85 
of the Constitution Act in that the legislation of a Provincial Council was only 
174See Wiechers in E. Kahn (ed) (1983) op cit. at 389. 
175Cowburn v Nasopie (supra) at 554H-555B. 
176The judge mentioned an example of Parliament enacting a law which 
suspends all future elections and makes the State Presidentship a lifelong and 
hereditary office, with unlimited legislative, executive and judicial powers and 
stated that there would be no doubt that the courts will be able to declare such 
a 'law' invalid on the basis that Parliament acted in contempt of a fundamental 
constitutional rule. See supra for a discussion of fundamental constitutional 
law rules. 
1771982 (3) SA 633 (C). 
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valid as long as it was not in conflict with any Act of Parliament, so that 
section 114(b) could not properly be compared with section 114(a) in its 
operation. 
In Mpangele and another v Botha and others(2)'78 De Kock J 
also came to the conclusion that the provisions of section 114 were not 
binding on Parliament. De Kock J held that since Parliament possessed 
supreme legislative powers, it could impliedly repeal or amend section 114 by 
simply ignoring it. He found that the principles applicable to the entrenched 
provisions were not applicable to section 114. 
Beinart179 had earlier expressed a contrary view regarding the question 
whether Parliament could ignore prescribed procedural requirements and 
whether the courts were incompetent to invalidate legislation which was passed 
contrary to such requirements. According to him, although the courts were 
incompetent to review the reasonableness, wisdom, policy, morality and 
motives of legislation, they were nevertheless competent to inquire into the 
question whether procedural requirements laid down in the Constitution have 
been complied with or not. Section 114 contained rules of procedure which 
conferred upon Provincial Councils rights outside the four walls of 
Parliament; Parliament could not therefore simply ignore these procedures. 
Van der Vyver180 also criticised the view that Parliament was not bound by 
the provisions of section 114 and that the courts were not competent to 
invalidate legislation which was passed contrary to these provisions. He 
'
781982 (3) SA 638(C). 
179B. Beinart "Parliament and the Courts" 1954 Butterworths LR 134. 
180J.D van der Vyver "The Section 114 Controversy and Government 
Anarchy" 1980 SAW 363. 
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dismissed this view as "a mockery of the Constitution". 181 Instead he 
distinguished between, on the one hand, material or substantive provisions and 
procedural provisions on the other hand. According to him the courts were 
competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the question whether Parliament 
had in legislating followed "all legally enacted requirements that constitute the 
process of law-making". 182 
As in the Harris cases and the Collins case, the approach of the courts to 
the section 114 provisions was a narrow and formalistic one. The courts in 
essence took a narrow view of legislative supremacy and, in conformity with 
this doctrine, denied themselves the right to inquire into the question whether 
Parliament had followed the legally enacted constitutional requirements for 
legislating. It was only van den Heever J's obiter dictum in Cowburn v 
Nasopie183 which, like the lone dissenting judgment of Schreiner JA in the 
Collins case, broke away from the narrow and formalistic approach. 
Van den Heever AJ considered Mpangele v Botha(2)184 and declined to 
follow it; he held that it was wrongly decided . He held that a supreme 
legislative authority cannot simply ignore a valid procedural requirement 
regarding the manner and form of legislation, even if the requirement is not 
entrenched. The legislative authority is bound to comply with the requirement 
unless and until it has been expressly or impliedly amended or repealed. 185 
Any instrument passed contrary to the procedural requirement is invalid and 
of no force and effect. 
181lbid. at 368. 
is21dem. 
18
'Supra. 
184Supra. 
185 At 130G-I. 
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3. Legislative Supremacy, Legal Positivism and Judicial 
Control of Legislation. 
The judicial function is closely associated with the meamng of law and 
theoretical approaches to the solution of legal problems. Friedman186 
illustrates the relationship between legal theory and the administration of 
justice by referring to the English case of Baylis v Bishop of 
London187 where Lord Summer (then Hamilton L.J) intimated that the 
courts are not "free to administer that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes 
attractively styled justice between man and man". Friedman makes the point 
that Lord Summer's attitude was itself a profession of a particular 
jurisprudential approach. 
In the South African context a consideration of the role of the judiciary in the 
light of legal theory becomes particularly relevant when the judicial function 
under a system of constitutional supremacy and the guarantee of fundamental 
human rights has to be contrasted with the judicial function under a system of 
legislative supremacy, which is lacking in the area of constitutional guarantees 
and judicial review of the substantive validity of Acts of Parliament. A 
consideration of this nature becomes imperative especially in the light of the 
indictment that the South African judiciary has in the past adopted a narrow, 
purely mechanical or phonographic approach to its interpretive function. 188 
186W. Friedman Legal Theory (1976) at 436. 
187[1913] 1 Ch. 127. 
188See C.J.R Dugard "The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty" 
1971 SAI.J 181 at 182. Dugard has been criticised for explaining judicial 
behaviour in terms of legal theory and for his argument that the past 
performance of the South African judiciary can be explained in terms of the 
judiciary's positivist premise : see J. Gauntlett "Aspects of the Value 
Problems in Judicial Positivism" 1972 Responsa Meridiana 204; C. 
Forsyth & J. Schiller "The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty II" 
1981 SAI.J 218. See, however, infra on the relationship between positivism 
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According to Dugard189 the judicial process under the Westminster-type 
system of legislative supremacy follows the "positivist legal tradition of 
Dicey". The import of this charge is that the judicial function is reduced to a 
mere mechanical interpretation and application of the intention of the 
legislature, without regard being had to legal values and moral standards in 
terms of which a choice can be made in favour of an interpretation which 
fosters the protection of individual rights and freedoms. 190 
Legal positivism is closely associated with Austin's command theory of 
law. 191 In terms of this theory, law is a command of the sovereign; the 
sovereign is either a person or body who does not obey the command of any 
other. According to this theory, therefore, law exists when the sovereign's 
commands, backed by a sanction of punishment, are habitually obeyed by the 
people of a country; its content is identifiable by tests which rest on factual 
considerations alone. 192 This theory is often used as a theoretical justification 
for the view that Parliament is sovereign and therefore not bound by 
restrictions which it has imposed upon itself. 193 
Legal positivism as a doctrine about the nature of law rests on a strict 
separation between law as an expression of the will of the sovereign and law 
and the administration of justice. 
189J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal 
Order (1978) at 373. 
190ldem. See also J. Dugard 1971 SALJ at 182. 
191For a discussion of Austin's theory of law see inter alia G. W Paton A 
Textbook on Jurisprudence (1951) at 274 et seq.; J.D Finch 
Introduction to Legal Theory (1970) at 37 et seq. 
192See D. Dyzenhaus Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems : 
South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy 
(1991) at 6. 
193See Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 171. 
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as it ought to be.194 It strongly advocates a separation of law and 
morality .195 Its claim, and the major fear of its proponents, is that the 
infusion of moral standards and value considerations into law as it is may lead 
lo bad law and wrong value-laden results. 
This doctrine can be contrasted to the value-oriented or normative approach 
to constitutional law; in terms of the value-oriented or normative approach, 
constitutional law is the bearer of higher legal values which reflect 
fundamental libertarian concepts in terms of which positive law must be 
tested. 196 
The meanmg of legal positivism in South Africa and, in particular, its 
influence on the judicial process, has given rise to varying academic 
viewpoints which tend either to support it as a theory of law or to criticise its 
negative impact, especially in the area of judicial protection of fundamental 
human rights. 
Dugard's analysis of legal positivism follows the traditional view of positivism 
as a theory of law which has as its basis two major premises, firstly, that law 
is a command of a political superior and secondly, that law as it is should be 
distinguished from law as it ought to be.197 This conception of law, 
according to Dugard, gives pre-eminence to the will of the legislature as 
expressed in legislation and inhibits, as a result, judicial interpretation of 
194See R. W.M Dias Jurisprudence (1970) at 382; Lord Lloyd 
Introduction to Jurisprudence (1979) at 184. 
195For a comprehensive discussion and argument on the separation of law 
and morals see H.L.A Hart "Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morality" 1958 Harv. LR 593. 
196Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 1-4 and 216-219. See also D.M Davis 
"Positivism and the Judicial Function" 1987 SAW 103 at 110. 
197Dugard op cit. (1978) at 373. 
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legislation in the light of higher legal values. Dugard charges that legal 
positivism reduces the judicial function to a purely mechanical application of 
the intention of the legislature. 198 
Dugard's view of legal positivism and its impact on the judicial function has 
not escaped criticism. Forsyth & Schiller199 have accused Dugard of 
misinterpreting legal positivism. According to them, legal positivism is not a 
theory of law which judges use to avoid their judicial responsibility; they 
assert that positivism is merely descriptive, and not prescriptive, of law. Their 
approach is that since legal positivism merely describes the law and helps to 
accumulate knowledge about the law, it cannot help judges to avoid value 
considerations in judicial decision-making. 
Van Blerk200 has also sharply criticised Dugard's view of legal positivism 
and its impact on the judicial function and accused him of clothing his view 
in "jurisprudential garb". 201 She charges that Dugard's criticism of the South 
African judiciary is in essence based on the social backgrounds of the judges 
and the fact that they are predominantly white. 
In reply to his critics Dugard has pointed out that one should distinguish 
between positivism as a legal philosophy and its understanding by the ordinary 
legal practitioner, who would understand it as a simple and unsophisticated 
concept consisting of the two basic principles of Austinian theory. 202 In his 
198See in particular 1971 SALJ 181. 
199Forsyth & Schiller 1981 SALJ at 218 et seq. 
200A van Blerk Judge and be Judged (1988) at 153-154. 
201At 155. 
202J. Dugard "Some Realism about the Judicial Process and Positivism : 
A Reply" 1981 SALJ 372 at 374-376. See also A.J.G.M Sanders "Legal 
Philosophy as a Political Tool in South Africa" 1990 THRHR 203 at 203-
204. Sanders points out that the concept of legal positivism was seized upon 
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view, it is this understanding of legal positivism which has led to a mechanical 
interpretation and application of law and "a rigid adherence to the distinction 
between law and legal values, with a neglect of human dignity and freedom 
of speech that together with similar principles comprise the value system of 
the South African common law". 203 
However, Dugard later qualified his earlier criticism of legal positivism and 
its influence on the judicial function by asserting that his critique was directed 
at the command theory of law and not at contemporary positivism, which 
recognises that judges do in fact have a discretion to interpret the law in 
favour of individual liberty. 204 
In an illuminating study of the judicial function in what he calls 'wicked' legal 
systems, Dyzenhaus205 has averred that Dugard was wrong in moving away 
from his original view of positivism and its impact on the judicial function. 
He shows that the Austinian command theory may in fact provide an answer 
to the charge that the South African judiciary's approach to the interpretation 
of laws smacked of a mechanical application of the law. 
by some scholars and jurists to legitimise social oppression. 
203Dugard 1981 SALJ at 376. 
204J. Dugard "Review of Forsyth" 1986 SAW 303. The view that judges 
have a discretion in the interpretation and application of law is a rejection of 
the Blackstonian theory which holds that judges cannot make law but can only 
discover it. Centred around these opposing views is the debate concerning 
'judicial creativity' and 'naked usurpation of the legislative function' : see B. 
Dickson "The Judiciary - Law Interpreters or Law-makers?" 1982 Manitoba 
W 701. In the British judicial scene Lord Denning has been a strong 
proponent of judicial creativity in the interpretation of law (see Lord Denning 
The Discipline of Law (1979) ), while Lord Devlin has strongly opposed 
judicial creativity (see Lord Devlin The Judge (1979) and "Judges and 
Lawmakers" 1976 MLR 7). 
205Dyzenhaus op cit. at 217. 
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Dyzenhaus's claim is not that South African judges were positivists. His 
charge is that they have at times espoused a conservative doctrine of judicial 
responsibility which is akin to the positivist view of law. 206 This judicial 
approach, which he calls the 'plain-fact' approach, concentrated more on the 
will of the legislature and excluded moral and value considerations. 207 The 
'plain-fact' approach is mainly based on what Dyzenhaus calls the 
counterpointer and historical design tests; whereas the historical design test 
focuses on the intention of the legislature as to policy, the counterpointer test 
focuses on the intention of the legislature as to who should determine policy; 
the counterpointer test thus encourages the pre-eminence of the executive's 
determination of policy .208 Both tests underplay the relevance of value 
considerations in the interpretation and application of laws. 
Dyzenhaus's explanation of legal positivism and its influence on the judicial 
function in South Africa is attractive in that he does not simply claim that 
legal positivism was the central theory which the judiciary followed in 
fulfilling its role of interpreting and applying the law but shows that the 
positivists' creed that law is a command of the law-maker lent itself to, and 
encouraged, the 'plain-fact' approach, in terms of which the role of the 
judiciary is to interpret and apply the law as ii is, without the infusion of 
moral and value considerations. In following the 'plain-fact' approach, the 
judiciary therefore created room for and opened itself to the charge that it 
simply deferred to the will of the legislature and the executive, without 
exercising its discretion to choose libertarian interpretations. 
The view taken in this thesis is that allhough legal positivism is not per se a 
theory of law which the South Africa judiciary has adopted in the past, it has 
206lbid. al 58 and 217-218. 
207lbid. at 57 and 217-218. 
208lbid. at 75. 
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influenced judges to adopt a mechanical approach to the interpretation and 
application of law and contributed to judicial deference to the will of the 
legislature and judicial executive-mindedness. Its influence closed the door to 
the infusion of libertarian and value considerations into the interpretation and 
application of the law. 
The South African judiciary was on many previous occasions, under the old 
system, called upon to interpret and apply oppressive and counter-libertarian 
laws. Objections to these laws were largely based on libertarian values and 
principles of justice and fairness. A number of studies show that the judiciary 
by and large refrained from choosing a libertarian, value-oriented approach 
and instead adopted a pro-executive and pro-legislature approach. 209 This 
exclusion of value considerations contributed to the erosion of fundamental 
human rights. 
Coupled with the fact that legislative supremacy operated as a principal rule 
of the South African constitutional-juridical system, legal positivism essentially 
implied that effect must be given to the intention of the legislature in the 
interpretation and application of law. The courts accepted the view that their 
exclusive task was to determine the intention of the legislature and to apply 
it to cases at hand, without a consideration of fundamental values such as 
equality, justice and fairness. 
The acceptance of the view that the exclusive task of the courts is to determine 
209See H. Corder Judges at Work - The Role and Attitudes of 
the South African Judiciary 1910-1950 (1984) ; C.F. Forsyth In 
Danger for their Talents - A Study of the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court of South Africa (1985); H.J Erasmus 
Regspleging in die gedrang, paper read at the University of 
Stellenbosch, February 1986 at 26 et seq and 52-60; A.S Mathews "The South 
African Judiciary and the Security System" 1985 SAJHR 199; J. Dugard 
"Some Realism about the Judicial Process and Positivism -A Reply" 1981 
SALJ 372 at 383-386. 
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the intention of the legislature led in some instances to imputed legislative 
intent prevailing over identifiable principles of the common law such as 
reasonableness, justice and fairness. These principles contain legal values210 
which, although not specifically embodied in the Constitution or legislation, 
are inherent in the common law. Dyzenhaus211 explains these principles as 
standards of reason which are "the coherent products of a process of reasoning 
by lawyers and judges over time, and express certain commonly shared values 
and conceptions of reasonableness and the common good". 
The case of S V Meer212 is a good example of judicial imputation of 
legislative intent and a corresponding rejection of principles of the common 
law which carry within them certain fundamental values. 213 It had been 
argued on behalf of the appellant that a banning order which forbade her to 
attend any gathering as described in section 9(1)(b) of the Internal Security 
Act, 44 of 1950 was unreasonable, manifestly unjust and an oppressive 
curtailment of her rights. Despite the fact that the concept of reasonableness 
was a principle of the common law, Rumpff CJ rejected this argument and 
instead imputed to the legislature an intention to empower the Minister to act 
drastically. There was very little in the legislation, however, to suggest that 
that was the clear intention of the legislature; there was, on the contrary, 
210See A.W.G Raath "Jura! Freedom and Legal Principles: Their Nature 
and Role in Public Law" 1987 S.A Public Law 21. Raath makes use of 
the concept of jural freedom to illustrate the nature and role of principles 
which embody legal values. These principles find expression in concepts such 
as justice, fairness, 'proper' administration, etc. 
211Dyzenhaus op cit. at 3. Dyzenhaus also points out that to understand 
the role of law in society one must also examine how notions such as justice 
are involved in attitudes towards validity: see D. Dyzcnhaus "Positivism and 
Validity" 1983 SALJ 454 at 467. 
2121981(4) SA 604 (A). 
213See also S v Adams;S v Werner 1981(1) SA 187 A); S v 
Christie 1982(1) SA 464(A). 
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sufficient room for a libertarian interpretation, namely that the legislature 
could not have intended to empower the Minister to act in a manifestly unjust 
or highly oppressive way. 214 Rumpff CJ's approach, and his conclusion that 
the court was powerless to do anything, is in line with the counter-pointer 
approach, in terms of which pre-eminence is given to the executive's 
determination of policy, even if such policy is manifestly counter-libertarian 
and oppressive and can hardly be justified on some other universally 
acceptable ground. 
Rumpff CJ's approach smacks of a pure mechanical application of law which 
is akin to legal positivism. Although the judge was not specifically espousing 
a positivistic approach, one finds it difficult to escape the conclusion that he 
viewed the role of the court as one of purely giving effect to the intention of 
the legislature, even if the legislation in issue was open to a libertarian and 
value-oriented interpretation. This view, namely that the function of the court 
is one of purely giving effect to the intention of the legislature, seems to 
proceed on the basis that the intention of the legislature enjoys precedence 
over common sense and everything else. 215 A fear of judicial involvement 
in politics, coupled with an avoidance of inviting the wrath of the politicians, 
above all, runs central to this view. 216 
The judicial function is by no means completely apolitical. The judiciary, as 
part of the machinery of the state, resolves legal disputes in the light of the 
214Cf Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v Rasool 1934 AD 167 
at 173; Sinovich v Hercules Municipal Council 1946 AD 783 at 
802; R v Abdurahman 1950(3) SA 136 (A) at 143D. 
215See for example In re Duma 1983(4) SA 469 (N) at 475G-476A; S 
v Nel 1987(4) SA 276 (0) at 2881-289A. 
216See for example L.C Steyn "Regbank en Regsfakulteit" 1967 THRHR 
101 at 107; N. Ogilvie-Thompson "Centenary Celebrations of the Northern 
Cape Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa" 1972 SALJ 23 at 32. 
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fairness and social consequences of its decisions, and in this way gives 
direction to society; where the dispute involves the exercise of government 
authority by the legislature and the executive, the judicial role neeessarily 
becomes political. 217 It is therefore essentially the function of the judiciary 
to employ all applicable principles in order to arrive at deeisions which are 
fair and just. 
It would be incorrect to ascribe the courts' reluctance to control the exercise 
of legislative power in general only to the narrow and legalistic approach 
which often manifested itself in judicial decisions. In essence, the overriding 
factor was the doctrine of legislative supremacy as inherited from English 
constitutional law. The operation of this doctrine has effectively served to 
preclude the courts from testing the reasonableness or morality of Acts of 
Parliament. All that the courts could do was to inquire into and pronounce, 
within the scope of the entrenched provisions, upon the question whether 
Parliament had legislated in accordance with the prescribed special procedure. 
The courts' incompetence to test the substantive validity of legislation logically 
followed from the view that as long as Parliament followed the procedure for 
legislating, it could exercise its supreme and omnipotent power as it liked. 
An important question which arises in relation to the operation of the doctrine 
of legislative supremacy and the role of the judiciary in the light of this is 
whether the courts had any room to offer an effective protection to the 
individual whenever his rights and freedoms were threatened by Parliament's 
exercise of its supreme legislative power. 
Within the context of the principle of the separation of powers218 the South 
African judiciary indeed had the role and duty to protect the rights and 
217See J. Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) at 
7. 
218See Chapt. 5 for a discussion of the separation of powers. 
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freedoms of individuals from government excesses; 219 in terms of this 
principle the judiciary, as an independent and impartial co-ordinate branch of 
government, has the function of controlling the exercise of government 
authority. The extent to which it could have succeeded in protecting the rights 
and freedoms of individuals largely depended, however, on the relationship 
between the other branches of government, in particular the legislature, as 
well as the courts' own approach. 
In a system of legislative supremacy the relationship between the courts and 
the legislature is clearly determined by the legislature's status as a supreme 
body with omnipotent legislative powers. The status of the legislature as a 
supreme body with omnipotent legislative powers reduces the courts to 
instruments for implementing the supreme will of the legislature, without 
questioning the reasonableness, wisdom or justness of legislation. 
Nevertheless, the courts do not implement the will of the legislature 
mechanically; the courts must interpret such will before implementing it. 
In its interpretation and application of the law the court often has a 
choice. 220 The interpretation of the law involves giving meaning to words 
and principles; in many instances more than one meaning can be attached. 
Vague legislation, in particular, is open to a number of acceptable 
interpretations. 221 In choosing between more than one acceptable 
interpretation the judge has a latitude within which he may choose an 
interpretation which promotes the protection of individual rights and freedoms 
or the one which is the least oppressive. 
In interpreting and applying the law judges do not, therefore, act merely 
219Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 264. 
220Idem. See also Chap!. 10 where the creativity of constitutional 
interpretation is discussed. 
221Idem. 
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mechanically. The interpretation of a statute 1s essentially a creative and 
discretionary exercise. 222 The judicial function does not involve mere I y 
discovering the intention of the legislature; it is a creative process whereby 
meaning is given to a set of words and sentences in the context of principles 
which operate within the whole legal system.223 The interpretation and 
application of the law involves finding an acceptable meaning which strikes 
a balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of society at 
large. 
According to Cowen, 224 legislation does not exist m a vacuum; it is an 
integral part of the whole body of law, consisting of the common Jaw and all 
other statutes. When interpreting legislation, judges must not only be 
concerned with simply dispensing justice but must also seek a meaning which 
harmonises the legislation in issue with the rest of the legal system. In doing 
this, judges should therefore take into account those principles within the legal 
system which enhance the protection of the individual's rights and 
freedoms. 225 
In the interpretation of legislation, presumptions of interpretation also have to 
be taken into account. These presumptions are a reflection of certain basic 
tenets of the legal system which the legislature ought to follow; 226 they are 
222See Ebrahim v Minister of Interior 1977(1) SA 665 (A) at 
678A. See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of judicial creativity in constitutional 
interpretation. 
223See E. Cameron "Legal Chauvinism, Executive-mindedness and Justice 
- LC Steyn's impact on South African Law" 1982 SAW 38 at 59-60. 
2240. V Cowen "The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of 'the 
Intention of the Legislature" 1980 THRHR 374 at 378. 
225See Dyzenhaus op cit. at 155 on the harmonisation of the interpretation 
and application of law with principles of the common law such as 
reasonableness, fairness and justice. 
226See G.E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) at 156. 
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fundamental principles of the legal system which "provide, in effect, a 
common law bill of rights a protection for the civil liberties of the 
individual against invasion by the state". 227 
In interpreting and applying the law judges have the responsibility and duty 
to dispense justice in accordance with the principles and values which operate 
within the legal system; this responsibility and duty implies that the 
interpretation of law involves not only the norms applicable to the process of 
interpretation but also those norms which constitute and form part of the 
whole legal system. As an interpreter of the law, the judge has to bring to 
bear to the process of interpretation all the principles and values of the legal 
system which is the very basis of the judicial function; to do so is to fulfil his 
judicial duty. The 1993 Constitution, in particular, places a high normative 
responsibility and judicial duty on the judiciary; the fundamental rights 
entrenched in it are based on value-laden concepts which call for greater 
judicial creativity in order to give pre-eminence to the supreme law of the 
Constitution. 
4. Judicial Review of Executive Acts. 
Judicial review of executive or administrative acts is largely a matter of 
administrative law. 228 It is an important form of control over the powers, 
organisation and actions of the state administration. 229 The Supreme Court 
has an inherent power to review all administrative acts irrespective of their 
227D.C Pearce Statutory Interpretation in Australia (1991) at 81, 
as quoted by Devenish op cit at 156. 
228The scope of this thesis does not permit a detailed discussion of all the 
relevant aspects of administrative law. 
229M. Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) at 259. 
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character. 230 
In the past the South African judiciary was accused of being executive-
minded, shying away from a libertarian approach and interpreting subordinate 
legislation and dealing with administrative action in a way which suggests 
judicial acquiescence in the government's policy of racial segregation and the 
practice of oppression. Sasson & Viljoen231 attribute judicial executive-
mindedness in South Africa to positivism, the influence of legal education and 
the backgrounds and personalities of the judges. 
Despite charges of executive-mindedness the courts have, especially during the 
states of emergency of July 1985 and July 1986, handed down libertarian 
judgments. 232 Where a member of the police force was empowered to arrest 
and detain a person, if in his opinion such an arrest and detention was 
necessary for the purposes as provided in the regulations proclaimed with 
regard to the state of emergency, 233 it was held in Nkwinti V 
Commissioner of Police and Others234 that, notwithstanding the 
subjective nature of the opinion, there must be a jurisdictional prerequisite for 
the arrest; in essence, the police officer must apply his mind to the matter; the 
23
"Wiechers op cit at 266. 
231Sasson & Viljoen op cit. at 266. 
232See D.A Sasson "Judicial Activism in a state of emergency: an 
examination of recent decisions of the South African Courts" 1987 SAJHR 
28. 
233Proc. R121 in Government Gazette 9877 of 21/07 /1985 and Proc. R109 
in Government Gazette 10280 of 12/06/1986, especially regulation 3(1). 
2341986(2) SA 421 (EC) at 430!-J. See also Radebe v Minister of 
Law and Order & another 1987(1) SA 586 (W) at 5911-592C; 
Dempsey v Minister of Law and Order 1986(4) SA 530 (C) at 
531H-I; The State President & others v Tsenoli; Kerchoff & 
another v The Minister of Law and Order & others 1986(4) SA 
1150 (A) at 1181-1182. 
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arrest and detention must be based on an honest opinion that it is necessary 
for the purposes of the regulations, for example that it is necessary for the 
maintenance of public order. 
In Buthelezi v The Attorney-General of Natal235 the court applied 
the audi alteram partem rule as a prerequisite before the Attorney-General 
could issue an order, in terms of section 30 of the Internal Security Act 74 of 
1982, preventing the courts from granting bail. 236 The audi alteram partem 
rule is one of the rules of natural justice; these rules protect the interests of 
individuals by ensuring that they are treated fairly and justly in the 
administrative decision-making process.237 The rules of natural justice are 
ancient and universal rules of fairness which should never be abolished or 
excluded. 
The operation of the doctrine of legislative supremacy can, however, affect 
the operation of the rules of natural justice and the ability of the courts to 
come to the aid of individuals who are affected by executive or administrative 
acts. In the first place, Parliament may pass legislation which excludes or 
abolishes the rules; secondly, Parliament may confer wide-ranging powers on 
the executive and preclude the courts from determining the validity of the 
exercise of such powers. 
2351986(4) SA 377 (D). 
236At 379-381 and at 3838-C. See also the minority judgment of Stegmann 
J in S v Baleka & others 1986(1) SA 361 (T) at 383-384 and that of 
Hoexter JA in Omar & others v Minister of Law and Order & 
others; Fani & others v Minister of Law and Order & others; 
State President & others v Bill 1987(3) SA 857 (A) at 907A-F. 
237See M. Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) at 208-228 for a 
discussion of the rules of natural justice. 
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For example, the Appellate Division held in the Omar/Fani/Bill case238 
that an amendment which eliminated the applicability of the audi alteram 
partem rule completely abolished this rule as a jurisdictional prerequisite 
before the Minister of Law and Order could issue an order for the continued 
detention of a person. 
The courts themselves have sometimes been reluctant to come to the aid of the 
individual because of self-imposed restraints. According to Wiechers239 one 
of the major reasons why the courts have been reluctant to exercise their 
power to control executive or administrative acts is their application of the 
rule that a court which reviews the discretionary exercise of administrative 
powers may not substitute its opinion for that of the administrative organ; the 
effect of this rule is that the court becomes reluctant to consider the merit of 
the administrative decision. 240 The courts often relied on the assumption that 
the administrative organ had acted in good faith, even if there was a proven 
mistake of fact or law. 241 
There have been instances, however, where the courts have jealously guarded 
their power to control executive acts and subordinate legislation in conformity 
with their role to protect the rights and liberties of subjects in terms of the 
238Supra. Rabie ACJ delivered the judgment of the majority. 
23
'Wiechers op cit at 287. 
240In terms of the doctrine of separation of powers, the court does indeed 
have no jurisdiction to examine the merits of an administrative discretion; this 
does not mean, however, that the courts may not examine the administrative 
action to ensure that all legal requirements for validity have been met. 
Constitutionalism dictates that the courts must ensure that administrative acts 
comply with the principle of legality: Wiechers op cit. at 297. 
241See for example Theron v Minister van J ustisie 1961(3) SA 298 
(T); Rajah and Rajah (Pty) Ltd v Ventersdorp Municipality 
1961(4) SA 402 (A); Bunting v Minister of Justice 1963(4) SA 531 
(C). 
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principle of the separation of powers. In Minister of Law and Order 
v Hurley242 it was held, for example, that the so-called ouster clause, 
which prohibited the court from inquiring into the existence of a jurisdictional 
fact or the proper exercise of a discretion, did not preclude the court from 
deciding upon the validity of an administrative act. What was issue in that 
case was the power of a policeman to arrest and detain in terms of section 29 
of the Internal Security Act. 243 The rationale for the court's decision that it 
was not precluded from deciding the validity of the arrest and detention was 
that action in terms of the section was ultra vires and therefore in reality not 
action in terms of that section at all; an ultra vires action did not activate the 
ouster clause. 
Hurley's case is also important because it introduced a libertarian approach 
to the interpretation of section 29 and the court's power of judicial review. 
Section 29 authorised detention without trial for questioning if a police officer 
above the rank of lieutenant-colonel had 'reason to believe' that a person (the 
detainee) had committed the statutory crime of terrorism or subversion or had 
the intention to do so. The court interpreted the words 'reason to believe' to 
mean that the there should be reasonable grounds for the belief that a person 
was indeed guilty of the stipulated actions and also held that these reasonable 
grounds were also justiciable by the court. 
This libertarian approach of the courts in the control of executive acts 
represents a development away from executive-mindedness on the part of our 
courts; 244 it bodes well for their role of interpreting a supreme Constitution 
and provides a sound foundation for the development of a libertarian and 
2421986(3) SA 568 (A) at 584 and 586H-I. 
243Act 74 of 1982. 
244See in general D. Basson "Judicial Activism in a State of Emergency: 
An Examination of Recent Decisions of the South African Courts" 1987 
SAJHR28. 
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generous approach in the interpretation and application of the fundamental 
human rights. 245 
245Section 24 of the 1993 Constitution, in particular, entrenches the right 
to administrative justice. This section incorporates the basic elements of 
judicial review of administrative action. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE JUDICIARY AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS. 
The constitutional law principle of the separation of powers is relevant to a 
discussion of the role of the judiciary in a modern democratic state. This 
principle requires that the legislative, the executive and judicial branches of 
government must be distinct from one another. This distinction is mainly 
based on a difference in function. The function of the legislature is to make 
laws; the function of the executive is to carry out the laws; and the function 
of the judiciary is to adjudicate legal disputes and, as part of the process of 
adjudication, to interpret the law. Within the context of this distinction, the 
concept of the separation of powers postulates that while each of the three 
branches must confine itself to its area of operation, the branches are at the 
same time co-ordinate components of the state. 
The significance of the principle of the separation of powers in relation to the 
role of the judiciary is that it constitutes the basis for the independence of the 
judiciary from the other branches of government. Judicial independence is a 
necessary and important ingredient of the role of the judiciary in the 
adjudication of legal disputes. Its importance lies in the fact that only a 
judiciary which is independent, impartial and free from undue influence, either 
from the parties to the dispute or some other person or body, including the 
legislative and executive branches, can perform its functions effectively. 
1. The Principle of the Separation of Powers. 
1.1. The Early Foundations of the Principle. 
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The principle of the separation of powers has its origin in the related principle 
of mixed authority and the concept of limitation of authority. The principle of 
limitation of authority is as old and ubiquitous as authority itself. The essence 
of the principle of mixed authority was that the exercise of state authority 
could be limited by permitting a combination of diverse political inclinations 
in such a way that the various inclinations would balance each other.1 
The principle of mixed authority can be traced back to Plato's concept of the 
mixed state. In the Laws2 Plato postulated a state based on moderation and 
harmony through obedience to law. The state which Plato postulated was a 
mixed state which was a combination of the monarchic element and the 
democratic element. According to Plato, the wisdom inherent in the monarchic 
element is balanced by the freedom inherent in the democratic element. 3 
Aristotle's construction of the best practicable state also contained elements 
of a mixed state. 4 It combined the oligarchic element and the democratic 
element. The wealth and status inherent in the oligarchic element was balanced 
by the sheer weight of numbers inherent in the democratic element.5 
Both Plato and Aristotle were, however, not concerned only with the concept 
of the mixed state. They were also concerned with the distinction of functions 
within the city-state. According to Plato reciprocal needs gave rise to an 
exchange of services and the division of labour; the farmers produced food for 
the city, the soldiers defended the city and the rulers attended to the day-to-
'See M.J.C Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of 
Powers (1967) at 33 and 34-35. 
2E.B England (ed) The Laws of Plato (1921). 
3G.H Sabine A History of Political Theory (1966) at 77 and 79. 
4The Politics of Aristotle, translated by E. Barker (1946). 
5Sabine op cit. at 113. 
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day administration of the city.6 Plato's division of functions was, however, 
related to the satisfaction of reciprocal needs rather than to the exercise of 
authority. 
Aristotle's concern with the distinction between functions appears from his 
division of political science into legislative science, which was concerned with 
the function of law-giving, and politics, which was concerned with the 
function of policy-making; 7 his distinction between the functions of law-giving 
and policy-making was related to a division of these functions in the exercise 
of the authority of the state. 
Aristotle's distinction between functions becomes clearer when he 
distinguishes between the deliberative element, the element of the magistracies 
and the judicial element. Although the deliberative element was dominant in 
the making of laws and also concerned with common affairs, it did not refer 
to the legislative function as we know it today; the legislator was rather a 
divinely inspired person whose function was to set the foundations of the legal 
system.8 
Despite the apparent concern of Plato and Aristotle with the division of 
functions, both were, however, not directly concerned with the separation of 
functions in the exercise of the authority of the state. The great Greek 
philosophers were mainly concerned with attaining a balance between the 
various social classes and not with the balance of actual political power. 
Theirs was rather a theory of mixed government based on the composition of 
6lbid. at 48-50. 
7Vile op cit. at 21. 
"Ibid. at 22. 
,. 
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Greek society and not a theory of separation of powers.9 
The analysis of the Roman Constitution10 by Polybius, a stoic philosopher 
and historian, helped to lay a foundation for the development of the concept 
of the balance of power. Polybius attributed the strength of Rome to its 
Constitution, which was based on a division of authority between the consuls, 
the senate and the popular assemblies. The Constitution was a mixed form 
which allowed the three political powers to balance and check one another. 11 
Polybius's analysis of the Roman Constitution was based largely on the 
theories of the mixed Constitution of Plato and Aristotle and on their 
classification of Constitutions. The consuls represented the monarchic element, 
the senate the aristocratic element and the popular assemblies the democratic 
element. 
The principle of the separation of powers in relation to the exercise of state 
authority began to emerge clearly with the distinction between the legislative 
and the executive functions. This distinction arose from the distinction 
between divine law and human law by Marsilius of Padua, an Italian 
philosopher. 12 Marsilius regarded divine law as a command of God; it was 
intended to attain the best end for man in the world to come; its sanction did 
not involve earthly penalty but rather involved rewards or punishments which 
9Vile op cit. at 23; K. von Fritz The Theory of the Mixed 
Constitution in Antiquity (1954) at 205. 
10
'Constitution' in this sense does not refer to a Constitution embodied in 
a single document or in a number of statutes but to the manner in which the 
state was organised and regulated. 
11Sabine op cit. at 154. 
12Marsilius of Padua made this distinction in his Defensor Pacis, 
translated by A. Gerwith as Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of the 
Peace (1956). 
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would be meted out by God in a future life. Human Jaw, on the other hand, 
derived its authority from human enactment; it could only be enforced through 
earthly penalty .13 The legislative function was, as a result of the distinction 
between divine law and human law, associated with a human legislator. The 
legislative function therefore came to be regarded as implying the power to 
make laws and to exact obedience to these laws as well as the power to 
execute these laws, coupled with the sanction of pain or punishment for those 
who disobeyed the laws. 14 
It is significant to note that at this stage there was as yet no inclusion of the 
judicial function as a separate and distinct function. Marsilius regarded the 
judicial function as an integral part of the executive function. For him the 
'executive power' included the administration of justice under the law.15 The 
notion that the 'executive' was also responsible for the administration of 
justice did not disappear until the seventeenth century. 
In England the King exercised executive and judicial power through the Privy 
Council, a body which originated from the permanent committee or council 
of the Great Council. 16 The judicial power of the Privy Council was 
terminated in 1641, 17 after which it became, as far as England was 
concerned, a purely executive organ. During Charles H's reign (1660-1685) 
the Privy Council became a small and trusted executive committee of the 
13Sabine op cit. at 295. 
14Vile op cit. at 27. 
15Sabine op cit. at 297; Vile op cit. at 28-29. 
16The committee or council (concilium regis) was strictly speaking a 
parliamentary body which changed to an extra-parliamentary body. Its 
composition was decided solely by the King. 
17See infra. 
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King; it came to be known as the Cabinet Council (or Cabal}. 18 The three-
fold division of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary 
emerged clearly during the mid-eighteenth century. 19 
The classical concept of mixed government, and the distinction between the 
legislative function and the executive function during the medieval period, 
helped to provide ideas for the development of the modern concept of the 
separation of powers. The concept of mixed government also laid the 
foundation for the need to prevent a concentration of power in one organ of 
government and to achieve a balance of power between the organs of 
government in order to avoid or minimise arbitrary rule. The importance of 
the distinction between the legislative and the 'executive' function, on the 
other hand, lies in its attribution of distinct functions to the various organs of 
government. Until then the English King wielded both legislative and 
executive powers; judges were regarded as the King's deputies.2° 
1.2. The Modern Concept of the Separation of Powers. 
The work of the English philosopher John Locke on civil government, Two 
Treatises on Government (1690), provided a basis for the later 
development of the. modern concept of the separation of powers. According 
to Locke, freedom within the state could only be maintained if there was a 
separation of government powers. He identified these powers as the legislative 
authority, which vested in the King in Parliament, the executive authority and 
18The Cabinet, as an executive arm of government, developed from this 
body. 
19Vile op cit. at 30. See infra for a discussion of the development of 
judicial independence in England. 
20Ibid. at 36. 
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the federative authority, both of which vested in the King and his council. 21 
The federative authority was concerned with the security of the state and the 
conduct of foreign affairs. 22 Locke did not regard the function of judging as 
a distinct function; this function was to him "not a separate power, but a 
general attribution of the state". 23 Although Locke admitted that a balance 
could be achieved if the powers were placed in different hands, 24 nothing can 
be inferred from his work to suggest that he envisaged that freedom could be 
achieved through placing the exercise of state authority in different hands and 
through an overlap of powers between the branches of government. 25 
The formulation of the modern concept of the separation of powers is in 
general attributed to the French philosopher Montesquieu. 26 His formulation 
was, however, not original but largely based on the ideas of John Locke. 27 
According to Montesquieu, political freedom was only possible in a state in 
which the power of the state, and all corresponding functions, were not 
concentrated in the same person or organ. 28 Following Locke's example, 
Montesquieu identified three functions or powers of the state, namely the 
211. Locke Two Treatises of Government, edited by P. Laslett 
(1967), at 117. See also C.J Friedrich Constitutional Government and 
Democracy (1968) at 175. 
22Locke (Laslett) op cit. at 117. 
23[bid. at 118. 
24(bid. at 107 et seq. 
25[bid. at 117-118. 
26See G. Carpenter Introduction to 
Constitutional Law (1987) at 156. 
South African 
27Carpenter op cit. at 156. Montesquieu formulated his concept of the 
separation of powers in his work L 'espirit des Lois (1748). 
28See A. Passerin d'Entreves The Notion of the State · An 
Introduction to Political Theory (1967) at 120. 
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legislative authority, the executive authority and the power to judge .. He 
specifically identified the power of judging, or the 'judicial' power, as a 
distinct power; according to him, "there is no liberty as yet if the power of the 
judge is not separated from the legislative and executive power". 29 
Montesquieu's formulation of the principle of the separation of powers has 
given rise to two broad lines of interpretation. The one line of interpretation, 
namely the "pure" separation of powers or formalist approach, advocates a 
demarcation of powers and functions in accordance with the tripartite division 
of government organs. The other line, namely the "partial" separation of 
powers doctrine or functional approach , permits some overlapping of powers 
and functions, while at the same time maintaining a system of checks and 
balances; 30 it allocates government tasks to those organs most likely to 
perform them well and also prevents the concentration of power in one organ. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers is particularly prominent in the 
United States of America; there is a clear distinction of powers and functions 
between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It has been 
recognised, however, that the concept of the separation of powers is 
"necessarily ambiguous and will tolerate some overlap of functions among the 
branches so that the entire government can operate effectively" .31 
29Montesquieu L'espirit des Lois, edited by G. True (1949), vol. I, 
Book XI, Chapt. 4 at 164 and Book XI, Chapt. 6. 
30See Vile op cit. at 85-86. The 'pure doctrine of the separation of 
powers' is usually associated with continental constitutional systems, while 
the 'partial separation of powers doctrine' is associated with the American 
constitutional system. 
311.R Kaufman "The Essence of Judicial Independence" 1980 Columbia 
LR 671 at 689 and the cases and authorities cited by the author at footnote 
104. See also R.H Nelson "Separation of Powers: An Historical Review from 
Marbury to Bowsher" 1987 Illinois Bar J 484; M. Yoder "Separation of 
Powers: No Longer Simply Hanging in the Balance" 1990 Georgetown W 
173. 
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The system of checks and balances seems logically incompatible with the idea 
of separation of powers but is practically indispensable to it. Checks and 
' balances are necessary because they serve to prevent any branch from 
dominating the others; they ensure limited but effective exercise of powers. 
While the basic powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are 
separate and unique, the three branches nevertheless interact; the executive 
(the President) has the power to recommend and to veto legislation; the 
legislature has the power to confirm important appointments made by the 
executive, to ratify treaties and to appropriate money; the judiciary has the 
power to invalidate executive and legislative acts if they are 
unconstitutional. 32 
The significance of Montesquieu's formulation of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, in relation to the role of the judiciary, lies in its 
identification of the judicial branch as a separate branch of government. 
1.3. The Separation of the Judicial Branch. 
Montesquieu did not refer specifically to the judicial authority; he instead 
referred to the 'power to judge'. 33 It is clear, however, from his description 
of the functions of this third branch as the punishment of crimes or the 
settlement of disputes34 that he was in fact referring to the judicial authority 
as we understand the expression to mean today. 
Before the appearance of Montesquieu's work the tendency was to fuse the 
32Checks and balances do not mean that one branch usurps the functiOns 
of other branches; they merely serve to ensure that the function has been 
constitutionally performed by the other branch; they also serve to ensure 
balance in order to guard against one branch becoming excessively powerful. 
33Montesquieu (True, ed) op cit vol. I, Book XI, Chapt. 4 at 164. 
34lbid. 
• 
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executive with the judicial authority. By distinguishing between the legislative, 
the executive and the judicial authority, Montesquieu bridged the gap between 
early modern and later modern terminology associated with the branches of 
government. 35 He treated the judicial authority as on a par with the 
legislative and the executive authority;36 he introduced a distinction between 
the supreme judicial authority which was fused with the executive authority 
and the ordinary courts that had emerged at a more elementary level. It is 
therefore clear that by detaching the elementary judicial authority from the 
other branches of government, he regarded it as independent of these other 
branches. 
Montesquieu also dealt with two other aspects which later became significant 
in relation to the role of the judiciary in a modern state. First, in his treatment 
of the judicial authority in a republican government he insisted that judges 
must abide by the letter of the law. 37 This raises the question whether judges 
must only confine themselves to interpreting and applying the law, or whether 
they can also, in interpreting the law, make law; if judges can also make law, 
the further question that arises concerns the permissible limits of judicial law-
making or the extent to which judges can make law without actually 
encroaching on the sphere of authority of the legislature.38 The crucial 
consequences of judicial law-making is that if judges were to encroach on the 
sphere of authority of the legislature, there would no longer be a separation 
of powers between the legislature and the judiciary.39 Montesquieu's view 
35Vile op cit. at 87. 
36lbid. at 88. 
37Vile op cit. at 89. 
38This question is crucial in states with supreme Constitutions but not so 
much in a system of legislative supremacy. 
39See Chapt. 10 and Chapt. 11 infra on the question of judicial law-
making and its limits. 
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was that the judiciary should only pronounce the law without moderating 
either its force or rigour. 40 
Secondly, Montesquieu believed that judicial procedures play an important 
role in the protection of the individual.41 In modern times the insistence that 
procedures and formalities must be adhered to where a person's rights are 
involved, or before they can be taken away has come to be known as 'due 
process of law' and is one of the cornerstones of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism. 
1.4. The Separation of Powers m Systems of Legislative 
Supremacy and Constitutional Supremacy. 
The nature of the Westminster system of government is such that, apart from 
the legislative supremacy of Parliament, members of the executive are also 
members of the Iegislature.42 In Britain the Law Lords sit in the House of 
Lords both as members of the judiciary and as members of the legislature; the 
head of the judiciary, the Lord Chancellor, is a member of the executive and 
also serves as a member of the House of Lords when it sits as part of the 
legislature. 
It may at first sight appear that the principle of separation of powers does not 
apply in Britain and that the judiciary, especially the House of Lords, is not 
independent. There is, however, in fact a dividing line between the functions 
of the judiciary and the other two branches of government. The judicial and 
legislative functions of the House of Lords are completely separate; only those 
40Vile op cit. at 89. In modern legal theory this view corresponds to the 
positivistic approach : See Chapt. 4 supra. 
41Vile op cit. at 89-90. 
42See Chapt. 4 supra. 
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members of the House of Lords who are professional judges (the Law Lords) 
can perform judicial functions; they are also as a rule precluded from 
participating in politically controversial debates when the House of Lords 
performs its legislative functions; moreover, full-time judges are precluded 
from sitting in the House of Commons and may not be subjected to political 
pressure. However, since the Constitution is unwritten, the independence of 
the judiciary is not completely protected;43 Parliament can, for example, 
easily reconstitute the courts or pass legislation which somehow interferes with 
their independence. 44 
In South Africa the executive has always been part of the legislature. Under 
the 1993 Constitution, members of the executive are appointed by the 
President from members of the legislature, with preference being given to 
members belonging to the party which he leads. 45 Having been drawn from 
the party with the majority in the legislature, the executive has in the past 
been able to assume a dominant role in the making and implementation of 
laws. 
The judiciary has, however, always been separate from the other two branches 
of government; its impartiality, integrity and independence have never been 
43See S.A De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(1981) at 32-33. 
44See Van den Heeever JA's judgment in Minister of the Interior 
v Harris 1952(4) SA 769 (A), discussed in Chapt. 4. 
45ln terms of section 88(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act, 200 of 1993 a party holding at least 20 seats is entitled to be 
allocated one or more of the portfolios in the executive (the Cabinet) in 
proportion to the number of seats it holds in the legislature (the National 
Assembly) relative to the number of seats held by other parties participating 
in the government. 
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seriously questioned. 46 Neither has the legislature, especially after the 
decision of the Appellate Division in Minister of the Interior v 
Harris,47 performed or attempted to perform a judicial function.48 The 
operation of the doctrine of legislative supremacy has, however, had the effect 
of limiting the role of the judiciary in mitigating the rigour of legislation 
which violated human rights and freedoms. 49 
Although there may be a degree of overlapping concerning the persons who 
constitute the government organs in a system of legislative supremacy, the 
principle of the separation of powers does operate, albeit in a limited sense. 
There is a clear dividing line as regards the functions of the three organs of 
government. More importantly, the exercise of judicial authority is clearly 
separate and distinguishable from the exercise of the legislative authority and 
the executive authority. 
In a system of constitutional supremacy the judiciary is more separate from 
the legislative and executive branches and more substantially insulated than in 
a system of legislative supremacy. This stems from the fact that the judiciary 
exercises a greater check on legislative and executive acts through its power 
of judicial review. One of the major arguments against judicial review of 
legislative and executive acts as a means of checking the exercise of legislative 
and executive power is that it offends against the separation of powers as well 
46Criticisms of the judiciary have largely centred around its legitimacy and 
impartiality in the light of the judges' socio-economic backgrounds: See the 
authorities cited in Chapt. 1, footnotes 39-44. 
471952(4) SA 769 (A). 
48See Chapt. 4 for a discussion of this case. 
49See M.G Cowling "Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South 
Africa: Articulating the Inarticulate Major Premise" 1987 SAJHR 177. See 
also Chap!. 4 for a discussion of the effect which the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy has had on the role of the judiciary in the protect individuals 
against government excesses. 
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as against the principle that the will of the people, as exercised through their 
elected representatives, must prevail. 
In the United of America the debate concerning judicial review and the 
separation of powers usually centers around resolving the tension between 
judicial review and democratic theory. According to substantive judicial 
review theory ,50 it is the function of the judiciary to set aside any 
majoritarian decision which is inconsistent with the values embodied in the 
Constitution. 
The problem with substantive judicial review, however, is that it encourages 
judicial activism and often results in judicial undermining of important 
government decision-making and value choices. 51 
One of the major critics of substantive judicial review, John Hart Ely, argues 
that it is unacceptable for appointed judges to set aside decisions and value 
choices of elected representatives. According to him the judiciary should 
confine itself to policing the mechanisms by which the system of 
representation seeks to ensure that the elected representatives will actually 
fulfil the function of representing those who elected them. 52 Judges, 
according to this view, are only called upon to ensure that representative 
democracy is maintained and to prevent the tyranny of the majority. 
It has been argued, however, that a separation of powers based theory is 
50See J. Ely Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review (1980) at 43-72; A. Bickel The Supreme Court and the 
Idea of Progress (1978) at 45-100; L. Tribe "The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Constitutional Theories" 1980 Yale W 1063 for a discussion 
of this theory. 
51See I. Jenkins "Judicial Activism and Constitutional Government" 1984 
American J of Jur. 169. 
52Ely op cit. at 102. 
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capable of reconciling the tension between judicial review and democratic 
theory. According to Neuborn53 the dilemma of proponents of judicial review 
is that of harmonising the traditional function of the judiciary with the 
interpretation and application of constitutional values. 54 Critics of judicial 
review argue that it lacks legitimacy because there are no 'demonstrably 
correct' pre-existing criteria in terms of which fundamental constitutional 
values can be identified, defined and proclaimed. ss 
Neu born argues that the tension between judicial review and democratic theory 
is best resolved by following the process-based theory of judicial review. This 
theory seeks to ensure that value choices be made by an "an appropriate 
government body pursuant to appropriate rules" .56 The rationale for this 
theory is that, in the first place, the likelihood of making incorrect value 
judgments is minimised by channelling difficult decisions to the most 
appropriate bodies and, secondly, 'secondary rules' pursuant to which value 
choices can be made ensure certainty and legitimise any choice that is made. 
The process-based theory implies that the court must, before deciding whether 
a legislative or executive decision is constitutional or not, first examine the 
nature and extent of functions, powers and responsibilities granted to each 
branch in order to determine the limits on legislative, executive and judicial 
behaviour. It must examine, in the second place, which functions are 
specifically allocated to each branch and which branch is most likely to 
perform a specific task well. 
53B. Neuborn "Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and 
the United States" 1982 New York Univ. LR 363. 
54lbid. at 364. 
55See Ely op cit. Chapt. 3. 
s6Neuborn 1982 New York Univ. LR at 365. Neuborn's argument is 
based on the French model of separation of powers and judicial review and 
decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel. 
-169-
Although the process-based theory is consistent with the functional separation 
of powers doctrine, it is not free of difficulties. Justice Brennan, in Baker 
V Carr,57 alluded to the delicate nature of an examination of ill-defined 
limits of the functions, powers and responsibilities of government organs: 
11 Deciding whether a matter has in any mea~ure been conunitted by the Constitution to 
another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority 
has been committed, is itse]f a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and it is the 
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution". 
1.5. The Importance of the Separation of the Judicial Branch. 
According to Nwabueze58 , not even the most vocal critics of the separation 
of powers principle would deny its importance as regards the judicial function. 
The authoritative interpretation and application of laws requires a separate, 
independent and impartial agency. The judiciary is composed of judges who 
have received extensive specialised training, both academic and practical, in 
the interpretation and application of law with impartiality and finality; it is the 
only branch which is unlikely to have the self-interest and consequent bias 
inherent in the legislature and the executive in upholding their own action. 59 
The doctrine of precedent and a tradition of self-restraint provide sufficient 
safeguards against the possibility of judges acting arbitrarily in the 
interpretation and application of laws. 60 
The separation of the judicial branch is an important constitutional safeguard 
of the rights and freedoms of citizens, which should be determined with 
57369 U .S 186 (1963) at 211. 
58B.O Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States 
(1973) at 14. 
59N wabueze op cit. at 15. 
60See Chapt. 10 infra. 
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finality by an independent and impartial judicial organ. 61 The legislature and 
the executive, which, by virtue of the nature of their functions and their acts, 
are more likely to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of individuals, are 
not the best agencies to be entrusted with the determination of disputes 
concerning the infringement of these rights and freedoms. 
According to Marshall62 , the distinguishing characteristic of the exercise of 
judicial authority is the procedures which are applied in the determination of 
rights and duties. A judicial procedure is characterised by the notion of the 
independence of the deciding officers, the finality of their decisions and their 
respect for the procedural aspects of natural justice. 63 
Judicial authority can only be exercised within, or in relation to, a specific 
area of operation, namely the determination of legal disputes. However, as 
Marshall64 points out, the principle of the separation of powers does not 
resolve the question of the scope of the area of operation of the judiciary .65 
All that the principle does is to tell us that there ought to be a separation of 
powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; it does not 
specifically inform us, for example, whether the judiciary can in interpreting 
the law also make law. 
In practice the scope of the area of operation of the judiciary is usually 
stipulated, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Constitution or some other 
'
1G. Marshall Constitutional Theory (1971) at 119. 
62Marshall op cit. at 119-120. 
63Marshall op cit. at 120. 
64ldem. 
65The problem of the scope of the area of operation of the judiciary is 
related to the question regarding the permissible limits of judicial review of 
legislation: see Chapt. 10 infra. 
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statute. Where no such provision is made, the scope of the area of operation 
will most probably have been established by custom. Undue legislative or 
executive interference, as opposed to legitimate checks and balances, in the 
judiciary's area of operation would amount to a violation of the principle of 
the separation of powers and offend against the independence of the 
judiciary. 66 This view is supported by a number of decisions of the Privy 
Council. 
In Liyanage v R67 the Privy Council held that certain statutes of Ceylon 
which empowered the Minister of Justice, and later the Chief Justice, to 
nominate judges in cases relating to certain offences, amounted to legislative 
usurpation of the judicial power or interference with the exercise of judicial 
power and that their enactment was therefore a violation of the principle of the 
separation of powers. The court found that the Constitution of Ceylon 
envisaged a separation of powers; the statutes were held to be ultra vires the 
Constitution and therefore invalid. 
Although the Constitution of Ceylon did not expressly vest judicial power in 
the courts, the Privy Council found that the judicial system which had been 
established by the Charter of Justice of 1833, and in terms of which the courts 
had been operating since then, continued to operate even after the coming into 
operation of the Constitution in 1946. In terms of clause 4 of the Charter, the 
entire administration of justice, civil and criminal, was vested exclusively in 
the courts as established and constituted by the Charter. 68 
66See infra. 
67[1966] 1 ALL E.R 650 (PC). For a discussion of this case see G.N 
Barrie "The Separation of Powers Doctrine" 1967 SALJ 94 and Marshall op 
cit. at 120-123. 
68At 651. The operation of the Charter was reaffirmed by a Royal 
Instruction which directed the Governor to comply with the rules in terms of 
which the Charter separated the judicial function from the legislative and 
executive functions. 
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Since the area of judicial authority was established by the Charter, the 
legislature could not usurp the exercise of the authority or encroach upon its 
area of operation without violating the principle of the separation of powers, 
even though it had plenary legislative powers. Abolition of the judiciary by 
the legislature, usurpation of the exercise of judicial authority, the exercise of 
legislative power to punish offenders and definition of offences ex post facto 
by the legislature would therefore amount to a violation of the principle of the 
separation of powers. 69 
In another Privy Council decision, Hinds v The Queen,70 Lord Diplock 
held that a discretion to vary the severity of punishment vested in the 
Governor-General by a Jamaican Act of Parliament, violated the principle of 
the separation of powers in that it amounted to an exercise of judicial authority 
by the executive. 71 In terms of the Act the Governor-General acted on the 
advice of a Review Board consisting of a superior judge, the Director of 
Prisons, the Chief Medical Officer, a nominee of the Jamaican Council of 
Churches and a qualified psychiatrist nominated by the Prime Minister after 
consultation with the leader of the opposition. In the opinion of the Privy 
69See Marshall op cit. at 122. 
70[1976] 2 W.L.R 366 (PC). 
71The discretion which was in issue in the Hinds case must be 
distinguished from the traditional prerogative of mercy exercised by the 
executive. In the Hinds case the discretion was conferred by legislation 
specifically enacted for that purpose; the discretion not only concerned the 
reduction of sentences but also their increase. Traditional prerogatives are 
powers which the executive exercises under the common law and generally on 
the advice of a minister. Although the prerogative of mercy appears at first 
glance to be a judicial prerogative, it is in essence a power of an executive 
rather than a judicial nature. A judicial discretion, unlike an executive 
discretion, is exercised in the settlement of legal disputes only and not disputes 
about moral issues (such as mercy or kindness); legal disputes, unlike moral 
issues, relate to rights, privileges, powers or duties, or prohibitions or decrees 
laid down or recognised by law: see M. Wiechers Administrative Law 
(1985) at 97. 
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Council the transfer of the power to punish offenders to an executive body 
whose members were not appointed in accordance with the constitutional 
provisions for the appointment of members of the judiciary was inconsistent 
with the principle of the separation of powers. Three of the members of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were of the view that the separation 
of powers was implied in the Jamaican Constitution; two of the members were 
of the view that the written terms of the Constitution gave effect to the 
principle of the separation of powers. 
In Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs72 Lord Diplock emphatically stated that the 
British Constitution was also based on the separation of power between the 
legislature and the judiciary: 
11 At a time when more and more cases involve the application of legislation which gives 
effect to policies that are subject to bitter public and parliamentary controversy. it cannot be too 
strongly emphasized that the British Constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the 
separation of powers: Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interprets them 11 • 73 
The importance of cases such as Liyanage, Hinds and Duport Steels 
is that although they do not assert judicial supremacy and in fact acknowledge 
the legislative supremacy of Parliament in a Westminster-type system of 
government, they emphasise the separateness and independence of the 
judiciary. There may be no express or explicit vesting of judicial authority in 
the judiciary, but the principle of the separation of powers nevertheless 
requires that in a modern state the judiciary should be separate from the 
legislative and executive branches and be independent of them. 74 
Whereas Westminster-based jurisprudence distinguishes between judicial 
72[1980] 1 W.L.R 142. 
73At 157. 
74See B.O Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa 
(1977) at 193. 
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supremacy and judicial independence, the tendency in American jurisprudence 
is to define the two concepts as synonymous. This tendency can be ascribed 
to the greater separateness of the judiciary and its substantial power to check 
and balance the legislature and the executive through judicial review in a 
system of constitutional supremacy. 
2. Judicial Independence. 
The concept of judicial independence 1s theoretically founded on 
Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers. 75 Montesquieu's view 
that there can be no freedom if the judicial authority is not separate from the 
legislative and executive powers paved the way for the later development of 
the concept of judicial independence. 76 
The division of public decision-making into the legislative, executive and 
judicial authority is based on the idea that each of these three acting parts 
must have a certain degree of independence in relation to the exercise of the 
powers allotted to each one of them.77 Although the principle of the 
separation of powers does permit some overlapping of persons and functions 
for the effective carrying out of government services, it does not permit undue 
interference by one branch in the sphere of operation of another branch. 78 
Checks and balances are not regarded as undue interference because they help 
to reduce a concentration of power in one branch and ensure effective 
government. 
75Discussed above. 
76Vi!e op cit. at 87-88. 
77See S. Shetreet "Judicial Independence: New Dimensions and 
Contemporary Challenges" in S. Shetreet & J. Deschenes (eds) Judicial 
Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) 590 at 595. 
78See l.R Kaufman "The Essence of Judicial Independence" 1980 
Columbia LR 671 at 688-689. 
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Judicial independence is an important aspect of the role of the judiciary in 
society. 79 It enables the judiciary to resolve legal disputes between parties in 
an independent and impartial way and as a result makes judicial judgments 
acceptable to rival parties. Judicial independence becomes absolutely necessary 
when one of the parties to a dispute is the government or one of its agencies; 
in order to resolve disputes impartially and effectively under such 
circumstances the judiciary must be independent of the other branches of 
government and be free from pressure or influence emanating from these other 
branches. 80 
2.1. The Development of the Concept of Judicial Independence. 
Judicial independence in the Anglo-American legal system had its early origins 
in the courts' struggle to free themselves from royal and parliamentary 
control. 81 The English courts' struggle to free themselves from royal and 
parliamentary subjection in fact predates Montesquieu's doctrine of the 
separation of powers and his insistence that there should be a separation of the 
judicial branch from the legislative and executive branches. 
In early times justice was dispensed by the King in his own court.82 It was 
only at a later stage, but still very early in British constitutional history, when 
a system of law requiring specialised knowledge of the law had developed, 
that the delegation of the determination of legal disputes to trained judges 
became inevitable. 83 Once the judicial function fell in the hands of trained 
79Shetreet op cit. at 590. 
80Shetreet op cit. at 591. 
81Kaufman 1980 Columbia LR at 672. 
82See E.C.S Wade & G.G Phillips Constitutional Law (1957) at 243. 
83ldem. The administration of justice was a royal prerogative which was 
exercised by the King by virtue of his position as a feudal lord. During the 
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judges, it became the role of the judges to ensure that the law was complied 
with. This function could, however, only be effectively carried out if the 
judiciary was free from the control of the King or his agencies. 
In England royal attempts to undermine the independence of the judges, and 
the subsequent struggle by the courts to free themselves from royal subjection, 
became evident after James I's accession to the throne in 1603. James I 
claimed that he could dispense justice. He contended that the judges were 
merely his delegates and that he had the right to determine to which court a 
case should go. 
In the Case of Prohibitions8' the judges of the common law courts, led 
by Chief Justice Coke, declared that they possessed the power to prohibit an 
ecclesiastical court from hearing cases which ought to be heard by the 
common law courts. Chief Justice Coke held that the King could not dispense 
justice by determining to which court a case should go; the function of 
dispensing justice was, according to him, the function of the judges: 
"The King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, or treason, felony 
etc; or betwixt party and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels or goods etc, but this ought 
to be determined and adjudged in some court of justice according to the law and custom of 
England. God has endowed His Majesty with excellent science and great endowments of n,ature, 
but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern 
the life, or inheritance , or goods or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural 
reason but by judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience, 
before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it 11 • 85 
reign of Edward I (1272-1307) the administration of justice passed to three 
courts of justice, namely the 'Common Bench', the 'King's Bench' and the 
'King in Council': see Carpenter op cit. at 172. 
84(1607) 12 Coke's Reports 63. 
85Case of Prohibitions (supra), as quoted in Wade & Phillips op 
cit. at 243. 
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When the King attempted to alter the law by means of a proclamation, Chief 
Justice Coke held, in the Case of Proclamations86 , that the King did not 
have the power to alter the law or to create an offence by proclamation; the 
King's prerogative was that which had been conferred on him by the law of 
the land. 
When a question arose in the Case of Commendams87 whether a bishop 
was entitled to receive an income by virtue of his office, the King issued an 
instruction through his Attorney-General, directing the judges not to proceed 
with the case before consulting him. This was clearly an encroachment upon 
the independence of the judges. Chief Justice Coke and his fellow judges 
decided to proceed with the case. The judges were summoned by the King, 
who then demanded an undertaking from them that they would in future not 
proceed with the case if requested by him not to proceed with it. Although the 
other judges acceded in to the King's demand, the Chief Justice refused to do 
so and was subsequently suspended and then dismissed. 88 
Chief Justice Coke's refusal to accede to the King's demand, and his 
resistance to royal interference in judicial matters, was in essence an assertion 
of the independence of the judges. Chief Justice Coke had in fact elsewhere 
claimed that judges alone were authorised to interpret and apply the laws and 
customs of England. 89 
Lord Coke was also instrumental in an attempt to subject the King to the law 
86(1611) 12 Coke's Reports 74. 
87Colt and Glover v Bishop of Coventry Hobart 140. 
88See verLoren van Themaat-Wiechers Staatsreg (3rd ed. 1981) at 87; 
Carpenter op cit. at 37. 
89Nicholas Fuller's Case (1608) 12 Coke's Reports 41 at 42a; 77 
ER at 1323. 
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through the adoption of the Petition of Right in 1628. The Petition, which 
listed various autocratic practices of the King, was aimed at refuting and 
curtailing the King's claim of sovereign power; the King reluctantly approved 
it after it was accepted by both Houses of Parliament.90 
Attempts to subject the King to the law during Charles I's reign did not, 
however, succeed in the long run. Charles dissolved Parliament, which was 
then the leading force behind the attempts to curtail the King's power, and 
ruled without it for the next eleven years. Fearing dismissal, the judges did 
as the King wished. Thus, in the Case of Shipmoney'", the judges 
upheld the validity of the King's writs whereby he demanded the amount of 
money which ships from maritime counties would cost (the so-called ship 
money). 92 
In 1641 Parliament forced Charles I to approve a number of laws, among 
which was the Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for Taking 
Away the Court Commonly called the Star Chamber. The Act terminated the 
civil and the criminal jurisdiction of the Privy Council in England93 and 
abolished the Star Chamber, the King's special court. 94 The civil jurisdiction 
90The House of Lords had initially proposed an amendment which sought 
to preserve the King's sovereign power; this amendment was however rejected 
by Lord Coke. 
911637(3) State Trials 825. 
92In terms of an ancient royal privilege the King was entitled to issue writs 
to maritime counties, commanding them to supply him with ships. Instead of 
demanding the supply of ships the King demanded the amount of money which 
each ship would cost: See verLoren van Themaat-Wiechers op cit. at 89; 
Carpenter op cit. at 39. 
93The Privy Council remained the highest court of appeal for the British 
Colonies and Dominions. Its appellate jurisdiction is so far as South Africa 
was concerned was terminated in 1950. 
94VerLoren van Themaat-Wiechers op cit. at 90; Carpenter op cit. at 
39. 
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of the Star Chamber was confined to maritime matters and disputes between 
foreign traders; its criminal jurisdiction was confined to cases of fraud and 
crimes of a public nature. It was empowered to impose any sentence except 
the death sentence and was notorious for its excessive fines and cruel 
punishments, including torture.95 The abolition of the Star Chamber was 
therefore a positive step towards the independence of the common law judges. 
The King also undertook to appoint judges for life quamdiu se bene 
gesserint, that is as long as they behaved. 
Charles I continued to impose his will upon Parliament. The civil war, which 
broke out in 1642 and lasted for seven years, culminated in the defeat of 
Charles; he was tried and executed in 1649. The Republic which Oliver 
Cromwell attempted to introduce thereafter was shortlived and lasted only 
until 1660. The monarchy was restored, under Charles II (1660-1685); unlike 
his predecessors, Charles II largely managed to avoid an open confrontation 
with Parliament. 
After James II ascended the throne in 1685, he succeeded in obtaining a 
judicial decision which vested him with the power to dispense with or to 
suspend a legal provision. The independence of the judges was once again at 
stake. James subsequently removed from office all the judges who were likely 
to oppose him; he then proceeded to test his dispensing power by charging Sir 
Edward Hales96 , a holder of a military office who had converted to 
Catholicism, with non-compliance with a statutory provision which obliged a 
holder of a military office to take an oath renouncing Catholicism. Having 
been granted a dispensation from the operation of the statutory provision by 
the King, Hales had answered the case brought against him by contending that 
he was exempt from the operation of the provision. The court upheld the 
contention and decided that the King indeed had the prerogative to grant a 
95See F.W Maitland Selected Essays (1936) at 221. 
96Godden v Hales (1686) 11 State Trials 1165. 
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dispensation from the operation of a statute. The court based its decision on 
the absolute nature of royal discretionary powers. 97 
When seven bishops who had initiated a petition against an order of the King 
promoting Catholicism were tried before the King's Bench, the nation 
protested, resulting in the bishops' acquittal. The Glorious Revolution which 
followed in 1688 led to James II's flight. Although the Declaration of Right, 
which was adopted after the joint ascension of William and Mary to the 
throne98 , did not specifically declare that the judges were independent, it 
declared, inter alia, that royal grant of a dispensation from laws, with the 
exception of instances such as the royal prerogative to pardon offenders or to 
reduce sentences, was illegal99 ; the creation of ad hoc courts was also 
declared illegal. 
The Act of Settlement of 1701100 is generally regarded as the watershed for 
the recognition of judicial independence. Among other matters, the Act made 
provision for the appointment of judges at a fixed salary, as long as they 
behaved themselves. As appropriately stated in a Canadian case, the Act 
11 provided a practical means of ensuring that neither the King nor ParJiament wou]d be 
capable of attaining their particular political objectives or ambitions by exercising control over the 
decisions of the judiciary. The King could no longer hold over every judge's head the very real 
threat of immediate dismissal from an office held at his pleasure, nor could Parliament attain its 
own ends by an equally pre-cmptory and almost as effective menace of withdrawa1 of 
livelihood 11 • 101 
97VerLoren van Themaat-Wiechers op cit. at 92. 
98Bil1 of Rights 1 William and Mary sess. 2 c2 (1689), reproduced in 
verLoren van Themaat-Wiechers op cit, Appendix 2 at 528-530. 
99VerLoren van Themaat-Wiechers op cit. at 529. 
10012 & 13 William III c2, 1701. 
101Beauregard v The Queen 130 (1981) D.L.R (3d) 433 (Canada 
Federal Court) at 446. 
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The overlap of functions between the judiciary and the other branches of 
government in England did not, however, completely disappear. A phasing out 
of the overlap of functions between the judiciary and the executive began after 
the appointment of Chief Justice Ellenborough to a cabinet post in 1805 led 
to a public outcry .102 The distinct nature of executive, legislative and judicial 
functions eventually crystallised. Since 1803 no common law judge has sat in 
the House of Commons; neither has any superior judge sat in the House of 
Commons after the enactment of the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 .103 
The independence of the English judiciary as a whole was finally statutorily 
placed on a sound basis with the enactment of the Judicature Act of 1925 .104 
Section 12(1) of this Act provided that 
"all the judges of the High Court and of the Court of Appeal, with the exception of the 
Lord Chancellor. shal1 hold office during life, subject to a power of removal by His Majesty on 
an address to His Majesty by both Houses of Parliament". 
Judicial appointments for life were later replaced by statutory ages of 
retirement. 105 
102See S. Shetreet Judges on Trial (1976) at 14-15. The only exception 
in this regard is the Lord Chancellor, who is a member of the Cabinet and 
also presides as a judge over the highest court in England, the House of 
Lords; he is also a member and speaker of the House of Lords when it 
performs its legislative functions. The Lord Chancellor, however, rarely sits 
at the hearing of appeals and avoids sitting at hearings of appeals which 
involve one of the government departments or agencies as a party: see E. C.S 
Wade & A. w Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th 
ed, 1985). 
103Shetreet op cit. at 13-15. 
10415 & 16 George V c49, 1925. 
'
05The retirement of judges in England is presently governed by the 
Judicial Pensions Act, 1981, Schedule 2, para. 1(1) and the Supreme Court 
Act, 1981, section 11(8)(9). In South Africa the retirement of judges is 
regulated by section 3(1)(a) of the Judges Remuneration and Conditions of 
Employment Act, 88 of 1989; in terms of this section a judge retires from 
active service on attaining the age of 70, or after completing 10 years' 
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2.2. The Meaning of Judicial Independence. 
The concept of judicial independence or 'an independent judiciary' is best 
understood from the viewpoint of the various approaches to which it is 
amenable. Three main approaches to judicial independence can be discerned, 
namely the substantive independence approach, the behavioural 
independence approach and what may appropriately be called the multi-
faceted independence approach. The first two approaches make use of a 
single dominant attribute or a single group of closely related attributes of the 
judiciary as a basis for defining judicial independence; the last-mentioned 
takes into account all the relevant attributes of the judiciary which might have 
a bearing on, or may affect, the independence of the judiciary to inform us 
what judicial independence is all about. 
According to the substantive independence approach, judicial independence is 
defined in terms of the reality and uniformity of the judicial decision-making 
process. In accordance with this definition, Sir Ninian Stephen106 defines an 
independent judiciary as 
11
ajudiciary which dispenses justice according to Jaw without regard to the policies or 
inclinations of the government of the day 11 • 
Another jurist, Erkki-Juhani Taipale107 finds the hallmark of an independent 
service, whichever comes later. In terms of section 4 of the Judges 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act a judge has the option of 
continuing in active service until he has served a total period of 15 years or 
has reached the age of 75, whichever comes sooner, at which stage he must 
retire from active service. 
106
"Judicial Independence - A Fragile Bastion" in Shetreet & Deschenes 
op cit 529 at 531. 
107
"Judicial Independence from a Lawyer's Point of View" Report of 
the Symposium on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 
(Nov. 1980, Helsinki) at 118, as quoted in Shetreet & Deschenes op cit. at 
594-595. 
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judiciary in the fact that the organs administering justice should be subordinate 
only to the law and that only the law ought to influence the content of the 
decisions made by these organs. No other state authority, not even the highest, 
is allowed to influence the decisions of judicial organs. In this sense judicial 
independence is seen as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the legal security of 
the individual. 
By focusing only on the actual decision-making process, the substantive 
independence approach does not fully take into account other aspects of 
judicial independence such as observable judicial behaviour, likely legislative, 
executive and other influences which may affect the independence of the 
judiciary, and other factors, such as political affiliation, personal predilections 
and working conditions, which may affect the personal independence of 
individual judges. 
The behavioural independence approach, on the other hand, focuses on 
observable judicial behaviour in order to determine whether the judiciary is 
actually independent from the other branches of government or some other 
outside source. This approach does not, however, adequately address other 
relevant aspects of judicial independence, such as those not readily observable 
attributes which relate to the internal and collective independence of the 
judiciary. 
The behavioural independence approach is closer to the substantive approach 
in that it takes into account substantive attitudes, values and actions relative 
to judicial decisions and strategies. The only difference between the two 
approaches is that the behavioural independence approach emphasises degrees 
of independence by distinguishing between control and influence. Thus, 
according to Becker108 
108T.L Becker Comparative Judicial Politics The Political 
Functioning of the Courts (1970) at 144. 
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11 judicial independence is (a) the degree to which judges believe they can decide and do 
decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, values and conception of judicial ro]e (in their 
interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others, who have or are be1ieved to have 
political or judicial power, think about or desire in like matters, and (c) particularly when a 
decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those with political or judicial power may bring some 
retribution on the judges personally or on the power of the court 11 • 
A more comprehensive exposition of judicial independence, one which not 
only focuses on the substantive and behavioural aspects of judicial decision-
making but also on all other aspects, both obiiervable and latent, is the multi-
faceted independence approach. This approach encompasses both the 
substantive and behavioural approaches and also takes into account all aspects, 
whether observable or not observable, which may affect judicial independence. 
In addition to the substantive and behavioural aspects of judicial decision-
making the multi-faceted approach also takes into account the nature of the 
constitution, the traditions prevalent within the legal system, the social climate 
obtaining within the country, as well as the nature, character, background and 
ideologies of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary in order to 
determine the extent to which judicial independence is affected or is likely to 
be affected. 109 In essence, the multi-faceted independence approach looks not 
only at the substance and nature of judicial decision-making but also at the 
whole legal system in order to determine the extent of judicial independence. 
2.3. The Attributes of Judicial Independence. 
Judicial independence refers not only to the personal independence of judges 
but also to their collective independence. 110 Judges perform their functions 
individually and collectively. Although the judiciary is made up of individual 
109See in general Shetreet in Shetreet & Deschenes op cit. at 596. 
u01dem. 
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judges it is, viewed properly, a collective unit consisting of the whole 
corporate body of judges. It is therefore appropriate to make a distinction 
between individual and collective independence when considering the attributes 
of judicial independence. Another important aspect is that judges must not 
only be nominally independent but must also be perceived to be independent 
by the society which they serve. 
2.3.1. The Independence of Individual Judges. 
In the determination of disputes between parties, be it disputes between citizen 
and citizen or between citizen and state, the judge first and foremost performs 
his function as an individual, in the sense that he must bring to bear on the 
decision the full power of his intellect and understanding of the facts of the 
case and the law applicable to the dispute. When doing this the judge must be 
independent and free of any interest or pressure that may affect the result of 
the case. m 
The independence of the individual judges has two types of essential 
attributes, namely those attributes which relate to the substantive or functional 
independence of the judges and those which relate to their personal 
msection 10(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959 (S.A), for 
example requires a judge, upon appointment, to take an oath in terms of 
which he is obliged to "administer justice to all persons alike without fear, 
favour or prejudice, and ... in accordance with the law ... ". Section 104(3) 
of the 1993 Constitution also requires a judge to make and subscribe to an 
oath in terms which he is obliged to "uphold and protect the Constitution of 
the Republic and the fundamental rights entrenched therein and in doing so 
administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in 
accordance with the Constitution and the Law of the Republic". The oath 
obliges a judge to decide disputes before him on factual and legal merits, 
without showing either favour or disfavour to the parties to the dispute: See 
L. Boulle, B. Harris & C. Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (1989) at 201. 
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independence. 112 Both these types of attribute are fundamental aspects of the 
role of the judiciary within the state. 
2.3.1.1. Substantive or Functional Independence. 
Substantive or functional independence is based on the substantive 
independence approach. 113 As an attribute of judicial independence, 
substantive or functional independence focuses on the independence of the 
individual judge in relation to his impartiality or neutrality in the actual 
adjudication of legal disputes between parties. It requires that in performing 
his function as an adjudicator of legal disputes a judge must be free of any 
outside influence or control and must interpret and apply the law on the basis 
of his understanding of the facts before him as well as the relevant legal 
principles. 
Substantive judicial independence may be achieved in a number of ways; these 
may be divided into protective means and restrictive means. Protective means 
are those which are aimed at insulating individual judges from possible 
partiality by protecting them from certain practices or conduct which are likely 
to give rise to partiality. Restrictive means are those means whereby judges 
are restricted from participating in certain activities or the hearing of certain 
matters which are likely to give rise to partiality. 
Protective means include the immunity of judges from liability for acts done 
or words spoken in their official capacity, 114 protecting judges from criticism 
112See Shetreet op cit. at 598. 
113Supra. 
114See Lord Denning "The Independence and Impartiality of Judges" 1954 
SAW 345 at 355-357. Such protective means are usually dealt with in case 
law and in statutes pertaining to the judiciary. Thus, in Penrice v 
Dickenson 1945 AD 6 it was held that delictual damages will not be 
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in Parliament and the prohibition of undue comments on matters that are still 
being heard by the court;115 the prohibition of comment on matters that are 
still being heard is known as the sub judice rule. 
Restrictive means include the disqualification of judges from serving on 
legislative bodies or in executive office, prohibiting judges from becoming 
involved in party politics, the prohibition on judges holding an office of profit 
or receiving remuneration in respect of services rendered, other than the 
salary they receive as judges116 and the exclusion of judges from 
adjudicating in matters in which they have a personal interest. The last-
mentioned exclusion is also known as the rule against bias and finds 
expression in the maxim nemo judex in sua causa. 117 
The rule against bias not only means that a judge must be free of personal 
prejudice but also that it must be apparent to a reasonable man that a judge is 
free of bias. 118 There need not be real likelihood of bias; a reasonable 
awarded against a judicial officer unless it was shown that he acted with 
malice. Similarly, in May v Udwin 1981(1) SA 1 (A) the court came to the 
conclusion that a judicial officer can raise the defence of qualified privilege 
to an action based on defamation; the privilege would be lost only if it were 
to be shown that the judicial officer acted with malice. Section 25(1) of the 
Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959 also provides that no civil summons or 
subpoena can be issued against a judge without the permission of the court out 
of which the process is to be served; the purpose of this section is to ensure 
that only a summons or a subpoena which is based on a genuine claim will be 
issued. 
115See B.R Bamford "Aspects of Judicial Independence" 1956 SALJ 380 
at 382-384. 
116See section 11 of the Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959. 
117Bamford op cit. at 384; Denning op cit. at 352-355. 
118R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924] 1 KB 256 at 
259: " ... [J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done." (per Lord Hewart). 
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suspicion of bias will suffice. 119 Thus, in S v Tyebela120 the Appellate 
Division set aside proceedings of the court a quo after having found that the 
sarcastic and hostile interventions of the judge had given the impression that 
he had not been fair and unbiased in his conduct of the case. 
2.3.1.2. Personal Independence. 
Personal independence is concerned with adequate security of judges in 
relation to their office and tenure as well as with the provision of adequate 
remuneration and other conditions of service. Undue interference, especially 
by the legislature or the executive, with judicial office, tenure and terms and 
conditions of service is likely to affect the independence of judges as 
individuals adversely . 
The personal independence of the judiciary may be affected by the fear that 
a judge will be removed from office or that one or other condition of service 
will be withdrawn, such as a threat to withdraw the provision of an official 
vehicle, should he give a decision which is adverse to the interests of the 
legislature or the executive. 
In general, the personal independence of the judiciary is secured by appointing 
judges for as long as they behave themselves properly (quamdiu se bene 
gesserint) and up to a specified retirement age; 121 in addition, the 
remuneration of judges and other conditions of service are usually statutorily 
119See L Baxter Administrative Law (1984, 1989 reprint) at 558-560. 
1201989 (2) SA 22 (A). 
121 In terms of section 104(4) of the 1993 Constitution a judge may only 
be removed from office by the President on the grounds of misbehaviour, 
incapacity or incompetence established by the Judicial Service Commission 
and upon receipt of an address from both the National Assembly and the 
Senate calling for such removal. 
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protected. 122 
Under the previous constitutional dispensation the provisions protecting the 
security of tenure, remuneration and terms and conditions of service of judges 
were contained in ordinary legislation.123 In theory there was nothing which 
prevented the legislature from amending or repealing these provisions and 
interfering with the security of tenure, salaries and terms and conditions of 
employment of judges; however, since the independence of the judiciary is 
one of the cornerstones of the Westminster system, it may be argued that such 
interference would have been invalid. The removal of judges and the 
protection of their remuneration is now regulated by the 1993 
Constitution,124 which is rigid and therefore difficult to repeal or amend. 125 
The supremacy of the Constitution also essentially entrenches the security of 
tenure and remuneration of judges; in terms of section 4(1) any law which is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution shall be of no force or 
effect to the extent of the inconsistency. 
Personal judicial independence is, however, not threatened only by undue 
legislative or executive interference. Potential pressures from parties to a case 
or other persons may also pose a threat; it is for this reason that judges are 
granted immunity from liability for any words uttered or acts or omissions 
1221n terms of section 104(2) of the 1993 Constitution the remuneration of 
judges shall not be reduced during their continuation of office. 
123Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, 88 of 1989. 
124Apart from guaranteeing judicial independence (section 96(2)), the 1993 
Constitution protects the remuneration of judges (section 104(2)). 
125ln terms of section 62(1) of the 1993 Constitution a Bill which amends 
the Constitution must be adopted at a joint sitting of the National Assembly 
and the Senate by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of 
members of both Houses. 
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performed in the discharge of their judicial functions. 126 
An effective means of protecting judges from pressures from sources other 
than the legislature and the executive is to maintain the prestige of judges 
through the rules governing the offence of contempt of court. 127 Any act 
which impugns the integrity and dignity of a judge and thereby brings into 
disrepute the standing of the judiciary or the court constitutes a punishable 
offence. 128 The sub judice rule also protects the personal independence of 
the judiciary by prohibiting the discussion and speculation in the media of a 
matter which a judge is still hearing. Criticism of judicial action and of 
decisions taken in good faith is, however, allowed; the criticism will constitute 
contempt of court only if improper motives, partiality or unfairness are 
imputed to a judge. 
2.3.2. Collective Independence. 
Although attributes of personal independence serve to insulate individual 
judges from real or potential prejudice in the discharge of their judicial 
function, they are not sufficient to ensure that judges are independent as a 
corporate branch of government. Interference with the judiciary as a corporate 
branch of government may adversely affect judges collectively; it may also 
affect individual judges in the discharge of their judicial function. The 
traditions and sense of corporate judicial responsibility serve to strengthen the 
personal independence of individual judges. 129 
126See Shetreet op cit. at 623; Boulle, Harris & Hoexter op cit. at 203. 
127See Carpenter op cit. at 258. 
'
28P.M.A Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure 
Vol. II (1982) at 185; C.R Snyman Criminal Law (1983) at 291. 
129Shetreet op cit. at 643. 
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As a corporate body which administers the law on behalf of the state, the 
judiciary by and large depends on the executive or the legislature for the 
provision of administrative personnel, the provision of court equipment and 
stationery, the erection of court buildings and the preparation of court 
budgets. The provision of these services makes it possible for the executive 
or the legislature to interfere with the collective independence of the judiciary. 
The collective independence of the judiciary may be undermined where the 
central administration of the courts is placed entirely in the hands of the 
executive branch. Problems associated with the administration of the courts, 
and which are likely to affect the collective independence of the judiciary, 
were highlighted by a judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa when he 
was giving evidence before the Hoexter Commission: 130 
" ... [T]he structure, as it exists, is one which the people who administer it [do not] fully 
understand il or are [not] equipped to understand the problems of the Supreme Court ... [1lhese 
problems are often looked at as though the Supreme Court were an adjunct or appendage of the 
Department and wa"> perhaps a bit of a problem, because it did not conform to the ordinary 
convenient standards that obtained throughout the whole of the particular department ... There are 
sorts of problems that judges have. They relate to quite major matters and to quite minor matters, 
like getting essential books for libraries and getting practical things that a judge needs to do his 
work properly. 1' 
The position of the judiciary could even be worse where an executive who is 
entirely responsible for the central administration of the courts becomes hostile 
or antagonistic when judicial decisions that are unfavourable to it are made; 
such an executive could, for example, deliberately replace well-trained and 
competent court administration personnel with incompetent or inefficient ones, 
supply insufficient or poor court equipment and stationery or neglect to 
maintain court buildings properly. Such conduct would in the long run clearly 
demoralise judges and affect their collective independence. 
"°Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and 
Functioning of the Courts RP 78\83, para. 4.2.4. 
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Possible executive manipulation of the central administration of the courts 
could be avoided through the participation of the judiciary itself, the extent of 
which may range from consultation, sharing responsibility with the executive 
(or the legislature) to exclusive judicial responsibility. 131 
In Britain, possible manipulation of the administration of the courts by the 
executive and the legislature is mitigated by the position of the Lord 
Chancellor who, apart from being a member of the cabinet and a member of 
the House of Lords, is the head of the judiciary. 132 The Lord Chancellor is 
responsible for the administrative business of the Supreme Court; the 
appointment of court officials is partly his responsibility and the responsibility 
of the presidents of the various divisions of the Supreme Court.133 It may 
be that the position of the Lord Chancellor as a member of both the executive 
and the judiciary is a deviation from the separation of powers; this deviation, 
however, serves a positive purpose in that it acts as a check against possible 
manipulation of the administration of the courts by the executive; on the other, 
hand possible manipulation of the administration of justice by the Lord 
Chancellor is mitigated by the fact that the Lord Chancellor rarely sits as a 
judge in cases in which an organ of the state is involved as a litigant. 
Coetzer134 has put forward an acceptable and workable solution which could 
mitigate possible manipulation of the central administration of the courts under 
the new South African constitutional dispensation. He has suggested, first, that 
the central administration of the courts should be divorced from the public 
service; secondly, that an office similar to that of the Lord Chancellor, 
131See Shetreet op cit. at 644 et seq. 
132J.P.J Coetzer "Die Regsadminstrasie en Verwante Sake in 'n Nuwe 
Bedeling" 1991Consultus104 at 106-107. 
133Wade & Phillips op cit. at 233. 
134Coetzer 1991 Consultus at 110. 
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suitably adapted, should be established; thirdly, that a Council of Justice along 
the lines suggested by the Hoexter Commission135 should be created; and 
lastly, that the Chief Justice should play a larger out-of-court role. 136 
A more serious threat to collective judicial independence is the possibility of 
the abolition of the established courts and the creation of ad hoc tribunals. 
Although the abolition of the courts would rarely occur, there is nothing to 
stop a legislature with supreme and omnipotent law-making powers from 
abolishing the courts and replacing them with some other form of tribunal; 
such a course of action would be easy to take where the courts are established 
by ordinary legislation and not in terms of a rigid Constitution. 
The creation of the High Court of Parliament by the South African legislature 
in 1952 provides an example of the creation of an ad hoc tribunal which 
135The Hoexter Commission recommended the establishment of a Council 
of Justice which would advise the Minister of Justice on matters pertaining to 
the administration of Justice. The Council would be under the chairmanship 
of the Chief Justice, would sit at least once a year and would have to table a 
report before the State President at least once a year. The Department of 
Justice would have to place at the disposal of the Council a permanent 
secretariat which would be staffed by qualified statisticians, researchers and 
secretarial personnel: RP 78\83, vol. I, Chap. 4, part II. The establishment 
of the Judicial Services Commission in terms of section 105(1) of the 1993 
Constitution is in line with the idea of ensuring the independence of the 
judiciary; the participation of the Judicial Service Commission in the 
appointment of judges reduces the risk of purely executive appointments: see 
infra for a discussion of the functions of the Judicial Service Commission. 
136The Chief Justice's out-of-court role would include, inter alia, 
chairmanship of the Council of Justice, contact with members of the 
government to ensure that the government is constantly kept informed about 
problems facing judges in the exercise of their functions, and addressing 
parliamentary committees whenever legislation affecting the courts is under 
consideration : Coetzer op cit. at 109. See infra for a discussion of the role 
of the Chief Justice under the 1993 Constitution. 
-194-
posed a threat to collective judicial independence. 137 The High Court of 
Parliament was constituted by members of Parliament and was empowered to 
review certain decisions of the Appellate Division, the highest court in the 
country. It was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Appellate 
Division in Minister of the Interior v Harris.138 
In declaring the High Court of Parliament unconstitutional the Appellate 
Division concluded that the High Court was not a court of law but simply 
Parliament masquerading as a court of law. In his judgment Van den Heever 
JA outlined the power of a legislature with supreme law-making powers to 
create new tribunals. Van den Heever JA opined that Parliament possessed the 
power to create tribunals which may not satisfy certain criteria of 
independence, competence and justness; 139 he went on, however, to state 
that no matter what Parliament created, the creation must be a court capable 
of adjudicating disputes between parties to a dispute, including disputes 
between Parliament and.individuals; it had to be a body other than Parliament 
or an extension of Parliament and capable of passing judgment on issues 
arising from the dispute. 140 
Collective judicial independence may also be affected by the legislature's pre-
empting and frustrating decisions. Discussion and criticism of judicial 
proceedings which are still pending would amount to pre-empting the decision 
of the court; such conduct may affect the independence of not only the 
137Mr J.G.N Strauss, the leader of the Opposition, described the creation 
of the High Court of Parliament as a move which was "calculated to 
undermine the independence of the law courts and to smash the Constitution." 
78 House of Assembly Debates, col. 4136 (22 April 1952). 
138Supra. See Chapt. 4 for a full discussion of this case. 
1391t is submitted that the legislature would not have such a power if the 
Constitution is supreme. 
140At 792. 
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individual judge but also of the judiciary as a whole; it may result in judges 
feeling that their judicial function is futile. 
The legislature may also frustrate judicial decisions by passing an Act which 
reverses a decision and restores the position as it was before a decision was 
given. The frustration of judicial decision is best prevented by means of a 
constitutional provision which prohibits the retrospective reversal of decisions 
by the legislature. 141 
2.4. Judicial Appointments and the Independence of the Judiciary. 
Implicit in the concept of judicial independence is the underlying assumption 
that judges must, as far as possible, be appointed purely on merit and not on 
political grounds. 142 The involvement of politics in the appointment of 
judges can materially affect the independence of the judiciary and jeopardise 
its role as an independent and impartial umpire in the resolution of disputes 
between parties, especially when one of the parties is the government which 
was responsible for the appointment. The politicisation of judicial 
appointments does not, however, necessarily result in lack of judicial 
independence. In the United States of America, for example, confirmations of 
nominees for judicial office by the Senate Judiciary Committee are often 
excessively politicised; 143 the United States judiciary is nevertheless well-
known for its fearless independence. 
141Such a provision would positivise the presumption against retrospectivity 
and at the same time prevent the government from making use of its 
legislative muscle to interfere with vested rights and the administration of 
justice. See G.E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) at 186 et 
seq. for a discussion of the presumption against retrospectivity. 
142See S. Kentridge "Telling the Truth about Law" 1982 SALJ 648 at 
651. 
143Sec G. Nienaber "United States Supreme Court Appointments: 
Implications for a Future Constitution in South Africa" 1991 Consultus 19. 
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Whether judicial appointments are likely to affect the independence of the 
judiciary will depend on who is responsible for such appointments. Where the 
executive is solely responsible for judicial appointments and there is no 
mechanism through which purely political appointments can be prevented, the 
appointment of a judge purely on the ground that he is sympathetic to the 
government cannot be excluded. 144 Judicial appointments by the executive 
do not, however, necessarily result in pro-executive judgments. It is not 
uncommon for an appointee to disappoint the hopes of those who expected 
him to follow the political views of the appointer. 145 
South Africa has had its fair share of controversial judicial appointments. 146 
One such appointment, and later promotion, was that of Mr Justice L.C Steyn. 
Prior to his appointment to the bench Mr Justice Steyn was Attorney-General 
for South West Africa (now Namibia) and later a Senior Government Law 
Advisor; he had never practised at the bar. 147 Mr Justice Steyn was later 
144See infra. for a discussion of judicial appointments under the 1993 
Constitution. 
145Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr of the United States Supreme 
Court disappointed President Roosevelt with his 'anti-administration' opinions 
in anti-trust cases, notably in Northern Securities v United States 193 
US 197 (1904) : see H.J Abraham The Judicial Process (1986) at 76-78 
for an account of judicial appointments and subsequent disappointments in the 
United States. 
146See A van Blerk Judge and be Judged (1988), Chapt. V. 
147Traditionally, judges in England and South Africa have been appointed 
from the ranks of practising Senior Counsel. The role of the Judicial Service 
Commission under the new Constitution has certainly opened the room for the 
appointment of competent, independent and qualified lawyers (such as 
lecturers in law and attorneys) as judges, even if they are not Senior Counsel. 
Examples are the appointments of Mr Justice John Hlophe and Mr Justice 
Edwin Cameron, former professors of law (appointees need not even be 
professors), as judges and Ms Justice Navi Pillay, an attorney, as an acting 
judge. Sections 99(2)(b) and 104(1) of the 1993 Constitution require that the 
appointee shall be a fit and proper person. While the appointment of 
academics as judges is to be welcomed, it is desirable, however, that 
appointees should have sufficient practical experience to be able to deal with 
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elevated to the position of Chief Justice over judges considered to be more 
senior and deserving. 148 
The packing of the Appellate Division in the 1950s provides a local example 
of judicial appointments which have raised suspicions of political motivations. 
The six additional judges of the Appellate Division were appointed pursuant 
to the enactment of the Appellate Division Quorum Act149, an Act which 
increased the quorum of the Appellate Division to eleven judges in appeals 
dealing with the validity of any Act of Parliament. At the time the government 
was involved in a process of removing Coloured voters from the common 
voters' roll; it was anticipated that the Appellate Division would in due course 
consider the validity of legislation effecting the removal of Coloured voters 
from the common voters' roll. The additional appointments were made 
without the customary consultation with the Chief Justice; 150 the new 
appointees were not readily accepted by their colleagues. 151 
intricate practical aspects of the resolution of legal disputes. The appointment 
of magistrates from the ranks of public prosecutors has never been seriously 
questioned; it is important, however, that their independence should be 
statutorily recognised and protected. 
148For a criticism of L.C Steyn's appointment and later elevation to the 
position of Chief Justice see E. Cameron "Legal Chauvinism, Executive-
mindedness and Justice - L.C Steyn's Impact on South African Law" 1982 
SALJ 38 at 41-43; C Forsyth In Danger for their Talents - A Study 
of the Supreme Court of South Africa from 1950-1980 (1985) 
at 25-26. 
149Act 27 of 1955. 
15
°Forsyth op cit. at 15. Traditionally, judicial appointments were made 
in consultation with the Bench and the Bar. Under the new dispensation the 
Judicial Service Commission plays a pivotal role in the appointment of judges: 
See infra. 
151Forsyth op cit. at 23. According to Forsyth the new appointees, whom 
he refers to as 'the second team', "were denied inter alia, participation in the 
bowls games on Wednesday afternoons, which were an Appellate Division 
tradition". 
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Controversial appointments may not always glaringly affect judicial 
independence because only a proportion of cases are politically sensitive; the 
majority of cases are decided by judges who are, above all, competent, 
regardless of their political leanings. There can be no doubt, however, that 
controversial appointments are disturbing and do not go unnoticed by other 
members of the judiciary and in legal circles. In his evidence before the 
Hoexter Commission Mr Justice Didcott noted that such appointments are 
11 
commonplace ac,; a topic of conversation whenever lawyers gather ... 1hings have got 
so bad that some advocates and attorneys who claim political influence, and visibly relish the role 
of wheeler-dealers, bomit openly of their successes in securing the appointment and promotion of 
so and so, and spoi1ing the prospects of what's-his-name. Their arrogance and cynicism is 
distressing enough. Much more is the harm they do to the status and reputation of the judiciary, 
and for that matter the executive itself 11 • 152 
Purely political appointments are generally intended to give the appointer 
leverage with which to influence the outcome of judicial decisions; such 
appointments therefore violate the independence of the judiciary .153 A 
political appointment may instil in the appointee a sense of obligation towards 
the appointer, with the result that he may become personally dependent. Such 
appointments may in the long run also cause loss of confidence in the 
judiciary as a collective branch of government. 
The fact that executive appointments have the potential to affect judicial 
independence does not necessarily mean that the executive ought not be 
involved in the appointment of judges. The executive does have a 
responsibility in the administration of justice and, therefore, the appointment 
of judges. This responsibility stems from the principle of responsible 
152
"The Didcott Memorandum and other Submissions to the Hoexter 
Commission" in 1980 SAW 651 at 661. 
153See z. Motala "Independence of the Judiciary, Prospects and 
Limitations of Judicial Review in terms of the United States Model in a New 
South African Order : Towards an Alternative Judicial Structure" 1991 
CILSA 285 at 295. 
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government in a parliamentary system. 154 
Executive participation in the appointment of judges requires, however, an 
effective mechanism or some constitutional check through which political and 
controversial appointments can be prevented. Associated with the doctrine of 
the separation of powers is the principle of 'checks and balances'; 155 there 
ought to be a measure of control over the exercise of governmental powers if 
there has to be good government. 
Various mechanisms have been devised to minimise the danger of purely 
political judicial appointments. In the United States of America judicial 
appointments by the President have to be confirmed by the Senate; 
confirmation is preceded by hearings and a vote of the Judiciary Committee 
of the Senate. 156 The American Bar Association also plays a significant role 
in the evaluation of qualifications of actual or potential nominees during the 
pre-formal nomination stage. 157 
Nienaber158 is of the view that in the absence of the participation of the 
legislature, judicial appointments by a body which consists of members of the 
executive, the judiciary and the legal profession would not be politically 
legitimate. His suggestion is that a mechanism which is similar to that which 
154Shetreet op cit. at 651. 
155See supra. 
156Art II s. 2 of the Constitution of the United States. The Judiciary 
Committee consists of members representing the party-political division in the 
full Senate. The nominee's political views are usually perceived to be crucial: 
Nienaber 1991 Consultus at 20-21; Abraham op cit. at 23-26. 
157Abraham op cit. at 26-29. The Bar Association's Committee on 
Federal Judiciary does not directly participate in the nomination process but 
evaluates the qualifications of actual or potential nominees and reports to the 
Justice Department on the qualifications and ratings of the nominees. 
158Nienaber 1991 Consultus at 23-24. 
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is employed in the United States should be applied. In his view judicial 
appointments should be assigned solely to the legislature in order to ensure 
public accountability; the legislature could then assign the pre-appointment 
process to a legislative committee whose function would be to propose 
candidates selected from a pool of potential candidates; recommendations to 
the legislature would be preceded by committee hearings. Under such a system 
the judiciary and the legal profession could play the useful role of identifying 
and evaluating potential candidates; the evaluation could then serve as a guide 
to the legislative committee when it selects candidates. 
Although the method of appointment suggested by Nienaber promotes and 
ensures public accountability, it is submitted that it does not reduce the risk 
of political appointments to a meaningful degree; where a political party 
enjoys the support of a large majority of the members of the legislature, it 
would be easy for it to ensure the appointment of only those candidates who 
are likely to be sympathetic to its cause; it would also be easy for the majority 
party to load the legislative committee with members from its party and for 
the committee to recommend the appointment of candidates who are more 
likely to support its cauSe and leave out those who are less likely to support 
it. This method has the propensity to politicise the process of judicial 
appointments; the interview of candidates by a legislative committee may be 
conducted along political lines and engage potential judges in politics. 159 
In the former Federal Republic of Germany the consent of the Minister of 
Justice and the majority of the electoral council for judges was necessary for 
the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court. 160 In Portugal judges of the 
159The controversy which surrounded the appointment of Mr Justic~ 
Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court serves as a good 
example of an interview along political lines. 
160Art. 95, 11 GG, Section 1 ff of the Law for the Election of Judges. The 
electoral council consisted of the eleven Ministers of Justice of the states and 
eleven members of the German Parliament : see P Schlosser & W Hobscheid 
"Federal Republic of Germany" in Shetreet & Deschenes op cit. at 85. 
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Constitutional Court are elected en bloc by the Assembly by a two-thirds 
majority from both the ranks of judges of the ordinary courts and 
academics. 161 
In Namibia judicial appointments are assigned to an independent body 
consisting of members of the executive, the judiciary and the legal profession. 
In terms of article 82 of the Namibian Constitution all appointments of judges 
of the Supreme Court and the High Court are to be made by the President on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. The Judicial Service 
Commission is an independent body consisting of the Chief Justice, a judge 
appointed by the President, the Attorney-General and two members of the 
legal profession nominated in accordance with the provisions of an Act of 
Parliament by the professional organisation or organisations representing the 
interests of the legal profession in Namibia. 162 
3. The Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence under 
the 1993 Constitution. 
Like previous Constitutions, the 1993 Constitution makes provision for a 
formal division of state authority among the legislature, the executive and the 
Otherwise than in common law systems, judges in civil law systems are 
usually professional career judges. The idea of professional career judges is 
more suited to civil law systems, where there is a more strict reliance on 
written statutes and the judge plays an active role in the proceedings; the 
specialised training of judges is geared towards the application of systematised 
legal codes and a discovery of the truth through the interrogation of witnesses. 
In the common law system the judge relies more on precedent and authorities 
and plays a neutral role in the examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses; judicial experience is usually gained in practice rather than in the 
lecture-hall. 
161See the account by M. Seligson (untitled) in 1991 Consultus 27 at 28. 
162Art. 85(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. See infra 
for a discussion of judicial appointments under the 1993 Constitution. 
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judiciary. 163 There is, however, some fusion of functions and personnel 
between the legislature and the executive; the President, Deputy Presidents 
and members of the cabinet are also members of the legislature and are 
accountable to it for their actions. The judiciary, on the other hand, is 
completely separate from both the legislature and the executive. 
What is significant about the 1993 Constitution is that it formally recognises 
the importance of the principle of the separation of powers and of checks and 
balances. In terms of Constitutional Principle VI "[t]here shall be a separation 
of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness". 164 The formal recognition of the principle of separation of 
powers and of checks and balances reflects the position of the courts as a 
separate and independent organ of the state. 
An important feature of the 1993 Constitution is that it places formal 
limitations on the powers of the legislature and the executive and vests in the 
courts the power to test legislative and executive acts; the testing power 
operates as a means of ensuring that these formal limitations are adhered to. 
The first formal limitation is contained in section 4(1); in terms of this section 
the legislature, the executive and the judicial organs of state at all levels of 
government are bound by the Constitution. The second formal limitation is 
contained in section 7(1); in terms of this section the legislative and executive 
organs of state at all levels of government are bound by the Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights (Chapter 3). 
163See sections 37, 75 and 96(1). 
1~he Constitutional Principles are contained in Schedule 4. In terms of 
section 7l(l)(a) a new constitutional text must comply with the Constitutional 
Principles contained in Schedule 4; in terms of section 71(2) the Constitutional 
Court must certify that the provisions of the new constitutional text comply 
with the Constitutional Principles. 
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Chapter 3 entrenches the fundamental human rights and freedoms of 
individuals and protects them against infringement by the legislature and the 
executive. The rights and freedoms entrenched in Chapter 3 are enforceable 
in a court of law. The Constitution therefore gives the courts the fundamental 
role of checking the exercise of power by the legislature and the executive. In 
order to he effective in this role, the courts ought to be independent; section 
96(2) of the Constitution therefore provides that "the judiciary shall be 
independent, impartial and subject only to this Constitution and the law"; 
section 98(3) also explicitly prohibits interference with judicial officers in the 
performance of their functions by any person or organ of state. 
The Constitution also protects the security of tenure and the remuneration of 
judges. In terms of section 104(2) the remuneration of judges shall not be 
reduced during their continuation in office; in terms of section 104(4) a judge 
may only be removed from office by the President on the grounds of 
misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence established by the Judicial Service 
Commission and upon receipt of an address from both the National Assembly 
and the Senate praying for such removal. The import of section 104( 4) is that 
neither the executive nor the legislature can on their own remove a judge from 
office; the Judicial Service Commission165 must first establish that a judge 
is guilty of misbehaviour, is incapacitated or is incompetent before he can be 
removed from office. 166 
The Judicial Service Commission also plays an important role in the 
165The Judicial Service Commission is composed of the Chief Justice, the 
President of the Constitutional Court, a Judge President designated by the 
Judges President, the Minister of Justice or his representative, four legal 
practitioners representing the advocates and attorneys' professions, a professor 
of law representing all the law faculties at South African Universities, four 
senators designated by the Senate and four persons, two of whom are 
practising attorneys or advocates, designated by the President in consultation 
with the Cabinet: section 105(1). 
166Section 104(5) makes provision for the suspension of a judge pending 
investigation by the Judicial Services Commission. 
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appointment of judges. Its composition and its role in the appointment process 
reduces the risk of purely political appointments; otherwise than in the past the 
executive can no longer decide on its own who to appoint as a judge. 
The 1993 Constitution does not, however, make provision for a consistent 
method of appointment of judges. The Chief Justice is appointed by the 
President in consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with the 
Judicial Service Commission. 167 The President of the Constitutional Court 
is appointed by the President in consultation with the Cabinet and after 
consultation with the Chief Justice;168 four judges of the Constitutional Court 
are appointed from among judges of the Supreme Court by the President in 
consultation with the Cabinet and with the Chief Justice. 169 The remaining 
six judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President in 
consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with the President of the 
Constitutional Court. 170 
167Section 97(1). 
168Section 97(2)(a). 
169Section 99(3). 
170A judge of the Constitutional Court must, in addition to being a fit and 
proper person, be a South African citizen and either be a judge of the 
Supreme Court or a person qualified to be admitted as an advocate or attorney 
and has, for a cumulative period of at least 10 years after having so qualified, 
practised as an advocate or an attorney or lectured in law at a university or be 
a person who, by reason of his or her training and experience, has expertise 
in the field of constitutional law relevant to the application of the Constitution 
and the law of the Republic; a judge of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
need only be a 'fit and proper person'. The additional qualifications for judges 
of the Constitutional Court seem to be based on the rationale that members of 
a specialised Constitutional Court ought to be South African citizens who have 
extensive experience and sufficient expertise to be able to interpret and apply 
fundamental constitutional values. There seems to be no reason, however, why 
judges of the Supreme Court, who also often interpret and apply the 
provisions of the Constitution during litigation, should not be subject to the 
additional qualifications. 
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In terms of section 99(5)(a) the appointment of the President of the 
Constitutional Court and of the six judges of the Constitutional Court who are 
not appointed from among the judges of the Constitutional Court shall only be 
made from the recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission. 171 The 
appointing authorities are enjoined to inform the Judicial Service Commission 
and to furnish it with reasons if they decide not to accept any or some of the 
recommendations, after which the Judicial Service Commission must make 
further recommendations; the appointing authorities are thereafter obliged to 
make appointments from the recommendations as supplemented. 172 The 
Judicial Service Commission is, on the other hand, directed to have regard to 
"the need to constitute a court which is independent and representative in 
respect of gender and race" when making its recommendations.173 
It is clear from the definition of "in consultation with" in section 233(3) that 
the appointments of the Chief Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court 
and judges of the Constitutional Court require consensus between the President 
and the Cabinet before a valid decision can be taken; in other words, the 
President and the Cabinet must make the decision together. In terms of section 
233(3), "where . . . any functionary is required to take a decision in 
consultation with any functionary, such decision shall require the concurrence 
of such other functionary ... " 
The words "after consultation with" do not have the same meaning as "in 
consultation with". 174 Section 233( 4) stipulates that a decision taken after 
consultation with a functionary shall be a decision taken in good faith after 
consulting and giving serious consideration to the views of the functionary. 
171Section 99( 6) makes prov1s10n for an exception in respect of the 
appointment of the first President of the Constitutional Court. 
172Sections 99(5)(b) and (c). 
173Section 99(5)(d). 
174Colonial Secretary v Molteno School Board 27 SC 96. 
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The words "after consultation with" mean that the decision-maker must 
provide the person or body with whom he must consult with all the relevant 
information, but the parties need not agree on the final decision. 175 This 
means that the President and the Judicial Service Commission, in the case of 
the appointment of the Chief Justice, or the President and the Chief Justice, 
in the case of the appointment of the President of the Constitutional Court, or 
the President and the President of the Constitutional Court in the case of the 
six judges of the Constitutional Court who are not appointed from among 
judges of the Supreme Court176 need not agree on the final decision. In view 
of the section 233(4) requirement that the President must give serious 
consideration to the views of the Judicial Service Commission, it seems 
unlikely that the President will ignore its recommendation. Sections 99(5)(b) 
and (c) in essence oblige the President to make the appointments from the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President acting on the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. However, the Constitution does 
not define the words "acting on the advice of". The words logically mean 
something other than "after consultation with"; they suggest in relity that the 
the President is obliged to seek, and act according to, the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission. 177 This means that President cannot simply 
175See D.H Sasson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional 
Law (1988) at 56; D. Sasson South Africa's Interim Constitution 
: Text and Notes (1994) at 116. 
176There is a difference between the appointment of the four judges as 
provided in section 99(3) and the appointment of the six judges as provided 
in section 99(4); whereas the President is required to make the decision to 
appoint the four judges together with the Cabinet and the Chief Justice, he is 
required to make the decision to appoint the six judges, from the 
recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission, together with the 
Cabinet and only to consult President of the Constitutional Court; the final 
decision rests with the President and the Cabinet. The Judicial Service 
Commission does not play any role in the appointment of the four judges. 
177Sasson op cit. at 139. 
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appoint anyone he likes as a judge; he can only appoint persons recommended 
by the Judicial Service CommissionY' In essence, he has little or no 
discretion. Indeed, if he is to avoid charges of making political appointments, 
he would hardly ignore the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Otherwise than in the United States, there is no participation of a special 
committee of the legislature in judicial appointments under the 1993 
Constitution. The Judicial Service Commission, which has seventeen 
members, is dominated by persons who are not members of either the 
executive or the legislature. It is instead dominated by members of the legal 
profession, namely judges, a professor of law and legal practitioners. The 
legislature is represented by only four senators who arc designated by the 
Senate; the executive is represented by the Minister of Justice or his 
representative. 
4. Constitutional Supremacy and the Independence of the 
Judiciary. 
In the constitutional sense, the independence of the judiciary depends on the 
normative level of the legal system with regard to the position of the judiciary, 
and the extent to which this position can be altered through the exercise of 
178The words 'on the advice of' bear a similar meaning to 'on the 
recommendation of': The Oxford Paperback Dictionary (J.M 
Hawkins, 2nd ed. 1983) q.v advise; recommend ; The New American 
Roget's College Thesaurus (A.H Morehead, 1962) q.v advice. Under 
the 1961 Constitution the State President was obliged to act on the advice of 
the Executive Council when he exercised certain powers which were mainly 
inherited by him as the successor to the British Monarch and 'new' powers 
specifically conferred on him in terms of the Constitution and other statutory 
enactments; in exercising these powers the State President had no discretion 
to act according to his own inclination but was obliged to act on the advice or 
recommendation of the Executive Council. 
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legislative or executive power. 179 The extent to which the position of the 
judiciary can be altered will depend on the constitutional limits which are 
imposed on the exercise of legislative or executive power in relation to the 
judiciary. In the absence of a constitutional guarantee of judicial 
independence, the principle of the separation of powers can at best serve as 
a reminder to the legislature and the executive that the judiciary is a separate 
branch of government whose independence ought to be respected. 
In a normative sense, the constitutional position of the judiciary is determined 
by the legal norms which provide for the establishment of the courts, the 
jurisdiction of the courts, the appointment, terms of office and tenure of the 
judges. These legal norms may be divided into two categories, namely 
supreme constitutional norms and ordinary statutory norms. 
Supreme constitutional norms are those which are contained in a supreme 
Constitution. The Constitution is supreme in the sense that it constitutes 
fundamental law which cannot be repealed or amended through the ordinary 
legislative process. Ordinary statutory norms, on the other hand, are those 
which are contained in ordinary statutes; such statutes do not have any special 
status and can be repealed or amended through the ordinary legislative 
process. 
The regulation of the position of the judiciary by constitutional norms ensures 
greater judicial independence; judicial independence is m essence 
constitutionally guaranteed, because the supreme provisions of the Constitution 
insulate the establishment of the courts, their jurisdiction, the appointment of 
judges, their terms of office and tenure against legislative or executive 
interference; legislative changes regarding the position of the judiciary would 
require constitutional amendment or repeal, which would not be easy to effect 
if the Constitution is sufficiently rigid. 
179See Shetreet op cit. at 610. 
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The regulation of the position of the judiciary by ordinary statutory norms, on 
the other hand, may not always safeguard judicial independence, because the 
ordinary statutes in which these norms are contained do not enjoy any 
supreme status and may be repealed or amended with ease. It is also possible, 
however, to guarantee judicial independence by making express provision for 
judicial independence in a supreme Constitution and then regulating the 
establishment of the courts, their jurisdiction, the appointment of judges, their 
terms of office and tenure through ordinary statute. In such an instance, undue 
legislative or executive interference with the courts or the appointments, terms 
of office and tenure of judges would offend against the constitutional 
guarantee of judicial independence and would therefore be unconstitutional. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE ROLE OF 
THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA. 
1 . A Brief Constitutional History of Canada 
Canada was established by the British North America Act, 1867 .1 The Act 
created the Dominion of Canada by uniting the four original provinces, 
namely Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.2 It also outlined 
the elements of the central government and made provision for a distribution 
of powers between the central government and the provinces. 
As a dominion Canada was, like the Union of South Africa, subject to certain 
legal handicaps which restricted the legislative powers of its Parliament. In 
terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, the legislature of a dominion 
could not pass laws which would be in conflict with an Act of the British 
Parliament. A further handicap was that the legislature of a dominion could 
not pass laws with extra-territorial effect. These legal restraints were removed 
by the Statute of Westminster of 1931.3 
Although prior to the passing of the Statute of Westminster the position of 
'30 & 31 Viet. c 3. 
2Sections 3 and 5. Other provinces were incorporated later; at present 
Canada consists of 10 provinces and 2 territories. 
3See Chap!. 3 for a discussion of the effect of the Statute of Westminster 
on the legislative competence of dominion parliaments. On the Statute of 
Westminster in relation to Canada in particular see G. Marshall 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth (1957) at 94-
102; R.M Dawson The Government of Canada (1957) at 61. 
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Canada as a dominion was similar to that of the Union of South Africa, the 
two dominions had different constitutional orders. The purpose of the British 
North America Act was to create a federal system of government, 
characterised by a distribution of powers between the central government and 
the provincial governments. The provincial governments were given a 
moderate list of powers which were essentially concerned with local matters;4 
the central government was given comprehensive powers "to make laws for 
the peace, order and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not 
coming within the classes of subjects . . . assigned exclusively to the 
legislatures of the provinces" as well as a long list of specific powers which 
were for the most part concerned with national matters. 5 Provision was also 
made for concurrent powers in relation to certain matters. 6 
Legislative power at central level was vested in the Queen, the Senate and the 
House of Commons. 7 A Governor-General acted as the Queen's 
representative. Legislative power at provincial level was vested in the 
Lieutenant-Governor and a Legislative Assembly. 8 
Prior to 1949 the power of the central legislature to amend the Constitution 
(the British North America Act) was limited. The established tradition was 
that constitutional changes were made by the British Parliament at the request 
4Sect. 4, British North America Act, 1867. 
5Sect. 91, British North America Act, 1867. 
60riginally these matters were immigration and agriculture (sect. 95). A 
1951 amendment created a third concurrent power, namely the enactment of 
laws in relation to old age pension (section 94A, British Statutes, 14 & 15 
George VI c 32. 
7Sect. 17, British North America Act, 1867. 
'Sects. 67, 71, and 88, British North America Act, 1867. 
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of the Canadian Parliament. 9 The limitation of the power of the Canadian 
Parliament to amend the Constitution was, however, relaxed by the British 
North America (No. 2) Act,1949. 
The British North America Act of 1949 left only certain matters, affecting for 
the most part the relationship between the central government and the 
provincial governments, to be amended by the British Parliament at the 
request of the Canadian Parliament. The Act granted the Canadian Parliament 
the power to amend the Constitution, with the exception of certain matters 
which fell within the legislative competence of the provincial parliaments in 
terms of the 1867 Act, the rights and privileges of the provinces acquired by 
them in terms of the 1867 Act or any other constitutional act and the rights of 
any class of persons pertaining to schools or the use of the English or French 
languages. 10 These exceptions were in the nature of a constitutional 
entrenchment; constitutional provisions relating to them could only be 
amended with the consent of the provinces or by the British Parliament at the 
request of the Canadian Parliament. 11 
Although the Canadian provinces were structured along federal lines, the 
British North America Act, 1867 was intended to create a united dominion 
"with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom". 12 
The basic principle of the United Kingdom has been that of the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament13 and an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts 
9Dawson op cit. at 80 and 142-143. The British North America Act, 
1867 did not itself make provision for an amendment mechanism. 
10Marshall op cit. at 89. 
11Marshall op cit. at 89-90. 
12Preamble to the British North America Act, 1867. 
13See c. H Mcilwain The High Court of Parliament and its 
Supremacy (1934) at 336-346; G. Winterton "Parliamentary Supremacy 
and the Judiciary" 1981 LQR 265 at 273. 
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over the validity of parliamentary legislation. 14 In conformity with the 
principle of legislative supremacy, the British North America Act did not 
make any provision for the protection of individual rights and freedoms in 
terms of which the validity of legislation could be reviewed by the courts. 
Until 1960 the only basis on which the courts could review the validity of 
legislation was the ultra vires doctrine in relation to the distribution of powers 
between the central government and the provincial governments. 15 The courts 
could declare federal legislation invalid if the federal Parliament had in 
enacting the legislation exceeded the powers granted to it by the Constitution; 
similarly, a provincial statute could be declared invalid if the provincial 
legislation had in enacting it exceeded its legislative powers in terms of the 
Constitution. 16 
In 1960 the federal Parliament of Canada enacted the Canadian Bill of 
Rights.17 The Bill of Rights was, however, not a fully-fledged constitutional 
document. It was not part of a supreme Constitution, nor was it entrenched; 
it was rather a quasi-constitutional document in terms of which certain 
fundamental human rights and freedoms were recognised and protected. 18 
14See A. v Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution 10th ed. (1975) at 60-61. 
15V.S Mackinnon "Dicey and New Dispensations: the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms" 1985 CILSA 404 at 405. 
16ldem. 
11An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms S.C. 1960, c 44, reprinted in R.S.C 1970, 
App. III (the 1960 Bill of Rights). For a discussion of the events leading to 
the enactment of 1960 Bill of Rights see M. Mandel The Charter of 
Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (1989) at 9-15. 
18See Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration 
[1985] 1S.C.R177 at 224. 
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The Bill of Rights was enacted by the federal government unilaterally and was 
applicable only to the federal organs of government. 19 
Largely because it did not form part of a Constitution with supreme legal 
effect, the 1960 Bill of Rights did not in the long run prove to be effective in 
the protection of human rights and freedoms. The courts' cautious and reticent 
application of the Bill of Rights contributed to its ineffectiveness.20 
Dissatisfaction with Canadian representative politics, the influence of United 
States institutions and culture on Canadian life and the government's promise 
to transfer power to the people by giving them the right to approach the courts 
for the enforcement of their rights against government excesses ushered in a 
new era in Canadian law and politics. 21 A new Constitution was introduced 
in 1982. The new Constitution was introduced by way of the enactment of the 
Canada Act by the British Parliament. 22 Section 1 of the Canada Act enacted 
the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 52 of the Constitution Act made the 
Constitution of Canada the supreme law of Canada; the Constitution Act 
contained a justiciable Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 23 In terms of 
section 2 of the Canada Act the British Parliament expressly renounced its 
19Mackinnon 1985 CILSA at 408. The application of the Bill of Rights 
to the provincial governments would have affected their powers and would as 
a result have required a consultation with them and their consent. In addition, 
a subsequent amendment of the Constitution by the British Parliament , in 
terms of section 91(1) of the British North America Act (No. 2) of 1949, 
would have been required. 
20See infra. 
21See Mandel op cit. Chap!. 1 for a discussion of the events which 
preceded the introduction of the new Constitution. 
221982, c 11 (UK). 
23The various rights and freedoms are specified in sections 2 to 23 of the 
Charter. Section 24 of the Constitution Act renders the rights and freedoms 
specified in the Charter justiciable. 
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authority to legislate for Canada in any way. 24 
In so far as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms forms part of a 
supreme Constitution and is justiciable, any federal or provincial legislation 
which is in conflict with its provisions may be reviewed and declared invalid 
by the courts. The supremacy of the Constitution implies that it operates as 
the supreme law of Canada; it has superior force over federal and provincial 
laws and any such law which is inconsistent with it would be 
unconstitutional. 25 
2. Legislative Supremacy and the Judiciary before 1982. 
Until the late 1930s the view that was held by Canadian lawyers and 
politicians about the constitutional position of the Canadian Parliament was 
that Parliament possessed absolute legislative supremacy; it was, according to 
this view, for Parliament to make laws and for the courts to apply these laws 
without questioning their validity. 26 
As early as 1899 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Canada's 
highest court of appeal until 1949, had held, in Union Colliery of 
British Columbia v Bryden,27 that it was not the function of the courts 
to question the wisdom or fairness of parliamentary legislation. In the opinion 
of the Privy Council, the legislative authority of Parliament was unfettered; 
all that the courts could do was to determine what the limits of the legislative 
24Section 2 provides as follows: "No Act of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend 
to Canada as part of its law". 
25See B.L Strayer The Canadian Constitution and the Courts 
(1988) at 43. 
26Mandel op cit. at 4. 
27[1899] A.C 580, per Lord Watson at 585. 
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authority granted were, and, once that point had been settled, courts of law 
had no right whatever to inquire whether legislative authority had been 
exercised wisely or not. 
The only limit on the legislative authority conferred by the British North 
America Act, 1867 was the division of powers between the federal 
government and the provincial governments. 28 In terms of this limitation, the 
courts could inquire whether the federal Parliament or the provincial 
legislatures had acted ultra vires the powers granted to them by the British 
North America Act. Provided that the federal and the provincial authorities 
did not infringe on each other's powers, the courts were not competent to 
question the validity of either federal or provincial legislation. 29 
The courts' competence to inquire into the question whether the federal or 
provincial legislatures acted ultra vires the powers granted to them in terms 
of the British North America Act was in reality not an inquiry into the validity 
of legislation. When Parliament acted ultra vires the powers granted to it, the 
ensuing instrument was no law at all, since the enacting organ had no legal 
power to make the 'law'. The instrument in question was null and void from 
the moment of its enactment. 30 
An inquiry into the question whether Parliament had acted ultra vires the 
powers granted to it in terms of the British North America Act essentially 
amounted to an inarticulate application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. 31 
The British North America Act was a statute of the British Parliament; an 
enactment of the federal or provincial Parliament which was ultra vires the 
28Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, 
29Strayer op cit. at 4-5. 
30Dawson op cit. at 81-82. 
31Strayer op cit. at 7. 
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powers prescribed in a statute of the British Parliament would be repugnant 
to that statute and therefore in conflict with the Colonial Laws Validity Act. 32 
The Colonial Laws Validity Act continued to operate in relation to statutes of 
the British Parliament extending to Canada, which were for the most part the 
British North America Acts, until 1982. 33 
The enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 by the federal 
legislature did not affect the legislative supremacy of Parliament. The Bill of 
Rights was applicable only to enactments of the federal Parliament; it was 
more of an interpretative mechanism than a full guarantee of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. 34 As a statute which was unilaterally enacted by 
the federal Parliament, it was binding only on that legislature; it did not in law 
form part of the body of the Constitution of Canada. 
However, the 1960 Bill of Rights provided the Supreme Court of Canada with 
a basis for the review of federal legislation, even if the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy continued to operate. In terms of section 2 of the Bill of Rights, 
laws of the federal Parliament were to be construed and applied as not to 
abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorise the abrogation, abridgement or 
infringement of any of the rights or freedoms recognised and declared in it, 
unless an Act of the Canadian Parliament had expressly declared that such Act 
shall operate notwithstanding the Bill of Rights. 
32See Chap!. 4 for a discussion of the effect of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act on acts of dominion Parliaments. 
33 Although the Colonial Laws Validity Act ceased to operate in relation 
to legislation of the federal and provincial legislatures after the adoption of 
the Statute of Westminster, 1931, section 7 of the Statute of Westminster 
preserved the applicability of the Colonial Laws Validity Act in relation to the 
British North America Acts; section 7 was repealed in respect of Canada by 
virtue of item 17 of the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982. 
34See R v Drybones (1969) 9 D.L.R (3d) at 491; Curr v The 
Queen (1972) 26 D.L.R (3d) 603 at 613. 
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Section 2 of the Bill of Rights raised two important questions regarding its 
applicability. The first was whether the court could apply a statute even if 
such a statute was in conflict with the provisions of the Bill of Rights; the 
second was whether the court could hold a statute inoperative if it could not 
construe such a statute so as to avoid a conflict with the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. 35 
The applicability of the Bill of Rights was considered for the first time in R 
v Drybones. 36 The question was whether the Indian Act was compatible 
with the Bill of Rights. The Indian Act, a federal statute which was 
exclusively applicable to Indians, made provision for stiffer penalties for 
liquor-related offences; it was theoretically applicable to offences committed 
in private places and, in contrast to Northwest Territories liquor laws which 
were restricted to intoxication in a public place, therefore operated unequally. 
Drybones, a Canadian Indian, had been convicted of being "intoxicated off a 
reserve" and sentenced to a fine of $10. A Territorial Court judge had found 
that the Indian Act operated unequally and that the relevant section of the Act 
was incompatible with the Bill of Rights and therefore invalid. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously confirmed the decision of the 
Territorial Court. The matter went to the Supreme Court of Canada in a 
further appeal. 
The Supreme Court overruled the Indian Act and held that the effect of section 
2 of the Bill of Rights was to render inoperative, and therefore to override, 
federal statutes which were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. The court did 
not, however, exercise full power of judicial review but used section 2 as no 
more than a canon of interpretation. 37 This form of 'judicial review' has 
35See Mackinnon 1985 CILSA at 409. 
'
0Supra. 
37Mackinnon 1985 CILSA at 409. 
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variously been described as 'indirect judicial review'38 and 'judicial 
braking'. 39 In essence, the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 was an 
interpretative statute which enabled the court to interpret federal legislation in 
favour of the rights and freedoms recognised and declared in it.40 
Apart from the decision in R v Drybones41 there has been no other 
decision where the court accorded the Bill of Rights greater credence. The 
decision was watered down in Attorney-General, Canada v 
Lavell. 42 In this case the court upheld a section of the Indian Act which 
disenfranchised Indian women (but not Indian men) who married non-
lndians, despite the fact that the statute operated unequally and was therefore 
incompatible with the Bill of Rights; the conflict could also not be avoided by 
interpretation. 
The practical, direct impact of the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 has been 
described as 'almost nil'. 43 Although the Bill of Rights substantially affected 
the doctrine of legislative supremacy, 44 the Supreme Court largely adopted 
an extremely cautious approach. 45 According to Lyon46 the court's cautious 
381. Jaconelli Enacting a Bill of Rights (1980) at 34. 
39E. McWhinney Judicial Review (1968) at 13. 
40See Jaconelli op cit. at 42; D.A Schmeiser Civil Liberties in 
Canada (1964) at 52. 
41Supra. 
42(1974) S.C.R 1349. 
43P. Brett "Reflections on the Canadian Bill of Rights" 1969 Alberta 
LR294. 
44See Attorney-General, Canada v Lavell (supra) at 1374. 
45See for example Rebrin v Bird (1961) 130 C.C.C 55; Robertson 
and Rosentanni v The Queen (1963) 41 D.L.R (2d) 485; 
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approach reflected a commitment to the legislative supremacy of Parliament 
and a belief that the common law provided sufficient protection of the rights 
and liberties of individuals; in terms of this belief the Bill of Rights was no 
more than an embodiment of the rights and freedoms which were already 
protected under the common law. The doctrine of legislative supremacy in 
essence continued to operate until the coming into operation of the 
Constitution Act of 1982. 
3. Judicial Review under the Constitution Act of 1982. 
The cornerstone of judicial review under the 1982 Constitution is the 
supremacy of the Constitution. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act provides 
that 
"[tJhe Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is to the extent of the inconsistency of no force 
or effect 11 • 47 
The Constitution Act contains a Charter of Rights and Freedoms; a reference 
to 'the provisions of the Constitution' in section 52(1) is therefore also a 
O'Connor v The Queen (1966) 57 D.L.R (2d) 123; Attorney-
General, Canada v Lavell (supra). There were instances, however, 
where a broad approach, which sought to give the Bill of Rights greater 
credence, was adopted : see for example the dissenting opinions of Laskin J 
(later Chief Justice of Canada) in Attorney-General, Canada v Lavell 
(supra), Mitchell v The Queen 24 C.C.C (2d) 241 and 
Morgentaler v The Queen (1975) 20 C.C.C (2d) 449. 
46N. Lyon "The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Guarantee: 
What to do with Vague but Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Supreme 
Court Rev. 57 at 58. 
471t has been expressly stated that section 52 adopts the principle of the 
supremacy of the Constitution: see R v Currie (1983) 33 C.R (3d) 227 at 
233 (N.S.C.A); Re Martin: Children's Aid Society of Winnipeg 
v Martin et al (1983) 25 Man. R (2d) 143 (CA) at 149. 
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reference to the provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
inclusion of the rights and freedoms specified in the Charter in a supreme 
Constitution elevates them to a status which is above ordinary legislation, so 
that these rights and freedoms take precedence over ordinary legislation; any 
legislation which is inconsistent with these rights and freedoms may be 
declared invalid. The entrenchment of the rights and freedoms enumerated in 
the Charter may not, however, be construed as denying the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada. 48 
Section 24(1) of the Constitution ensures the efficacy of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Section 24(1), which forms part of the Charter, renders the 
rights and freedoms specified in the Charter justiciable. It provides that 
11 
[ a]nyone whose rights and freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed 
or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate 11 • 
Section 52 of the Constitution provides for the sanction of invalidity where 
the court finds that a legislative or executive act has infringed a right or 
freedom guaranteed by the Charter. According to Strayer49, section 24(1), 
on the other hand 
11 assures a role for the courts and seemingly contemplates a wide range of judicial 
remedies based on findings that rights or freedoms have been infringed, not just (as in s. 52) a 
finding of invalidity because laws relied on by a party are inconsistent with the Constitution 11 • 
3.1. Legislative Supremacy and the 1982 Constitution. 
Although the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights provided the courts with a 
mechanism for protecting individual rights and freedoms, it left the 
Grundnorm intact; the ultimate norm in Canadian constitutional law remained 
48Section 26. 
49Strayer op cit. at 33. 
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the legislative supremacy of Parliament. The Constitution Act of 1982 
introduced a new Grundnorm; it made the Constitution of Canada the 
supreme law of the land and made provision for a Canadian procedure for 
constitutional amendment. 
Before 1982 the concept of legislative supremacy in Canada was strengthened 
by Canada's acceptance of the supremacy of the British Parliament. However, 
the British Parliament expressly renounced, in terms of section 2 of the 
Canada Act of 1982, its authority to legislate for Canada. 50 The British 
Parliament's renunciation of its authority to legislate for Canada and the 
introduction of a new Grundnorm meant that Canadian courts no longer .had 
to regard the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures as 'sovereign' 
in the same sense as the British Parliament. 
Canadian courts could, in accordance with the new Grundnorm, decide cases 
in such a way that provisions of the Constitution would override ordinary laws 
which were inconsistent with these provisions. This meant that ordinary laws 
which were in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, including those 
which infringed the rights and freedoms specified in the Charter, could be 
declared invalid. 
However, despite the fact that the Constitution Act introduced a new 
Grundnorm in terms of which the Constitution was the supreme law of the 
land, it has attempted to preserve the concept of legislative supremacy while 
at the same time protecting, through the Charter, individual rights and 
freedoms as effectively as possible. 51 In terms of section 33(1), Parliament 
50The Canada Act is a statute of the British Parliament which was enacted 
at the request of the Canadian Parliament and brought into existence the 
Constitution Act, 1982. 
51B. L Strayer "Life under the Canadian Charter: Adjusting the Balance 
Between Legislatures and the Courts" 1988 Public Law 347 at 353; Strayer 
op cit. at 61. 
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or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of the federal 
Parliament or of a provincial legislature that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 
to 15 of the Charter. 
Section 2 of the Charter deals with fundamental freedoms; 52 sections 7 to 15 
deal with legal rights53 • The implication of section 33(1) of the Constitution 
is that , in so far as these rights and freedoms are concerned, the federal 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures remain, to some extent, supreme. 
Section 33(1) permits the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to 
override these freedoms and rights. 54 It is noteworthy that the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa of 1993 does not, except for section 33(5) 
which provides for the continued operation of certain labour legislation, have 
a provision similar to section 33(1) of the Canadian Charter. 
Section 33 does not, however, give the federal Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures absolute legislative supremacy. In terms of section 33(3) a 
declaration that an Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a 
provision of the Charter mentioned in section 33(1) can have effect for five 
years only, after which it may be renewed only after debate and vote. 55 The 
overriding power must also apparently be exercised with particularity; this 
implies that the government invoking section 33(1) must take responsibility 
52These are freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, 
belief, opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of 
association. 
53The legal rights guaranteed in sections 7 to 15 are those relating to life, 
liberty and security of the person, search and seizure, detention or 
imprisonment, proceedings in criminal and penal matters, treatment or 
punishment, self incrimination and the assistance of an interpreter and 
equality. 
54Strayer op cit. note 25 at 63. 
55See Strayer 1988 Public Law at 353. 
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before the legislature and the voters for overriding any specific Charter 
guarantee. 56 
A section 33(1) override is unlikely to be deemed justifiable by the legislature 
and the voters unless it is based on some existing valid grounds, such as, for 
example, national emergencies where section 1 of the Charter57 does not 
provide an adequate means of abridging individual rights and freedoms. 58 
Section 33 also does not permit an override of those rights which are an 
integral part of parliamentary democracy, such as the requirement of regular 
legislative sessions and elections59, mobility rights60 and linguistic rights61; 
the absolute protection of these rights serves to enhance the democratic 
process. 62 
There has also been another attempt to reconcile the entrenchment of 
individual rights and freedoms with parliamentary democracy. Section 1 of the 
Charter permits "such reasonable limits (to individual rights and freedoms) 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society". By permitting limits "prescribed by law" section 1 preserves 
legislative power in relation to rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, 
provided, however, that the limitations imposed can be shown to be "justified 
56ldem. 
57Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
in the Charter are "subject ... to such limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 
58Strayer op cit. note 25 at 61. 
59Sections 3 to 5 of the Charter. 
60Section 6 of the Charter. 
61Sections 16 to 23 of the Charter. 
62See Strayer op cit. note 25 at 64. 
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in a free and democratic society". 63 
A limitation clause such as the one contained in section 1 of the Charter sets 
out a criterion in terms of which courts should determine when the will of 
elected representatives of the people can be declared invalid on the basis that 
it is unconstitutional. 64 The criterion operates as a secondary rule pursuant 
to which the legislature, the executive and the courts should make value 
choices. It preserves the democratic principle that it is the function of elected 
representatives to make important value choices but qualifies it by stating that 
the values chosen must be reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. To a large extent the criterion therefore eases the tension between 
substantive judicial review and the fundamental principle of majority rule 
rooted in the democratic process. In deciding whether to vote again for a 
particular government, voters are more likely to gauge the performance and 
acts of elected representatives by the standard of what is reasonable and 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
The limitation criterion is available to the courts to determine whether elected 
representatives have made permissible value choices. In the absence of such 
a criterion the legislature, the executive and the judiciary in particular lack a 
principled mechanism which limits the making of value choices; this invites, 
as in the United States, judicial activism and frustrates democratic value 
choices by elected representatives. Instead of deciding cases and controversies 
according to a laid down criterion, judges usually make qualitative 
assessments of values and as a result engage in social engineering. 65 
"Ibid. at 59-60. 
64Section 33(1) of the Republic of South Africa of 1993 contains a 
provision which is similar to section 1 of the Canadian Charter. 
65See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the permissible limits of judicial 
review. 
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There are indications that section 1 of the Canadian Charter must be applied 
strictly and that it has qualified legislative power in a major way. 66 The 
section only permits a limitation and not a direct denial or negation of a right 
or freedom guaranteed by the Charter; such a denial or negation can only be 
effected under section 33. 67 Section 1 does not, therefore, grant absolute 
legislative power in relation to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter. 
3.2. Judicial Determination of Constitutionality in Canada. 
Judicial determination of constitutionality in Canada is centred around section 
52 (the supremacy clause) and section 24 (the justiciability clause) of the 1982 
Constitution. Taken together, these sections provide that whenever an 
individual approaches the court with a complaint that his right or freedom as 
guaranteed by the Charter has been infringed, the court has the power to 
determine whether the legislative or executive act complained of actually 
infringes the guaranteed right or freedom and to give effect to the superior Jaw 
of the Constitution if the act complained of is found to be inconsistent with it. 
Section 24(1) of the Constitution assigns the determination of constitutionality 
to a "a court of competent jurisdiction". In Singh et al v Minister of 
Employment and Immigration•• it was held that section 24(1) 
"premises the existence of jurisdiction to a source external to the Charter 
itself". The constitutive statute as to the parties to the suit, the subject-matter 
of the cause of action and the remedy being sought will determine whether a 
66Strayer op cit. note 25 at 60. 
67Attorney-General Quebec v Quebec Association of 
Protestant School Boards et al [1984] 2 S.C.R 66 at 84; R v Big 
M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R 295 at 353. 
68[1985] 1 S.C.R 177 at 222. 
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court is of competent jurisdiction. 69 The Charter itself does not directly 
confer upon any specific court jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter which 
arises under it. 
The question arises, however, whether provisions of the Charter apply only 
to disputes where one of the parties is a government organ or also to those 
involving only private individuals, that is, whether they apply only vertically 
or both vertically and horizontally. Section 32(1) of the Charter makes its 
provisions applicable only to Parliament, the provincial legislatures, the 
government of Canada and the governments of the provinces. The question 
whether the Charter also applies horizontally was considered in Retail, 
Wholesale & Department Store Union Local 580 v Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd. 70 
The question in issue in Dolphin Delivery was whether the application by 
the court of the common law rule according to which secondary picketing is 
considered to be a civil wrong and may give rise to an order of damages for 
breach of contract constituted a form of governmental action which obliged the 
court to apply the provisions of the Charter, even if none of the legislative or 
executive organs of state was involved. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that a court order could not be regarded as a form of governmental action. In 
the court's view the word 'government' as used in section 32 does not refer 
to government in its generic sense - meaning the whole of the governmental 
apparatus of the state - but to a branch of government.71 It rejected the 
approach that the Charter applies to the common law in litigation between 
69Strayer op cit. note 25 at 71; Mills v The Queen [1986] 1 S.C.R 
863. In general the Supreme Court of Canada and the higher provincial courts 
have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of legislative and executive 
acts. 
70 (1986] 2 S.C.R 573. 
71 Per Mcintyre J at 598. 
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private individuals. According to Mcintyre J the Charter 
11
will apply to the common law ... only in so far as the common law is the basis of some 
governmental action which, it is alleged infringes a guaranteed right or freedom 11 • 72 
The position in Canada, therefore, is that provisions of the Charter apply 
vertically and not also horizontally. Section 35(3) of the 1993 South African 
Constitution, which obliges the court to have due regard to the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights (Chapter 3) in the application and 
development of the common law, on the other hand, gives some of the 
entrenched rights a horiwntal dimension. 73 
Where the exercise of legislative power is concerned, the Canadian 
Constitution contains competing principles which may limit both the exercise 
of such power and judicial determination of constitutionality. On the one hand, 
the judiciary may limit the exercise of legislative power through a 
determination of constitutionality and a finding that legislation that violates the 
provisions of the Constitution is invalid. On the other hand, Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures may deny rights to individuals in terms of section 
33 of the Charter, or impose limits on rights guaranteed by the Charter in 
terms of section 1, the effect of which would be to restrict judicial 
determination of constitutionality. 
There are also various other ways in which judicial determination of 
constitutionality may be restricted. It may be restricted by means of 
procedural requirements or through statutory denial of a right of action or 
72At 599. Mcintyre J recognised that the Charter would apply to private 
relations where there is an exercise of, or reliance upon, governmental action 
and one private party invokes or relies upon it to produce an infringement of 
the Charter rights of another: see also Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey 
Association (1986) OR (2d) 513 (Ont. CA); McKinney v University 
of Guelph (1991) 76 D.L.R (4th) 545. 
73See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of this aspect. 
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through legislative pre-determination of judicial findings. 
3.2.1. Procedural Requirements for the Determination of 
Constitutionality. 
Procedural requirements for the determination of constitutionality are those 
requirements which have to be met before the court can engage in a 
determination of constitutionality. The most common requirement is the 
service of a notice on the appropriate Attorney-General, advising him of an 
intention to challenge the validity of legislation. 74 This requirement is based 
on the fact that the Attorney-General, as a representative of the government 
which is a participant in the intended constitutional litigation, should be made 
aware of the impending challenge of the validity of legislation and be given 
an opportunity to intervene and participate in the hearing. 75 
Various provincial enactments make provision for the notice requirement. 76 
Although there is no federal statute which requires notice of an impending 
challenge of the validity of legislation to be given to the federal government, 
the rules of the Supreme Court of Canada have since 1905 required that notice 
be given to the Attorney-General where the validity of federal legislation is 
challenged.77 Rule 32(1) has broadened the notice requirement by laying 
down that a party raising a question as to the constitutionality of legislation 
must apply to the Chief Justice or a judge for the purpose of stating that 
question. The rule also makes provision for service of the stated question to 
the Attorney-General of Canada and the Attorneys-General of all the 
74Strayer op cit. note 25 at 73. 
75See Northern Telecom Ltd v Communication Workers of 
Canada [1980] l S.C.R 115 at 139-140. 
76See Strayer op cit. note 25 at 7 4-77. 
77Supreme Court Rules, 1945, rules 18 and 19 as originally promulgated. 
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provinces, who may intervene. 78 
However, in so far as the notice requirement in respect of a challenge of the 
validity of federal legislation is contained in rules laid down by the Supreme 
Court itself and not in a federal or provincial statute, it is self-imposed and 
therefore does not constitute a real legislative restriction on judicial 
determination of constitutionality. The Supreme Court rules are, just like the 
provincial statutes requiring notice to the Attorneys-General, simply intended 
to facilitate government participation in constitutional litigation. 79 
Although the notice requirements contained in the various provincial statutes 
are intended to facilitate government participation in constitutional litigation, 
they may, to a certain extent, restrict judicial determination of 
constitutionality, especially where the requirement is couched in such a way 
that not only notice to an Attorney-General but also his consent is required. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has, in Thorson v Attorney-General of 
Canada80 , expressed its views on conditions precedent laid down by the 
legislature: 
11 Any attempt by Parliament or a Legislature to fix conditions precedent. as by requiring 
the consent of some public officer or authority, to the determination of constitutionality of 
legislation cannot foreclose the courts merely because the conditions remain unsatisfied. 11 
78Supreme Court Rules, SOR/83-74; SOR/84-821; SOR 87-292. See 
Strayer op cit. note 25 at 77-78. 
79Strayer op cit. note 25 at 83. The Rules of the Federal Court of Appeal 
are not peremptory with regard to the notice requirement; they simply provide 
that where "any constitutional question or any question of general importance" 
is raised before the court a party may serve notice on any interested Attorney-
General, or the court may bring the matter to the attention of any Attorney-
General, and in such a case, or independent of such notice, any Attorney-
General may apply for leave to intervene and participate in the hearing: 
Strayer ibid. at 79. 
80[1975] 1S.C.R138 at 151. 
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What the court apparently meant was that conditions or requirements which 
are impossible for a litigant to comply with, and which do not facilitate 
effective judicial consideration of constitutional issues, will not preclude the 
court from determining the constitutionality of Iegislation.81 In particular, 
where the notice requirement in relation to a challenge of the validity is 
contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court, the court can dispense with the 
requirement where it becomes difficult for a litigant to comply with it; this 
also explains why the notice requirement in terms of the Rules of the Federal 
Court of Appeal is not peremptory. In essence, full compliance with the notice 
requirement will be required only where it facilitates effective and proper 
judicial determination of constitutionality. 
3.2.2. Statutory Denial of a Right of Action (Ouster Clauses). 
Judicial determination of constitutionality may be restricted or excluded by 
federal or provincial statutory provisions which either limit or abolish the right 
of action in instances where a constitutional point may be raised. Provincial 
legislatures, in particular, have in the past attempted to interfere with the 
substantive rights which fell outside their legislative powers and then barred 
enforcement of these rights in provincial courts through a purported exercise 
of their jurisdiction over 'Administration of Justice in the Province, including 
the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts ... 
including Procedure in Civil Matters' and over 'Property and Civil Rights in 
the Province'. The courts have, however, generally held that the legislatures 
were not empowered to restrict access to the courts so as to avoid a 
determination of constitutionality. 82 
Federal or provincial statutes may, however, legitimately restrict or deny a 
right of action in respect of acts done under an invalid legislative or executive 
81Strayer op cit. note 25 at 86. 
82lbid. at 97-98 and the cases discussed. 
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act.83 Such statutes are aimed at ensuring the efficient functioning of the 
public service and the courts and are therefore not designed to maintain 
constitutionally invalid projects. According to Strayer, 84 as long as the 
legislature does not restrict access to the courts "in such a way as to permit 
it colourably (sic) to accomplish ends otherwise denied it by the Constitution", 
it may restrict or deny access to the courts where constitutional issues are 
involved. 
Federal denial of a right of action is potentially limited by the provisions of 
section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which restricts Parliament's power 
to "the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of 
Appeal for Canada, and for the establishment of any additional Courts for the 
better Administration of the Laws of Canada". The effect of a federal statute 
denying a right of action would be limited by the fact that in an appeal case 
the constitutional issues would already have arisen and been canvassed in the 
provincial court, so that the court of appeal would be obliged to consider and 
determine the issues. Even if it were possible for the federal legislature to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the court, such a restriction would be invalid if it 
amounted to an evasion of the constitutional limitations on its power. 85 
The Federal Court Act of 1971, however, presents the possibility of a denial 
of the right of provincial superior courts to consider constitutional issues 
which relate to federal government activity. In terms of section 17(1) of the 
Act, the Trial Division of the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction "in all 
cases where relief is claimed against the Crown"; section 18 of the Act gives 
the Trial Division exclusive jurisdiction over prerogative writs, declarations, 
and similar relief against tribunals or officers, including proceedings against 
83lbid. at 106. 
84lbid. at 107. 
85ldem. 
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the Attorney-General. 86 The effect of the Act is that the review jurisdiction 
which provincial superior courts formerly exercised over federal agencies is 
excluded. 87 
In Denison Mines Ltd v Attorney-General, Canada88 the Ontario 
High Court held that section 17 of the Federal Court Act, 1971 constituted an 
effective bar to an action for a declaration in a provincial court that a federal 
statute was invalid; it has also been held, in Hamilton v Hamilton 
Harbour Commissioners,89 that section 18 of the Act constitutes a bar 
to an action against a federal board for a declaration involving a constitutional 
issue. 
It has been held, however, that an action for a declaration in respect of which 
the validity of a statute is in issue is not an action 'against the Crown' or its 
agencies and that it does not affect the Crown directly90; such an action 
would therefore, according to this view, not be excluded from the review 
jurisdiction of provincial superior courts over federal agencies. Provincial 
courts have distinguished such actions from those which sought a declaration 
concerning a specific personal or property right which is in dispute between 
the crown and the individual where crown property or financial interests 
would be affected; they have held that sections 17 and 18 of the Federal Court 
Act, 1971 deny access only in respect of the latter type of action and not in 
86lbid. at 108. 
87See e.g Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v Hernandez [1975) 
1S.C.R228 at 233-237. 
88[1973) 1 OR 797. 
89(1972) 1 OR 61. 
90McNeil v N.S Board of Censors [1975) N.S.R (2d) 483; 
Canex Placer Ltd v Attorney-General, British Columbia [1976) 
1 W. W .R 24. These cases did not, however, involve the Federal Court Act. 
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respect of actions where declarations about the validity of federal laws are 
sought. 91 
The Supreme Court of Canada has ignored the distinction made by the 
provincial courts and approached the matter differently. In an appeal from the 
British Columbia court, the Supreme Court held, in Attorney-General, 
Canada v Law Society of British Columbia92, that section 101 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 merely empowered Parliament to make provision 
for the constitution, maintenance and organisation of the courts for the better 
administration of the laws and did not seek to prevent provincial superior 
courts from determining the constitutionality of those laws. The court reasoned 
that a restriction or denial of the jurisdiction of provincial superior courts 
would amount to stripping them of a judicial power fundamental to the 
Canadian federal system as described in the Constitution Act. 
Strayer93 points out, however, that provincial superior courts do not 
necessarily always have jurisdiction over Charter issues arising under federal 
laws. According to him what appears from Attorney-General, Canada 
v Law Society of British Columbia94 is that provincial superior 
courts will have the power to determine the constitutionality of federal laws 
only if such laws are "fundamental to a federal system". 95 Provincial 
91See Law Society of British Columbia v Attorney-General, 
Canada [1980] 4 W.W.R 6; Borrowski v Minister of Justice 
[1981] W.W.R 1; Zutphen Brothers Const. Ltd v Diwidag 
Systems International et al [1987] 35 D .L.R (4th) 43 (NSCA). 
92[1982] 2 S.C.R 307. 
93Strayer op cit. note 25 at 109. 
94Supra. 
95See also Canada Labour Relations Board et al v Paul L' 
Anglais Inc. et al (1983) 1 S.C.R 147 at 154. 
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superior courts' power to determine the constitutionality of federal Jaws would 
therefore be recognised only if their jurisdiction in respect of these laws is 
aimed at preserving the constitutional distribution of powers between the 
provincial government and the federal government. 96 
The view that provincial superior courts are not necessarily empowered to 
determine the constitutionality of federal laws finds support in the provisions 
of section 24 of the Charter. Section 24 of the Charter assigns jurisdiction in 
respect of Charter issues to a 'court of competent jurisdiction'. A court of 
competent jurisdiction would be a court which has jurisdiction over the 
person, the subject matter and the remedy. 97 Section 52 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, on the other hand, impliedly assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Federal Court in relation to Charter issues arising from federal laws. 
Section 98(2)(d) of the Republic of South Africa (interim) Constitution of 
1993, read with section 101(3)(c), similarly assigns exclusive jurisdiction to 
the Constitutional Court in relation to Bill of Rights issues which raise the 
constitutionality of Acts of the national legislature. The argument that 
provincial superior courts have the power to determine the constitutionality of 
national laws only if such laws are 'fundamental to the provincial system' 
would not apply in South Africa because, in terms of section 98(2)(e) of the 
interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction in the 
determination of disputes of a constitutional nature between organs of state at 
any level of government; the jurisdiction of provincial superior courts is 
confined to disputes between local and provincial governments. 98 
96Strayer op cit. note 25 at 109. 
97lbid. at 70-73. 
98Section 101(3)(d). 
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3.2.3. Legislative Pre-determination of Judicial Decisions. 
In a country where the courts are empowered to determine the constitutionality 
of legislation, an attempt by the legislature to dictate the finding a court must 
make on a constitutional question would be contrary to the concept of judicial 
review; such an attempt would also undermine the independence of the 
judiciary and frustrate the function of the courts as bodies entrusted with 
ensuring the efficacy of the supreme law of the Constitution. Canadian 
provincial courts have in the past spoken out against legislative pre-
determination of judicial findings, holding that the legislature cannot preclude 
a court, where a constitutional question is properly before it, from reaching 
a certain conclusion as to the constitutionality of legislation.99 
In Home Oil Distributors v Attorney-General, British 
Columbia100 the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that a statute 
which required the court to interpret its provisions in a particular way was 
"ineffective to curtail the unassailable power of the Courts of Canada to 
adjudicate upon constitutional questions under the British North America 
Act" .101 This view would be equally applicable to the 1982 Constitution. 
A distinction must, however, be made between a statute which requires the 
court to interpret its provisions in a particular way for the purpose of 
determining constitutional validity and a statute which simply lays down 
guidelines for the interpretation of its provisions. The latter type of statute is 
intended to provide a means of ascertaining the meaning and scope of 
application of a legislative instrument, whereas the former type dictates to the 
court how its constitutional validity must be determined. Where the 
99See Strayer op cit. note 25 at 111. 
100(1937] 2 W. W .R 418. 
101 At 419-420. 
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constitutional validity of a statute is in issue, the court has to determine 
whether the legislature acted within its constitutional jurisdiction; the 
legislature therefore cannot be allowed to achieve an effect which falls outside 
its constitutional jurisdiction by dictating how the statute in issue must be 
interpreted. 102 
Legislative attempts to restrict judicial determination of constitutionality 
illustrate the tension between the power of judicial review and the exercise of 
legislative power. It may be said that the legislature may not use its legislative 
powers to prevent judicial determination of the constitutional limit of those 
powers, especially in relation to constitutional guarantees of the rights and 
freedoms of individuals. However, the extent to which the courts will be able 
to determine the constitutional limits of legislative power in relation to 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms effectively depends on the 
courts' approach to the interpretation of those rights and freedoms. 
3.3. Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
Prior to the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, 
constitutional adjudication in Canada was mainly confined to an interpretation 
of the distribution of powers between the federal government and the 
provincial governments. Although the 1960 Bill of Rights introduced some 
value-based provisions in terms of which federal legislation could be 
interpreted, these provisions could be statutorily excluded and therefore did 
not effectively limit the legislative power of the federal Parliament. At best the 
1960 Bill of Rights provided a mechanism by which the effect of federal 
legislation on individual rights and freedoms could be minimised. 103 
102See Strayer op cit. note 25 at 112. 
103The applicability of the 1960 Bill of Rights was also limited by the fact 
that it was not applicable to provincial legislation. 
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The approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to the 1960 Bill of Rights had 
generally been restrictive. 104 However, in interpreting the 1982 Charter the 
court acknowledged from the outset that it was engaged in a new interpretative 
task, a task which was significantly different from that of interpreting the 1960 
Bill of Rights. The difference between the 1982 Charter and the 1960 Bill of 
Rights was expressed by Estey J in Law Society of Upper Canada v 
Skapinker105 , the first Charter case, as follows: 
11 We are here engaged in a new task, the interpretation and application of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ... 1bis is not a statute or even a statute of extra-ordinary nature 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights ... It is part of the Constitution of a nation ... The Canadian Bill 
of Rights is, of course, in form, the same as any other statute of Parliament. It was designed and 
adopted to perform a more fundamenta1 role than ordinary statutes in this country. It stands, 
however, somewhere between a statute and a constiru.tional instrument ... 106 
There are some simple but important considerations which guide a court in construing 
the Charter, and which are more sharply focused and discernible than in the case of the federal 
Bill of Rights. The Charter comes from neither level of the legislative branches of government but 
from the Constitution itself. It is part of the fabric of Canadian law. Indeed, it is "the supreme Jaw 
of Canada' : s 52, Constitution Act, 1982. " 107 
104See P. Brett "Reflection of the Canadian Bill of Rights" 1969 Alberta 
LR 294. R v Drybones (supra) was the only case in which the Canadian 
Supreme Court held a federal statute to be inoperative on the basis that it was 
incompatible with the Bill of Rights. 
105[1984) 9 D.L.R (4th) 161. 
1
°"The South African Bill of Rights is different from the Canadian Charter. 
Like the Canadian Charter, its provisions are an integral part of a supreme 
Constitution. Although it is an interim Bill of Rights intended to operate until 
the adoption of a new final Constitution, Constitutional Principle II ensures the 
inclusion of the fundamental principles and values contained in it in the final 
Constitution. In terms of this constitutional principle the final Constitution 
must make provision for the protection of universally accepted fundamental 
rights, freedoms and liberties, drafted after consideration was given to inter 
alia the fundamental rights contained in the interim Bill of Rights. 
107At 167-168. 
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Unlike the 1960 Bill of Rights, the 1982 Charter is not merely declaratory. It 
not only sets out the individual's rights and freedoms but also guarantees them 
against legislative and executive infringement, at both federal and provincial 
level. In R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd108 Dickson J held that the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not simply recognise and 
declare rights as they were circumscribed by the legislation current at the time 
of the Charter's enactment; its language is imperative. 
Since the language of the Charter is imperative, it means that the court has to 
give effect to its provisions whenever the constitutionality of legislation is in 
issue. As prescriptive provisions intended to set a standard upon which present 
as well as future legislation should be tested, Charter provisions therefore call 
for a generous interpretation which will give effect to their spirit. It was with 
this idea in mind that the court warned, in Law Society of Upper 
Canada v Skapinker109, against 
11 [a] narrow and technical interpretation [which], if not modulated by a sense of the 
unknown of the future, can stunt the growth of the law and hence the community it serves." 
To adopt a generous approach to the interpretation of the Charter is, in 
essence, to recognise its special nature and the great ideals it was intended to 
represent. The Charter is, as the court held in Hunter et al v Southam 
lnc110 , a document which provides a continuing framework for the 
legitimate exercise of governmental power; it is, as a result, capable of growth 
and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities 
often unimagined by its framers. It is, therefore, the task of the court to 
interpret the Charter in such a way that it will meet these social, political and 
historical realities. 
108(1985] 1 S.C.R 295. 
109Supra at 366. 
110[1984] 2 S.C.R 145. 
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In line with the generous approach, the Supreme Court refused in a number 
of cases to follow its earlier Bill of Rights cases in the interpretation of 
Charter provisions. 111 It was therefore paradoxical when, in Re Singh 
and Minister of Employment and Immigration112, the court 
stated that the "the Canadian Bill of Rights retains all its force and effects, 
together with the various provincial charters of rights". The court's 
affirmation of the continued existence and vitality of the 1960 Bill of Rights 
posed the danger that the courts could avoid dealing with difficult or 
contentious Charter issues and instead rely on Bill of Rights jurisprudence. 
This danger was, however, dispelled when the court, in The Queen in 
Right of Canada v Beaureguard113 , refused to follow Bill of Rights 
jurisprudence when interpreting the right to equality as guaranteed by the 
Charter. 
While the Supreme Court was willing to give Charter provisions a generous 
interpretation, it nevertheless also sounded a caution with respect to the new 
interpretative task. In Law Society of Upper Canada v 
Skapinker114 Estey J cautioned that the interpretation and development of 
the Charter 
11
must necessarily be a careful process. Where issues do not compel commentary on these 
new provisions, none should be undertaken. There will be occasions when guidance by obiter or 
anticipation of issues will serve the Canadian community, and particularly the evolving 
constitutional process. On such occasions, the court might well enlarge its reasons for judgment 
beyond that required to dispose of the issues raised 11 • 
111See for example R v Therens [1985] 18 D.L.R (4th) 655; 
Reference re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 
S.C.R 486; R v Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R 103. 
112(1985] 18 D .L.R (4th) 422 at 430. 
113(1986] 30 D.L.R (4th) 481. 
n•supra at 181. 
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What Estey J meant in essence was that although judges may comment obiter 
on certain important policy issues, they should not substitute their decisions 
for legislative ones. 115 In Reference re British Columbia Motor 
Vehicle Act116 Lamer J was more forthright when he warned that the 
judiciary should avoid becoming a 'judicial super-legislature'. Lamer J was 
intimating that some moderation is called for when a generous approach is 
adopted in the interpretation of Charter provisions. 
The case of Operation Dismantle v The Queen117 shows that the 
Supreme Court of Canada does in fact approach the interpretation of Charter 
provisions with moderation and not with over-eagerness. The case was 
concerned with the efforts of Operation Dismantle, an Ottawa peace group, 
to use the Charter as a means of stopping the testing of cruise missiles in 
Canada. The efforts were a sequel to the federal government's announcement, 
in July 1983, that it would allow the American government to conduct a series 
of cruise missile tests in Canada. Despite popular opposition to the tests the 
two major parties in the federal government had defeated a motion of the New 
Democratic Party against the tests. Operation Dismantle contended that the 
tests would be contrary to section 7 of the Charter. Section 7 guaranteed "the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". 
After the matter had been considered by the Trial Division118 and the 
"
5See also Edward Books and Art Ltd v The Queen (1986] 
S.C.R 713 at 781-782. 
116Supra at 497. 
117(1985] 18 D.L.R (4th) 481. 
118The Queen et al v Operation Dismantle et al (1983] 1 F .C 
745. 
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Federal Court of Appeal, 119 the Supreme Court unanimously decided against 
Operation Dismantle. The Supreme Court readily acknowledged its power to 
determine the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts but 
nevertheless pointed out that there were limits to the exercise of the power. 
According to Dickson CJ, although the court should not refuse to determine 
the constitutionality of government policy merely because it involved the 
exercise of a prerogative or because it was highly controversial, it should 
refrain from adjudicating issues which "lie in the realm of conjecture, rather 
than fact" . 120 
In her judgment, Wilson J expressed the need to enforce Charter provisions 
while at the same time exercising moderation: 
11 [T]he courts should not be too eager to relinquish their judicial review function simply 
because they are called upon to exercise it in relation to weighty matters of State. Equa1ly, 
however, it is important to reaJize that judicial review is not the same thing as substitution of the 
court's opinion on the merits for the opinion of the person or body to whom discretionary 
decision-making power ha..; been conunitted. 11121 
Operation Dismantle provides an illustration that policy issues are not 
suited to judicial determination; although judges often grapple with policy 
issues and sometimes shape policy through their decisions, they ought to 
decide on principle and not on policy. What was really in issue m 
Operation Dismantle was a question of defence policy and foreign 
policy, issues which fell within the discretion of the executive and invited the 
court to make a subjective evaluation of the merits of the opinion of the 
person or body to whom the discretion had been committed. 
119The Queen et al v Operation Dismantle et al [1984] 3 
D.L.R (4th) 193. 
120At 454. 
121At 503. 
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As Wilson J stated when dealing with the argument that cruise missile testing 
endangered the lives and security of Canadian citizens, whatever disagreement 
one might have with government policy, any challenge of the policy before the 
courts must be based on a violation of some legally recognisable principle. 
She could not find such principle in Operation Dismantle's disagreement with 
the executive decision to allow nuclear testing in Canada: 
11 1 do not see how one can distinguish in a principled way between this particular risk 
and any danger to which the government's action vis-a-vis other states might incidentally subject 
its citizens" (my emphasis). 122 
The Supreme Court's call for caution and moderation with regard to the 
interpretation of the Charter underlines the need for the courts to stay within 
limits of the judicial role, especially in the relationship between the legislature 
and the judiciary. Thus, in Edward Books and Art Ltd v The 
Queen123 Dickson J opined that "the courts are not called upon to 
substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones". According to Mcintyre J, in 
R v Andrews124 , all that the courts are required to do is to "measure the 
legislative enactment against the requirements of the Charter". As long as the 
court confines itself to determining justiciable legal disputes which involve the 
legislature or the executive in accordance with the requirements of the Charter 
it acts within the scope of the judicial function. 
There can be no doubt that legislative enactments can only be measured 
against the requirements of the Charter through interpretation of Charter 
provisions, and that the courts do in fact make law during the course of their 
interpretation of Charter provisions. The Supreme Court's concern with the 
proper limits of judicial review, therefore, essentially revolves around 
122At 518. 
123Supra at 781-782. 
'
24[1989] 1 S.C.R 143 at 191. 
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permissible judicial law-making in the course of interpretation. 125 
The Supreme Court's concern with keeping within the proper limits of judicial 
review has at times resulted in self-imposed restraints. The court has, for 
example, refused to decide constitutional issues which arose during ordinary 
litigation when there were other grounds upon which the litigation could be 
disposed of. 126 The court has also indicated, however, that it would be 
willing to decide constitutional issues which arise during ordinary litigation if 
the issues raised are "important and novel", even if the litigation can be 
disposed of on other grounds. 127 
In general, the proper role of the judiciary in constitutional adjudication is 
determined by the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable issues. 
In the United States of America, for example, issues which raise 'political 
questions' have been classified as non-justiciable issues. 128 The Canadian 
Supreme Court has, however, rejected the 'political question' terminology, 
while at the same time recognising that judicial review has its limits. 
In Operation Dismantle et al v The Queen et al129 the Supreme 
125See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the permissible limits of judicial law-
making. 
126See for example, Skoke-Graham et al v The Queen [1985] 1 
S.C.R 109; R v Christansen [1983] 15 D.L.R (3rd) 340 (NSCA); 
Royal Trust Corp of Canada et al v Law Society of Alberta 
[1985] 19 D.L.R (4th) 159. 
127See Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker (supra) at 
360-361. 
128See in general E.S Corwin The Supreme Court and Political 
Questions (1936). See Chapt. 10 for a detailed discussion of the 'political 
question' doctrine. 
129Supra. 
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Court decided that it was not precluded from deciding issues which raised 
political questions. Speaking for the majority, Dickson J stated that he had "no 
doubt that disputes of a political or foreign policy nature may be properly 
cognizable by the courts" .13° Wilson J, in a separate judgment, also 
expressed the same view when she said that "courts should not be too eager 
to relinquish the judicial review function simply because they are called upon 
to exercise it in relation to weighty matters of State" .131 According to 
Wilson J, the court is not called upon to determine whether government policy 
is sound, but whether or not it violates a litigant's rights as guaranteed by the 
Charter; she expressed the view that the concept of right as used in the 
Charter cannot be divorced from the reality of the modern state. 132 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has taken the general view that the 
courts are not precluded from determining issues which raise political 
questions, 133 it has nevertheless at the same time recognised that there is a 
line of demarcation, albeit not a clear one, between those issues which may 
properly be decided by the courts and those which are suitable for decision by 
the political branches of government. Issues such as conventions, for example, 
are imprecise, flexible political rules of conduct for the exercise of political 
powers and are unsuitable for judicial determination. 
The court's recognition of a line of demarcation between issues which are 
suitable for judicial determination and those which are not can be gathered 
from its conclusion that although the testing of cruise missiles posed a risk to 
life or security of the individual, a finding whether the risk indeed existed 
involved so many imponderables and the weighing of so many probabilities, 
130At 459. 
131At 471. 
132At 472 and 488. 
133See Operation Dismantle v The Queen (supra). 
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that it was not possible to determine the issues involved judicially .134 
The constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms essentially 
prescribes the limit of the exercise of state power in relation to these rights 
and freedoms. Although it is the function of the courts to determine whether 
legislative power has been exercised within the limits of the guarantee of 
fundamental rights and freedoms as prescribed in the Constitution, the courts 
ought constantly to remind themselves that they are dealing with decisions 
taken by a freely elected legislature. It therefore becomes important, in 
determining whether the legislature has exercised its powers within the limits 
of constitutional guarantees, to look at the object the legislature intended to 
achieve. The Canadian Supreme Court has held in R V Big M Drug 
Mart Ltd135 that the purpose and effect of legislation are important in 
determining the validity of legislation on the basis of the object the legislature 
intended to achieve. 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd was concerned with the validity of the 
Lord's Day Act, an Act of the federal Parliament which outlawed commercial 
activity on Sunday .'36 The validity of the Act was attacked on the basis that 
it infringed freedom of conscience and religion as guaranteed in section 2(a) 
of the Charter. It was contended on behalf of the government that even if the 
original purpose of the Act was to protect the Sabbath of one form of religion, 
its effect was secular, alternatively that even if its original purpose was 
religious in nature, that purpose had changed into a secular objective of 
ensuring a day of rest. 
134See Strayer op cit. (1988) at 218-219. 
135Supra. 
136The Act was still in force in the majority of the provinces at the time 
of the Charter, with the exception of Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and 
Newfoundland. 
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Referring to the purpose and effect of legislation in general, Dickson J 
expressed the following view: 
11 [B]oth purpose and effect are relevant in detennining constitutionality; either an 
unconstitutiona1 purpose or an unconstitutional effect can invalidate legislation. All legislation is 
animated by an object the legislature intended to achieve. This object is realized through the 
impact produced by the operation and application of the legislation. Purpose and effect, 
respectively, in the sense of the legislature's object and its ultimate impact, are clearly linked, if 
not indivisible. Intended and actual effect have often been looked at for guidance in assessing the 
legislation's object and thus, it~ validity. "137 
It appears from the majority judgment in the Big M Drug Mart case that 
the purpose of legislation may in certain instances be an overriding factor in 
the determination of its constitutionality. The effect of the legislation would 
come into consideration where its purpose is valid but its effect is such that 
individual rights and freedoms are infringed. In this regard the court expressed 
itself as follows: 
"If the legislation fails the purpose test, there is no need to consider further its effect, 
since it has already been demonstrated to be invalid. Thus, if a law with a valid purpose interferes 
by its impact. with rights and freedoms. a litigant could still argue the effects of the legislation 
as a means to defeat its applicability and possibly its validity. In short. the effects test will only 
be necessary to defeat legislation with a valid purpose; effects can never be relied upon to save 
legislation with an invalid purpose. "138 
The court found that the purpose of the Lord's Day Act was "the compulsion 
of sabbatical observance". The purpose was found to be in conflict with 
freedom of conscience and religion; it was held to be invalid on that basis. As 
for the contention that the purpose of legislation could change with the passage 
of time and the change of circumstances the court held that 
11 [p]urpose is a function of the intent of those who drafted and enacted the legislation at 
137At 331. 
138At 334. 
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the time, and not of any shifting variable 11 • 139 
The court's finding that the purpose of legislation is fixed by those who 
drafted it at the time of its drafting and therefore cannot be affected by the 
change of circumstances underlines the distinction between purpose and its 
effect; the effect of legislation, on the other hand, is a shifting variable and 
depends on the circumstances of a particular case. The implication of this is 
that in determining the validity of legislation the court has to determine its 
purpose in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time of its enactment 
and its effect in the light of the circumstances of the case at the time of the 
determination of its validity. 
The purpose of legislation is, however, not a paramount consideration in the 
determination of its constitutionality. The paramount consideration is the 
larger purpose of the Charter and the specific purpose of the relevant 
provision of the Charter which is alleged to have been infringed by the 
legislation in issue. Thus, in Attorney-General, Quebec v Quebec 
Association of Protestant School Boards et al140 the Supreme 
Court, in coming to the conclusion that a Bill adopted to make exceptions to 
the minority language education rights guaranteed in section 23 of the Charter 
could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter, looked at the historical 
purpose of the framers in drafting section 23; the court found that the purpose 
of section 23 was to invalidate precisely the type of minority language 
education system which existed in Quebec at the time of the adoption of the 
Charter. 
In emphasising the purpose of the relevant prov1s1on of the Charter the 
Supreme Court essentially adopted a teleological or value-coherent approach. 
An interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter is not 
139At 335. 
140(1984] 2 S.C.R 66. 
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only based on the language used but on all factors which give these rights and 
freedoms their true worth; the language used merely lays down a general 
guide and leaves the court with wide room within which to interpret the 
Charter so as to carry out its spirit. 
The case of Hunter et al v Southam Inc141 shows that the purpose of 
the relevant Charter provision is not only paramount but also decisive in the 
interpretation of the provision. The Supreme Court specifically stressed that 
"the proper approach to the interpretation of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is a purposive one ... "142 and then proceeded to interpret section 
8 of the Charter in the light of its purpose as discoverable from its history and 
the common law. 
The relationship between the common law and the provisions of the 
Constitution was emphasised hy Mcintyre J in Retail, Wholesale and 
Dept. Store Union Local 850 v Dolphin Delivery Ltd. 143 The 
judge stated that the courts 
ttought to apply and develop the common law in a manner consistent with the 
fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution11 • 
The purposive approach was elaborated on by Dickson J in R v Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd144 as follows: 
11 lb.e meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter (has) to be ascertained 
by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it (has) to be understood, in other words, in 
the light of the interests it was meant to protect. 
141Supra. 
142At 157. 
143(1986] 2 S.C.R 573 at 603. 
144Supra. 
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[T]his analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in 
question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger object of the Charter itself, 
to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the 
concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights 
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should 
be, as the judgment in Southam emphasizes, a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at 
fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing the individual the full benefit of the Charter's 
protection. At the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or 
freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in vacuum, and must therefore, 
as this Court's decision in Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker [1984] 1 
S.C.R 357 illustrates, be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical context. '1145 
A consideration of the purpose of legislation, the purpose of specific Charter 
provisions and the larger purpose of the Charter will in many instances 
involve a consideration of policy questions. 146 If it is borne in mind, 
however, that human rights provisions are based on open ended and value-
laden concepts which are intended to operate within a social, political and 
economic context, a consideration of policy questions is invariably 
unavoidable. The approach of the Canadian Supreme Court to the 
interpretation of the Charter shows, however, that a consideration of policy 
issues is not an open invitation to a large-scale invalidation of legislative or 
executive acts. 
The advantage of the Canadian Charter of Rights is that it circumscribes, in 
section 1, the extent of operation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Charter. In terms of section 1 the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Charter are subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The Charter 
therefore not only guarantees the rights and freedoms specified in it but also 
makes provision for a criterion in terms of which the courts can measure the 
145At 344. 
146See Chap!. 10. 
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constitutionality of legislative limitations on those rights and freedoms. 147 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in R v Oakes, 148 laid down an analytical 
framework, based on the provisions of section 1 of the Charter, which it 
would use to measure the constitutionality of laws it was asked to review. The 
framework involves a two-phase inquiry. In the first phase the challenger must 
establish that the law or act complained of infringes his right or freedom as 
guaranteed by the Charter; once the challenger has succeeded in doing this, 
the onus shifts to the government to show that the infringement is justifiable 
in terms of the values of a free and democratic society. 
A challenger seeking to show that his right or freedom as guaranteed in the 
Charter has been infringed must establish that the Jaw or act complained of 
actually infringes one of his rights or freedoms as guaranteed in the Charter. 
The proof that is required from the challenger is, however, not confined to 
establishing that the interest or activity for which protection is sought falls 
within one of the categories of rights or freedoms guaranteed in the Charter; 
it extends to showing that the Jaw does, as a matter of fact, limit his 
constitutional entitlements. 
Once the challenger has established that the law or act complained of infringes 
his constitutional right or freedom, the court passes on to the second phase, 
namely whether the government can justify the infringement as being 
consistent with the values of a free and democratic society. This process 
involves a consideration of the Jaw or act in issue in the light of criteria which 
underlie the function of legislation in a free and democratic society, namely 
147Section 33(1) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution, 1993 also 
contains a limitation mechanism; however, unlike section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter, section 33(1) makes provision for stricter limitation requirements in 
respect of certain rights; a limitation of these rights must, in addition to being 
reasonable and justifiable, also be necessary: see Chap!. 10. 
""Supra. 
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its purpose and the proportionality of its object to its effect. 
According to the court in R V Oakes149, a law will be justifiable in terms 
of section 1 of the Charter, and therefore constitutionally valid, if it has 
sufficiently important objectives and employs appropriate means to achieve 
those objectives. In order to be valid, the means which the law employs to 
achieve its objectives must (a) be rationally connected to those objectives; (b) 
impair the rights and freedoms of individuals as little as possible; and (c) have 
an effect which is proportional to the importance of the objective which is 
sought to be achieved. 
In determining whether a law is justifiable in terms of its objectives and the 
means it employs to achieve those objectives, the court embarks upon an 
interpretation which differs from that employed in relation to ordinary 
legislation. A determination of constitutionality in terms of section 1 of the 
Charter involves not only a consideration of the objectives of a law and the 
means it employs to achieve those objectives but also its effect on the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. 
A consideration of the effect of a Jaw involves a weighing up of the benefits 
which the community would derive from it, and the constraints which it 
imposes on the rights and freedoms of the individual as guaranteed by the 
Charter. Where the benefit to the community outweighs the constraints which 
it imposes on the rights and freedoms of individuals, the Jaw may be upheld 
as being justifiable. The ultimate criterion, however, is whether the law's 
infringement of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is justifiable in 
a free and democratic society. It may be said that a consideration of the effect 
of a law in the light of proportionality principle amounts to a practical 
application of the "in a free and democratic society" criterion; in weighing and 
balancing the interests of the community as represented by the state and the 
149Supra at 138-139. 
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interests of the individual the court attempts to achieve the highest level of 
consensus in society. 150 
The case of R v Stinchcombe151 illustrates judicial weighing and 
balancing of the interests of the community as represented by the state and 
those of the individual and an attempt to achieve the highest level of consensus 
in society in the light of constitutional guarantees. The question in issue was 
whether an accused person is entitled to have access to documents and 
statements of witnesses in the possession of Crown Counsel. In coming to the 
conclusion that the accused was entitled to discovery of such documents and 
statements, Sopinka 1 considered the interests of the Crown at stake and the 
interests of the accused to answer the charges against him and to defend 
himself properly. 
Sopinka 1 found that the inclusion in section 7 of the Charter of the right to 
liberty and not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice gave the common Jaw rules relating to disclosure a new 
dimension. The judge invoked the principle of justice to weigh and balance the 
interests of the Crown and those of the individual;152 he found that an 
accused's right to answer charges against him and to defend himself properly 
is one of the pillars of criminal justice on which the courts depend to ensure 
that the innocent are not convicted. The principle of justice as applied by 
Sopinka 1 in essence represents the highest level of consensus in society. 
In another sense, Stinchcombe also serves as an example of the application 
150See J. Murphy "Property rights in the new constitution: an analytical 
framework for constitutional review" 1993 CILSA 211 at 221. 
1511992 LRC (Crim) 68. 
152At 71 the judge accepted the principle that justice is better served when 
the element of surprise is eliminated from the trial and the parties are prepared 
to address issues on the basis of complete information of the case to be met. 
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of the proportionality principle. Sopinka J stated that the obligation to disclose 
is not absolute and that there may be cases where there will be no duty to 
disclose, for example where it will result in serious prejudice or even harm 
to a person who supplied the information. In such instances non-disclosure is 
justified on the basis that it is in proportion to the accused's right to answer 
charges against him and to defend himself and would also not be contrary to 
the principle of justice .153 
The proportionality principle was applied by Hiemstra CJ in the 
Bophuthatswanan case of Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana154 in order to determine in which circumstances and 
to what extent a denial of the right to bail in violation of the provisions of the 
Constitution would be unconstitutional. Hiemstra CJ held that for an 
interference with constitutionally guaranteed rights to be constitutional, such 
an interference must (a) be allowed in the Constitution, (b) be capable of 
achieving its purported objective, (c) be necessary to achieve such purported 
objective in the sense that no lesser form of interference is available and (d) 
be reasonable or proportional in the sense that the purported objectives of such 
interference are as such lawful, adequate, necessary and of equal or superior 
weight, when balanced against the affected right. 155 The last requirement 
involves a weighing and balancing of the interests of the state against the 
interests of the individual who claims that his rights have been interfered with. 
3.4. Interpreting Equality/Inequality Issues. 
153Stinchcombe has been referred to with approval in a number of 
South African decisions dealing with the right to information (section 23 of the 
1993 Constitution) and the disclosure of the contents of police dockets: See 
Chapt. 10. 
1541984(1) SA 196 (BSC). See Chap!. 7 for a discussion of this case. 
155At 201A-C. 
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Like South Africa, Canada is a country of great social inequalities. Its societal 
composition is marked by economic, linguistic, ethnic and religious 
differences which are likely to become the subject of Charter interpretation. 
Section 15(1) of the Charter guarantees every individual, irrespective of race, 
national or etbnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability equality before and under the law. Section 15(2) goes on to state that 
section 15(1) does not preclude what may appropriately be called 'affirmative 
action', that is state action aimed at redressing the conditions of persons 
disadvantaged because of their race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, or age or mental or physical disability. 
Section 8 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution also similarly 
guarantees the right to equality156 and prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age disability, religion, conscience, belief or language."7 Like 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter, section 8 does not preclude 'affirmative 
action'. 
Despite the seemingly encompassing nature of section 15 of the Charter, 
Canadian courts have not been too eager to use its provisions and their power 
of judicial review to redress all issues of inequality. According to Mandel158 
Canadian courts "have not attempted to dismantle Canada's hierarchical 
structure. They have not even made a dent in (the) basic social inequalities. 
Nor is tbere any chance that they will". 
Indeed, the courts' approach to the interpretation of section 15 has been 
accompanied by a painstaking attempt to strike a balance between legislative 
156Section 8(1). 
157Section 8(2). 
158M. Mandel op cit. at 241. 
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policy and judicial review. Thus, in Reference re An Act to Amend 
the Education Act (Ontario)159 the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected 
a contention that the extension of full public funding to Catholic high schools 
contravened section 15 because it singled out one religion for government 
generosity. 160 The court based its decision on the original confederation 
compromise in terms of which the educational rights of denominational 
schools were protected in section 93(1) of the British North America Act, 
1867. The court expressed the following view: 
"These educational rights, granted specifically to the Protestants in Quebec and the 
Roman Catholics in Ontario, make it impossible to treat all Canadians equally. The country was 
founded upon the recognition of special or unequaJ educational rights for specific religious groups 
in Ontario and Quebec. The incorporation of the Charter into the Constitution Act, 1982, does not 
change the original Confederation bargain. 11 
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the view expressed by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal and even went further to hold that the Constitution not only 
permitted but actually required full funding. It decided that the funding 
programme was part of government policy and "returns rights constitutionally 
guaranteed to separate schools by section 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1867" .161 
The courts' approach in the Ontario Catholic Schools Funding case evidences 
their concern to avoid "a free interpretation of equality rights to upset the 
Canadian political balance of power" .162 At the root of this concern, 
however, lurks a deeper concern to draw a line between judicial review and 
159[1986] 25 D.L.R (4th) 1 (Ont. CA). 
16
"The Act in issue was designed to redress educational inequalities in 
Ontario though generous government funding. 
•••Reference re An Act to Amend the Education Act 
(Ontario) [1987] 40 D.L.R (4th) (Supreme Court of Canada) at 59. 
162Mandel op cit. at 243. 
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a determination of policy issues. This deeper concern was voiced by Wilson 
J in the Ontario Court of Appeal in the same case: 
11 I want to stress ... that it is not the role of the court to determine whether as a policy 
matter a publicly funded Roman Catholic school system is or is not desirable. That is for the 
legislature. The sole issue before us is whether Bi11 30 is consistent with the Constitution of 
Canada. 11163 
Another area in which the courts have interpreted section 15 is in relation to 
the rights of the aboriginal people of Canada. In Apsit v Manitoba 
Human Rights Commission164 the court's approach to affirmative 
action programmes in favour of aboriginal people under section 15(2) was that 
such programmes must have a "reasonable relationship between the cause of 
the disadvantage and the ameliorative action" in order to be constitutionally 
valid. 165 The affirmative action programme in issue was the exclusive 
granting of new licences to aboriginal Indian people by the Manitoba 
government in order to encourage them to participate actively in the wild rice 
industry. The court found that poverty, and not discriminatory licensing, was 
the cause of the aboriginal Indians' inability to take an active role in the 
industry. It decided that there was no reasonable relationship between the 
cause of the disadvantage and the form of ameliorative action taken. 
The case of R v Kent, Sinclair and Gode166 illustrates the limited 
applicability of section 15 in protecting the rights of aboriginal Indian people 
even in relation to basic equality rights cases. In this case a Manitoba status 
Indian who had been convicted of murdering a prison guard contended that the 
selection of a jury panel, which consisted of only two Indians (out of 148), 
163At 38. 
164[1988] 1W.W.R629. 
165 At 643. 
166[1986] 27 c. c. c (3d) 405. 
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and the final choice of only one of them to serve in his trial, violated his 
equality rights. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention and held that 
11 [t]o so interpret the Charter would run counter to Canada's multi-cultural and multi-
racial heritage and the right of every person to serve as a juror (unless otherwise disqualified). It 
would mean the imposition of inequality 11 • 167 
Although the decision of the court was correct, it did not squarely address the 
appellant's fear, namely that a jury consisting of only one Indian, his peer, 
was likely to have been biased and to have treated him like a status Indian and 
not as an ordinary Canadian citizen. The irony of the matter, however, is that 
the appellant was faced with the insurmountable difficulty of showing that the 
jury would indeed be biased and would not treat him like an ordinary 
Canadian citizen. 
The first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada squarely faced the 
interpretation and application of section 15 of the Charter and laid down the 
applicable principles was Andrews v Law Society of British 
Columbia168. The issue in this case was whether a provision of the 
Barristers and Solicitors Act169 , which required British Columbia lawyers to 
be Canadian citizens, infringed section 15(1) of the Charter and, if it did, 
whether it was saved by section 1 of the Charter. The court unanimously held 
that the provision infringed section 15(1); a majority held that it was not saved 
by section l. 
167At 421. In S v Collier 1995(8) BCLR 975 Hlophe J came to much 
the same conclusion when he held that the mere fact that a presiding officer 
was white did not necessarily disqualify him from presiding in a case 
involving an accused belonging to a different race. To insist upon a judicial 
officer recusing himself on account of his race "would run counter to the spirit 
of national reconciliation enshrined in the Constitution" (at 979F). See Chap!. 
9 for a discussion of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993. 
16
'[1989] 1 S.C.R 143. 
169Section 42 of the Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.B.C 1972 c 26. 
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Prior to the decision of the court in the Andrews case170 there had been 
no attempt by Canadian courts to state the circumstances in which section 
15(1) may be infringed and to lay down the principles applicable to its 
interpretation. Mcintyre J described the circumstances in which section 15(1) 
may be applicable from the viewpoint of discrimination which would 
constitute unequal treatment: 
11 1 would say that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional 
or not based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has 
the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not 
imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and 
advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics 
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of aoi;;sociation with a group wilJ rarely escape the 
charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capabilities will rarely 
be so classed. 11171 
The conception of equality which in Mcintyre's view underlies section 15 is 
that "the admittedly unattainable ideal should be that a law expressed to bind 
all should not because of irrelevant personal differences have a more 
burdensome or less beneficial impact on one than another". 172 Although the 
judge emphasised that inappropriate distinction would amount to inequality, 
he also recognised that identical treatment may also produce inequality. 
According to Mcintyre J, a challenger claiming that legislation violated section 
15(1) bears an onus regarding two issues. In the first place he must show that 
he has been denied one of the equality rights set out in the first part of the 
section; 173 secondly, that he has been discriminated against. 174 This 
110Supra. 
171At 174-175. 
172At 165. 
173These rights are equality before the law, under the law and the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law. 
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approach corresponds to the first phase of the review process as enunciated in 
R v Oakes115, namely that, as a starting point, the bu~den lies on the 
challenger to prove that the legislation complained of actually infringes one 
of his rights or freedoms as guaranteed by the Charter. In relation to the right 
to equality this means that the challenger must establish that he is in terms of 
the Charter entitled to be treated equally; he must also show, in addition, that 
his constitutional entitlement has been denied as matter of fact. 
Mcintyre J also dealt with the relationship between section 15 and section 1 
of the Charter. In terms of section 1 Charter guarantees are "subject to such 
reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society". The section 1 exception corresponds to the second phase of the 
review process as enunciated in R v Oakes176 • Once the challenger 
succeeds in proving that his constitutional entitlement has been denied the 
onus shifts to the government to show that the denial is "justified in a free and 
democratic society". If the government fails to show that the denial is 
justifiable on some other principle or criterion compatible with the tenets of 
a free and democratic society, the legislation complained of will be 
unconstitutional. 
In the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Andrews case177, before 
the matter went to the Supreme Court, McLachlin JA had opined that only 
unreasonable and unfair legislative distinctions between individuals would 
infringe section 15(1) and that once such a type of distinction is shown to 
exist, it would be justifiable under section 1 only in exceptional circumstances, 
174At 182. 
msupra. 
176Supra. 
177[1986] 27 D.L.R (4th) 600. 
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for example a wartime emergency. 178 There is a distinction between 
unreasonable legislative distinctions and those that are unfair. Whether a 
distinction is reasonable or not has to be determined from its content; the 
crucial question is whether there is a reasonable connection between its 
objectives and the means it employs to achieve these objectives or whether the 
purported objectives are adequate and of equal or superior weight when 
balanced against the right to equality. The unfairness of legislation, on the 
other hand, is determined in the light of its operation and its effect on the 
individual. 179 This distinction was made by Melunsky J in the South African 
case of AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Others: 180 
'
1 In the instant case there is no suggestion that wifair discrimination arises hecaa.i;;e of the 
content of the law. It comes about, according to the applicant, because of the manner in which 
the law is applied by an organ of the State ... A Jaw expressed to bind all should not have a more 
burdensome or less beneficial impact on one than another (Andrews (supra) at 11). In my view, 
however, and where the application of the law is in issue a transgression of section 8(1) or (2) 
will arise only if the organ of state intends to apply the law unequally or if the law is enforced 
according to a principle which has a discriminatory effect due to some particular characteristic of 
178The Court of Appeal did not make a distinction between the stage of 
deciding whether there is a violation of section 15 and one of determining 
whether discrimination, if it is found to exist, is justifiable under section 1; 
it held that the stage of determining whether a limitation on equality rights is 
justifiable under section 1 is when the court decides whether there was a 
violation of section 15. This approach was followed in R v Keegstra 
(1991) 2 W.W.R 1 where the court upheld section 219 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code; section 219 prohibited hate speech against groups identifiable 
by colour, race, religion etc. 
179Thus, while affirmative action may sometimes be unfair it may not 
always be unreasonable when the connection between the objective of the 
relevant legislation , namely to achieve the adequate protection and 
advancement of disadvantaged groups of persons, and the means it employs 
to achieve this connection are considered. 
1801994(4) BCLR 31 (E) at 37I-38A. 
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the discriminatee. 11181 
Hogg182 , a Canadian constitutional jurist, has ventured the view that any 
distinction between individuals infringed section 15(1) and that it was for the 
government to justify any such distinction if it is challenged. The Canadian 
Supreme Court, per Mcintyre J in the Andrews case rejected both the 
approach followed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal and that suggested 
by Hogg. 
Mcintyre J instead adopted the "third or 'enumerated and analogous grounds' 
approach" as the one which 
11
most closely accords with the purposes of s.15 and the definition of discrimination 
outlined above and leaves questions of justification to s.1". 183 
The essence of this approach is that discrimination is generally determined on 
the basis of the analogous grounds enumerated in section 15(1). Section 15 
applies as long as an analogous ground specified in it involving discrimination 
is found to exist, either in a specific provision of the law or through an 
intended or unintended effect of the law on a particular group. 184 In addition 
to an assessment of the distinction in issue on the basis of the enumerated 
grounds, 
"the effect (my emphasis) of the impugned distinction or classification on the 
complainant must be considered ... A complainant under section 15(1) must show not only that 
he or she is not receiving equa1 treatment before and under the law or that the law has a 
181The intention to apply a law unequally will appear from its content; 
whether a law is applied according to a principle which has a discriminatory 
effect will also appear from its content. 
182P. Hogg Canadian Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1985) at 800-
801. 
183At 182. 
184This approach was confirmed by the court in McKinney v 
University of Guelph (1991) 76 D.L.R (4th) 545 at 647. 
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differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by the law but, in addition, 
must show that the legislative impact (my emphasis) is discriminatory" .185 
Once discrimination is found to be contrary to section 15(1), and section 15(2) 
is not applicable, 
11 
any justification, any consideration of the reasonableness of the enactment, indeed, any 
consideration of factors which could justify the discrimination and support the constitutionality of 
the impugned enactment would talce place under section 111 • 186 
Applying the approach he set out, Mcintyre J came to the conclusion that by 
requiring that British Columbia lawyers be Canadian citizens the Barristers 
and Solicitors Act infringed section 15(1). It discriminated against a class of 
persons on grounds of lack of citizenship status and without considering 
educational qualifications or other attributes or merits of individuals in the 
group; it could also not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. 187 
A closer look at the judgment of Mcintyre J reveals that the conclusion that 
the Barristers and Solicitors Act infringed section 15(1) and could not be 
saved by section 1 was arrived at by applying the principles laid down in R 
v Oakes. IBB In the first place the court found that the Act was 
discriminatory and denied the challenger his constitutional entitlement; 
secondly, the finding that the Act could not be saved by section 1 evidences 
the absence of a sufficiently rational connection between the citizenship 
i•'Idem. 
i••Idem. 
1B7The principles laid down in Andrews v Law Society of British 
Columbia (supra) have been approved and applied in Reference re 
Sections 32 and 34 of the Workers Compensation Act (1983) 
(Newfoundland) [1989] 56 D.L.R (4th) 765 and R v Turpin [1989] 
1 S.C.R 1296. 
1
"Supra. 
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requirement and the government's desire to ensure that British Columbia 
lawyers are familiar with Canadian institutions and customs and are committed 
to the laws of Canada. As will be shown later, the approach of the Canadian 
Supreme Court has an interesting parallel with the approach followed by the 
Bophuthatswanan and the Namibian courts in some Bill of Rights cases. 
The Andrews case is also important in regard to the approach to be 
followed in the interpretation of Charter provisions. The court followed a 
purposive interpretation. It determined the constitutional validity of section 42 
of the Barristers and Solicitors Act (British Columbia) in the light of the 
purpose of section 15 of the Charter, which it found to be the promotion of 
a society in which all human beings are given equal concern, respect and 
consideration. 
Decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court also reveal, however, that a 
purposive approach is not the only appropriate approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Thus, in R V Big Mart Ltd189 , Dickson J, while stating 
that the purposive approach is the proper approach to be taken in interpreting 
the Charter also opined that the character and larger objects of the Charter, 
the language chosen to articulate the specific right, the historical origin of the 
concepts enshrined and the meaning and purpose of other rights entrenched in 
the Charter will sometimes call for a generous approach. 190 
Dickson J's dictum illustrates that a Constitution is a structural instrument 
consisting of provisions which are intended to serve the larger purpose of the 
whole; although each provision has a purpose of its own and sometimes a 
purpose associated with the purpose of other specific provisions, "every 
component contributes to the meaning as a whole, and the whole gives 
189Supra. 
"'
0 At 344. See Chapter 10 for a discussion of the purposive approach and 
the distinction between it and the generous approach. 
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meaning to its parts". 191 
3.5. Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in Canada. 
It may be said that an activist judicial philosophy which sought to foster a 
civil libertarian conception of the judicial role and the advancement of the 
fundamental ideals of an open society existed in Canadian constitutional 
jurisprudence even before the enactment of the 1960 Bill of Rights and the 
1982 Charter of Rights and freedoms. 192 However, with the exception of 
R v Drybones193 , the courts adopted a cautious approach to the 
interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights. In a number of cases the 
courts exercised restraint and refused to strike down legislation as being 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 194 
The Canadian Supreme Court's recognition and acceptance that the 
interpretation of the 1982 Charter involved a new task, and its adoption of a 
purposive and generous approach 195 to the interpretation and application of 
191Dubois v The Queen (1985) 23 D.L.R (4th) 503 at 528. 
192See for example the opinions of Chief Justice Duff in Re Alberta 
Statutes [1938] 2 D.L.R81at107, Cannon Jin Re Alberta Statutes 
(supra) at 119 and Rand Jin Winner v S.M.T (Eastern Ltd) [1951] 
4 D.L.R 529 at 558, Saumur v Quebec [1953] 4 D.L.R 641 at 670-
671, Henry Birks and Sons (Montreal) v Montreal [1955] 5 
D.L.R (2d) 321 at 322 and Switzman v Elbling [1957] 7 D.L.R (2d) 
337 at 357-358. 
193Supra. 
194See for example Attorney-General v Lavell (supra); Hogan 
v R [1975] 2 S.C.R579; R v Chow [1978] 43 C.C.C (2d)215 (BCCA); 
Duke v R [1972] S.C.R 917; R v Ewing and Kearney [1974] 5 
W.W.R232. 
195The terms 'purposive' and 'generous' are not synonymous: see Chap!. 
10 for a detailed discussion of the distinction between the two terms. 
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the Charter in the first cases it was called upon to consider196 raised the 
hope that the judiciary would give primacy to the supremacy of the 
Constitution and accord the individual the full benefit of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. A Canadian constitutional jurist has 
noted, however, that the impact which the Charter has had "has been 
somewhat limited and, on the whole, salutary" .197 
The 1982 Charter merely set out and guaranteed individual rights and 
freedoms; it only supplied "the jural postulates or high level values common 
to a civilisation". 198 Clearly, the intention was that the individual should, 
subject to the constitutionally recognised limitations, enjoy the full benefit of 
Charter guarantees; the Charter did not, however, specifically stipulate how 
the rights and freedoms were to be interpreted and applied so as to reflect the 
"high level values common to a civilisation" and to give the individual the full 
benefit of its guarantees. It was up to the courts to choose what to do with the 
postulates or values enshrined in the Charter. 
Although the Canadian Supreme Court had in the early Charter cases called 
for a purposive and generous approach to the interpretation of Charter 
provisions, it nevertheless sounded a cautionary note, urging that the 
development of the Charter should be a careful process. 199 The cautionary 
note carried within it seeds of judicial reticence and judicial deference to the 
legislature. 
196See for example Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker 
(supra); Hunter et al v Southam (supra); R v Big M Drug 
Mart (supra). 
197Strayer 1988 Public Law at 355. 
198E. McWhinney "The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights - The 
Lessons of Comparative Jurisprudence" 1959 Can. Bar Rev. 16 at 33. 
199See Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker (supra) at 
181. 
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Traces of judicial deference to the legislature can be discerned from judgments 
in cases such as Edward Books and Art Ltd v The Queen200 and 
R v Oakes201 . In the Edward Books case Dickson CJ pointed out that 
the interpretation of the Charter was not an open invitation to substitute 
judicial opinions for legislative ones. 202 In a similar vein the court in the 
Oakes case took the view that courts should not invade the legislative field 
and substitute their views for that of the legislature, unless the choice of the 
legislature was unreasonable or not proportionally related to the means it used 
to effect its objective. 203 
The rationality and proportionality principles as laid down and applied in the 
Oakes case204 left an opening for judicial deference to the legislature. The 
court indicated that it would apply the rationality and proportionality principles 
with considerable caution and restraint. It would, for example, not strike down 
legislation if the legislature had a 'reasonable basis' for choosing the means 
it did, even if the challenger of the legislation succeeded in showing that his 
right or freedom as guaranteed by the Charter has been infringed as a matter 
of fact and that there were 'better possible means' to accomplish the objectives 
of the legislature.205 The court's indication was that little or no evidence 
would be required from the government defendant in order to show that an 
infringement of a Charter guarantee was rationally and proportionally related 
200Supra. 
201Supra. 
202At 781-782. 
203See also the Andrews case (supra) at 191. 
20
•Supra. 
205D. Beaty "The Rule (and Role) of Law in a New South Africa: Some 
Lessons from Abroad" 1992 SAlJ 408 at 419. 
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to the means it used to achieve its objective. 206 
The court's posture of deference was a sign of its wish to maintain the proper 
degree of respect for the separation between the judicial branch and the 
democratically elected branches of government. 207 This wish is based on the 
fact that the legislature, as an elected branch of government has a direct 
mandate to make laws and policy decisions for the benefit of all citizens; it 
proceeds on the assumption that in a modern state laws are enacted by 
representatives of the people as a result of and through the process of 
participatory democracy. 
Relying upon a strict division of powers between the judicial branch and the 
legislative and executive branches, Canadian courts have avoided making 
policy decisions, reserving such decisions for the legislature. Mcintyre J 
specifically stated in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store 
Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd208 that although it was acceptable in 
political science terms to treat the courts as one of the fundamental branches 
of government, judicial decisions cannot for the purpose of Charter application 
be equated with an element of governmental action. 
The case of Operation Dismantle et al v The Queen,209 in 
particular, shows strong traces of judicial deference to the political branches 
of government. In this case the court held that the question whether or not the 
206In the Oakes case (supra) Dickson CJ stated that "[w]here evidence 
is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a s. 1 inquiry, and 
this will generally be the case ... there may be cases where certain elements 
of the s. 1 analysis are obvious or self-evident." See also the judgment of La 
Forest Jin Jones v R [1986] 2 S.C.R 284 at 299. 
207Beaty 1992 SAW at 419-420. 
20
'Supra at 600. 
209Supra. 
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testing of cruise missiles by the United States government in Canada 
endangered the lives and security of Canadian citizens was too imponderable 
for the court to determine. However, what the court was asked to consider 
was, in essence, the value of the government's decision to allow the testing 
of cruise missiles as against the values implicit in the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person as guaranteed by the Charter. The court felt that since 
the decision to allow the testing of cruise missiles was a foreign policy 
decision, and foreign policy decisions are not capable of prediction, a 
weighing of the competing values would be based on speculation; the court 
was concerned that to embark upon an inquiry into the weight of the 
competing values and to decide which value was more important would 
amount to a 
11
substirution of the court's opinion on the merits for the person or body to whom 
discretionary decision~making powers has been committed ... 11210 
The court's reluctance to become involved in a determination of policy issues 
was justified. The danger was that to allow contentious policy issues to be 
settled through litigation could weaken the very basis of democracy on which 
the Constitution was founded. Contentious policy issues, especially those 
which involve the exercise of a discretion, are matters which fall within the 
domain of politicians. The political process in a modern democratic state 
provides for ways and means of debating contentious issues and of reaching 
consensus. The solution is political, not legal. 
The sensitive nature of policy issues is discernible in cases which involve a 
determination of the constitutionality of highly contentious legislation, 
especially those dealing with important social and economic issues. One such 
case is Morgentaler v The Queen211, where the Canadian Supreme 
210At 503-504. 
211(1988] 44 D.L.R (4th) 385. 
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Court struck down the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code212 which 
prohibited all abortions213 , except therapeutic abortions carried out in 
defined and limited circumstances. 214 The court held that the abortion 
provisions of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional on the basis that they 
infringed section 7 of the Charter and were not saved by section 1. The 
decision of the court was described as "a repeat performance of the 'quick and 
stunning victory' in Roe V Wade (which left Canada) suddenly without an 
abortion law" .215 The court was nevertheless reluctant to decide policy 
issues; the majority of the court restricted itself to the question of principle 
(the means), namely whether the means chosen to accomplish the provisions' 
objective were proportional to that objective and left the question of policy 
(the ends), namely under what circumstances an abortion would be permissible 
to the legislature. 
The traces of judicial deference to the political branches of government in the 
Canadian courts' approach to the interpretation and application of Charter 
issues do not necessarily suggest judicial abdication of power. There have 
been many instances where the Supreme Court, in particular, has used 
provisions of the Charter to strike down legislation; it has, for example, struck 
down a law which made provision for a minimum period of imprisonment for 
driving on a highway without a valid driver's Iicence. 216 It has also struck 
down Sunday closing laws on the ground that they violate freedom of 
conscience and religion as guaranteed in section 2(a) of the Charter. 217 
212R.S.C 1970, c. C-34, s.251. 
213s. 251(1)(2). 
214s.251(4). 
215Mandel op cit. at 277. 
210Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act (Supra). 
211R v Big M Drug Mart (supra). 
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Indeed, there has been a great deal of activist philosophy in Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence; specific provisions of the Charter have been given 
a large and liberal construction "in the light of its larger objects", namely, "to 
guarantee and protect . . . the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it 
enshrines. "218 As the Supreme Court stated, the Charter ought to be 
interpreted and developed in such a way that it would "meet new social, 
political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers". 219 
The interpretation and application of the Charter in such a way that it would 
be capable of growth and expansion involves an identification, elucidation and 
expression of the values contained in its open-ended provisions. According to 
Dickson CJ, in interpreting and applying the Charter, the court ought to 
express 
" the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society ... which 
embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment 
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and 
group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation 9f 
individuals in society". 220 
In expressing the values and principles essential to a democratic society, 
judges certainly make value-laden assumptions about the social need for, and 
the effect of, each value and principle. 
The court can only make objective determinations about rights and freedoms 
by having regard to the different conceptions about them; constitutional rights 
and freedoms can have meaning only if the social, political and economic 
values which inhere in them are identified, elucidated and expressed. If the 
court does not give meaning to these values, and apply them to cases at hand, 
21
'Hunter et al v Southam Inc. (supra) at 169. 
219At 155. 
220R v Oakes (supra) at 136. 
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they will be abdicating their constitutional function. 
The Canadian Supreme Court has in general followed a libertarian (though 
sometimes restrictive) approach to the interpretation and application of Charter 
provisions. While the court has been rigorous in its protection of the rights 
and freedoms in the Charter, it has been wary of overstepping the boundaries 
of judicial review. The libertarian approach of the Canadian Supreme Court 
not only appears from its rigorous application of Charter provisions but also 
from its approach to factors which have the propensity of affecting rigorous 
judicial review. It has significantly relaxed the locus standi requirement in 
constitutional litigation; a challenger of legislation need only show that he "has 
a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation and that there 
is no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may be brought 
before the court". 221 It has expressly rejected the 'political question' doctrine 
and has held that it is not precluded from considering issues simply because 
they raise questions of a political or policy nature; 222 it has also undermined 
the presumption of constitutionality in relation to Charter litigation, holding 
that where a law is capable of more than one interpretation it will not simply 
presume in favour of the legislature but will instead try to avoid declaring it 
inconsistent with the Charter and thus invalid by choosing an interpretation 
221Minister of Justice v Borowski [1982] 1 W.W.R 97 at 117. 
Unlike section 7(4)(b) of the Republic of South Constitution of 1993, section 
24(1) of the Canadian Charter, which provides for standing to sue, confines 
standing to persons "whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, 
have been infringed or denied". The purport of section 24(1) is that standing 
is confined to persons who are themselves affected by the allegedly 
unconstitutional law or action, that is persons acting in their own interest. 
Section 7(4)(b), on the other hand, extends standing to persons other than 
those acting in their own interest. 
2220peration Dismantle v The Queen (supra) at 471-472, 481 
and 484. See Chapter 10 for a discussion of the 'political question' doctrine. 
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that is consistent with the Charter. 223 
The lesson to be learnt from Canadian constitutional jurisprudence is that 
although courts may allow the executive and the legislature unfettered 
discretion in policy issues, they do make a real contribution to good and 
democratic government by ensuring that legislative and executive powers are 
exercised within the confines of constitutional prohibitions. Judicial review is 
much more than simply evaluating whether government initiatives and policies 
can be justified against broad constitutional principles; 224 the terms of the 
constitutional text must be interpreted and defined, taking into account the 
purpose of constitutional guarantees and the function of the political branches 
of government in a modern democratic state. 225 
223See Attorney-General, Manitoba v Metropolitan Stores 
(M.T.S) Ltd [1987] 1S.C.R110. See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of the 
presumption of constitutionality and the 'reading down' of statutes. 
2240. Beaty "Human Rights and Constitutional Review in Canada" 1992 
Human Rights W 185 at 193-194. 
225See Chap!. 11 for an analysis of the lessons which can be learnt from 
comparative constitutional jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE BOPHUTHATSWANAN EXPERIMENT. 
Bophuthatswana was one of the 'independent' homelands (the so-called TBVC 
states) which may appropriately be described as the apartheid experiment in 
black self-rule; it came into existence as a result of the unilateral partition of 
South Africa into separate 'states' for the various ethnic groups. The partition 
was done in pursuance of the National Party government's policy of separate 
development; no referendum or any such process was conducted to test public 
opinion about the desire of citizens for 'independence'. Bophuthatswana 
became nominally independent on 6 December 1977. 1 
The Constitution of Bophuthatswana2 declared Bophuthatswana to be "a 
sovereign independent state and a republic ... ". 3 The Constitution was 
accorded recognition in South African law by the Status of Bophuthatswana 
Act. 4 
1. The Constitution of Bophuthatswana. 
1Bophuthatswana and its sister 'independent states', namely Transkei, 
Venda and Ciskei were not recognised by the international community as 
independent states; only the South African government recognised their 
'independent' status. All these 'independent states' ceased to exist when they 
were re-incorporated into South Africa after the coming into operation of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 on 27 April 
1994. 
2Act 18 of 1977 (B). 
3Section 1(1). 
4Act 89 of 1977. 
-275-
The Constitution of Bophuthatswana established a dispensation which deviated 
materially from the South African constitutional tradition. Section 7 introduced 
the principle of constitutional supremacy; in terms of this section the 
Constitution was made the supreme law of Bophuthatswana and any law, 
passed after its commencement, which was inconsistent with its provisions 
was, to the extent of such inconsistency, void. Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
embodied a declaration of fundamental rights. 
The fundamental rights, which were contained in sections 9 to 17, were, in 
terms of section 8, binding on the legislature, the executive and the judiciary 
and directly enforceable by law. Section 8(2) specifically made the declared 
fundamental rights justiciable before the Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana. 5 
The purport of section 8(2) was to empower the Supreme Court to review 
legislative and executive acts and to declare them invalid if they were found 
to be inconsistent with the provisions which guaranteed the fundamental 
rights. 
The Bophuthatswanan judiciary was drawn from members of the South 
African judiciary. Until 1982 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa acted as the final court of appeal from decisions of the 
Bophuthatswanan Supreme Court. 6 The Bophuthatswanan Constitution 
therefore posed a great challenge for both the South African trained 
Bophuthatswanan judges and the South African Appellate Division, which had 
hitherto never exercised the power to review the substantive validity of Acts 
of Parliament in the light of a supreme Constitution which guaranteed 
fundamental rights. 
5Section 59(1) of the Constitution established and constituted the Supreme 
Court of Bophuthatswana. 
6 Appeal to the South African Appellate Division was abolished by section 
6 of Act 31 of 1982 (B). 
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2. The Judiciary and the Declaration of Fundamental Rights. 
2.1. The Formative Years: S v Marwane and Smith v Attorney-
General, Bophuthatswana 
2.1.1. S v Marwane7 
S v Marwane presented the first opportunity for the South African 
judiciary to test the validity of legislation against the yardstick of human rights 
constitutional provisions. The Marwane case was significant because it 
came at a time when the debate about the constitutional protection of human 
rights was beginning to gain momentum in South Africa. 8 
The legislation in issue in the Marwane case was the Terrorism Act, a 
statute which Bophuthatswana had inherited from South Africa. Marwane, 
who had been trained as a guerrilla in Angola, was found in possession of a 
grenade in Bophuthatswana. He was charged with various criminal offences 
and convicted of contravening section 2(1)(c) of the Terrorism Act, read with 
sections 1, 2(2) and 5 of the same Act, and sentenced to fifteen years' 
imprisonment. His application for leave to appeal having been refused by the 
court a quo,9 leave to appeal was granted by the Appellate Division. 
71982(3) SA 717 (A). 
8The Constitutional Committee of the President's Council of South Africa 
later cited Marwane's case as an example of "[t]he problems that may arise 
with the courts having a testing right by virtue of a human rights 
declaration ... ": Second Report of the Constitutional Committee 
of the President's Council - The Adaptation of Constitutional 
Structures in South Africa P.C 4/1982. 
'S v Marwane 1981(3) SA 588 (B). 
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On appeal it was argued on behalf of Marwane that the sections of the 
Terrorism Act under which he was charged and convicted were in conflict 
with section 12(3) of the Constitution, which protected the right to liberty and 
security of the person; it was also contended that the provisions of the 
Terrorism Act in issue were in conflict with section 12(7) of the Constitution 
in that they placed the onus of proof of an essential element of the offence on 
the accused. Apart from the validity of the provisions of the Terrorism Act, 
the court also had to decide on the continued operation of received legislation, 
as provided for in section 93(1) of the Constitution, which was in conflict with 
the provisions of the Constitution. 
The appeal was allowed. The majority of the court held that the sections of 
the Terrorism Act which were in issue were glaringly in conflict with 
Marwane' s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty as 
contained in section 12(7) of the Constitution. JO 
Miller JA, who delivered the judgment of the majority, also noted that section 
6(5) of the Terrorism Act, which denied access to the courts to any individual 
detained under section 6(1) of that Act, directly violated the right of a 
detained person to approach the court for a determination of the legality of his 
detention as guaranteed in section 12(5) of the Constitution; furthermore, 
section 9(1) of the Terrorism Act, which made provision for the retrospective 
application of some of the provisions of the Act, was in conflict with section 
12(8) of the Constitution, which clearly stated that no one would be guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under the law in force when it was committed. 11 
In his judgment, Miller JA showed a keen awareness of the far-reaching 
consequences of a declaration of fundamental human rights in relation to 
JOAt 746H et seq. 
11At 746-747. 
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legislation and the power of the court to enforce these rights: 
"For as long as this Constitution stands, the right to challenge the validity of legislation 
passed by the legislative authority will remain, a• will the Supreme Court's power (and its duty, 
when properly called upon to do so) to test the validity of challenged legislation by reference to 
the provisions of the Constitution. This is usually a feature of systems in which a 'bill of rights' 
is enshrined in a Constitution, to which very many cases decided in the United States bear 
irrefutable testimony". 12 
Turning to the continued operation of received legislation which is in conflict 
with the provisions of the Constitution, both Miller JA and Rumpff CJ, who 
delivered a minority judgment, rested a determination of the issue on an 
interpretation of sections 7(1), 7(2) and 93 of the Constitution and the 
intention of the legislature. 
Rumpff CJ took the view that section 93(1) of the Constitution had to be 
restrictively interpreted, since a Constitution was a statute which was not 
passed in the ordinary course of Parliament's business. In his opinion, the real 
and true intention of Parliament was that all received laws should continue to 
operate until repealed or amended. 13 Rumpff CJ thought that to interpret 
section 93(1) to mean that any existing laws which were in conflict with a 
provision of the Constitution would be invalid would lead to great uncertainty; 
he reasoned that such could never have been the intention of the Legislative 
Assembly .14 
Miller JA, on the other hand, decided the issue on the basis of the principle 
of constitutional supremacy; since the Constitution was supreme to all other 
laws, provisions of the Constitution took precedence over all other laws, 
including received legislation, in the event of a conflict between these laws 
12At 750A. 
13At 740H. 
14At 741G-H. 
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and the provisions of the Constitution.15 Miller JA admitted that such an 
approach could lead to uncertainty; he pointed out, however, that uncertainty 
may be unavoidable in systems in which human rights were guaranteed in the 
Constitution. 16 The possibility of some uncertainty was, according to the 
judge, not an indication that the intention of the Legislative As5embly was that 
laws which were in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution should 
continue to operate until repealed or amended. 
Miller JA's judgment, and his willingness to interpret the Constitution in 
favour of constitutional rights and freedoms, may at first sight appear to be 
value-oriented and to negate the strict literalist and intentionalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation. On a closer analysis, however, the judgment 
reveals a literalist and intentionalist approach which is discernible in the 
interpretation of ordinary statutes; in terms of this approach the intention of 
the law-maker is sought from the ordinary meaning of the words used. This 
approach also features in the minority judgment of Rumpff CJ. 
Although in his judgment Miller JA, relying on the judgment of Lord 
Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Collins 
MacDonald Fisher and Another17, called for a generous approach to 
the interpretation of the Constitution so as to give individuals the full benefit 
of constitutional guarantees18 , he nevertheless restated the literalist-
intentionalist approach when he intimated that the courts would, in interpreting 
a particular provision of the Constitution, 
11 give full effect to the ordinarily accepted meaning of the words used and would not 
deviate therefrom unless to give effect to the ordinary meaning would give rise to g]aring 
15At 753C. 
1
'ldem. 
171980 CA 319 (PC) at 328-329. 
18At 748H et seq. 
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absurdity; or unless there were indications in the Act (considered as a whole in its own peculiar 
setting and with due regard to its aims and objects) that the legislator did not intend the words to 
b d d . h . d" " 19 e un erstoo in t e1r or inary sense . 
Miller JA's approach plays down the open-ended nature of human rights 
provisions and the creative role of the judiciary in the interpretation of these 
provisions. 20 
Miller JA's judgment was also criticised for going for an 'overkill', by 
considering issues it was not even called upon to deal with.21 Nevertheless, 
it was praised as a positive one which gave pre-eminence to constitutional 
guarantees. 22 The judgment may be described as a starting point in modern 
South African constitutional interpretation and was therefore to be welcomed. 
2.1.2. Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana23 
19At 7490-E. 
20See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the creative role of the judiciary in 
constitutional interpretation. 
21See T.J Kruger Die Wordingsproses van Suid-Afrikaanse 
Menseregtebedeling (1990) at 211; A.E.A.M Thomashausen "Human 
Rights in Southern Africa: The Case of Bophuthatswana" 1984 SAW 467 at 
469-474. 
:USee G. Carpenter "S v Marwane" 1983 THRHR 93 at 96-97; S. 
Luiz "S v Marwane" 1983 THRHR 231 at 237; G.N Barrie 
"Marwane's case: Echoes of Marbury v Madison on the Arid Plains of 
Southern Africa" 1983 THRHR 288. 
231984(1) SA 196 (B). See G. Carpenter "Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana" 1984 THRHR 363; S. Luiz "The Entrenchment of 
Human Rights in Bophuthatswana" 1984 SAW 435; Thomashauscn 1984 
SAW 474-479 for a discussion of this case. 
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Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana came approximately 
one-and-a-half years after the Marwane case. Unlike the Marwane case, 
the Smith case was not politically sensitive, which made the court's task 
easier. The question in issue was the validity of section 61A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. 24 Section 61A was a post-independence amendment of section 
61 of the Criminal Procedure Act;25 its effect was to give the Attorney-
General the power to prevent the granting of bail to an accused person who 
was permanently or ordinarily resident outside the area of jurisdiction of the 
Bophuthatswana Supreme Court. On the mere ipse dixit of the Attomey-
General that an accused was permanently or ordinarily resident outside the 
court's area of jurisdiction, and that he was not likely to reappear for trial if 
released on bail, the court was obliged to refuse bail for 90 days. 
Smith had been arrested and charged with fraud and theft of money from the 
state. He was refused bail by a magistrate after the Attorney-General had 
submitted information that he was permanently or ordinarily resident in South 
Africa and that he was not likely to reappear for trial if released on bail. He 
appealed to the General Division of the Bophuthatswanan Supreme Court. 
The main issue for decision was the constitutionality of section 61A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. The court had to decide, first of all, whether section 
61A was in conflict with section 12(3)(b) of the Constitution and secondly, 
whether it was covered by the section 18 derogation clause; it was argued 
that, by placing the granting or refusal of bail entirely in the hands of the 
Attorney-General, the section excluded the court's discretion and therefore 
interfered with the accused's right to be released pending the finalisation of 
the trial. 
24Act 51 of 1977. 
25Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act, 33 of 1980 (B). 
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Hiemstra CJ approached the determination of the constitutionality of section 
61A from two angles, namely the 'due process of law' principle and the 
'proportionality' principle. 'Due process of law' is a well known principle 
which features prominently in American constitutional law; it entails 
compliance with the legal process before the rights of individuals can be 
interfered with. The 'proportionality' principle (Verhaltnismassigkeit) is a 
principle of German law; it means that interference with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights is justifiable only if such interference is permitted by the 
Constitution, is capable of achieving its purported objective, is necessary in 
order to achieve its objective and is in proportion to the right affected; 
proportionality implies that the purported objective of a law which interferes 
with constitutionally guaranteed rights must be lawful, adequate, necessary 
and of equal or superior weight to the affected right. 26 
After analysing the refusal to grant bail pursuant to the provisions of section 
61A in the light of the proportionality principle, Hiemstra CJ came to the 
conclusion that section 61A was disproportionate in its rigour to attain the 
purpose sought to be achieved. This purpose was to prevent an accused from 
absconding; it could be fulfilled "by the traditional and long-standing method 
of court decisions". 27 
As to the applicability of the 'due process of law' principle, Hiemstra CJ 
decided that individual liberty is universally protected by an independent 
judiciary operating in public and compelled to give reasons for its decision;28 
section 61A denied the appellant due process of law because it not only left 
the appellant with no right to challenge the Attorney-General's allegation but 
also compelled the court to accept the Attorney-General's word and to refuse 
26 At 201A-C. See also the discussion of the Canadian case of R V 
Oakes [1986) l S.C.R 103 in Chapt. 6. 
27At 201F-G. 
28At 200F. 
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bail; it eliminated a fundamental rule of due process of law, namely the audi 
alteram partem rule, and was therefore "unmistakably an encroachment upon 
the essence of a fundamental right". 29 
As to the question whether section 61A was covered by section 18 of the 
Constitution, the court once again relied on the German law concept of 
Wesensgehalt. In terms of this concept the main issue is whether a law 
encroaches upon the essence of a fundamental right; if it appears to encroach 
on the essence of the right, the court must apply the principle of 
Wechselwirkung or interplay of forces to decide whether it was constitutional 
or not. 30 The court found that the nature of section 61A was such that it 
encroached upon the essence of a fundamental right and was therefore 
unconstitutional. 
In his judgment, Hiemstra CJ expressly recognised that the interpretation of 
a Constitution which guarantees fundamental human rights calls for a generous 
interpretation which upholds constitutional values, and not a narrow, literalist 
and mechanical interpretation. The judge noted that the approach to the 
interpretation of a Constitution with a Bill of Rights was entirely different 
from, and opposed to the "positivist tradition which applies statutes according 
to their strict meaning as construed from the words used". 31 
Whereas in Marwane's case Miller JA contented himself with calling for 
and following a generous approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, 
Hiemstra CJ went further and dwelt on the delicacy which accompanied the 
interpretation of a Constitution which restrains the exercise of legislative 
power by guaranteeing certain fundamental rights, especially where the 
29At 202H. 
30At 202F. 
31At 199F. 
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restraints imposed are foreign to a system with a tradition of a supreme 
parliament with unfettered legislative powers. He explained this as follows: 
"Tue Court helps to shape the Declaration of Iiuman Rights with great deference to the 
Legislature. A Court which is over-active in striking down Legislation can destroy the exalted 
instrument it is trying to bring to 1ife, it can incur the resentment of the Legislature and cause the 
Declaration, which wa.., meant to be a charter of freedom, to become a clog upon the wheels of 
government. That must be avoided for the sake of the stature of Parliament a<il the highest law-
making forum of the nation. In the course of reasoning along these lines the Court will for 
instance not create an embarrassing lacuna within the legislative structure if it is at all possible to 
avoid such a result. On the other hand the Court dare not abdicate its function as upholder of the 
long term aims and ideaJs of the Constitution. 1132 
Hiemstra CJ's plea for judicial deference to the legislature may at first sight 
sound strange when examined in the light of the generous approach to the 
interpretation of the constitution which he had advocated. This plea is, 
however, also a warning against judicial over-eagerness; it essentially informs 
us that there may very well be certain areas where the court ought to exercise 
its power to strike down legislation with great caution and restraint and to 
maintain a proper balance between the exercise of legislative powers and the 
protection of human rights. 
The Canadian Supreme Court has followed a similar approach. The Court has 
repeatedly exercised restraint and applied the proportionality principle with 
caution when dealing with cases involving social and economic policies;33 
caution was necessary because such cases involved matters of compromise and 
accommodation. 34 In essence, however, judicial deference to the legislature, 
32At 199C-E. 
33See Edward Books & Art Ltd v The Queen [1986] 2 S.C.R 
713; Irwin Toy v Quebec (1989) 58 D.L.R (4th) 577; McKinney v 
University of Guelph (1991) 76 D .L.R (4th) 545. 
34See D. Beaty "Human Rights and Constitutional Review in Canada" 
1992 Human Rights LJ 185 at 191. 
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in matters involving social economic policies in particular, amounts to an 
appreciation of the proper degree of the separation of powers between the 
judiciary and the elected branches of government. Legislation dealing with 
social and economic issues is usually enacted by the democratically elected 
representatives of the people after compromise and accommodation;35 the 
judiciary, whose function is confined to the adjudication of justiciable legal 
disputes, ought to respect the legitimate expression of the will of the elected 
representatives of the people on important social and economic issues. 
Another important aspect of Hiemstra CJ's judgment is that it not only 
emphasised judicial protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights and the 
relationship between the judiciary and the elected representatives of the 
people, but also the type of society within which the Constitution operates. 
Although Hiemstra CJ felt that it was the duty of the court to articulate the 
values and ideals embodied in the Constitution's Declaration of Human 
Rights, 36 he was at the same time conscious of the type of society within 
which the Declaration operated, the extent to which a human rights culture 
had permeated through society, and the political development of that society. 
Where a human rights culture has not yet become fully established, and the 
political processes are still in their infancy, the court ought to exercise its 
power of judicial review with caution, while at the same time fulfilling its 
duty as guardian of the principles and values embodied in the Constitution.37 
Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana is "an excellent 
example of carefully balanced constitutional adjudication". 38 Balanced 
constitutional adjudication implies, in the first place, that, taking the 
35ldem. 
36At 199H. 
37At 199 in fin - 200. 
31
'Thomashausen 1994 SAW at 480. 
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provisions which guarantee human rights as a starting point, the court must 
give meaning to the values and ideals of the Constitution in such a way that 
the individual enjoys their full benefit; it implies, in the second place, that the 
judiciary ought to exercise its power to strike down legislation with caution 
when dealing with certain contentious but important social and economic 
issues which have been decided by elected representatives through the 
ordinary political process and after compromise and accommodation; it also 
implies, in the third place, that, the judiciary should not lose sight of the 
prevailing social and economic conditions and the type of society within which 
it operates. 
2.2. The Later Decisions. 
The decisions in S v Marwane and Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana raised the hope that the Bophuthatswanan judiciary 
would give the Declaration of Fundamental Rights its due status in the 
regulation of relationships between state organs and individuals, and bring to 
bear on these relationships the fundamental values and ideals embodied in the 
Declaration. However, Hiemstra CJ's remark in the Smith case that "[t]he 
Court helps to shape the Declaration of Human Rights with great deference 
to the Legislature "39 so as to avoid the resentment of the legislature proved 
to be a "harbinger of things to come" .40 This cautionary but somewhat 
conservative statement was grabbed at by later judges and applied out of 
context. 
39At 199C-D. 
40D. Woolfey & P. Manda "A Bill of Rights 
Bophuthatswana" 1990 CILSA 70 at 75. 
Lessons from 
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2.2.1. S v Chabalala41 
Chabalala had been convicted of murder; no extenuating circumstances having 
been found, he was sentenced to death. It was argued on his behalf that the 
death sentence was inhuman and degrading and therefore in conflict with 
section 11 of the Constitution. 
Counsel for Chabalala had urged the court to adopt an approach which would 
uphold the Constitution rather than one which would promote deference to the 
will of legislature. 42 In support of his argument that the death penalty was 
inhuman and degrading, Counsel referred to foreign writers, to case law 
dealing with the interpretation of article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights43 , to American case law dealing with capital punishment and 
to the 8th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which 
prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishment'. An opportunity thus presented itself 
for the court to analyse the values embodied in section 11 and to make use of 
international law and foreign law as a guide in the search and analysis of these 
values.44 
The court's response was disappointing. Thea! Stewart CJ implicitly gave 
411986(3) SA 623 (BA). See S. Luiz "A Bill of Rights: Is It Worth the 
Paper It's Written On?" 1987 SAJHR 105; Woolfey & Manda 1990 
CILSA at 75-76 for a discussion of this case. 
42At 628A. 
43 Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights is similar in 
content to section 11 of the Bophuthatswana Constitution. 
44See for example S v Ncube; S v Tshuma; S v Ndlovu 1988(2) 
SA 702 (ZSC) and Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re 
Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991(3) SA 76 (Nm) 
where the Zimbabwean and Namibian courts made extensive use of foreign 
law and international law as a guide in analysing the meaning of 'inhuman and 
degrading' punishment in relation to corporal punishment. 
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credit to the notion that a constitutional provision derives its meaning from the 
words used, a notion which is completely incompatible with the idea of human 
rights provisions as an embodiment of fundamental values; these values are 
expressed in vague and open-ended terms which have to be analysed in order 
to give them meaning. According to the judge, the "representatives of the 
people of Bophuthatswana" expressly authorised the death penalty; it could not 
therefore per se be inhuman or degrading.45 Without even attempting to 
search for and analyse any values which might be embodied in section 11 of 
the Constitution, the judge concluded that there was nothing inhuman or 
degrading in the application of the death penalty in Bophuihatswana.46 
Thea! Stewart CJ's line of reasoning manifests a commitment to a conservative 
doctrine of judicial responsibility which is akin to a positivist view of law. 
This line of reasoning underplays value considerations in judicial interpretation 
and focuses mainly on the intention of the legislator; it proceeds on the basis 
that the intention of the legislator overrides everything else. 
As Luiz47 points out, Thea] Stewart CJ obviously took the view that it was 
the function of the legislature to abolish the death penalty. This does not 
imply, however, that a court which is called upon to determine 
constitutionality must abdicate its function of creatively interpreting the 
Constitution to give the individual the full benefit of its provisions. A court 
is not usurping the function of the legislature when declaring a statute invalid; 
45At 628C-D. Section 10(1) of the Constitution of Bophuthatswana 
guaranteed the right to life but qualified the guarantee by providing that a 
person may be deprived of his life "in the execution of a sentence of a court 
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law". 
It should be noted that the main argument in Cbabalala was not that the 
death penalty was inconsistent with section 10(1) but that it constituted 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
46At 628J-629E. Moll and van den Heever JJA concurred. 
'
7Luiz 1987 SAJHR 110. 
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in a system of constitutional supremacy it is the function of the court, when 
called upon to do so, to determine whether a piece of legislation is in conflict 
with the provisions of the Constitution or not and to declare the legislation 
invalid if it finds it to be in conflict with such provisions; the court is simply 
giving effect to the supreme law of the Constitution.48 
According to Thea! Stewart CJ, if one accepts that all punishment is degrading 
then imprisonment would also be unconstitutional.49 This reasoning is faulty 
in one important respect; imprisonment does not always constitute cruel 
punishment if one applies the yardstick of whether punishment is out of 
proportion to the offence. 50 Imprisonment for a period of up to one year 
imposed upon an offender who has committed an assault with a deadly weapon 
can hardly be said to constitute cruel punishment if one takes into 
consideration the nature and gravity of the offence. 
As to the use of international law and foreign law in the search of fundamental 
constitutional values Thea! Stewart CJ crisply dismissed their influence: 
11 The fact that some Courts in other countries as well as various legal writers have 
expressed the view that, for one reason or another, the death penalty is inhuman or degrading 
cannot override its express acceptance by the representatives of the people of Bophuthatswana, in 
formulating the Bill of Rights, as the usual and appropriate punishment in certain prescribed 
circumstances". 51 
48The death penalty was declared unconstitutional in South Africa by the 
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane 1995(6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
49At 628D-F. 
50Luiz 1987 SAJHR 110. 
51At 629C. Section 10(1) of the Constitution of Bophuthatswana was 
similar but not identical to section 4(1) of the Botswana Constitution. Section 
4(1) similarly guarantees the right to life but qualifies it by permitting the 
imposition of the death penalty "in respect of an offence under the law in 
force in Botswana". In S V Ntesang 1995(4) BCLR 426 (Botswana) 
Aguda JA, while recognising the significance of the development in other 
portions of the international community concerning the abolition and 
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It can be argued that the fact that the Bophuthatswanan Declaration of Rights 
is based largely on the European Convention of Human Rights52 shows that 
when the "representatives of the people of Bophuthatswana" adopted the 
Constitution they intended to adopt those fundamental values which are 
embodied in the European Convention as their own. This argument would 
mean that international law and foreign authorities dealing with the 
Convention were persuasive in the interpretation of the Declaration. 53 Section 
11 itself is similar in content to article 3 of the European Convention. 
There is also another aspect which is relevant to the interpretation of 'torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment' which the court did not 
consider. In assessing the cruelty of capital punishment the court is not only 
concerned with the actual carrying out of the death sentence per se, but also 
with its total impact, from the moment it is imposed through the execution 
itself, both on the individual and on the society which sanctions its use. 
The assessment of the cruelty of the death sentence in the light of its total 
constitutionality of the death penalty, held that despite the fact that it may be 
considered to constitute torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, section 7(2) preserved its imposition. (See also the judgment of 
Aguda JA in The Attorney-General v Dow 1994(6) BCLR 1 
(Botswana) at 45H-J on the significance of international law in the 
interpretation of the Constitution.) Section 7 of the Botswana Constitution 
prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment but saves, 
in subsection (2), any law which authorises the infliction of any description 
of punishment that was lawful in Botswana before the coming into operation 
of the Constitution. The death penalty provision in the Botswanan Penal Code 
was already in existence at the time of the coming into operation of the 
Constitution. Section 11 of the Bophuthatswanan Constitution did not contain 
a saving clause. 
52see M.P Vorster, M. Wiechers & D.J Van Vuuren (eds) 
Constitutions of Transkei, Bophutbatswana and Venda (1985) 
at 85. 
53The adoption of the Sixth Protocol of the European Convention on 
Human Rights provides evidence of a world-wide movement against the death 
penalty. 
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impact is illustrated in the Zimbabwean case of Catholic Commission 
for Justice & Peace, Zimbabwe v Attorney-General, 
Zimbabwe. 54 In this case four prisoners were sentenced to death after 
having been found guilty of the crime of murder. The applicant, a human 
rights organisation, sought an order preventing the prisoners' execution, on 
the basis that the dehumanising factor of the prolonged delay of their proposed 
execution, viewed in conjunction with the harsh and degrading conditions 
under which they had been confined, constituted inhuman or degrading 
treatment in violation of section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
After analysing the conditions endured by the prisoners, their mental anguish 
and the attitudes of the courts, both in Zimbabwe and in other countries, in 
relation to the delay in executing sentences of death, Gubbay CJ found that 
the total impact of these factors constituted cruel and inhuman or degrading 
treatment. With reference to American case law, the judge described the 
cruelty of the sentence of death in the following terms: 
11 The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the pain 
incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to 
execution during which the judicial and administrative procedures essential to due process of law 
are carried out. Penologists and medical experts agree that the process of carrying out a verdict 
of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constiru.te psychological 
torture55 ..• The mental agony is, simply and beyond question, a horror56 •.• The ordeals of the 
condemned are inherent and inevitable in any system that informs the condemned person of his 
sentence and provides for a gap between sentence and execution. Whatever one believes about the 
cruelty of the death penalty itself, the violence done the prisoner's mind must afflict the conscience 
541993(2) SACR 432 (ZS). See also the Jamaican case of Pratt and 
Another v Attorney-General for Jamaica and Another (1993] 
2 All E.R 769 (PC). 
55At 448d. 
56At 448h. 
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of enlightened government and give the civilized heart no rest57 ... 'The condemned must confront 
this primal terror directly, and in the most demeaning circumstances. "58 
While accepting that fear, despair and mental torment are the inevitable 
concomitant of a sentence of death, the court, however, based its judgment on 
the delay in carrying out the sentence. The delay in carrying out the sentence 
prolongs the fear, despair and mental torment and therefore constitutes cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. 59 The court ordered that the death 
sentences imposed on the prisoners be vacated. The sentences were set aside 
and sentences of life imprisonment substituted for them. 
Gubbay CJ adopted a value-oriented and generous approach to the 
interpretation of section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe60 and thereby 
gave the individual the full benefit of the Declaration of Rights. This approach 
is clear from the judge's remarks: 
"Because retribution has no place in the scheme of civilized jurisprudence, one cannot 
turn a deaf ear to the plea made for the enforcement of constitutional rights. Humanene~ and 
dignity of the individual are the hallmarks of civilized laws. Justice must be done dispassionately 
and in accordance with constitutiona1 mandates" .61 
An alternative argument was also advanced in the Chabalala case. 62 It was 
argued that section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, which made the 
death sentence mandatory if no extenuating circumstances are found, was in 
57At 449a. 
58At 449b. 
59At 459g. The accused in Chabalala's case had been on death row for 
2 years when his execution was eventually scheduled to be carried out. 
60Section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is similar to section 11 
of the Constitution of the former Bophuthatswana. 
61At 459f. 
62Supra. 
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conflict with the Declaration of Fundamental Rights in that it severely limited 
the court's discretion as to sentence and converted the death penalty into a 
degrading and inhuman punishment. 63 
Theal Stewart CJ took the view that the limitations arising from the operation 
of the concept of extenuating circumstances were not imposed by section 277 
but by the South African courts' interpretation and application of the section; 
the section itself did not, according to the judge, define the extent of 
extenuating circumstances. What the judge did not take into account, however, 
was that when South African courts interpreted and applied the concept of 
extenuating circumstances, they were dealing with an ordinary statute and not 
with a Constitution with supreme authority; as Dickson J of the Canadian 
Supreme Court stated in Hunter et al v Southam Inc••, 
11 [t]he task of expoWlding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a 
statute ... A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to 
provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power, and when 
joined by a Bill or Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and 
liberties 11 • 
In essence, what the court was called upon to consider in the Chabalala 
case was whether the very same interpretation and application of section 277 
of the Criminal Procedure as that followed by South African courts advanced 
the unremitting protection of individual rights in line with the Declaration of 
Rights. Since the interpretation and application of the Declaration called for 
a generous approach, the interpretation and application of section 277 of the 
Criminal in such a way that the section limited the appellant's constitutional 
right not to be subjected to cruel punishment was not in line with the spirit of 
the Bophuthatswanan Constitution. 
63At 632H-I. 
64(1984) D .L.R (4th) 641 at 649. 
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Van den Heever JA, who delivered a separate but concurring judgment, was 
concerned that the courts would be 
"usurping the legislative function were they. without legislative intervention, to deviate 
from the meaning given to section 277, Act 51of1977 by judicial interpretation in the Republic 
of South Africa as at the date of its adoption by Bophuthatswana on 6 December 1977" .65 
This approach, like that of Thea! Stewart CJ, assumes that those who drafted 
or adopted the Constitution accepted the position as it existed in South Africa 
and ignores the fact that when the drafters gave the court a testing power it 
was intended that this power should be used; it manifests extreme deference 
to the legislature and fails to take into account the special character of the 
Constitution as a unique document which must "be capable of growth and 
development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities 
often unimagined by its framers". 66 
2.2.2. Segale v Government of Bophuthatswana and 
Government of Bophuthatswana v Segale.67 
Segale, the applicant in this case, was the Chairman of the National 
Seoposengwe Party, the opposition political party in Bophuthatswana. His 
party had been refused permission to hold a political meeting in terms of 
section 31(1) of the Internal Security Act of 1979 (B). The effect of section 
31(1) of the Internal Security Act was to ban the holding of public meetings 
65At 635. 
••Hunter et al v Southam Inc. (supra) at 649. 
671987(3) SA 237 (B) and 1990(1) SA 434 (BA). See K. Motshabi 
"Constitutional Interpretation as a Means of Honouring Human Rights 
Commitments" 1988 SAJHR 79; A.M Dlamini "Growth by Stifling" 1990 
THRHR 121; l.M Rautenbach "Vooraftoestemming vir Vergaderings" 1990 
TSAR 767; G. Carpenter "Constitutional Interpretation in Bophuthatswana-
What Price a Bill of Rights?" 1989/90 SAYIL 169; Woolfey & Manda 1990 
CILSA at 77-79 for a discussion of these cases. 
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attended by more than 20 persons. Segale sought an order declaring that 
section 31 of the Internal Security Act violated freedom of expression and of 
peaceful assembly and association as guaranteed in sections 15 and 16 of the 
Constitution. 
In granting the order as prayed, the General Division of the Bophuthatswanan 
Supreme Court, per Waddington and Khumalo JJ, endorsed the approach to 
the interpretation of a Constitution with a Bill of Rights which Miller JA had 
adopted68 in Marwane's case69 from the speech of Lord Wilberforce in 
Minister of Home Affairs v Collins MacDonald Fisher and 
Another70 , namely that a Constitution which entrenches human rights must 
be given a generous interpretation which gives individuals the full benefit of 
these rights. 
In their judgment Waddington and Khumalo JJ recognised and articulated the 
values and norms inherent in the Constitution. Their Lordships found that the 
Constitution enshrined fundamental features of democracy and that its 
character and origin dictated that full recognition and effect must be given to 
the rights and freedoms it guaranteed. Adopting a generous interpretation to 
the Constitution, their Lordships came to the conclusion that section 31 of the 
Internal Security Act permanently left the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
section 15 and 16 of the Constitution exercisable at the discretion of the 
Minister of Justice and was therefore contrary to the spirit of the 
Constitution. 71 
The judgment of Waddington and Khumalo JJ is particularly significant in that 
68At 748G-749F. 
••Supra. 
70Supra at 328-329. 
71At 247G. 
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it places the burden of proving that a derogation of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights is justified on the government and not on the challenger. 72 Where the 
government relies on the security situation in the country in order to justify 
a derogation of rights it must show that there is a clear and present 
danger. 73 
Following the court's order declaring section 31 of the Internal Security Act 
unconstitutional, the Government appealed to the Bophuthatswanan Appellate 
Division. The Appellate Division shattered the illusion that the judgment of 
Waddington and Khumalo JJ "constitutes the beginning of a new trend in the 
interpretation of the Bophuthatswana Constitution". 74 The court, per Galgut 
AJA, held that section 31 was not in conflict with the provisions of the 
Constitution and reversed the decision of the court a quo.75 
The Bophuthatswanan Appellate Division failed to appreciate that it was 
dealing with a Supreme Constitution76 whose Declaration of Human Rights 
required cognisance to be taken of its fundamental values and ideals, as 
opposed to the intention of the legislature as discoverable from the words 
used. Although these fundamental values may also he discovered from the 
original intent of the framers, the interpretation of a Constitution is different 
72At 247D-F. This is the approach followed by the Canadian Supreme 
Court: see R v Oakes (supra). 
73At 247H. 
74K. Motshabi 1988 SAJHR at 79. 
75See A.M Dlamini "Growth by Stifling" 1990 THRHR 121; G. 
Carpenter "Constitutional Interpretation in Bophuthatswana- What Price a Bill 
of Rights?" 1989/1990SAYIL169; Woolfey & Manda 1990 CILSA 77-79 
for criticisms of Galgut AJA's judgment. 
76See Dlamini op cit. at 123; Carpenter 1989/1990 SAYIL at 171 and 
172; A.M Dlamini & P.J Majola "The Bophuthatswana (Constitution) Bill of 
Rights and Security Legislation: A Rule of Law Appraisal" 1993 
Stellenbosch LR 100 at 117. 
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from the interpretation of ordinary statutes; its provisions are capable of 
adaptation to meet future unknowable needs. 77 
The most startling aspect of Galgut AJA's judgment is its reliance on rules 
applicable to the interpretation of ordinary statutes; the judge referred mainly 
to South African and British cases which were decided against the background 
of the doctrine of legislative supremacy, a doctrine which is completely 
incompatible with the idea of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land 
to which all other laws are subordinate. 
There is no doubt the general rules of statutory interpretation are not discarded 
in the interpretation of a Constitution with supreme authority. Many writers 
have in fact argued in favour of a purposive approach to the interpretation of 
ordinary statutes, one which takes into account the purpose of specific 
legislation and the purpose of law in society. 78 In the interpretation of a 
supreme Constitution, however, the purpose of the specific rights entrenched 
in the Constitution and the larger purpose of the Constitution occupy a central 
place. A paramount consideration in the interpretation of such a Constitution 
is that the court must give effect to the values and norms, the ideals and 
aspirations of society and spirit embodied in its provisions. 79 These values, 
norms, ideals and aspirations are actualised in a manner completely different 
from that associated with the enforcement of legislative policy as contained in 
77McCulloch v Maryland 17 US (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) at 415. 
78See G.E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) at 35-39; L.M 
Du Plessis Interpretation of Statutes (1986) at 36; C.J Botha 
Wetsuitleg (1991) at 13; D.V Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of 
the Principles of Statutory Interpretation" 1976 THRHR 131; J.M.T 
Labuschagne "Die Opkoms van die Teleologiese Benadering tot die Uitleg van 
Wette in Suid-Afrika" 1990 SALJ 569. 
79See the discussion of Mahomed AJA's judgment in Ex Parte 
Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by 
Organs of State (supra) in Chapt. 8. 
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ordinary statutes. 
The Bophuthatswanan Appellate Division failed to rise above 'the austerity of 
tabulated legalism';80 its judgment reveals a commitment to a conservative 
brand of judicial interpretation which is akin to positivism.81 Instead of 
seeking guidance from the provisions of the Constitution and searching for 
fundamental values and norms therefrom, Galgut AJA saw the intention of the 
legislature as fundamental and adopted a literalist-intentionalist approach: 
11 The task of the Court is to ascertain from the words of the statute in the context thereof 
what the intention o~ the Legislature is. If the wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous they 
state what that intention is. It is not for the Court to invent fancied ambiguities and usurp the 
functions of the Legislature. 1182 
Galgut AJA's approach was a narrow one which emphasised the intention of 
the legislature over superior constitutional values. Without analysing the 
circumstances under which, and the extent to which, the Constitution 
permitted a restriction of the right of freedom and of assembly, the judge 
came to the conclusion that ". . . the right of freedom of expression and of 
assembly (can) be restricted when this (is) necessary in the interest of public 
safety" .83 
It is quite true that section 15 itself permitted certain restrictions. 84 Such 
restrictions, however, had to be necessary in a democratic society. Galgut 
AJA did not for one moment consider this criterion. Neither did he consider 
80Marwane's case (supra) at 748H. 
81Dlamini 1990 THRHR at 124; Carpenter 1989/1990 SAYIL at 208 
and 210-211. 
82At 448G. 
83 At 4491-J. 
84Section 15(1). 
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the criterion laid down in the Smith case85 , namely that a restriction would 
be constitutionally justifiable only if it was reasonable or proportional, in the 
sense that it was lawful, adequate, necessary and of equal or superior weight 
to the right in issue. 
The approach which the court ought to have followed is that which required 
the applicant to show that a constitutionally guaranteed right of his was at 
stake or had been violated; once the applicant had succeeded in showing that 
there was a prima facie violation or threat of violation of his right, the court 
ought to have required the government to justify this violation or threatened 
violation in terms of the proportionality and rationality principles or the 
criterion stipulated in section 15, namely that the restriction was 
11
necessary in a democratic state in the interests of nationaJ security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary". 
The fact that section 15 specifically stipulated instances in respect of which 
restrictions on the rights guaranteed in the Constitution were permissible was 
an indication that these rights could be encroached upon only under special 
circumstances. Moreover, even if these special circumstances existed, the 
restriction still had to be "necessary in a democratic state". An evaluation of 
the special circumstances and of whether a restriction was necessary in a 
democratic state under such circumstances would involve a consideration of 
the proportionality and reasonableness of the restriction, the security, integrity 
etc. of the individual as well as the position in other free and democratic states 
and the prevailing circumstances in the state. Considerations of 
proportionality, rationality, security, integrity and democracy cannot be 
divorced from the ideals and aspirations of society, which clearly include full 
participation in the political process. 
85Supra. 
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As Woolfey86 points out, had the court adopted a normative or teleological 
approach it would have found that although the Constitution expressly 
authorised, for certain purposes, restrictions on the rights and freedoms of 
individuals, such restrictions had to be kept to the absolute minimum; they 
should be permitted only when absolutely necessary in order to preserve the 
democracy which the Constitution sought to establish and to safeguard. The 
Constitution certainly did not permit unjustifiable and unnecessary restrictions 
of deliberately guaranteed rights and freedoms. 
2.2.3. The General Division Follows Suit: Monnakale and 
Others v Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana and 
Others87 and Lewis v Minister of Internal Affairs88 . 
Monnakale was concerned with the validity of detentions in terms of 
section 25 of the Internal Security Act. 89 Section 25(2) of the Act empowered 
any commissioned officer of the Police Force to detain an arrested person for 
interrogation, for a period of fourteen days, if the Commissioner of Police had 
reason to believe that such a person had engaged in activities that constituted 
an offence under the Act, or was withholding information relating to such an 
861990 CILSA at 79. 
871991(1) SA 598 (B). See G. Carpenter "Constitutional Interpretation in 
Bophuthatswana - Still no Joy" 1990/91 SAYIL 143; P. Manda "Executive 
Manipulation Employed by Virtue of the Security Clearance Act of 
Bophuthatswana" 1991 CILSA 240; I. Southwood "Naught for your 
(Constitutional) Comfort in Bophuthatswana" 1992 SA Public Law 169; 
H. Lever "Redressing the Racial Imbalance in the Law" 1992 Consultus 57; 
Woo!fey & Manda 1990 CILSA at 79- 81 for criticisms of this case. 
881991(3) SA 628 (B). See P.S Fouche & l.M Rautenbach "Deportasie en 
die Interpretasie van 'n Handves van Regte" 1992 TSAR 505 for a 
discussion of this case. 
89 Act 32 of 1977 (B). 
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offence. Members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who were alleged to 
have been involved in a failed coup had been detained in terms of section 25. 
The applicants, relatives of the detainees, approached the court for an order 
for the release of the detainees. The main issue was the discretion given to the 
Attorney-General to order the continued detention of a detainee after a 
consideration of the reasons for the arrest and detention furnished to him by 
the Commissioner of Police. 
The applicants contended that every arrest or detention prima facie interfered 
· with the liberty of the citizen, that a decision to arrest or detain must be based 
on reasonable grounds and that such a decision was objectively reviewable. 
Friedman J rejected this contention and decided that "the statute itself 
entrusted to the repository of the power the sole and exclusive function of 
determining whether in its opinion the prerequisite fact, or state of affairs 
existed prior to the exercise of the power" .9° The judge opined that it was 
"not the function of the court to enquire into the correctness of the Attorney-
General 's decision". 91 
Monnakale is yet another example of the court's failure to appreciate the 
significance of a Constitution which operates as a supreme law and the higher 
status of the fundamental values and ideals embodied in its human rights 
provisions. Throughout his judgment Friedman J approached the matter as if 
he were dealing with South African law. 92 Although the judge correctly 
pointed out that restrictions on human rights were permissible in the interests 
90At 612E, quoting from the judgment of Corbett J, as he then was, in 
South African Defence Aid Fund & Another v Minister of 
Justice 1967(1) SA 31 (C) at 35A-B. 
91At 6241. 
92See Carpenter 1990/91 SAYIL at 145. At the time of the judgment the 
South African system was not based on a supreme Constitution; the system 
was based on the doctrine of legislative supremacy and the South African 
Constitution had the same status as any other ordinary statute: see Chap!. 4. 
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of national security ,93 he did not in any way attempt to deal with the values 
embodied in the Constitution and the circumstances under which these 
fundamental values would justifiably give way to interests of national security; 
the judge instead regarded the intention of the legislature as a 'skeletal 
framework' of the law, which is discoverable from the 'plain and 
unambiguous' meaning of the statute, as paramount, "however unpalatable the 
result may be" .94 
Friedman J adopted a Iiteralist-intentionalist approach which excludes a 
consideration of fundamental constitutional values. In the guise of giving effect 
to the intention of the legislature as it appears from the 'clear and 
unambiguous' language of the statute there is discernible "the positivist's 
belief in the fixed meaning of language and the rigid separation of law and 
morality" .95 Friedman J's approach betrays an avoidance of judicial 
creativity; it suggests that where the language of a statute which infringes 
constitutionally guaranteed rights is clear and unambiguous the role of the 
court is confined to giving effect to the intention of the legislature, without a 
corresponding analysis and application of superior constitutional values. 
According to Friedman J, a generous approach to constitutional interpretation 
can only be resorted to where the language of a statute is uncertain and 
unambiguous. 96 This approach not only ignores the supremacy of the 
Constitution; it also reduces interpretation to a process whereby only the 
meaning of words used in a statute is sought and applied, without taking into 
account the situation or circumstances in which the meaning has to be applied. 
93At 613H-614A. 
94At 621D and H. 
95Woolfey & Manda 1990 CILSA at 80. 
96At 622G. 
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In relation to a statute which is alleged to violate constitutionally guaranteed 
rights, the right or rights in issue form part of the situation or circumstances 
in which the meaning of the statute have to be applied and therefore become 
relevant; a proper determination of a dispute involving an alleged violation of 
these rights is possible only when not only the meaning of the violating statute 
but also the meaning of the provisions which embody the rights are 
considered. By its very nature, a supreme Constitution which guarantees 
fundamental human rights calls for a generous interpretation which gives 
individuals the full benefit of the values and ideals embodied in its provisions. 
Friedman J's view that a generous approach to the interpretation of a 
Constitution which guarantees human rights can only be resorted to where the 
words used in a statute which impinges on these rights are obscure or 
ambiguous also appeared in his judgment in Lewis v Minister of 
Internal Affairs and Another. 97 In this case a university lecturer who 
had been appointed on contract was ordered to leave Bophuthatswana in terms 
of section 65(1) and (2) of the Aliens and Travellers Control Act98• Friedman 
J followed the 'original intent' approach99 and held, with regard to the 
constitutionality of section 65(1) and (2), that the intention of the legislature 
in enacting the Declaration of Fundamental Rights had never been that the 
rights of the individual should prevail over interests of the state or public 
safety. 
As in the Monnakale case, 10° Friedman J adopted a literalist-intentionalist 
approach. The judge viewed the function of the court as one of giving effect 
to the intention of the legislature as it appears from the 'clear and 
97Supra. 
98Act 22 of 1979 (B). 
99See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of this approach. 
100Supra. 
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unambiguous' language of a statute, even if the Constitution contained a 
justiciable Bill of Rights. 101 This approach prefers the certainty and 
uniformity of plain meanings and avoids a creative and normative analysis of 
the tensions that may exist between such meanings and fundamental 
constitutional values and ideals. 
Although, in the Lewis case, Friedman J referred to and approved the 
judgment of Corbett CJ in Administrator Transvaal and Others v 
Traub, 102 which he found to be weighty and of persuasive authority, he 
refused to follow the generous approach which could be gleaned from that 
case. Traub did not specifically deal with constitutional or statutory 
interpretation; it does illustrate, however, the fundamental role of the judiciary 
in protecting the interests of the individual. 103 
Traub was concerned with the question whether the director of hospital 
services could refuse to appoint the respondents, who were doctors, as senior 
house officers in accordance with the established practice, without having 
granted them an opportunity to present their case in terms of the audi alteram 
partem rule. The Appellate Division decided that the respondents had a 
legitimate expectation of being appointed and/or that they were entitled to a 
101At 638F. 
1021989(4) SA 7 (A). 
103Traub's case has generally been well-received as a positive step 
towards substantial judicial protection of the interests of individuals in public 
law: see G. Carpenter "Legitimate Expectation Here to Stay" 1990 
Consultus 59; C.F Forsyth "A Harbinger of a Renaissance in 
Administrative Law" 1990 SALJ 387; M. Beukes "Geregverdige Verwagting 
as Aanspraak van die Individu in die Adrninistratiewe Proses" 1991 TSAR 
150; M.P Olivier "Legitimate Expectation and the Protection of Employment" 
1991 TSAR 483. The concept of legitimate expectation has since been built 
into the Republic of South Africa (interim) Constitution of 1993: see section 
24. 
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fair hearing in the event of a contemplation to depart from the established 
practice .1°4 The application of the notion of legitimate expectation "where 
an adherence to the formula of 'liberty, property and existing rights' would 
fail to provide a legal remedy, when the facts cry out for one'', 105 is an 
illustration of creative judicial decision-making in coming to the aid of the 
individual where his rights or interests are threatened by administrative or 
executive acts. By reaching out and coming to the aid of persons prejudicially 
affected, the court in essence adopted a generous approach to the protection 
of the rights or interests of the individual. 
It may be argued that the right to be heard in terms of the audi alteram 
partem rule, which was in issue in the Lewis case, is a fundamental human 
right106 and that the court ought to have held that it should have been 
complied with. 107 Although the audi alteram partem rule was not 
specifically enshrined in the Constitution, it may be argued that at least fair 
procedure was envisaged. 108 In the Smith case Hiemstra CJ specifically 
recognised and applied the 'due process of law' principle as a universal 
method of safeguarding the rights of individuals;109 the right to be heard is 
clearly a major part of 'due process of law'. It may also be argued that the 
exclusion of the application of the audi alteram partem rule in respect of 
104At 762B-C. 
105At 7610-E. 
106See G. Carpenter "Fundamental Rights, Security Legislation and the 
Audi Alteram Partem Rule - Still no Congruence in the Appellate Division" 
1989 S.A Public Law 87. See also the discussion of the Chikane case 
infra. 
107See for example the judgment of Khumalo J (with Comrie J concurring) 
m Sefularo v President of Bophuthatswana & Another 
(unreported judgment delivered in June 1992). 
108See for example the provisions of section 12(6) and section 12(7). 
109At 200F-H. 
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aliens who were lawfully in Bophuthatswana was in conflict with the right to 
equality, as guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution, in that it discriminated 
against them in regard to a fundamental aspect of the administrative law 
process on the basis of their descent or origin. 
Friedman J was able to exclude the application of the audi alteram partem 
rule through a literal interpretation of section 65(1) and (2) of the statute in 
issue, without a corresponding consideration of the values and ideals embodied 
in the Constitution. This approach fails to recognise the significance of a 
transition from a system of legislative supremacy, where giving effect to the 
intention of the legislature is paramount, to a system of constitutional 
supremacy, where fundamental constitutional values and ideals override 
ordinary legislation and executive acts which are inconsistent with these values 
and ideals. 
It cannot be denied that every sovereign state is entitled to regulate the 
admission and removal of aliens within its territory. It is submitted, however, 
that where the Constitution specifically guarantees certain rights of 
individuals, an approach to the interpretation of legislation, which is alleged 
to be unconstitutional, which rests solely on the 'clear and unambiguous' 
sanction of a violation of these rights does not face the constitutionality of that 
legislation squarely. Whether the language of a statute is clear or unclear, 
ambiguous or unambiguous, its constitutionality must still be determined in the 
light of the rights which are alleged to have been violated and the fundamental 
values and ideals which are expressed or inherent in these rights. 
By its very nature, the Bophuthatswanan Constitution required that weight be 
given to its supremacy rather than to the intention of the legislature. The court 
ought to have dealt with the constitutionality of the legislation in issue on the 
basis of either the compelling state interest principle or the proportionality 
principle. Such an approach would have involved a weighing up of the 
conflicting state interests and individual interests, a consideration of the 
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constitutional values associated with them and giving greater weight to 
constitutional values and ideals in the event of an absence of a compelling 
state interest or lack of proportionality between the objective of the legislation 
and the affected right. This approach takes cognisance of the superior nature 
of constitutional values and ideals and the limits which may justifiably be 
imposed on them. 
2.2.4. A Change of Heart? - Mfolo and Others v Minister of 
Education, Bophuthatswana110 and Nyamakazi v President of 
Bopbuthatswana111 
The Mfolo and Nyamakazi decisions constitute a significant departure 
from the Bophuthatswana General Division's earlier approach to the 
interpretation of the Constitution. In both cases the court was prepared to 
analyse and to articulate the fundamental values and ideals inherent in the 
Bophuthatswana Constitution's Declaration of Fundamental Rights. 
The issue for determination in Mfolo was the validity of Regulation 13(2), 
promulgated under Government Notice No. 168 of 25 August 1989 (B). 
Regulation 13(2) made provision for the suspension of the rights of a student 
at a teachers' training college if such a student became pregnant during an 
academic year. The regulation was promulgated by the Minister of Education 
pursuant to section 10(1) of the Bophuthatswana National Education Act. 112 
The applicants, who were female students at a teachers' training college, were 
1101992(3) SA 181 (B). 
1111992(4) SA 540 (B). See H. Lever "A Change of Heart on 
Bophuthatswana's Bill of Rights" 1993 SALJ 223 at 226 et seq. for a 
discussion of Nyamakazi. 
112Act of 1979. 
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suspended from all college activities by the rector of the college on the ground 
that they were pregnant; their suspension also meant that they were precluded 
from writing their final examinations. They brought an application for a 
declaratory order that regulation 13(2) was null and void and that they were 
entitled to write the final examinations and to participate in all college 
activities. 
It was contended on behalf of the applicants that regulation 13(2) violated the 
right to equality before the law regardless of sex, descent, race, language, 
origin or religious beliefs as guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution. In 
determining the issue before it, the court looked at what section 9 of the 
Constitution had to say. It found that the key words in section 9 were 'before 
the law' and concluded that the operation of these words was not confined to 
courts of law but also extended to both the legislature and the executive.113 
Comrie J relied on the judgment of the South African Appellate Division in 
Cabinet for the Territory of South West Africa v Chikane 
and Another114 and squarely faced the interpretation of the meaning and 
ambit of the right to equality before the law. The judge opined that the 
essence of the right to equality before the law is that classification of and 
discrimination against persons on the basis of sex, race, etc. would be 
unconstitutional, unless such a classification or discrimination was reasonable, 
in the sense that it was based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes 
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, 
and rational, in the sense that the differentia is rationally related to the object 
which the statute or act in question sought to achieve. 
The employment of 'object' or purpose, reasonableness and rationality in the 
113At 184C and G. 
1141989(1) SA 349 (A). See Chapt. 8 infra for a discussion of this case. 
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determination of the constitutionality of a legislative measure is commendable. 
It implies that, for a discriminatory legislative measure to be valid, it must 
have sufficiently important objectives and employ appropriate means to 
achieve those objectives. 115 
By making use of normative concepts such as reasonableness and rationality, 
Comrie J's approach in the Mfolo case constitutes a clear departure from the 
formalistic approach which emphasises the language of a legislative measure 
rather than fundamental values in so far as these values may be at variance 
with the provisions of the legislative measure. This approach is consistent with 
the superior force of constitutional values as discoverable from the provisions 
of the Constitution. 
Comrie J's reference to the dictum of Grosskopf JA in the Cbikane case 
illustrates the wide implication of the principles of reasonableness and 
rationality in the determination of the constitutionality of a legislative measure 
as well as the limits inherent in the language used in a legislative measure: 
11 The question ... is whether the distinctions rest on a 'rea"ionable basis': i.e whether they 
are 'founded on an intelligible differentia'; whether that differentia ha."i a 'rational relationship 
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question'. A court, in ascertaining the object 
sought to be achieved by the statute engages in a process of interpretation. In doing so, it may 
make use of whatever permissible aids are available for the interpretation of the statute in 
• 116 Th . f . . . f I " issue. e question o 1nterpretatlon is one o aw . 
115See e.g the Canadian cases of R v Oakes (supra) at 138-139 and 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1S.C.R143 
at 182. 
116My emphasis. This means that the court is not confined to the literal 
meaning of the words used in a statute but may employ other methods of 
interpretation to interpret the statute in the light of its purpose and the larger 
purpose of the Constitution. A strictly literal interpretation of the statute would 
be unsuitable because the court is not concerned only with finding the 
intention of the legislature but also with the object or purpose of the statute, 
the purpose of the right or freedom it is alleged to violate and the larger 
objects of the Constitution. 
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Nyamakazi epitomises the creative role of the judiciary in interpreting a 
Constitution with a declaration of fundamental rights, to give its terms their 
full worth and to reflect its spirit. In this case the court did not view 
interpretation as a conclusion but rather as a process whereby the terms of the 
Constitution are creatively analysed in search of a meaning which best reflects 
the spirit and supremacy of the Constitution; this process distinguishes 
between the interpretation of the provisions of an ordinary statute and those 
of a supreme Constitution and approaches the latter generously and 
extensively. 
Nyamakazi was concerned with the constitutionality of section 3 lB of the 
Internal Security Act. 117 The effect of section 3 lB was to prohibit non-
citizens from participating, at gatherings, in speeches, addresses, discussions, 
debates or campaigns on matters pertaining to the internal politics of 
Bophuthatswana. The section was inextricably linked with section 30 of the 
same Act; the latter section extended the ambit and parameters of the section 
31B prohibitions by defining 'act of public protest' and 'political 
organisations' to include almost every aspect of life in the State. 
The applicant, who had been born in South Africa but resided in Winterveldt 
in Bophuthatswana, had as chairman of the Winterveldt Civic Association 
applied for and was granted permission to hold a public meeting to discuss 
issues of common concern to the residents of Winterveldt and to formulate 
steps to be taken to resolve the issues. In granting the permission to hold the 
meeting, the relevant authorities had stated that since the organisers and 
speakers were South African citizens, their participation at the meeting would 
be in contravention of section 3 lB of the Internal Security Act and therefore 
unlawful. 
117Act 32 of 1979 (B). Section 31B was inserted by the Internal Security 
Amendment Act, 5 of 1991 (B). 
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The applicant attacked the validity of section 3 lB on a number of grounds. He 
contended, first, that it curtailed the rights to freedom of expression and 
assembly of aliens; 118 secondly, that it was not of general application;119 
thirdly, that it abolished the fundamental rights to freedom of association, 
assembly and information120 and lastly, that it discriminated against non-
citizens residing in Bophuthatswana. 121 It was also argued that section 30 
was unconstitutional in so far as it extended the ambit and parameters of 
section 3 lB. 
The court, per Friedman J, held that section 31B and the definition of "act of 
public protest" in section 30 were unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 
During the course of his judgment Friedman J stated and elucidated the 
approach which ought to be followed in interpreting a Constitution with a 
declaration of fundamental human rights. 
According to Friedman J, a Constitution with a declaration of fundamental 
rights must be "liberally construed, according to its terms and spirit, to give 
effect to the intention of the framers, the principles of government contained 
therein and the objectives and reasons for its legislation". 122 It is significant 
to note that the intention of the framers is not the only important 
consideration; nor is the language used by the framers an overriding factor. 
As Friedman J explained, 
"constitutions are expected to survive for a lengthy period of time, and because the 
process of amending or revising is more onerous than for an ordinary statute, they are not bound 
118Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution. 
119Section 18(1) of the Constitution. 
1wsection 18(2) of the Constitution. 
121Section 9 of the Constitution. 
122At 566H. 
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by the strict or confined interpretation applied to the construction of a criminal or other 
statute" . 123 
Friedman J drew support for the liberal approach from American, Botswanan 
and Namibian constitutional jurisprudence as well as from decisions of the 
Privy Council in which the provisions of Commonwealth Constitutions with 
Bills of Rights were interpreted. Friedman J's reliance on foreign case law is 
in sharp contrast with Thea! Stewart CJ's curt rejection of the influence of 
foreign case law in S V Chabalala.124 The rejection of 'foreign 
influences' ignores the fact that the notion of a Bill of Rights is itself, within 
the African context, of foreign origin. 125 
Indeed, the many years of experience of foreign courts in the interpretation 
and application of declarations of rights provide fertile ground for the 
development of a constitutional jurisprudence which would give meaning to 
local human rights provisions. As Friedman J found, the foreign decisions he 
referred to in his judgment support a broad, generous construction which takes 
into account 
11 the character and origin of the instrument ... guided by the principles of giving fuH 
recognition and effect of those fundamental rights and freedoms with a statement of which the 
constitution cormnences126 These fundamental rights are "the moral and legal norms 
relating to the rights of individuals and the concomitant powers of the Legislature in regard 
thereto tt. 121 
The liberal or generous approach which Friedman J adopted emphasises the 
123 At 567B-C. 
124Supra. 
125See Lever 1993 SAW at 230. 
126At 555G. 
127At 567E-F. 
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substantial role played by factors beyond a mere mechanical, textual 
construction. It acknowledges that rights and freedoms are expressions of the 
fundamental values of society and that constitutional interpretation must take 
into account and reflect these values. Factors such as 'sense of community, 
substantive justice and rights' and 'moral norms' provide a yardstick for 
measuring human rights violations. 128 These factors reflect the fabric of 
human belief in good and just law as the foundation of good government and 
human freedom and are a manifestation of the endeavours of the human spirit; 
good law is regarded as being "synonymous with justice and the timeless 
fundamentals of human value". 129 
What appears from Friedman J's judgment is tha.t constitutional interpretation, 
first and foremost, recognises the wisdom of the framers who identified 
certain fundamental rights and then deemed it fit to guarantee for themselves 
and future generations the values contained in these rights; constitutional 
interpretation therefore has as its starting point the 'intention of the 
framers'. 130 However, since these fundamental values are also intended for 
the benefit of future generations, the Constitution in which they are entrenched 
must be interpreted as a living document "intended to endure for ages to 
come". 131 As Friedman J put it, 
11 (i]t must be interpreted in the context, scene and setting that exists at the time, and not 
when it was passed, otherwise it will cease to take into account the growth of society which it 
seeks to regulate ... A constitution must not be regarded as frozen in time historica1ly at the 
moment of its adoption. Society is dynamic, and its growth is escalating rapidly. A constitution 
is not a musty historical relic which is confined to the status of merely being an interesting 
historical document. It must be interpreted to provide for the growth and development of the 
society wh:lch it regulates as the 'supreme law of Bophuthatswana'. The constitution needs to be 
128At 561E-F. 
129At 563A-E. 
130At 566H-I. 
131McCulloch v Maryland (supra) at 407. 
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interpreted in order to confront and answer the challenges of our time ... 11132 
Friedman J's approach not only illustrates the creative role of the judiciary in 
identifying and evolving fundamental constitutional values, but also the duty 
of the judiciary to uphold the Constitution, and the difference between judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution and applying the law as it is, where effect 
is given to the will of a supreme legislature: 
11 As far as the role of the Supreme Court is concerned, it ha'i the power to test 
legislation. creating in fact a position of judicial authority thereby establishing a jurisprudence 
based on the philosophy of natural law as opposed to positivism on which the doctrine of 
P ] . So · · b d " 133 ar iamentary vere1gnty is a.."ie . 
Friedman J's judgment is also particularly relevant in that, for the first time 
in the development of constitutional jurisprudence in Bophuthatswana, the 
court formulated principles for the interpretation of a Constitution with a 
declaration of fundamental rights. 134 The essence of these principles is that 
the provisions of a Constitution which guarantees fundamental democratic 
rights must be given a generous interpretation. 135 
In his judgment, Friedman J also undertook a normative analysis of the right 
of equality before the law. The judge opined that the concept of equality of 
persons is "a fundamental premise of western, liberal, and democratic 
132At 567E and 569E-F. 
133At 570H-J. 
134At 566E-567J. 
135Lever 1993 SALJ at 228. As Lever points out, there is too much 
overlap and duplication of the principles. However, Friedman J's attempt to 
systematise judicial interpretation of the provision of a declaration of 
fundamental rights provides a good starting point for the development of a 
theory of constitutional interpretation in South Africa. See Chap!. 10 for a 
suggested framework and approach to the interpretation of the 1993 
Constitution. 
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thought". 136 It is a moral idea that "has been converted from an ethical 
principle into 'an economic and social necessity'" .137 When contained in a 
Constitution which guarantees fundamental human rights, the concept of 
equality before the law "supplies a moral norm for the operation of the 
constitution, which must be implemented with uncompromising fidelity to its 
ideals". 138 
The importance of the right to equality before the law and its harmonisation 
with the ideals of a Constitution can be discerned from the approach to the 
interpretation of discriminatory legislation. Legislation which is discriminatory 
or treats people differently "must be strictly construed, and may only be 
justified on the basis of a compelling state interest or national interest, which 
must be proved" ."9 A consideration of the justification of a violation of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights on the basis of a compelling state or national 
interest necessarily involves a consideration and a balance of individual 
interests and state or national interests in the light of wider societal ideals. 
In so far as the government may permissibly limit a basic right, a 'compelling 
governmental interest' is required for such a limitation. 140 The 'compelling 
state or national interest' doctrine has been applied in American cases where 
discrimination was alleged. 141 The basic premise in American constitutional 
law is that all discrimination based on classification into groups is immediately 
suspect and unconstitutional, unless it can be supported on the basis of 
136At 573A. 
137At 5730. 
138At 575F. 
139 At 567! and 583H-I. 
140See Lever 1993 SALJ at 227. 
141See e.g Duncan v Missouri 152 US 377 (1893); Korematsu v 
United States 323 US 214 (1944). 
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rationality, in the sense that it has a rational basis or is rationally related to a 
legitimate state or national interest. 1<2 This principle applies to all forms of 
discrimination, including discrimination against non-citizens. 143 
It has been argued in the discussion of the Lewis case that the fact that a 
state is entitled to regulate the admission and removal of aliens within its 
territory does not prevent a court from determining the constitutionality of 
legislation which makes provision for such regulation merely because the 
'clear and unambiguous' language of the legislation sanctions a violation of the 
rights of aliens. In the Lewis case Friedman J had relied on the 'clear and 
unambiguous' language of the relevant sections to hold that the rights of aliens 
cannot prevail over interests of the state. He did not in that case make any 
distinction between fundamental rights which everyone, irrespective of his 
nationality, is entitled to enjoy and political rights which may justifiably be 
claimed and enjoyed by citizens only. 
In the Nyamakazi case Friedman J made a clear distinction between 
fundamental rights and political rights in relation to the treatment of aliens 
admitted into a state's territory: 
"The internationa1 standard relating to the treatment of aliens postulates that if a State 
admits an alien into its territory, it must conform in its treatment of him to the internationalJy 
determined standards. This means that the State should accord treatment to the alien which 
measures up to the ordinary standards of civilisation. The international standard of treatment of 
142For an expos1t10n of this principle by a South African court see 
Cabinet for the Territory of South West Africa v Chikane 
and Another (supra) at 186. 
143The N yamakazi case is in fact an interesting parallel of the Canadian 
case of Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia (supra). In 
the Andrews case Mcintyre J held that a statute which required lawyers in 
British Columbia to be Canadian citizens discriminated against a class of 
persons solely on grounds of lack of citizenship status, without considering 
other attributes or merits of individuals in the group, and was therefore 
unconstitutional. 
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aliens applies in respect of fundamental rights such as the right to life and integrity of persons but 
not to political rights. in respect of which an alien can only expect equality of treatment or even 
less than equality with that accorded to the State's own nationals 11 • 144 
Friedman J's approach in the Nyamakazi case differs markedly from his 
earlier approach in the Monnakale and Lewis cases. In the Nyamakazi 
case, the judge moved away from the formalistic and narrow approach which 
he had followed in the Monnakale and Lewis cases and adopted a 
generous approach which gives individuals the full benefit of constitutional 
guarantees and reflects the spirit and supremacy of the Constitution. 
Despite the generous approach which he adopted in the Nyamakazi case, 
Friedman J nevertheless also concluded that he did not find paragraph 
(aB)(aa)(i) of section 3(b)(iii) of the Internal Security Amendment Act, 1991 
to be in conflict with the Constitution.145 This section amended section 31 
of the principal Act; it provided that any application for authorisation to hold 
a public meeting must be accompanied by copies of the identity documents of 
the convener, speakers and participants. Friedman J's conclusion about this 
amendment raised the question whether there was anything in the Internal 
Security Amendment Act, 1991 that was worthy of being salvaged. 146 
The whole thrust of Friedman J's reasoning was directed at the conclusion that 
the legislation discriminated against non-citizens. The judge did not consider 
two other important aspects which indicated that the amendment to the Internal 
Security Act also constituted a serious deprivation of the rights of citizens, 
namely, in the first place, that the legislation violated the right of citizens to 
expose their thoughts to others and therefore rendered the democratic right of 
144At 579C-D. 
145At 584E. 
146See Lever 1993 SALJ at 234. 
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freedom of expression meaningless and, in the second place, that it 
criminalised a dutiful citizen who attended a meeting to discuss important 
matters if, during the course of debate a non-citizen raised a matter which 
impacted on a matter of legal, economic or political consequence; the meeting 
was transformed into an illegal gathering and a citizen committed an offence 
if he chaired it. 147 
In coming to the conclusion that the requirement that an authorisation to hold 
a public meeting must be accompanied by copies of the identity documents of 
the convener, speakers and participants did not affect fundamental rights, 
Friedman J did not consider that even though it was an administrative 
procedure, it no longer served the purpose it was intended to serve once it 
violated not only the rights of non-citizens but also citizens' democratic right 
of freedom of expression. The only purpose of the requirement was to identify 
the convenor of a public meeting and the speakers and participants at the 
meeting; such a purpose was rendered inoperative once it was found that the 
legislation violates constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms, especially 
the right of freedom of expression, without which there can be no exchange 
of ideas. 
The requirement materially obstructed the exercise of the right of freedom of 
expression and participation in the democratic process through peaceful 
persuasion of other people to change their minds; it essentially made the 
exercise of the right of freedom of expression conditional and in that sense 
restricted its exercise. Such a restriction could only be justified if it was 
'necessary in a democratic society'. The onus to justify the restriction rested 
on the government. 148 
147Lever 1993 SAW at 229-230. 
148R v Oakes (supra). See also Matinkinca and Another v 
Council of State, Ciskei and Another 1994(1) BCLR 17 (Ck) at 
27C. 
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2.2.5. The Spectre Returns: Mokwele v Government, Republic 
of Bophuthatswana and Others149 . 
If the judgment of Friedman J in the Nyamakazi case represented a change 
of heart in the Bophuthatswanan judiciary's approach to the interpretation of 
the Constitution and the constitutionality of the Internal Security Amendment 
Act, the judgment of Smith J in the Mokwele case showed that there was 
never really a significant change of heart. The judgment of Smith J in this 
case answered the question whether there was anything in the Internal Security 
Amendment Act worthy of being salvaged with a thunderous yes. 
In the Mokwele case the applicant was charged in a regional magistrate's 
court with contravening section 31(7) of the Internal Security Act, as amended 
by the Internal Security Amendment Act, 1991. The charge was that he, 
together with other persons, had held an unlawful gathering. The applicant 
objected to the charge and contended that section 31, as amended, violated his 
right to freedom of thought and freedom of expression as contained in sections 
15 and 16 of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. The 
matter was postponed pending an application for an order declaring that the 
amendments to the Internal Security Act were unconstitutional. 
The attack on the constitutionality of the Internal Security Amendment Act 
was three-pronged. It was contended, in the first place, that the amendment 
extended the operation of section 31 to meetings of any number of persons and 
no longer related to meetings of 20 persons or fewer; secondly, that the 
extended definition of 'gathering' contained in the amendment covered a wide 
range of activities than the previous word 'meeting'; and lastly, that the 
requirement in the amendment that the convenor of and the speakers at a 
1491993(2) SACR 707 (B). 
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gathering must submit their identity documents and their names and addresses 
unduly obstructed the exercise of freedom of thought and freedom of 
expression. 
Smith J held that the Internal Security Amendment Act was not 
unconstitutional. He came to the conclusion that the Act was necessary in the 
interests of public safety. The judge relied heavily on the judgment of Galgut 
AJA in the Segale case, despite the fact that in that case the court had relied 
on rules applicable to the interpretation of ordinary statutes and failed to 
interpret the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and to consider 
whether the restrictions imposed by section 31 were constitutionally justifiable. 
Smith J's interpretation of the constitutionality of the Act followed Galgut 
AJA's literalist-intentionalist approach. In the judge's opinion the wording of 
legislation is significant. 150 According to Smith J, the court was not entitled 
to intervene unless the wording is ambiguous. 151 This approach completely 
ignores the superior nature of constitutional values and the creative role of the 
judiciary to interpret the provisions of the Constitution in such a way that full 
effect is given to these values. 152 The applicability of the provisions of a 
supreme Constitution does not depend on the presence or otherwise of an 
ambiguity. 153 
Although Smith J recognised the importance of freedom of speech and 
150At 713a. 
151At 713b. 
152See the discussion of the Segale case (supra). Although the wording 
of legislation is important, the Constitution is the starting point. A statute will 
be unconstitutional if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, 
even if its wording is clear; in such an instance the duty of the court is to 
uphold the supreme law of the Constitution by striking the statute down. 
153See Lever 1993 SAW at 229. 
-321-
freedom of assembly as part of democratic rights at common law and in the 
Constitution, he did not attempt an analysis of the fundamental values inherent 
in them and the extent to which these values may have to give way to the 
interests of public safety. Such an analysis clearly involves a weighing up of 
interest of the individual to exercise his constitutionally guaranteed rights, the 
interests of public safety and a consideration of the ideal of democracy which 
the Constitution is supposed to manifest. 
Throughout in his judgment Smith J emphasised the restrictions to which the 
rights contained in sections 15 and 16 of the Declaration can be subjected.154 
It is not any type of restriction, however, which is permissible. Although 
section 18 permitted restrictions by a law of general application, sections 15 
and 16 specifically prescribed which types of restrictions were permissible; the 
only restrictions which were permissible were those which were "necessary 
in a democratic society ... ". 155 The crucial question, therefore, was whether 
the restrictions imposed on the particular guaranteed rights were, in the light 
of the purpose and objectives of the restricting legislation and all the 
considerations relevant to the constitutional values embodied in the guaranteed 
rights, justifiable as being necessary in a democratic society. 
As mentioned above, in determining whether a restriction is necessary in a 
democratic society, the court must derive whatever assistance it can from the 
experience of other free and democratic societies and the circumstances in the 
society which it serves, to answer the question whether the restriction imposed 
on the particular guaranteed right can be justified as being reasonable in the 
154At 711b; 712j; 713b; 715b. 
155See articles by J.D van der Vyver: "Limitation Provisions of the 
Bophuthatswanan Bill of Rights" 1994 THRHR 47 and "Suspension, 
derogation and de facto deprivation of Fundamental Human Rights in 
Bophuthatswana" 1994 THRHR 257 for a detailed discussion of the 
limitation, suspension and derogation of the rights which were entrenched in 
the Bophuthatswanan Declaration of Fundamental Rights. 
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light of principles of democracy, considerations of public safety and the 
interests which the restricting legislation is intended to protect. 
Since it was the government which imposed the restrictions, it was incumbent 
on the government to show that these restrictions were necessary in a 
democratic society. Smith J did not deal with this aspect satisfactorily. The 
judge simply quoted156 from the judgment of Comrie J in the unreported 
case of Kekana Royal Executive Council and Another v The 
Minister of Law and Order and Another157 in which the question 
of the onus to justify restricting legislation was also dealt with unsatisfactorily. 
The Kekana case was concerned with the constitutionality of section 3B of 
the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act158 in the light of the provisions of 
sections 8, 9, 13 and/or 17 of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights. Comrie 
J held that section 3B was not unconstitutional. 159 
Although Comrie 1 expressed himself in favour of a generous approach to the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, he watered down this 
approach by emphasising the literal meaning of the words of the statute under 
consideration. 160 According to Comrie, the "plain language (cannot) be 
ignored or receive less than its due weight". 161 
156At 715b-716a. 
157BGD 17-06-1993, case No. M20/93. 
158Act 52 of 1951 (as it was when Bophuthatswana became 'independent'). 
159See J.D van der Vyver "Comparative Law in Constitutional Litigation" 
1994 SAW 19 for an analysis of the Kekana case. 
160At 27. 
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Comrie J essentially relied on the judgment of Galgut AJA in the Segale 
case, which is flawed in a number of respects, as regards the question of the 
onus to justify restricting legislation. In the first place, Galgut AJA's approach 
was formalistic and premised on the importance of the intention of the 
legislature as opposed to the supremacy of the Constitution; in the second 
place, the judge contented himself with the fact that the legislature found it 
necessary to enact the legislation in issue and that it must have had reason to 
do so, without considering whether the legislation was actually justifiable as 
being reasonable and necessary in a democratic society; in the third place, 
Gal gut AJA' s opinion that the court was not in a position to decide the fate of 
the legislation, 162 whereas the Constitution permitted it and in fact instructed 
it to do so, amounted to an abdication of judicial duty. 
The most important flaw in Galgut AJA's judgment in the Segale case is that 
the judge proceeded on the basis that the onus was on the individual whose 
rights were at stake to show that the restrictions were not necessary. 163 The 
proper approach is that the onus to justify the restrictions rested on the 
government which imposed them in the first place. 164 The fact that the 
Minister gave reasons for the refusal of the appellants' application to hold a 
meeting did not really resolve the issue relating to the necessity for the 
introduction of the restrictions; the refusal by the Minister presupposed the 
validity of the restricting legislation, which issue had not been settled.165 
Comrie J's suggestion, in the Kekana case, that "the observation of Galgut 
AJA (at 452D) may not have been more than a conclusion based on the 
162At 452E. 
163At 452D. 
164See R v Oakes (supra). 
165Dlamini 1990 THRHR at 125. 
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absence of appropriate rebutting evidence" 166 is therefore also flawed. 
Comrie J also suggested in the Kekana case that there may well be cases 
where "[s]ome statutes ... would be so obviously within the apparent ambit of 
the permissible limitations, that the burden of adducing evidence against 
necessity would be upon the complainant" .167 This suggestion essentially 
implies that there are instances where, once the challenger has shown that a 
statute violates or restricts a constitutionally entrenched right of his, the 
challenger will carry the additional burden of showing that the violating statute 
is not justifiable or that a restriction it imposes is not necessary. 
It is quite true that there may be instances where the violation or restriction 
will be so obviously justifiable or necessary that no evidence or very little 
evidence in favour of necessity would be required. 168 In such instances the 
government is not required to adduce evidence in favour of necessity because 
once it is obvious that the restriction is necessary or justifiable, it would be 
166At 32. 
167Jdem. 
168It may be argued that section 3B of the Prevention of Jllegal Squatting 
Act (Bophuthatswana) was socially desirable to deal with illegal squatting and 
to protect the rights of lawful owners of land and therefore obviously 
justifiable or necessary that no evidence in favour of necessity was required. 
However, section 121 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution has 
brought about some change in the field of property law; in terms of this 
section any person or community who was dispossessed of a right in land in 
terms of legislation that would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of 
racial discrimination contained in section 8(2), is entitled to claim restitution 
in respect of such right from the state in a court of law. From the viewpoint 
of this change a law prohibiting illegal squatting may therefore not be 
obviously justifiable or necessary; evidence that it is reasonable and justifiable 
in a democratic society will be required to justify its constitutionality. It is 
significant to note that section 28, which guarantees the right to property, is 
not included among the sections for which there is the additional requirement 
that limitations should also be necessary: see A.J van der Walt "Notes on the 
Interpretation of the Property Clause in the New Constitution" 1994 
THRHR 181 for a discussion of sections 28 and 121. 
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superfluous to require it to do so. This does not mean, however, that the onus 
of adducing evidence against necessity rests on the complainant as suggested 
by Comrie J in the Kekana case. 
In cases of statutes which deal with certain desirable social or economic 
policies the court may itself evaluate the situation and relieve the government 
of the burden to adduce evidence in favour of necessity; such statutes are 
enacted after comprehensive debate by elected representatives and usually 
involve compromise and accommodation. In some cases, especially where 
there is general consensus among elected representatives and the various 
interest groups, the importance or desirability of the legislation will be so 
obvious that it will require no justification at all. 169 
In relieving the government of the burden to adduce evidence in favour of 
necessity the court in a sense defers to the legislature in matters concerning 
important social and economic issues. It may also be that, in another sense, 
when a court defers to the legislature in matters concerning important social 
and economic issues it acknowledges that such legislation involves contentious 
policy issues which are not suitable for judicial determination and as a result 
acquiesces in the democratic process by requiring the government to adduce 
little or no evidence in favour of necessity. 170 
However, in determining whether the court is entitled to defer to the 
legislature in matters concerning important social or economic issues, a 
169 An example is legislation which controls the production, sale and 
possession of pornographic material involving children and bestiality. 
Although there is no consensus on the control of the production, sale and 
possession of such material involving adults, there is consensus among 
representatives and interest groups that pornography involving children and 
bestiality should be outlawed; should the constitutionality of legislation 
outlawing this type of pornography be challenged, the government could 
hardly be expected to adduce evidence to justify its constitutionality. 
170See the discussion of the Oakes case in Chapter 6. 
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distinction should be made between rights which are essential to the 
democratic process and those which are not. Where the challenged legislation 
involves a restriction of a right which is essential to participation in the 
ordinary democratic process, such as the right of freedom of expression 
(which was in issue in the Mokwele case) or political rights , the court 
should not easily defer to the legislature. 171 The right of freedom of 
expression, for example, is necessary for one peacefully to expose his 
thoughts to others, to persuade people to change their minds and to bring 
about a peaceful transfer of power; political rights, on the other hand, are the 
very core of democratic government; these are rights to which an individual 
is entitled in order to participate in the democratic process. 
With the notable exception of Smith, Mfolo, Nyamakazi (and 
Marwane to some extent) the approach of the Bophuthatswanan judiciary 
to the interpretation of the Constitution was not encouraging. 172 In most of 
the judgments the court adopted a literalist/intentionalist approach and thus set 
an unsound trend for modern constitutional jurisprudence. 173 
171See The Carolene Products footnote (United States v 
Carolene Products Co. 304 US 144 (1938) at 152-153, footnote 4). 
172See L. M Du Plessis "Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa: 
Taking Stock", paper read at a conference a conference Interpreting a Bill of 
Rights held at the Potchefstroom University, 9-11 April 1992 and reproduced 
and expanded in J. Kruger & B. Currin Interpreting a Bill of Rights 
(eds) 1994 at 1-25 for an analysis of the performance of the Bophuthatswanan 
judiciary in the interpretation and application of the Declaration of 
Fundamental Rights. See also L.M Du Plessis and J.R De Ville "Bill of 
Rights Interpretation in the South African Context: Diagnostic Observations" 
1993 Stellenbosch LR 63 at 73-76 and 199 at 200-202. 
173See Chapt. 11 for a discussion of the lessons to be learnt from decisions 
of the Bophuthatswanan judiciary. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE NAMIBIAN EXPERIENCE. 
Namibia, formerly South West Africa, was a German colony before the First 
World War. In 1914, when the war broke out, the territory was occupied by 
South Africa at the request of the British government. During the South 
African occupation, it went from a League of Nations 'C' mandate territory' 
to a virtual fifth province of South Africa. In terms of section 7 of the South 
West Africa Affairs Act2 the territory was allocated six white members in the 
South African House of Assembly as well as two nominated and two elected 
members in the Senate. 
Although a Legislative Assembly was established in the territory, the South 
African government and Parliament exercised a considerable degree of 
control. The South African Parliament could override an ordinance of the 
Assembly. In essence, the South African Parliament exercised supreme 
legislative authority in and over the territory and no court of Jaw was 
competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of South African 
legislation applicable in the territory. 3 
The Constitution of South West Africa Act of 1968 placed the territory in 
much the same position as a province of the Republic.4 The topics on which 
'The mandate system was incorporated into article 22 of the League of 
Nations. 
2Act 23 of 1949. 
'See S v Tuhadeleni & Others 1969(1) SA 153 (A). 
4Act 39 of 1968, read with the Matters Relating to South West Africa Act 
25 of 1969. 
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the Legislative Assembly was competent to make laws were expanded. 
However, the legislative supremacy of the South African Parliament over the 
territory remained unchanged; in terms of section 37(1) of the Act, the 
provisions of the Act were not to be interpreted in such a way as to derogate 
from the full administrative and legislative powers exercised by the South 
African government and Parliament over the territory as a integral part of the 
Republic. 
The constitutional system, like the South African system, was structured along 
racial lines. In pursuance of the South African government's policy of separate 
development, a system of progressive 'self-government' for the different black 
peoples of Namibia was introduced by the Development of Self-Government 
for the Native Nations in South West Africa Act. 5 
The exertion of pressure by the international community and internal political 
movements, in particular the South West African People's Organisation 
(SW APO), precipitated a movement towards the independence of the territory. 
Following the abortive attempt to introduce the Turnhalle Constitution,' the 
territory's representation in the South African Parliament was terminated and 
the office of the Administrator-General was instituted by the State President. 7 
5Act 54 of 1968. For accounts of Namibian constitutional history see inter 
alia F. Venter "Suidwes-Afrika: 'n Dominium van die Republiek?" 1970 
Speculum Juris 70; D.S Prinsloo "SWA/Namibia: Interim Rule to 
Freedom" 1976 SAYIL 155; J.A Faris "South Africa's Severance of Links 
with South West Africa" 1977 SAYIL 49. 
6For an analysis of the Turnhalle Constitution see D.S Prinsloo 
"SWA/Namibie : 'n Kritiese Ontleiding van die Turnhalle-grondwet vir 'n 
Tussentydse Regering" 1977(2) Codicillus 4; L.J Boulle "The Turnhalle 
Testimony" 1978 SAW 49. 
7Procl. 249 of 28 September 1977. 
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The Administrator-General proceeded to revise certain existing legislation8 
and to make provision for the election of a constitutive assembly; the 
constitutive assembly was eventually converted into a National Assembly 
which could make laws for the territory .9 However, despite these changes, 
the South African Parliament still retained its legislative supremacy in and 
over the territory. 10 
A transitional Government of National Unity was established on 17 June 1985 
at the request of the Multi-Party Conference. 11 The Multi-Party Conference 
proposed and subsequently approved a Bill of Rights which recognised and 
guaranteed fundamental human rights. The Bill of Rights, together with other 
proposals, was put to the South African government and later incorporated in 
Proclamation 101 of 17 June 1985.12 The proclamation made provision for 
a legislative authority, an executive authority and a Constitutional Council 
which was charged with the task of drafting a Constitution for the territory. 
The Supreme Court of Namibia was given the power to inquire into and 
pronounce upon the validity of legislative and executive acts. 13 
8Controversial South African legislation such as the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act and section 16 of the Immorality Act were repealed. 
9Procl. AG 21 of 14 May 1979. The election of the National Assembly 
was not recognised by the international community. 
10See G. Carpenter Introduction to South African 
Constitutional Law (1987) at 424. 
11The Multi-Party Conference was made up of six major political 
organisations operating in the territory, viz. the Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance, the Labour Party of South West Africa, the National Party of South 
West Africa, the Rehoboth Bevryde Demokratiese Party, the South West 
African National Union and the SW APO Democrats. 
12South West African Legislative and Executive Authority Proclamation, 
1985 (Government Gazette vol. 240, No. 9790 of 17 June 1985). The Bill of 
Rights was contained in a addendum to the proclamation. 
13 An earlier draft national Constitution, the Turnhalle Constitution of 
1977, made provision for the institution of a constitutional 'court'. The 'court' 
• 
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Continued pressure for full independence by the international community led 
to a United Nations settlement plan. The plan was intended to lead to the 
adoption of a Constitution by an elected Constituent Assembly. An elected 
Assembly finally adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia;14 the 
Constitution was based on the 1982 Constitutional Principles15 which were 
negotiated with all the parties involved in the Namibian dispute by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and West Germany. 16 
The Constitutional Principles were claimed to have been based on the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 435. They made provision for the 
establishment of a unitary, sovereign and democratic state with a supreme 
Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights enforceable by an 
independent judiciary. 
l.The Namibian Constitution. 
The Constitution of Namibia came into operation on 21 March 1990, the date 
on which Namibia became a fully independent state. It established the 
Republic of Namibia as a unitary, sovereign, secular and democratic state. 17 
was, however, to be an advisory body with no power of judicial review. 
14Act 1 of 1990 (Nm). For a detailed discussion of the Namibian 
Constitution see G. Carpenter "The Namibian Constitution- ex Africa aliquid 
novi after all?" 1989/90 SAYIL 22. 
15For a comprehensive discussion of the 1982 Constitutional Principles see 
M. Wiechers "Namibia: The 1982 Constitutional Principles and their Legal 
Significance" 1989/1990 SAYIL 1. 
16The Constituent Assembly conducted its business in terms of the 
Administrator-General's Constituent Assembly Proclamation of 6 November 
1989. The Constitution was formally adopted on 9 February 1990. See D. van 
Wyk "The Making of the Namibian Constitution: Lessons for Africa" 1991 
CILSA 341 for a discussion of the process which led to the making and 
adoption of the Namibian Constitution. 
17Article 1(1). 
-331-
In terms of article 1(6), the Constitution is the Supreme Law of Namibia. The 
supremacy of the Constitution implies that its provisions bind the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary; the legislature and the executive may not 
exercise their powers in a way which is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution; 18 in relation to the judiciary, the supremacy of the 
Constitution implies that the judiciary has the power to inquire into and 
pronounce upon the validity of legislative and executive acts and to invalidate 
those which it finds to be inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 19 
Article 78(2) specifically makes provision for the independence of the 
judiciary. Article 78(3) goes on to provide that 
11 [n]o member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall interfere with 
judges or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial functions, and all organs of the State 
shall accord such assistance a"l the Courts may require to protect their independence, dignity and 
effectiveness ... 11 • 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution guarantees and protects fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. Apart from basic human rights and freedoms, other 
rights such as children's rights,2° administrative justice21 and the right to 
education22 are protected. The rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
18Article 25(1) expressly provides that the legislature or any subordinate 
legislative authority shall not make any law, and the executive and the 
agencies of government shall not take any action which abolishes or abridges 
the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter 3. 
19 Articles 80(2) and 79(2) expressly empower the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Namibia to hear and adjudicate cases (the High Court as a 
court of first instance and the Supreme Court as a court of appeal) which 
involve the interpretation, implementation and upholding of the Constitution 
and the fundamental rights guaranteed in it. 
20 Article 15. 
21Article 18. 
22Article 20. 
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Constitution are expressly rendered enforceable by the courts. 23 Any law 
which violates or is inconsistent with the rights and freedoms enshrined in 
Chapter 3 is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. 24 
The rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 3 are not absolute. Article 22 
envisages limitations upon these rights and freedoms. However, any limitation 
must, in the first place, be of general application, must not negate the essential 
content of the right or freedom in issue, and must not be aimed at a particular 
individual; it must, in the second place, specify its ascertainable extent and 
identify the article or articles of the Constitution on which authority for its 
imposition is claimed to rest. 
Article 24(1) also makes provision for derogation during periods when the 
country is in a state of national defence or any period when a declaration of 
emergency under the Constitution is in force. 25 However, article 24(2) 
makes provision for a number of safeguards where persons are detained by 
virtue of the authorisation of a declaration of emergency under the 
Constitution. An important safeguard is that article 24(3) expressly forbids a 
derogation or suspension of the right to life,26 the right to human dignity ,27 
the right not to be subjected to slavery and forced labour, 28 the right to 
equality and freedom from discrimination,29 the right to fair tria!,30 the right 
23Articles 5 and 25(2). 
24Article 25(1). 
25Chapter 3 makes provision for the declaration of a state of emergency, 
state of national defence and martial law. 
26Article 6. 
27 Article 8. 
28 Article 9. 
29 Article 10. 
'
0Articlc 12. 
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to marry and to found a family,31 children' rights,32 administrative 
justice, 33 culture, language or religious rights, 34 fundamental freedoms of 
speech and expression,35 thought, conscience and belief, 36 religion37 and 
association,38 or of access to courts or legal practitioners. 
A significant feature of the Namibian Constitution is that it absolutely 
prohibits any repeal or amendment which diminishes or detracts from the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 3; any such purported 
repeal or amendment would be invalid.39 The implication of this provision 
is that the judiciary would be competent to invalidate any repeal or 
amendment which diminishes or detracts from the enshrined rights and 
freedoms. 
2. Judicial Interpretation and Application of the Constitution. 
Judicial interpretation and application of the Constitution can be divided into 
two phases. The first phase relates to the Namibian Supreme Court and the 
South African Appellate Division's interpretation and application of the 1985 
Bill of Rights, which was incorporated in Proclamation RlOl of 17 June 1985; 
Proclamation RlOl was essentially the transitional Constitution of Namibia. 
31Article 14. 
32 Article 15 .. 
33 Article 18. 
34Article 19. 
35Article 2l(a). 
36Article 2l(b). 
37Article 2l(c). 
38Article 2l(e). 
39 Article 131. 
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The second phase relates to the Namibian courts' interpretation and application 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. 
2.1. Interpretation and Application of the Transitional 
Constitution. 
The significance of the transitional Constitution is that it incorporated a Bill 
of Rights and therefore, like the Constitution of the former Bophuthatswana, 
provided the South African trained judiciary of South West Africa/Namibia 
and judges of the South African Appellate Division with an opportunity to 
interpret and apply human rights provisions. 40 The transitional Constitution 
was intended to be a precursor to the independence of Namibia; it was based 
on the desire to establish an independent state founded on the ideals of 
freedom, equality, human dignity, a respect for the inalienable rights of man 
and the belief that governments derive their powers from the people and 
therefore ought to promote the safety and welfare of the people.41 The 
intention was to prepare for the establishment of a state based on democratic 
values. 
The Bill of Rights sought to entrench constitutionally, subject to certain 
qualifications, the right to life, 42 liberty, security of the person, privacy and 
equality before the law, the rights to a fair trial, to freedom of expression, 
40See Chapt. 11 for a discussion of the lessons to be learnt from the 
Bophuthatswanan and Namibian experience. 
41See the preamble to the original Bill of Fundamental Rights, drafted by 
the Political Committee of the Multi-Party Conference and Annexure I of 
Proclamation RIO 1 of 17 June 1985. 
42The right to life was limited in that the court retained the competence to 
impose the death penalty. 
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peaceful assembly and freedom of association, 43 the rights to participate in 
political activity and government, 44 and to enjoy, profess, maintain and 
promote culture, language, tradition and religion, the right to freedom of 
' 
movement and residence 45 and the right to own property. 
Article 12 empowered the SWNNamibian Supreme Court to hear and 
adjudicate matters arising out of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. In terms 
of this article, the Supreme Court was empowered to invalidate legislative, 
executive or judicial acts at variance with the provisions of the Bill. 
The Namibian judiciary (drawn from the ranks of South African judges and 
advocates) had been schooled in the common law and statutory law tradition; 
it was used to the principle of legislative supremacy and unused to interpreting 
and applying constitutionally guaranteed human rights provisions. 46 Although 
the Namibian Supreme Court was prepared to come to the aid of an individual 
whose rights had been violated, it started off on a careful note. It was only in 
later decisions that it began to face the Bill of Rights squarely. 
The discussion of decisions emanating from the transitional period will be 
confined to the formative decisions and the later important decisions.Specific 
attention will be given to the approach of the court in the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
43The right to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and freedom of 
association could be limited for the protection of public order, health or 
morals. 
44The right to participate in political activity and government could be 
limited in the interests of ethnic, racial or religious harmony. 
45Exigencies of public health and public order could limit freedom of 
movement and residence. 
46See Chap!. 10 and Chapt. 11 for a discussion of the influence of 
positivism and legislative supremacy in the interpretation of the provisions of 
a Bill of Rights and a comparison of the performance of the Bophuthatswanan 
and Namibian judiciary. 
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2.1.1. The Formative Decisions. 
The first cases were decided by the Supreme Court of South West Africa. In 
these cases the court based its decisions on well-established common law 
rights and principles of administrative law. 47 In Katofa v 
Administrator-General, South West Africa and Another'18 , 
Levy 1 found it unnecessary to consider certain arguments which counsel for 
the plaintiff had contended arose by virtue of the provisions of Proclamation 
101 of 1985 as read with the Bill of Rights. The judge instead based his 
decision to confirm an order granting access to a detainee by his attorney, and 
a rule nisi calling upon the respondents to show cause why the detainee 
should not be released from detention, on a finding that the mere ipse dixit 
of the Chairman of the Cabinet that the release of the detainee was "not 
advisable" was not sufficient and that the respondent had neither claimed the 
defence of 'privilege', nor was such a defence available to him in respect of 
the reasons with which he responded to the rule nisi. 
On the other hand, in S v Angula49 Strydom J simply adopted a narrow 
approach to the interpretation of Proclamation 101 of 1985 and avoided a 
direct application of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. He dismissed an 
objection to a charge of contravening section 11 of the Internal Security 
Act, 50 as amended, and section 2(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act;51 the objection 
was based on the ground that these sections were in conflict with the 
47See S.M Cleary "A Bill of Rights as a Normative Instrument: South 
West Africa/Namibia 1975-1988" 1988 CILSA 291 at 305. 
481985(4) SA 211 (SWA). 
491986(2) SA 540 (SWA). 
50 Act 44 of 1950. 
51Act 83 of 1967. 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights. Adopting a literalist approach, Strydom J took 
the view that the words used in section 34 of the Proclamation suggested that 
the Bill of Rights did not override laws which were in force prior to its 
coming into operation. 52 The judge based his view on the argument that the 
constitutional law of Namibia included the Constitution of South West Africa, 
Act 39 of 1968 and Acts of the South African Parliament. 
In Akweenda v Cabinet for the Transitional Government of 
South West Africa53 counsel for the applicant, a detainee, had argued, 
inter alia, that indefinite detention without trial was a violation of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, and that a detained person had a right to a 
hearing and to access to legal representation; the court, without directly 
applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights and analysing the content of these 
rights and the values enshrined in them, ordered the release of the applicant 
on the ground that the audi alteram partem rule had not been observed. 
Hendler AJ relied mainly on South African case law dealing with the 
application of the audi alteram partem rule in administrative law. 
A noticeable change of approach occurred in S v Heita and Others. 54 
In this case Levy J decided, in contradistinction to the judgment of Strydom 
J in S v Angola, 55 that the provisions of section 2 of the Terrorism Act 
were in conflict with article 4 of the Bill of Rights (the right to a fair trial, in 
particular the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty). The judge 
did not consider the fact that the territory was not a sovereign and independent 
52The same approach was adopted by the South African Appellate Division 
in Kabinet van die Tussentydse Regering van Suidwes-Afrika 
en 'n Ander v Katofa 1987(1) SA 695 (A). 
531986(2) SA 548 (SWA). 
541987(1) SA 311 (SWA). 
55Supra. 
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state to be a significant factor in the interpretation and application of the Bill 
of Rights. He saw the Bill of Rights as a stepping stone towards 
independence based on constitutionally established law and order; the 
guarantee of fundamental rights constituted the very backbone of Proclamation 
101 of 1985, which was intended to be a transitional arrangement leading to 
independence. The Proclamation was "no ordinary enactment and should be 
accorded pride of place amongst existing legislation". 56 
Levy J's judgment concerning the Bill of Rights illustrates the importance of 
its nature in its interpretation and application. The judge referred to "the 
golden thread which is woven into the fabric of this proclamation - the 
fundamental rights of the people of SW A/Namibia" ,57 to "the tone and spirit 
of the Jegislation", 58 and to "society's new substantive policy". 59 Levy J 
was in essence adverting to a new constitutional credo brought about by the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights, namely belief in a human rights value system 
as espoused by the representatives of the people at the Multi-Party 
Conference. 
However, as in the Katofa case, Levy J once again found it unnecessary, in 
S V Nathaniel60 , to consider counsel's argument that sections 2 and 3 of 
the Prohibition and Notification of Meetings Act61 were in conflict with 
56At 323!. Levy J's judgment was specifically disapproved by the South 
African Appellate Division in the Katofa case (supra) when it went on 
appeal. 
57At 319H. 
58At 3200. 
59At 326G. 
6()1987(2) SA 225 (SWA). 
61Act 22 of 1981. Section 2 and 3 prohibited certain organisations from 
holding, promoting, etc. or presiding or otherwise officiating at or addressing 
or attending a meeting consisting of more than twenty persons. 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights. Although the judge remarked obiter that the 
Bill of Rights was as much part of the law as any other provision of 
Proclamation 101 of 1985,62 he regrettably chose to found the protection of 
fundamental rights, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, on 
the common law and the application of ordinary rules of interpretation rather 
than on their constitutional recognition and protection and on a liberal 
interpretation in line with the tone and spirit of the document in which they 
were guaranteed. The constitutional recognition and protection of human rights 
and freedoms, even if they were already recognised at common law, surely 
emphasised their importance and elevated them to a higher status which called 
for their actualisation when positive law denied or violated their enjoyment by 
individuals. 
2.1.2. The Later Decisions. 
The Namibian decisions which have been considered thusfar were concerned 
with legislation which was in force prior to the coming into operation of the 
Bill of Rights as contained in Proclamation RlOl of 1985. Three other 
important cases, namely Cabinet of the Transitional Government 
for the Territory of South West Africa v Eins,6' Cabinet for 
the Territory of South West Africa v Chikane and Another°" 
and Namibian National Students' Organisation and Others v 
Speaker of the National Assembly for South West Africa and 
Others,65 (the NANSO case) dealt with legislation passed by the 
territory's National Assembly after the coming into operation of Proclamation 
62At 231F. 
631988(3) SA 369 (A). 
641989(1) SA 349 (A). 
651990(1) SA 617 (SWA). 
-340-
RlOl of 1985 and the Bill of Rights. Eins and Chikane are decisions of the 
South Africa Appellate Division which went on appeal from the Supreme 
Court of South West Africa; NANSO was decided by the Supreme Court of 
South West Africa. These cases, together with the advisory opinion of the 
Supreme Court of South West Africa in Ex Parte Cabinet for the 
Interim Government of South West Africa: In Re Advisory 
Opinion in terms of Section 19(2) of Proclamation RlOl of 
1985,66 are the last major constitutional cases which were decided before the 
independence of Namibia. 
Both the Eins and the Chikane cases were concerned with the compatibility 
of section 9 of the Residence of Certain Persons in South West Africa 
Regulation Act67 with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 68 Section 9 
empowered the cabinet of the territory to expel any person, excluding those 
born in the territory, whom it believed endangered or was likely to endanger 
the security of the territory or its inhabitants or the maintenance of public 
order. The advisory opinion, on the other hand, dealt with the question 
whether a proclamation of the Administrator-General which made provision 
for the creation of separate 'representative authorities' based on 'population 
grouping'69 abolished, diminished or derogated from any fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 
661988(2) SA 832 (SWA). 
67Act 33 of 1985. 
68See S.M Cleary "A Bill of Rights as a Normative Instrument: South 
West Africa/Namibia 1975-1988" 1988 CILSA 291 at 316-328 for a 
discussion of the Eins and Chikane cases. See also G. Carpenter 
"Fundamental Rights, Security Legislation and the Audi Alteram Partem 
Rule - Still no Congruence in the Appellate Division" 1989 SA Public Law 
87 at 90-93 for a discussion of the Chikane case. 
69The Representative Authorities Proclamation AG 8 of 1980. 
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2.1.2.1. The Eins Case. 
The Eins case was an appeal from a decision of Hendler J, sitting in the 
Supreme Court of South West Africa. Hendler J had found that section 9 of 
the Re.sidence of Certain Persons in South West Africa Regulation Act was in 
conflict with articles 2, 4 and 10 of the Bill of Rights.70 He had also found 
that section 9, more specifically, violated the right to equality before the law 
as guaranteed in article 3 of the Bill of Rights. The basis of this finding was 
that section 9 constituted unacceptable discrimination. The section was 
therefore declared invalid. 
On appeal to the South African Appellate Division by the Cabinet, counsel for 
the Cabinet had argued, as he did in the court a quo, that the respondent did 
not have locus standi to apply for the relief sought, namely an order declaring 
section 9 to be unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable as being in conflict 
with the Bill of Rights. In the court a quo Hendler J had dismissed this 
contention and found that the recognition and protection of fundamental rights 
in a constitutional document gave any person whose rights have been violated 
or are threatened the right to approach the court for relief. 71 
The Appellate Division held that the court a quo had erred in rejecting the 
appellant's objection to the respondent's locus standi. The court's reasoning 
was that the legislation complained of did not affect the respondent unless and 
until the authorities decided to take steps against him under section 9 of the 
70 Article 2 guaranteed the right to liberty, security of the person and 
privacy; article 4 guaranteed the right to a fair trial; and article 10 guaranteed 
the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence. 
71It may be noted that article 12 of the Bill specifically made provision for 
any person to apply to the Supreme Court to enforce the rights conferred in 
the Bill. The article also described the procedural mechanisms available to 
persons seeking to enforce their rights. 
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Act. 72 Regrettably, Rabic ACJ did not for one moment pause to consider 
whether that section would be compatible with the Bill of Rights if and when 
the authorities were to decide to take steps against the respondent. The court, 
without further ado, upheld the appeal and set aside the order of the court a 
quo. 
2.1.2.2. The Chikane Case. 
The Chikane case went much further than the Eins case. In the Chikane 
case Grosskopf JA analysed section 9 and considered the scope and effect of 
the Bill of Rights in order to determine whether the section was compatible 
with the provisions of the Bill. Since the judge decided the matter on the 
merits, he did not find it necessary to consider the appellants' objection to the 
respondents' locus standi. 
The respondents' main attack on the validity of section 9 was that it was in 
conflict with articles 3 and 10 of the Bill of Rights. Article 3 guaranteed the 
right to equality; article 10 guaranteed the right to freedom of movement and 
residence. 
In dealing with the attack on the validity of section 9, Grosskopf JA noted that 
the attack was based on the section's discrimination between one category of 
persons, namely persons born in the territory, persons rendering service in the 
territory in terms of the Defence Act of 1957 and persons employed in the 
civilian government service, and another category consisting of all other 
persons not included in the first category. 73 
Grosskopf JA noted that it was common cause that the Bill of Rights 
72At 3890. 
73At 362H. 
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.established a general rule against discrimination. It was also common cause, 
however, that the general rule against discrimination did not forbid 
"reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation". 74 Whereas in the 
Eins case Rabie ACJ relied mainly on South African law, Grosskopf referred 
extensively to foreign case law and looked at the position in countries with 
supreme Constitutions. 
The principle that reasonable discrimination is permissible was, as the judge 
noted, also a principle of American and Indian constitutional law. In American 
constitutional law, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States (the equal protection clause) 
11 forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable 
grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to 
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate ... It does not take away from 
the states the power to classify either in the adoption of poHce laws, or tax laws, or eminent 
domain law, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope discretion, and nullifies what they 
do only when it is not without any rea~nable ba"lis. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are 
not required. Similarly, not identity of treatment (sic), is enough. If any state of facts can 
reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification. the existence of that state of facts must be 
assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest 
upon any reasonable basis". 75 
It was pointed out in the discussion of the approach of the Canadian courts 
that the onus to justify a limitation of a fundamental rights rests on the 
government. 76 This approach is, however, not applicable in the United States 
of America in deciding the scope of the equal protection clause. The United 
States Supreme Court has used a shifting standard of review, depending on the 
nature of the classification or treatment. Where socio-economic legislation is 
in issue, the rationality standard is employed; where the classification is 
74At 363B. 
75The Chikane case at 3630-F. 
76See the discussion of R v Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R 103 in Chapt. 6. 
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based on race or where it creates a significant burden on the exercise of a 
fundamental right, (the so-called suspect classification) the compelling 
interest standard is used. The latter category invites strict judicial scrutiny and 
creates a burden for the government to show a compelling government 
interest. The former category is not subject to strict scrutiny; one who assails 
such a classification carries the burden to show that it does not rest upon any 
reasonable basis. There is also a third category, the so-called 'quasi-suspect 
classifications'; 77 here the government is required to show that the 
classification or treatment is substantially related to an important government 
interest. 78 
In Indian constitutional law, a classification will be constitutional only if two 
conditions have been met, namely, 
11 [t]he c1assification must be founded on an intelJigible differentia which distinguishes 
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, secondly, the 
diflerentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in 
question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely geographical, or according 
to objects, occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the 
basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration". 79 
Support for the principle that reasonable discrimination, that is, one founded 
on an intelligible differentia and rationally related to the objects sought to be 
achieved, was permissible was overwhelming. Grosskopf JA found that the 
77Discrimination on the basis of sex falls under this category. 
78See A. Cachalia, H. Cheadle, D. Davis et al Fundamental Rights 
in the New Constitution (1994) at 110. 
79The Chikane case at 363H. This is also the approach which has been 
followed by the Canadian Supreme Court: see for example Andrews V 
Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1S.C.R143. Comrie J and 
Friedman J followed the same approach in the Bophuthatswanan cases of 
Mfolo and Others v Minister of Education and Another 1992(3) 
SA 181 (B) and Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 
1992(4) SA 540 (B) respectively. 
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Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has also adopted the same general 
approach as that applied in the United States and India.80 The judge then 
decided that these principles were equally applicable to article 3 of the Bill of 
Rights. 
What was left for the judge to consider was whether the distinction in section 
9 of the Act in issue rested on a reasonable basis or, put differently, whether 
they were founded on an intelligible differentia and, if so, whether that 
differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the 
Act. The issue of the object sought to be achieved by the Act was a question 
of fact which involved a process of interpretation; this process of 
interpretation made use of "whatever permissible aids are available for the 
interpretation of the statute in issue". 81 
The reasonableness or intelligibility of the distinction in the Act, and the 
rationality of their relation to the object sought to be achieved were "largely 
matters of fact depending upon the circumstances to which the Act 
applies" .82 Although the judge considered the question of the admissibility 
of evidence to resolve the question whether distinction was justifiable, he did 
not give any decision on it. Since no evidence was tendered, the judge dealt 
with the matter as if on exception, as this would have the same effect as 
where evidence was not admissible. 
Grosskopf JA came to the conclusion that the section 9 distinction did not 
violate article 3 of the Bill of Rights. He based this conclusion on the possible 
explanations for the distinction between persons born in the territory, and 
others, on the one hand, and that between persons employed in the territory 
in various types of government service, and those not so employed, on the 
80At 3631. 
81At 364C-D. 
82At 364E. 
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other hand. Among these explanations was the possibility that government 
servants could never be guilty of harmful conduct, and that there consequently 
was no need to include them within the purview of the Act, 83 or that there 
were effective means of dealing with government servants who are believed 
to be guilty of harmful conduct, or that there were satisfactory ways of 
terminating the employment of government servants suspected of harmful 
conduct. In Grosskopf JA's view, the section 9 distinction between 
government servants could conceivably be justified on the basis that the 
purpose of the Act could, with reference to them, be achieved in other 
satisfactory ways; any one of the explanations could constitute a reasonable 
basis for the distinction.84 
Grosskopf JA also found that section 9 was not in conflict with article 10 of 
the Bill of Rights. Apart from the finding that section 9 did not violate the 
prohibition on 'arbitrary' conduct in terms of article 10, 85 the judge also 
dealt with the respondents' contention that section 9 violated the rights of 
freedom of movement and residence as guaranteed in article 10. The guarantee 
of the right of freedom of movement and residence was subject, inter alia, to 
"such provisions as are properly prescribed by law in the interests of public 
health and public order"; the respondents had argued that 'public order' was 
a narrower concept than, for instance, national security, and that the purpose 
of the exception was to prevent persons such as convicted prisoners, and not 
each and every person, from claiming the right to travel freely in the territory. 
83This possible explanation seems to be based on the fact that a public 
servant is supposed to owe allegiance to the government of the day. Although 
this is the position in principle, it is not always so in practice. As Grosskopf 
JA pointed out, this was a question of fact which was not fully canvassed in 
the case. 
84At 3661-3678 and 369E. 
85Grosskopf JA had earlier in his judgment found that the prohibition on 
'arbitrary' conduct was included in the general rule against diserimination: at 
3638. 
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The phrase 'public order' was not defined in the Bill of Rights; nor was any 
authority referred to which suggested that it had an established technical 
meaning. It had therefore to be given "... its ordinary meaning in the 
context". 86 The judge concluded that "[p]rovisions in the interest of 'public 
order' would clearly, in the context, include appropriate limitations on the 
freedom of movement and residence to protect the security of the territory and 
its inhabitants"; the ordinary meaning of 'public order' was wide enough to 
encompass such limitations. 87 
Grosskopf JA found that section 9 was designed to counteract "the 
endangering of 'the security of the territory or its inhabitants or the 
maintenance of public order' and the engendering of ' a feeling of hostility 
between members of the different population groups of the territory'"; any 
action aimed at combating such evils would fall within the description of 
'provisions prescribed in the interests of public order'. 88 The contention that 
section 9 violated article 10 of the Bill of Rights therefore had to fail. 
A~ to the nature, scope and effect of the Bill of Rights, Grosskopf JA noted 
that it was not 'entrenched' and did not have as full an effect as its authors 
might have desired. 89 The judge observed that although the effect of 
Proclamation RlOl of 1985 was that the National Assembly did not have the 
power to make a Jaw which was in conflict with the Bill of Rights, and 
provision was made for the examination of pre-existing legislation with a view 
to possible amendment or repeal if it was in conflict with the Bill of Rights, 
the effect of the Bill of Rights was limited to the field of legislation; there 
86At 373F-G. 
87At 373G-H. Restrictions on free travel through military camps and other 
military or security installations or visits to strategic spots or areas would, for 
example, constitute appropriate limitations of freedom of movement. 
88At 374B. 
89At 378E-F. 
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was, in particular, nothing in the Proclamation to suggest that the Bill of 
Rights would, as such, have any bearing on the validity of administrative 
actions; the Bill of Rights operated only in relation to Acts of the National 
Assembly and did not serve to limit governmental power in other respects. 90 
Grosskopf JA's judgment might at first sight appear to represent a significant 
movement away from the literalist/intentionalist approach to the interpretation 
of human rights provisions and a recognition of their sui generis nature. 
However, by explicitly refraining from deciding whether evidence concerning 
the reasonableness of the section 9 distinction was admissible, and deciding 
the matter as if on exception, the judge avoided direct application of article 
3 of the Bill of Rights. In essence, the respondents' application was refused 
because the question of the admissibility of evidence was left undecided and 
not because the distinction was reasonable and therefore constitutionally 
permissible. The crucial issue was whether the distinctions, in that particular 
instance, were in fact reasonable or unreasonable. This was an issue which 
required a consideration of the evidence concerning the object of the 
distinctions for a proper resolution of the dispute. 
Article 3 was, in essence, enacted as part of the Namibian people's desire for 
independence based on freedom and equality and had to be accorded a special 
place. As part of the Bill of Rights it called for a generous approach which 
reflected the idea of making effective provision for the protection of human 
rights for the full benefit of individuals. Grosskopf JA did not follow this 
approach; neither did he attempt to develop guidelines for the interpretation 
of the provisions of a Bill of Rights in the light of its special nature and the 
fundamental values which it postulated. 
Van Heerden JA adopted a different approach but agreed that the appeal 
should succeed. In his opinion, the distinction between persons born in the 
90At 379B-C. 
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territory, or those in the civil service or the defence force on the one hand, 
and all others, on the other, was prima facie unreasonable and therefore 
impermissible; evidence might, however, show that the distinction was in fact 
reasonable. 91 The judge preferred to refer the matter, as it pertained to the 
first respondent, back to the court a quo, to hear evidence regarding the 
reasonableness of the section 9 distinction, and to consider the application de 
novo. He took the view that the second respondent could not succeed on the 
ground that section 9 was incompatible with article 3 of the Bill of Rights as 
there was no evidence that action against it was contemplated under section 
9. 
Although Van Heerden JA did not specifically deal with the question of the 
onus regarding the reasonableness of a distinction, his opinion that a 
legislative distinction is prima facie unreasonable strongly suggests that the 
government carries the burden of producing evidence to justify its 
reasonableness. Once the challenger succeeds in showing that legislation 
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out 
of the group, the burden rests on the government to show, in the first place, 
that the distinction is based on an intelligible differentia and, secondly, that 
the differentia is rationally related to the object sought to be achieved by the 
legislation in question. 92 
2.1.2.3. The Namibian National Students' Organisation 
(NANSO) Case.9' 
91At 384H. Van Heerden JA had earlier in his judgment concluded that 
evidence was admissible to establish whether a distinction was reasonable or 
unreasonable. 
92See for example the approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in R V 
Oakes (supra) and Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia 
(supra). 
93Supra. 
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Whereas the Eins and Chikane cases were decided by the South African 
Appellate Division, the NANSO case was decided by the Supreme Court of 
South West Africa/Namibia. 94 The question in issue in the NANSO case 
was the validity of sections 2 and 3 of the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
Act. 95 The purported object of the Act was to protect certain fundamental 
rights of persons; section 2 of the Act had the effect of forbidding students, 
lecturers at educational institutions, or individuals from advocating through 
peaceful means any stayaway or any boycotting of lectures. Section 3, which 
was not severable from section 2, prohibited the performance of acts aimed 
at inducing or attempting to induce anyone to engage in stayaways or 
boycotts by using violence or threats of violence. In addition section 2(3) of 
the Act required a person accused of having performed an act in contravention 
of section 2 to show that he had 'lawful cause' for doing so. 
The applicants contended that sections 2 and 3 of the Proclamation of 
Fundamental Rights Act were in conflict with, in particular, articles 4 and 5 
of the Bill of Rights. Article 4 protected the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty; article 5 protected the right to freedom of expression of 
opinion, conscience and religious belief, including freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through the press and other media, subject 
to a limitation of the right by the obligation to ensure that such expression 
does not infringe the rights of others, impair the public order or morals, or 
constitute a threat to national security. 
Hendler J, with Strydom J concurring, found that section 2(1) of the Act 
under consideration could not be separated from the remaining provisions of 
the Act and decided that it was in conflict with article 5 of the Bill of Rights 
and therefore invalid. He also held that section 2(3) was unconstitutional and 
94See G. Carpenter "Namibia - The Final Run-in to Independence" 
1989/90 SAYIL at 158-164 for a discussion of the NANSO case. 
95Act 16 of 1988. 
-351-
therefore invalid. 
In his judgment Hendler J showed an awareness of the superior force of a 
Constitution in limiting the exercise of legislative power and the special place 
of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution: 
11 [T]he constitution does not empower the National Assembly to pass legislation which 
has the effect of forbidding students, lecturers at educational institutions, or individuals from 
advocating the peaceful boycotting of lectures or the use of public services. These are rights given 
to the people of Namibia by the Bill of Fundamental Rights and are basic fundamental rights in 
any truly democratic society". 96 
The main basis for the applicants' attack on the validity of section 2 had been 
that it not only prevented the debating and advocating of legitimate and legal 
ideals but also criminalised the mere inducement of a student to his colleagues 
not to attend a lecture, even though this may be done without the use of or 
advocating of force and violence. 
Hendler J agreed that section 2 criminalised the peaceful expression of one's 
thoughts in a manner which may induce others to agree with one and to take 
peaceful action as a result, without any force, violence, intimidation or 
'fighting talk'. 97 The judge found the following passage from the judgment 
in the American case of The City of Houston v Hill9' to be pertinent: 
11 This Houston ordinance is not Jimited to fighting words nor even to obscene or 
opprobrious language but permits speech that in any manner interrupts. The constitution does not 
allow such speech to be made a crime. The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge 
police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we 
distinguish a free nation from a police state. 1199 
96At 628H. 
97At 630C. 
98Case No. 86/243, 1987. 
99 At 629J-630A. 
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The judge decided the constitutionality of section 2(3) with reference to 
Canadian cases where the question of the 'inverted onus' was considered. In 
R v Carol100 the question of the constitutionality of legislation imposing 
an 'inverted onus' was decided on the basis of the principle of reasonableness. 
The Court held that to place the onus on an accused, in terms of the Canadian 
Narcotic Control Act, in cases of possession of narcotics for the purpose of 
trafficking cannot be permitted, unless this constitutes a reasonable limitation 
on the presumption of innocence and the limitation can be demonstrably 
justified in a democratic society within the meaning of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. 101 
The constitutionality of the Canadian Narcotic Control Act's imposition of the 
'inverted onus' was also considered in R v Oakesrn2 In this case the 
Court decided that statutory exceptions to the general rule that an accused has 
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty will be held to be 
constitutional only if they are reasonable. For an 'inverted onus' to be 
reasonable there must be a rational connection between the proved fact and the 
presumed fact; such a rational connection will exist if the proved fact raises 
a probability that the presumed fact exists. 103 
As Hendler J noted, the Canadian courts have held 'inverted onus' provisions 
to be constitutional where the accused has been engaged in highly suspicious 
100(1983), reported in the 1985 supplementary release to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, at 16, 4.2. 
101See Chapt. 6 for a discussion of section 1 of the Canadian Charter, 
which provides that a limitation of the rights guaranteed in the Charter is 
permissible only if it is demonstrably justifiable in a democratic society. 
102(1986] 1 S.C.R 103. See Chapt. 6 for a discussion of the Oakes test 
for constitutionality. 
103This test was confirmed by Strydom JP in Freiremar SA v The 
Prosecutor-General of Namibia and Another 1994(6) BCLR 73 
(NmH). See also S v Titus 1995(3) BCLR 263 (NmH) at 266H. 
-353-
activity. In such instances the proven facts, namely that the accused was 
engaged m a highly suspicious activity (for example, that he was found 
prowling, with instruments which are usually used in housebreaking, near a 
house at night), raise a probability of the presumed guilt of the accused and 
are therefore rationally connected with the presumed guilt. 
Turning to the matter before him, Hendler J came to the conclusion that 
inducing others not to purchase from a certain business or inducing fellow 
students not to attend lectures did not raise the probability that such 
inducement was done without a lawful reason. There was no rational 
connection between the prohibited acts and the 'lawful reason' which the 
accused had to prove; section 2 therefore, on that basis, violated the right to 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty and was unconstitutional. 
Mouton J gave a dissenting judgment. He dismissed the applications of the 
third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants on the basis that they had no locus 
standi. He relied on the Eins case for the view that these applicants were not 
in immediate danger "of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the 
enforcement of the Act, nor were they affected thereby" .104 It is, however, 
arguable whether the applications could have properly been disposed of 
without going into the merits of the case. As Hendler J noted, the question of 
urgency and locus standi was interwoven with the merits of the 
application. 105 Moreover, there was also another overriding reason why it 
was necessary for the court to consider the merits of the applicants' contention 
that the Act violated constitutional rights; it was the court's function to act as 
a buttress between organs of the state and the individual; as legitimate 
enforcers of the Constitution, the courts must be astute not to divest 
104For a criticism of this view see the discussion of the Eins case 
(supra). 
105At 624C. 
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themselves of their judicial powers. 106 
In determining the constitutionality of the Act in issue, Mouton J took as his 
starting point the presumption of constitutionality. 107 In his opinion, if the 
Act "falls within the framework generally of the rights envisaged in a Bill, the 
Court will sustain the validity of the Act". 108 
Although Mouton J's approach of first and foremost presuming in favour of 
the constitutionality of legislation is correct, it is not clear from his judgment 
whether the presumption operates in respect of all types of legislation. In the 
Carolene Products footnote109 Justice Stone of the United States 
expressed the view that the presumption of constitutionality may not operate 
in respect of legislation which restricted or infringed rights associated with the 
efficacy of the ordinary political process or a right within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution. It is submitted that legislation which restricts 
or infringes the right to express one's opinion, especially if such expression 
is directed at peacefully persuading others to adopt or to refrain from adopting 
a particular political outlook or standpoint falls within the Carolene 
Products footnote category in that it inhibits, or at least has the potential of 
inhibiting, the efficacy of the ordinary democratic political process. 
Mouton J adopted a rather narrow approach to the interpretation of the right 
'°"The role of the courts in protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights 
becomes even more crucial where the Constitution specifically empowers them 
to determine the constitutionality of legislation which is alleged to violate 
these rights. 
107See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of the presumption of constitutionality 
in relation to judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 
108At 635H. 
109United States v Carolene Products Co. 304 us 144 (1938), 
footnote 4. 
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to freedom of expression. He took the view that freedom of expression cannot 
be equated with free speech."0 However, viewed in a wider sense, free 
speech is an important aspect of freedom of expression, subject only to the 
limitation that free speech should not infringe the rights of others, impair 
public order or morals or constitute a threat to national security. One needs 
therefore to examine in each case whether the exercise of the right to express 
one's opinion exceeded those limits. Where the right is exercised within those 
limits it surely amounts to the legitimate exercise of the right of free speech. 
Mouton J's concern seems to have been that since participation in functions 
and activities at educational institutions takes place on a voluntary basis, the 
exercise of one's right to expression in order to persuade others to adopt one's 
viewpoint may interfere with voluntary participation.111 It is submitted, 
however, that as long as one does not infringe the rights of others, impair the 
public order or morals, or threaten the national security, one is entitled to 
persuade others to adopt one's point of view or to follow one's course of 
action. It is only where the rights of others are infringed or threatened with 
a view to persuading others to adopt one's viewpoint or to follow one's course 
that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression will be exceeded and 
therefore unlawful. 
Mouton J's narrow approach also appears from his treatment of the question 
of the 'inverted onus'. Although the judge agreed that "[t]he onus rests, as it 
should in criminal matters, on the state, and the accused is presumed 
innocent", 112 he nevertheless placed emphasis on the deeming provisions 
110At 636D. 
111See Carpenter 1989/90 SAYIL at 162-163 for a criticism of Mouton 
J's judgment on the question of voluntary participation in activities at 
educational institutions and the rules prescribed by the institution to govern 
participation. 
112At 638G. 
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contained in section 2(3) of the Act, 113 which actually formed the basis 
upon which the onus was inverted onto the accused. 
Mouton J's statement that the use or publication of language is already an 
offence before the accused can prove a lawful reason (for the use or 
publication of the language) and that the deeming provision affords the 
accused an opportunity to advance a defence open to him is rather startling. 
This statement completely ignores the accepted rule of criminal law that the 
state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the elements of the 
offence.114 While an accused is entitled to disclose his defence, he is not 
obliged to do so. 
The post-independence case of S v Pineiro115 confirms the correctness of 
Hendler J's judgment, and refutes the judgment of Mouton J, in relation to the 
question of the 'inverted onus'. In this case Levy J held that a provision of the 
Sea Fisheries Act, 58 of 1973 (Nm) which created an 'inverted onus' was in 
direct conflict with the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, as 
guaranteed in article 12(1)(d) of the Namibian Constitution, and was therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Mouton J's approach to the interpretation of human rights provisions fails to 
accord constitutionally protected rights a status which is above ordinary 
legislation. It fails to take into account the spirit of the Constitution and 
ignores the fact that human rights provisions constitute a set of higher norms 
against which the validity of legislation must be measured. 
113At 638H. 
rnsee Carpenter 1989/90 SAYIL at 163 for a criticism of this aspect of 
Mouton J'S judgment. 
1151993(2) SA 412 (Nm). 
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2.1.2.4. The Advisory Opinion.116 
The Cabinet for the territory of South West Africa had, in terms of section 
19(2) of Proclamation RlOl of 1985, submitted a question as to the 
compatibility of the Representative Authorities Proclamation of 1980117 with 
the Bill of Rights to the Supreme Court for argument and decision. In terms 
of section 19(2) the Cabinet was empowered, when it was in doubt whether 
a law in force immediately before the coming into operation of Proclamation 
RlOl of 1985, abolished or derogated from any fundamental right, to cause 
the question to be submitted to the Supreme Court for argument and decision. 
The Representative Authorities Proclamation made provision for the creation 
of 'representative authorities' which were to constitute the legislative and 
executive organs of the various population groups within the territory. Section 
3 of the Proclamation, the provision in terms of which the legislative and 
executive organs were established, had the effect that every person in the 
territory was deemed to be a member of one or other of the various population 
groups by operation of law and not by choice. The question for decision was 
whether the rights and privileges of such population groups were unequal and 
whether the Proclamation was as a result discriminatory and in conflict with 
the Bill of Rights. The question of unequal or discriminatory treatment 
revolved largely around the availability and provision of funds to the various 
'representative authorities' for the requisite administrative machinery and for 
necessary capital expenditure. 
The opinion of the court was given by a full bench of five judges of the 
Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia. The court, per Berker JP, with 
all the other judges concurring, based its opinion on the interpretation of 
article 3 of the Bill of Rights. Article 3 guaranteed the right of equality before 
116Supra. 
117Procl. AG 8 of 1980. 
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the law. 
The court's starting point in the interpretation of article 3 was a recognition 
of the special nature of the Bill of Rjghts as a constitutional instrument which 
guaranteed fundamental human rights. 118 A constitutional instrument which 
guarantees fundamental human rights is premised on a belief in freedom, 
equality, human dignity and the inalienable rights of man as well as a 
commitment by the state to respect these rights in the exercise of its power; 
as the judicial organ of the state, the court is charged with ensuring the 
efficacy of these ideals. 
As an instrument of a special kind, a Constitution which guarantees 
fundamental human rights is, unlike ordinary legislation, drafted in a broad 
and ample style; it lays down principles of width and generality and calls for 
an approach which reflects its character and the spirit of its human rights 
provisions: 
"[Provisions laying down fundamental rights] should be treated sui generis 'calling for 
principles on interpretation of its ovvn, suitable to its character'. without necessary acceptance of 
all the presumptions and principles applicable to legislation of ordinary statutes. The object is to 
ascertain the spirit of the various provisions of a Bill of Rights. as revealed by the language used, 
and to avoid the pitfalls of rigid literalism. 11119 
In analysing the right to equality before the law, Berker JP observed that 
article 3 of the Bill of Rjghts could be divided into two distinct but interrelated 
parts, namely the prescription that everyone is equal before the law and the 
prohibition of prejudice or advantage on grounds of ethnic or social origin, 
sex, race, language etc. The crucial issue for decision was the meaning of the 
second part. 120 According to Berker JP, the words 'prejudice' or 'advantage' 
118At 853B. 
119At 853E. 
120At 854E. 
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ought to be interpreted widely to include material and economic prejudice or 
advantage. In adopting this approach, the judge took into account the fact that 
the majority of the territory's citizens were economically disadvantaged and 
relied on the government's financial assistance for their health, welfare, 
education and other related needs. 121 This approach is commendable in that 
it harmonises the provisions of a Bill of Rights with the needs and aspirations 
of the society within which the Bill operates. 
The court also considered the question whether the right of equality before the 
law and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, 
language or religion was in conflict with the recognition of ethnic, linguistic 
and religious groups within a state. Berker JP concluded that there was no 
conflict between the articles providing for the two types of right; 122 in 
coming to this conclusion the judge observed that the exercise of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious rights does not involve compulsion but is based on free 
choice. Whereas ethnic, linguistic and religious rights were protected only in 
so far as the rights of others were not infringed, the right to equality was 
absolute in that it had no qualification.123 In essence, ethnic, linguistic and 
121At 855C-D. 
122 Articles 3 and 9. Article 9 made provision for the right of all ethnic, 
linguistic and religious groups, and all persons belonging to such groups, to 
enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote their cultures, languages, 
traditions and religion, as long as they did not infringe the rights of others or 
violate the national interest. 
123 At 856B-C. Although Berker JP's opinion that the right to equality 
before the law per se has no qualification and is therefore absolute is correct, 
it is not entirely correct as far as the prohibition of discrimination is 
concerned; it is an accepted principle of constitutional law that reasonable 
discrimination, that is one which is based on an intelligible differentia and is 
rationally related to the object sought to be achieved by the discriminating 
statute is permissible: see the discussion of the Andrews (Chapt. 6), 
Nyamakazi (Chapt. 7) and Chikane (supra) cases. The fact of the matter 
is that it is not any form of discrimination that is prohibited; what is 
prohibited is arbitrary and irrational treatment or discrimination; for this 
reason a person who alleges that he is being treated unequally in a particular 
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religious rights are more of an entitlement and do not involve a prohibition; 
the right to equality, on the other hand, amounts to both an entitlement and 
a prohibition. 
An entitlement merely gives one the choice to enjoy one's right without 
interference as long as the conditions attached to the right are complied with. 
The right to equality as entrenched in a Bill of Rights is different in that it 
does not involve a choice whether one wishes to enjoy it or not; it is more 
than an entitlement in that it creates an obligation upon the state and its 
organs to treat every person equally before the law and to afford them equal 
protection of the law and also involves a prohibition of any action which 
amounts to unequal treatment before the law or unequal protection of the law. 
Although the decision of the court that the Representative Authorities 
Proclamation was in conflict with the Bill of Rights did not have the effect of 
invalidating the proclamation but was merely an advisory opinion, it went a 
long way towards reflecting the character of a constitutional instrument which 
guaranteed fundamental human rights and articulating the spirit underlying the 
constitutional guarantee of fundamental human rights. The court adopted a 
generous approach which has the effect of giving individuals the full benefit 
of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. 124 
context must show that he is entitled to be treated equally: see the Andrews 
case. 
124The Cabinet referred the Proclamation (AG8 of 1980) and the Court's 
Advisory Opinion to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; 
although the Standing Committee reported, by way of a majority decision, that 
the Cabinet should take the necessary steps to replace the Proclamation with 
legislation providing for regional government in accordance with the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Administrator-General criticised, in a 
public address, the court's conclusions on the facts and the law: see Cleary 
1988 CILSA at 330-331. 
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2.2. The Interpretation and Application of the Constitution of 
Namibia. 
Article 5 of the Namibian Constitution specifically renders the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in Chapter 5 enforceable by the courts. 125 The Namibian 
Supreme Court and Namibian High Court have, since independence, dealt 
with a number of cases concerning the validity of legislation in the light of the 
rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 of the Namibian Constitution.126 These cases 
illustrate the role of the courts, and their approach, in the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of a supreme Constitution which guarantees 
fundamental human rights. 
For present purposes the decisions of the Namibian High Court and the 
Namibian Supreme Court in S v Acheson127, S V Minnies128 , Ex 
Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In Re Corporal 
Punishment by Organs of the State129, S v Tcoeib130 , 
Mwandingi v Minister of Defence, Namibia131 , Minister of 
125 Article 80(2) specifically empowers the High Court to hear and 
adjudicate cases which involve the interpretation, implementation and 
upholding of the Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in it; article 79(2) empowers the Supreme Court to hear appeals 
which involve the interpretation, implementation and upholding of the 
Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in it. 
126Hereinafter referred to as the Bill of Rights. 
1271991(2) SA 805 (Nm HC). 
1281991(3) SA 364 (Nm HC). 
1291991(3) SA 76 (Nm SC). 
1301993(1) SACR 274 (Nm HC). 
1311991(1) SA 851 (Nm HC. 
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Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi132 , Government of the 
Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and 
Another133 and Djama v Government of the Republic of 
Namibia and OtherS 134 will be analysed to illustrate the attitude and 
approach of the courts towards the interpretation and application of the Bill of 
Rights. 135 The analysis of the post-independence decisions will be concluded 
with an examination of S v Heita136, which illustrates the court's attitude 
to the independence of the judiciary. 
2.2.1. The Acheson Case. 
In this case the accused, Acheson, had been charged with the murder of a 
prominent member of SWAPO, the majority party in the Namibian 
Parliament, and then held in custody. The State had applied for a lengthy 
postponement of the murder trial and asked that the accused should remain in 
custody in the interim. The court granted the postponement but released the 
accused on bail. Although the applicability of the Bill of Rights and the 
validity of legislation did not pertinently arise for decision, Mahomed AJ 
made certain remarks which have a bearing on judicial interpretation and 
application of a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. 
1321991(2) SA 355 (Nm SC). 
1331994(1) SA 407 (Nm SC). 
1341993(1) SA 387 (Nm SC). 
135See G.J.C Strydom "A Bill of Rights and 'Value Judgments' vs 
Positivism: the Namibian Experience" in J. Kruger & B. Currin 
Interpreting a Bill of Rights (1994) at 94 for a discussion of the 
Minnies, Acheson, Mwandingi and Ex Parte Attorney General: 
in Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the State cases and an 
assessment of the performance of the Namibian judiciary. 
1361992(3) SA 785 (Nm HC). 
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The question that the court had to decide was whether it should exercise its 
discretion in favour of an adjournment and the granting of bail. Mahomed AJ 
expressed the view that this issue cannot be divorced from the fundamental 
values embodied in the Constitution: 
11 The Jaw requires me to exercise a proper discretion having regard. not only to aJI the 
circumstances of the case and the relevant statutory provisions, but against the backdrop of the 
constitutional va1ues now articulated and enshrined in the Namibian Constitution of 1990 11 • 137 
What Mahomed AJ meant was that since the exercise of the discretion to grant 
an adjournment and bail affected the constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
freedoms of the accused, it must be harmonised with the values embodied in 
the Constitution. These values derived their importance from the special 
nature of the Constitution: 
'
1 It is a mirror reflecting the national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations 
of a nation; the articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its government. The 
spirit and the tenor of the Constitution must therefore preside and permeate the processes of 
judicial interpretation and judicial discretion 11 • 138 
Mahomed AJ's judgment aptly illustrates the role of the court in upholding the 
Constitution and giving effect to its spirit and tenor to give individuals the full 
benefit of its provisions. Human rights provisions were embodied in the 
Constitution with the aim that the rights and freedoms of individuals should 
be given effective protection; it is therefore the function of the court to 
exercise its discretion in such a way that these rights and freedoms are fully 
protected. 
2.2.2. The Minnies Case. 
S V Minnies was concerned with the admissibility of evidence of a pointing 
137 At 812J-813A. 
138At 813B. 
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out. 139 The question was whether evidence of a pointing out was, in terms 
of section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977140, admissible against 
an accused. In terms of section 218, evidence of a pointing out may be 
admitted at criminal proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that such pointing 
out formed part of an inadmissible confession. The question whether such a 
pointing out could be used against an accused revolved around the 
interpretation of article 12(1)(f), read with article 8(2)(b), of the Namibian 
Constitution. 
Article 8(2)(b) of the Namibian Constitution protects individuals against 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 12(l)(f) 
protects the individual against self-incrimination and also provides that the 
court shall not admit evidence obtained in violation of article 8(2)(b ).141 
The court accepted that the accused had made a pointing oul as a result of 
repeated questioning and assaults. It came to the conclusion that the evidence 
of the pointing out was inadmissible, notwithstanding the provisions of section 
218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. Du Toit AJ rejected the state's 
argument that article 12(1)(f) should be narrowly interpreted to refer only to 
verbal declarations by the accused, and to exclude evidence of a pointing out 
as envisaged in section 218; the judge opined that this approach ignores the 
generous or benevolent interpretation which gave effect to constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and freedoms. 142 
Du Toit AJ's preference for and adoption of the generous or benevolent 
139See G. Carpenter "A Namibian Duo" '1990/91 SAYIL at 164-166 for 
a comment on this case. 
''°Act 51 of 1977. 
141As the court noted, the provisions of article 12(l)(f) are peremptory (at 
385G). 
142At 385I. 
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approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution was based 
on the fact that human rights provisions in a Constitution were an expression 
of democratic values and ideals, and a belief in life, liberty and human dignity 
under law: 
"[They] are a catalogue of human rights protecting life, liberty and human dignity. They 
express values and ideals which are consonant with the most enlightened view of a democratic 
society existing under Iaw 11 • 143 
Du Toit AJ's view was that the protection of human rights is so important that 
he would rather err in their favour than in favour of executive excesses: 
"In interpreting and giving effect to human rights provisions, I would rather err, if I do 
err, on the side of the protection of the individual against police excesses 11 • 144 
The generous or benevolent approach preferred and adopted by Du Toit AJ 
upholds the supremacy of the Constitution over legislative and executive acts. 
Du Toit AJ's decision to exclude illegally obtained pointings out is, however, 
also important in another respect. It implies that a law must have a relevant 
underlying rationale145 and must be consonant with the idea of law in 
society, namely governing human conduct through the proper administration 
of justice. The admission of evidence of an illegally obtained pointing out, in 
terms of section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, would have been 
contrary to the underlying rationale for excluding illegally obtained evidence, 
namely that the use of such evidence can bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. 146 
143At 384H. 
144At 385B. 
145See Carpenter 1990/91 SAYIL at 165, who mentions the inconsistency 
of excluding an improperly obtained statement and admitting information 
which has come to light in consequence of such a statement. 
"'See the Minnies case at 3851. 
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2.2.3. Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal 
Punishment by Organs of State. 
The question for determination in this case was whether the infliction of 
corporal punishment by organs of the state was in conflict with the prohibition 
of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as contained 
in article 8(2)(b) of the Bill of Rights!47 The matter had gone to the 
Namibian Supreme Court by way of a petition submitted to the Chief Justice 
in terms of section 15(2) of the Supreme Court Act, 1990.148 Article 87(c), 
read with article 79(2), of the Constitution empowers the Attorney-General to 
refer to the Supreme Court for decision issues involving the protection and 
upholding of the Constitution. 
The judgment of Mahomed AJA constitutes one of the most important 
expositions of the nature and spirit of a Constitution entrenching fundamental 
human rights and the context within which it ought to be interpreted and 
applied: 
11 The Namibian Constitution seeks to articulate the aspirations and values of the new 
Namibian nation following upon independence. It expresses the commitment of the Namibian 
people to the creation of a democratic society based on respect for human dignity, protection of 
liberty and the rule of law. Practices and values which are inconsistent with or which might 
subvert this commitment are vigorously rejected. 
For this reason colonialism as well as 'the practice and ideology of apartheid from which the 
majority of the people of Namibia have suffered for so long' are firmly repudiated. 
Article 8 of the Constitution must therefore be read not in isolation but within the context of a 
fundamental humanistic philosophy introduced in the preamble and woven into the manifold 
structure of the Constitution." 149 
147See Carpenter 1990/91 SAYIL at 163-164 for a comment on this case. 
148 Act 15 of 1990 (Nm). 
149 At 78A-C. 
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Article 8 does not specifically prohibit corporal punishment. It is, however, 
particularly relevant in relation to corporal punishment in that it guarantees the 
right to dignity, not only in general150 but also during the enforcement of a 
penalty151, and also prohibits the subjection of any person to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 152 The main issue, 
therefore, was whether the imposition of corporal punishment is inhuman or 
degrading and therefore an invasion of the right to dignity in contravention of 
article 8. 
In considering this issue, Mahomed AJA referred to the importance, and 
sometimes unavoidability, of value judgments in the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of a Bill of Rights: 
"The question whether a particular form of punishment authorised by law can properly 
be said to be inhuman or degrading involves the exercise of a value judgment by the court. "153 
As appears from Mahomed AJA's judgment, the values which the court must 
express and apply are not the court's own values or moral standards; the 
exercise of a value judgment involves an objective searching, identification 
and articulation of applicable values. 154 The process of searching, identifying 
and articulating these values is a continually evolving dynamic which uses as 
a source contemporary norms, the aspirations, expectations and sensitivities 
of the people as expressed in national institutions and the Constitution. It also 
takes into account the emerging values in the civilised international 
150Article 8(1). 
151Article 8(2)(a). 
152Article 8(2)(b). 
153At 86H. 
154See J. Kruger "Value Judgments versus Positivism" 1991 SA Public 
Law 290 for an analysis of Mahomed AJA's value-oriented approach. 
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·community. 155 More importantly, however, the process of searching, 
identifying and articulating applicable values recognises and seeks to give 
effect to perceptions as they exist at the time and application of the relevant 
provision of the constitution156 and, therefore, treats the Constitution as a 
'living document' . 
There were various factors which, according to Mahomed AJA, supported the 
view that corporal punishment was inconsistent with civilised values pertaining 
to the administration of justice and the punishment of offenders. These factors 
were, inter alia, the invasion of the offender's status as a human being, the 
infliction of acute pain and physical suffering which 'strips the recipient of all 
dignity and self-respect and arbitrariness inherent in the infliction of the 
punishment'. 157 After analysing the position in other countries, Mahomed 
AJA came to the conclusion that corporal punishment was degrading and 
inhuman and therefore in conflict with article 8 of the Constitution. 
In his judgment Mahomed AJA also highlighted the role of the judiciary in a 
system of constitutional supremacy, with reference to the dictum of Chief 
Justice Warren in the American case of Trop V Dulles158: 
"We are oath-bolllld to defend the Constitution. The obligation requires that 
congressional enactments be judged by the standards of the Constitution. The judiciary has the 
155At 861-J. Mahomed AJA's reference to the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and to the position 
in other countries (at 88A-89E), signifies the importance of international law 
and foreign law in the search for fundamental constitutional values: see Chapt. 
10. 
156At 87A. 
157At 870-H. As Mahomed AJA noted, "[j]uveniles also have an inherent 
dignity by virtue of their status as human beings and that dignity is also 
violated by corporal punishment in consequence of judicial or quasi-judicial 
authority" (at 90H). See also the Zimbabwean case, S v A Juvenile 
1990(4) SA 151 (ZS). 
158356 us 86 (1958). 
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duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights. When the 
government acts to take away the fundamental rights of citizenship, the safeguards of the 
Constitution should be examined with special diligence. 
The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or ho11ow shibboleths. They are vital, 
living principles that authorise and limit governmental powers in our Nation. They are the ru]es 
of government. When the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is challenged in this Court, we 
must apply these rules. If we do not, the words of the Constitution become little more than good 
advice. 
When it appears that an Act of Congres."'> conflicts with one of these provisions, we have no choice 
but to enforce the paramount commands of the Constitution. We are sworn to do no less. We 
cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate challenged legislation. We 
must apply those Jimits as the Constinition prescribes them, bearing in mind both the broad scope 
of legislative discretion and the ultimate responsibility of constinttional adjudication. 11159 
Berker CJ agreed with the opinion of Mahomed AJA but made additional 
remarks in which he emphasised the importance of local norms and standards 
and the aspirations, 160 conditions, experiences, perceptions and beliefs of the 
people of Namibia in the making of a value judgment.161 
Berker CJ' s opinion epitomises the importance of local conditions over and 
above other considerations in the making of a value judgment: 
" ... [T]he making of a value judgment is only possible by taking into consideration the 
historical background, with regard to social conditions and evolutions~ of the political impact of 
the perceptions of the people and a host of other factors, as well as the ultimate crystallisation of 
159 At 91F-I. 
160Modern Constitutions usually contain provisions which reflect the 
aspirations and ideals of the nation: see for example the Postamble of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1993, which forms an integral part 
of the Constitution. While admitting that "people differ very much in what 
they think it necessary for a Constitution to contain", Wheare has suggested 
that a Constitution should contain "[t]he very minimum, and that minimum to 
be rules of law" : K.C Wheare Modern Constitutions (1966) at 32 and 
34. 
161At 96A. 
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the basic beliefs of the people of Namibia in the provisions in the Bill of Fundamental Human 
Rights and Freedoms. 11162 
According to Berker CJ, the fact that Namibia was formerly under colonial 
rule and had been subjected to social values, ideologies and perceptions and 
political and general beliefs held by the former colonial power and which the 
people of Namibia found unacceptable, made the norms, approaches, moral 
standards, aspirations, beliefs, etc. of the Namibian people themselves a major 
and basic consideration in making value judgments. Since the Namibian people 
had become independent and free to make their own values, their own 
perceptions, approaches, moral standards, aspirations, beliefs, etc became 
paramount. 163 
The approach of the court in Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: 
In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the State is in sharp 
contrast to the approach of the Bophuthatswanan court in S V 
Chabalala. 164 In the Chabalala case Theal Stewart CJ adopted a 
literalist-intentionalist approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Constitution, and did not analyse or consider fundamental constitutional 
values; the judge avoided making a value judgment and played down the 
influence and importance of international law and foreign authorities as 
sources of fundamental constitutional values. Van den Heever JA, on the other 
hand, was concerned that the making of a value judgment would amount to 
usurping the function of the legislature. 
162At 961-97 A. 
163The view that the contemporary norms, aspirations, expectations, 
sensitivities, views, etc. of the Namibian people are paramount in making a 
value judgment was reaffirmed by the Namibian High Court in S V Tcoeib 
1993(1) SACR 274 (Nm HC). 
164Discussed in Chapt. 7. 
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The problem that the making of value judgments invites judicial policy making 
and that the judiciary may in the process usurp the function of the legislature 
or the executive, exists even in a system where judges do not have to make 
a switch to constitutional supremacy. The problem centres around drawing a 
line between judicial decision making and judicial legislation; while judges do 
make value judgments and shape policy in the process of making a decision, 
they can only do so within the scope of their function to resolve a justiciable 
legal dispute. 165 Value judgments are often unavoidable in judicial decision 
making; even an ostensibly value neutral judgment is a value judgment. 166 
In contrast to the judgments of Thea! Stewart CJ and Van den Heever JA in 
the Boputhatswanan case of S v Chabalala, which reveals excessive 
judicial restraint, the judgments of Mahomed AJA and Berker CJ in Ex 
Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment 
by Organs of the State epitomise a generous approach which is based 
on the spirit and primacy of a supreme Constitution in the legal system. 
In Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal 
Punishment by Organs of the State, the court did not for one 
moment feel that it would be usurping the legislative function when it made 
165See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the permissible limits of judicial 
review. 
166See W. Friedman Legal Theory (1976) at 436. The executive-
minded decisions of the South African Appellate Division such as, inter alia, 
Omar v Minister of Law and Order 1987(3) SA 859 (A); Castel 
NO v Metal and Allied Workers' Union 1987(4) SA 795 (A); 
Staatspresident v United Democratic Front 1988(4) SA 830 (A) 
and Staatspresident v Release Mandela Campaign 1988(4) SA 
930(A) afford an example of ostensibly value-neutral judgments which were 
in essence value judgments. 
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a value judgment as to the constitutionality of corporal punishment;167 it was 
engaging in a legitimate process of interpreting and applying the provisions of 
the Constitution; in doing so it was called upon to implement deliberately 
imposed constitutional safeguards that limited governmental power and 
.protected individual rights. 
As both Mahomed AJA and Berker CJ were at pains to emphasise, the making 
of value judgments is not a haphazard process; it involves an objective and 
careful identification of contemporary norms, aspirations, expectations and 
sensitivities of the people as expressed in, inter alia, the Constitution. It is, in 
essence, the Constitution which provides the yardstick against which a value 
judgment must be made in the determination of the constitutionality of a 
legislative or executive act. 
It may very well be that the Constitution is a political document and that its 
interpretation is in consequence a political activity. However, it is not a 
'party-political' activity; it is a political activity of a special kind. Although 
judicial interpretation and application may have far-reaching political 
consequences, they are limited to articulating and applying the values of the 
Constitution. As long as the court does not question the wisdom of the 
government's choice of policy, it acts within its power to determine 
constitutionality and does not therefore undermine the doctrine of separation 
167 Admittedly the court had been asked for an advisory opinion by way of 
abstract review in terms of article 87(c), read with article 79(2) of 
Constitution of Namibia. Nevertheless the judgment was bound to have a 
fundamental impact on legislative power with regard to corporal punishment. 
Unlike the Constitution of the United States and the German Basic Law, the 
South African Constitution (1993) also makes provision for a system of 
abstract review. In Canada the system is provided for in separate ordinary 
legislation; each province has legislation which empowers the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council to refer constitutional questions to a provincial superior; 
the Governor in Council may also, in terms of the Supreme Court Act, refer 
to the Supreme Court "important questions of law or fact" which deal inter 
alia with the constitutionality of federal legislation: see B.L Strayer The 
Canadian Constitution and the Courts (1988) at 170. 
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of powers. What the court did in the case in point was to determine whether 
the imposition of corporal punishment was in conflict with the constitutional 
norms and values which apply in relation to the Namibian society, and to give 
effect to these supreme and fundamental constitutional norms and values. 
2.2.4. The Mwandingi Cases. 
Mwandingi v Minister of Defence, Namibia168 was concerned 
with the interpretation of article 140(2) of the Namibian Constitution. In terms 
of article 140(3) of the Constitution, the Namibian Government accepts the 
validity of anything done under any law by its predecessor, the South African 
Government. The applicant, Mwandingi, had been shot by members of the 
South African Defence Force prior to the independence of Namibia; however, 
his claim for compensation was overtaken by independence. He had sought to 
replace the Minister of Defence of South Africa as the respondent and to cite 
the Minister of Defence of Namibia in the place of the former. 
Although article 140 does not contain an express reference to delicts and 
wrongs committed by a predecessor government, the applicant contended that, 
by virtue of the provisions of articles 140 and 145 of the Constitution, the 
Government of Namibia had accepted liabilities incurred by its predecessor. 
The respondent, on the other hand, relied on the presumption that a reference 
in a law to any action or conduct was a reference to lawful or valid action and 
contended that the Namibian Government did not accept liability for wrongful 
acts committed by its predecessor. 
The approach of the High Court of Namibia169 to the issue, per Strydom 
168Supra. 
169Mwandingi v Minister of Defence, Namibia (supra). See 
N. Botha "To Pay or not to Pay: Namibian Liability for South African 
Delicts" 1990/91 SAYIL 156-162; A. Boshoff "Interpretation of a 
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AJP, was that article 140 must be interpreted in the light of the other 
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution of Namibia was, according 
to Strydom AJP, not like an ordinary Act of Parliament and should therefore 
be interpreted " .. .in a specially purposive way, particularly so when the 
Constitution contains a declaration of human rights and freedoms, so as to 
give recognition and protection to such rights". 170 
Strydom AJP confirmed the view that in interpreting the Constitution special 
consideration should be given to the broader context in which the words 
appear, as opposed to their literal meaning; he referred 171 to a dictum of 
Lord Wright in James v Commonwealth of Australia,172 where his 
Lordship stated: 
"It is true that a constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense. 
The words used are necessarily general, and their full import and true meaning can often only be 
appreciated when considered, as the years go on, in relation to the vissitudes of fact which from 
time to time emerge. It is not that the meaning of the words changes, but the changing 
circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full import of that meaning. 11 
The view that a Constitution which guarantees fundamental human rights is 
a sui generis document which should not be interpreted like ordinary 
legislation is supported by the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in Minister of 
Home Affairs (Bermuda) and Another v Fisher. 173 Such a 
Constitution is not suited to the 'the austerity of tabulated legalism'; it 
11
calls for principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to its character ... , without 
Constitution: Mwandingi v Minister of Defence, Namibia" 1992 
TSAR 331 for discussions of this case. 
170At 857C. 
171At 857E. 
172[1936] AC 578 at 614. 
173(1980] AC 319 at 328-329. 
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necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private law 11 • 
Strydom AJP took the view that since the applicant's claim formed part of his 
property, which was constitutionally protected in the Bill of Rights, article 140 
should be given a generous interpretation in order to give full effect to the 
article in the context in which it appeared. 174 Following this approach, he 
came to the conclusion that article 140 was couched in the widest possible 
terms and could not be restricted by the presumption on which the respondent 
relied. To restrict the operation of article 140 on this basis would be to apply 
the 'austerity of tabulated legalism'. 175 The judge then ordered that the 
Minister of Defence of Namibia be substituted for the Minister of Defence of 
South Africa. 
The Minister of Defence (Namibia) appealed against the judgment of Strydom 
AJP to the Namibian Supreme Court. The Namibian Supreme Court 
unanimously dismissed the appeal. 176 The Supreme Court relied, as did 
Strydom AJP in the court a quo, on the dicta of Lord Wright in James v 
Commonwealth of Australia177 and Lord Wilberforce in Minister 
of Home Affairs (Bermuda) and Another v Fisher,178 adding 
that the interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Namibian 
Constitution are international in character and called for the application of 
international human rights norms. 179 
174At 860C. 
175At 860E. 
116Minister of Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi (supra). 
177Supra. At 362C. 
178Supra. At 362H-363G. 
179At 362G. 
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Botha 180 has criticised the opinion of Strydom AJP, that article 145 of the 
Constitution did not affect an individual's right to claim damages from a new 
government arising out of a delict committed by a predecessor government, 
as being out of step with the specific provisions of the Constitution, with the 
spirit of the Constitution, and with public international law. He bases his 
criticism on the argument that Namibia's commitment to principles of public 
international law, as evidenced by the provisions of sections 144 and 145 of 
the Constitution, implies that it has accepted the principles of public 
international law that a new state does not succeed to the delicts of its 
predecessor. 
It is submitted, however, that although a state may in terms of public 
international law not be liable for the delicts committed by its predecessor, the 
principle had to be applied in the light of the provisions of the Constitution of 
Namibia as the supreme law of the land. 181 Article 140(3) qualifies the 
application of the principle by providing that the acts of the South African 
government done prior to independence "shall be deemed" (my emphasis) to 
be the acts of the Namibian government, unless the latter repudiates such acts 
by an Act of Parliament. The section does not strictly speaking do away with 
the applicability of the international law principle that a state does not succeed 
to the delicts committed by its predecessor; it is simply a deeming provision 
which creates a legal fiction as a substitute for the true position. 182 
180Botha 1990/91 SA YIL at 162. 
181ln Minister of Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi (supra) at 
3668-D the court expressed reservations about the consistent application of the 
principle. As the court stated (at 3660) "[i]n Namibia art 140(3) confirms and 
puts beyond doubt the continuity of succession and its consequences". 
182See Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura 
2000 1994(1) SA 407 (NmSC). In this case Mahomed CJ observed that 
Parliament can enact legislation to undo the fiction and replace it with the true 
position. 
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It is true that article 144 of the Constitution provides that "the general rules 
of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia 
under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia"; the court is of 
course obliged to apply a rule of public international if it is an integral part 
of the law of the country. However, these rules are binding only if the 
Constitution does not provide otherwise. The Constitution, in article 140(3), 
contained a provision which provided otherwise; article 140(3) created a 
fiction in terms of which the Government of Namibia accepted liability for the 
delicts committed by its predecessor. As an integral part of a supreme 
Constitution, the section 140(3) fiction operates as a fundamental constitutional 
rule which overrides ordinary rules of law. 
The crucial issue in the Mwandingi case was whether article 140(3) should 
be interpreted restrictively to refer to only those acts which were lawfully 
done or generously to include those which were not lawfully done. In doing 
so the court had to take into account the nature of the Constitution as a 
"mirror reflecting the national soul', the identification of the ideals and 
aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values bonding its people and 
disciplining its government" (my emphasis). 183 
The very nature of a Constitution which deliberately guarantees fundamental 
rights and freedoms calls for a generous interpretation which gives individuals 
the full benefit of its human rights provisions. The Constitution constitutes the 
basic law of the state; it binds the state and authorises and limits governmental 
power. The supremacy of the Constitution and the entrenchment of 
fundamental human rights in it gives it a character of its own: 
11 This distinguishes the Constitution from ordinary Acts of Parliament. The whole tenor 
of chap 3 and the influence of international human rights instruments, from which many of its 
provisions were derived, call for a generous, broad and purposive interpretation that avoids the 
183S v Acheson (supra) at 813A-C. 
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'austerity of tabulated legalism'. 11184 
The judgments of the Namibian High Court and the Namibian Supreme Court 
in the Mwandingi cases constitute an antithesis to a narrow and pedantic 
approach to the interpretation and application of the provisions of a 
Constitution which entrenches fundamental human rights. In both cases the 
court followed an approach which harmonises the interpretation and 
application of constitutional provisions with the fundamental principles, norms 
and values embodied in the Constitution. 
2.2.5. Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v 
Cultura 2000 and Another. 185 
The Cultura 2000 case, like the Mwandingi cases, was concerned with 
the interpretation and application of article 140(3) of the Namibian 
Constitution in the light of the Constitution's guarantee of fundamental rights 
and freedoms. The question in issue was whether the State Repudiation 
(Cultura 2000) Act, 186 an Act which was promulgated pursuant to article 
140(3) and provided for, inter alia, the repudiation of any sale or donation of 
any movable or immovable property under laws which were in force prior to 
the independence of Namibia by the government or any official of the 
Republic of South Africa, was in conflict with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Cultura 2000, a cultural organisation whose aim was to preserve 
and further 'West-European cultural activities' in Namibia, received a 
generous donation of money from the former administration for whites, on 
condition that the donation be used for the promotion, development and 
'
84Minister of Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi (supra) at 
364B. 
185Supra. 
186Act 32 of 1991 (Nm) (hereinafter referred to as the Repudiation Act). 
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extension of the European culture; this was after a farm was sold to it by the 
administration for a consideration of R318 000. 00; a further generous amount 
of money, which was later converted to a donation by the Administrator-
General, was lent to Cultura 2000 by the former administration. 
It was clear that the Repudiation Act was aimed at repudiating the donations 
made to Cultura 2000. The validity of the Act was attacked on the basis that 
it constituted a statutory expropriation without compensation in conflict with 
article 16 of the Constitution, and violated the right to practise and promote 
the culture, language or traditions of certain persons or groups as guaranteed 
in article 19 of the Constitution. 
The Namibian High Court, per Levy AJP, had held that the Repudiation Act 
was unconstitutional and inconsistent with the provisions of section 140(3), 
and therefore invalid. 187 Levy AJP held that the fact that Cultura 2000 had 
originated as a racist organisation and the question whether that would make 
it an unlawful organisation in post-independence Namibia was not relevant; 
article 140(3), according to the judge, applied to both lawful and unlawful acts 
of the predecessor government. The judge arrived at the conclusion that the 
intention of the framers in permitting the repudiation of acts done by the 
predecessor government in article 140(3) was to enable the Namibian 
successor government to evade continuing obligations and not completed acts; 
since the donation to Cultura 2000 was a completed act, the repudiation in 
terms of the Repudiation Act, was, according to the judge, in conflict with the 
provisions of article 140(3). 
In arriving at the conclusion that the Repudiation Act was in conflict with the 
provisions of the Constitution, Levy AJP had relied on a dictum of the full 
1
•
1Cultura 2000 and Another v Government of the Republic 
of Namibia and Others 1993(2) SA 12 (Nm HC). 
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bench of the Namibian Supreme Court in the Mwandingi case. 188 In that 
case the court held that the Namibian Government could not escape liability 
simply by a narrow and mechanical interpretation of article 140(3) so as to 
limit its operation to acts lawfully done. The court adopted a purposive and 
generous interpretation189 in order to give the individual the full benefit of 
the provisions of the Constitution. 
Levy AJP also relied on a dictum of Strydom AJP, sitting in the High Court, 
in the Mwandingi case, to the effect that article 140(3) should be 
interpreted purposively and generously to preserve the rights guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights. Following this approach, the judge held that the Repudiation 
Act amounted to expropriation without compensation and was therefore 
contrary to the specific provisions of article 16 and the spirit of the 
Constitution. 190 Levy AJP, however, found that there was another reason, 
which he considered to be obvious, why the Repudiation Act was inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional, namely 
that the Namibian legislature purported to repudiate an act never performed 
by the predecessor government and therefore acted ultra vires its powers to 
repudiate 'acts' or 'actions' performed by the predecessor government. 
The Government of the Republic of Namibia appealed against the judgment 
of Levy AJP to the Namibian Supreme Court. The appeal initially sought a 
finding that the whole Act was unconstitutional. This raised the important 
constitutional question whether the sections of the Act in terms of which the 
moneys paid to Cultura 2000 by the former administration became repayable, 
and the property transferred to it became vested in and retransferred to the 
188Supra. 
189See Chapt. 10 for the distinction between the two concepts. 
190At 26G-H. 
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Government of Namibia, 191 were in conflict with article 16 of the 
Constitution; article 16 guarantees the right to acquire, own and dispose of 
property. This point was, however, abandoned. The remaining question was 
whether the repudiating provision (section 2(1)) was unconstitutional. The 
Namibian Supreme Court, per Mahomed CJ, held that it was not. 
In his judgment, Mahomed CJ once again set out the principles applicable in 
the interpretation and application of a supreme Constitution. What clearly 
emerges from Mahomed CJ's judgment is that the major premise in the 
interpretation and application of a Constitution is its nature, spirit and, in 
particular, the specific goals, values, aspirations and beliefs upon which its 
provisions are premised. Having examined the preamble and the provisions of 
the Constitution, Mahomed CJ said: 
11 It is manifest from these and other provisions that the constitutional jurisprudence of 
a free and independent Namibia is premised on the va1ues of the broad and universalist human 
rights culture which has begun in recent times and that it is based on a total repudiation of the 
policies of apartheid which had for so long dominated lawmaking and practice during the 
administration of Namibia by the Republic of South Africa." 192 
As in the Mwandingi case, Mahomed CJ advocated and followed a 
purposive and generous approach in terms of which the provisions of the 
Constitution are given a construction which is in accord with the ideals and 
aspirations of the nation and is 'most beneficial to the widest amplitude' .193 
A purposive approach implies that a specific provision of the Constitution 
should not be looked at in isolation; a Constitution is an organic instrument 
which must be interpreted in the light of all its provisions to give effect to its 
spirit and larger purpose. As Mahomed CJ observed, the 'basic temper of the 
191Sections 2(2) and 3. 
192At 412C. 
193At 4180 
-382-
Constitution' not only appeared throughout from the terms of the 
preamble194 but also from specific human rights provisions such as article 
10, 195 which prohibited discrimination, and general provisions of the 
Constitution, such as article 23, l% which prohibited racial practices, and 
article 63(2), 197 which gave Parliament the power to 
"remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of ensuring that the scourges of apartheid, 
tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest themselves in any form in a free and independent 
Namibia and to protect and assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been 
·the victims of these pathologies 11 • 
Mahomed CJ did not agree with Levy AJP's reasoning that article 140(3) 
empowered the legislature to repudiate only continuing obligations and not 
completed acts. Article 140(3) was simply a deeming provision which was 
coupled with the power to reverse such deeming by an Act of Parliament; the 
effect and purpose of section 140(3) was "to create a legal fiction as a 
substitution for the truth and . . . to enable Parliament to enact legislation 
through which the fiction introduced by the deeming can be undone and again 
substituted with the true position" .198 Article 140(3) did not, therefore, 
preclude Parliament from enacting an Act which sought to repudiate donations 
made to Cultura 2000 by the previous administration of Namibia. 
Levy AJP had based his opinion that article 140(3) empowered the legislature 
to repudiate only 'continuing' obligations, and not completed acts, on the 
meaning of the word 'repudiate'; according to the judge the word 'repudiate' 
indicated that the intention of the framers of the Constitution "was to enable 
194At 411F. 
195At 4111. 
1%At 4111-412A. 
197At 412B. 
198At 417F. 
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the Namibian successor Government to get out of an obligation which it had 
to do, something arising from an 'action' done or contracted by the previous 
regime". 199 The judge simply imputed the 'intention of the framers', without 
inquiring into the question whether the framers actually intended section 
140(3) to repudiate only 'continuing' obligations and not completed ones; 
there was nothing in article 140(3) or in the word 'repudiate' to suggest that 
the sole intention of the framers was to empower the legislature to repudiate 
only 'continuing' obligations. 
Levy AJP adopted a 'narrow, mechanistic, rigid and artificial' interpretation 
of article 140(3) and failed to articulate the ideals and aspirations of the 
Namibian people as expressed in the whole organic body of the Constitution. 
Mahomed CJ, on the other hand, adopted a purposive and generous approach 
which is in line with the ideals and aspirations of the Namibian people as 
expressed in the supreme Constitution. The Namibian Constitution is based on 
a rejection of the policies of apartheid and a desire to eradicate apartheid, not 
only in the statute books, but in social relations everywhere in Namibia and 
to establish a non-racial society; acts of the previous administration that sought 
to manipulate cultural and ethnic diversity were therefore contrary to the 
aspirations and ideals of the Namibian people as expressed in the Constitution; 
this is the background against which the provisions of the Constitution had to 
be interpreted and applied. 
Although the question of the constitutionality of the whole Act had been 
abandoned on appeal, Mahomed CJ commented that a repudiating Act which 
unlawfully invades any of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Constitution would be vulnerable to constitutional attack. 200 The sections 
1~he intention of the framers approach is inconsistent with the purposive 
and generous approach. It does not allow a Constitution to grow in order to 
deal with events unimagined by its drafters: See Chap!. 10 where the 'original 
intent' approach is discussed. 
2<"'At 422G. 
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effecting the repayment of the money paid to Cultura 2000 and the retransfer 
of the property transferred to it would also be vulnerable to attack on the basis 
that they invaded the right to property. The judge pointed out, however, that 
not every repudiating Act would be set aside by the court; it is only those 
which are in conflict with chapter 3 of the Constitution which will be set 
aside. 201 The court did not express any view as to whether the provisions 
effecting repayment or retransfer were indeed unconstitutional or not. 
In dealing with the contention that section 2(1) (the repudiating section) of the 
Repudiation Act was in conflict with articles 16 and 19 of the Constitution and 
therefore unconstitutional, the Namibian Supreme Court held that the Act did 
not violate the respondent's right to own property or to just compensation in 
the event of expropriation as guaranteed in article 16 nor its right to profess, 
maintain and promote the culture, language or traditions of its members. The 
court held that section 2(1) was simply a repudiatory provision which reversed 
the fiction that the acts of the previous administration in allocating moneys to 
Cultura 2000 were acts of the new Government and did not therefore violate 
the rights guaranteed in articles 16 and 19. 
2.2.6. Djama v Government of the Republic of Namibia and 
Others.202 
Djama had been born in Somalia but claimed that he was entitled to Namibian 
citizenship by virtue of his father's having born in Namibia. Having entered 
Namibia under the auspices of the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, he was arrested in terms of the Admissions of Persons to the 
Republic Regulation Act, 1972203 and subsequently detained. However, 
201At 422H. 
202Supra. 
203 Act 59 of 1972. 
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contrary to the requirements of section 5 of the said Act, he was not informed 
of the reasons for his detention. 
Pursuant to an urgent habeas corpus application, a rule nisi interdicting the 
respondents from deporting him, and requiring the respondents to show cause 
why he should not be released, was issued. However, on the day of the 
application a 'warrant of release' was presented by the Minister of Home 
Affairs officials to the Prison authorities; Djama was released into the custody 
of a Home Affairs official and subsequently handed a document declaring him 
to be a prohibited immigrant in terms of section 40 of the Admission of 
Persons to the Republic Regulation Act; he was thereafter detained again and 
requested to leave Namibia voluntarily and to apply for entry from outside the 
country. When he refused to leave he was detained further until the court 
ordered his immediate release. 
The court relied on articles 7 and 11 of the Namibian Constitution to order 
Djama's release. Article 7 prohibits the deprivation of personal liberty, except 
in accordance with the procedures established by law. Article 11 prohibits the 
arbitrary arrest and detention of any person; subarticle (3) prohibits the 
detention of any person for a period of more than 48 hours without the 
authority of a magistrate; subarticle (4) renders the provisions of subarticle (3) 
inapplicable to prohibited immigrants but goes on to provide that such persons 
shall not be deported from Namibia unless such a deportation has been 
authorised by a tribunal empowered by law to authorise the deportation. The 
tribunal envisaged by article 11(4) had not yet been established at the time of 
Djama's application. 
In his judgment, Muller AJ pointed out that the right to liberty not only 
features in most regional and international human rights instruments but is 
specifically guaranteed in the Namibian Constitution.204 The judge observed 
204At 3940. 
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that the protection of the right to liberty is fortified by the prohibition of 
arbitrary arrest or detention and the mechanisms provided for in article 11. It 
would be arbitrary, the judge stated, to detain a person if such detention was 
not authorised by law. 205 
It is clear from a reading of articles 7 and 11 that the right to liberty is not 
absolute. However, as Muller AJ pointed out in his judgment, where the right 
to liberty is affected by the application of a statute or law, and such a statute 
or law is reasonably capable of more than one meaning, the meaning which 
least interferes with the liberty of the individual is to be preferred; 206 the 
statute or law must be interpreted strictly to avoid harshness or injustice. 207 
The principles enunciated by Muller AJ are in fact ordinary common law rules 
of statutory interpretation. They are principles which still form part of the 
legal system; the adoption of a supreme Constitution does not relegate them 
to the background. In the Djama case they were applied against the 
background of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to maximise judicial 
protection of constitutionally guaranteed human rights. The application of 
common law rules of interpretation in the light of the provisions of a Bill of 
Rights in the Djama case aptly illustrates that the common law contains 
certain principles and values which can be harmonised with the Bill of Rights 
in order to give individuals the full benefit of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. 208 Applying these principles, Muller AJ was able to arrive at the 
conclusion that section 40 of the Admission of Persons to the Republic 
Regulation Act did not envisage indefinite detention or detention the purpose 
of which was not to remove a person from Namibia. 
205At 394H. 
206At 394I-J. 
207At 395A-B. 
. 
208See Cha pt. 10. 
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2.2.7. S v Heita:209 The Court's view of Judicial Independence. 
A judiciary, especially one which has the role of enforcing the provisions of 
the Constitution and protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals, must 
be able to discharge its judicial functions fearlessly and independently .210 
The Heita case illustrates the tenacity with which the Namibian judiciary 
strives to uphold its independence. 
In reaction to a sentence imposed by O' Linn J in a criminal case, some people 
purporting to act on behalf of SW APO, the ruling party in Namibia, had 
called for the dismissal and resignation of the judge, and even for his arrest. 
Similar calls had been made based on the allegation that the judge was 
colonialist and anti-black. 
During the course of a criminal trial in the Heita case, O'Linn J decided to 
consider, mero motu, whether he should recuse himself from continuing with 
the trial after he and other members of the judiciary had been scandalised, 
insulted and threatened. The judge dealt extensively with the independence of 
the judiciary and decided that he should not recuse himself. 211 
Article 78(2) of the Constitution of Namibia expressly provides for the 
independence of the judiciary. The article makes it abundantly clear that the 
independence of the judiciary is subject only to the Constitution and the law. 
200Supra. 
210See Chapt. 5 for a discussion of judicial independence. 
211The judge decided this particularly in view of the fact that there were 
indications that the government did not condone the acts of those responsible 
for scandalising, insulting and threatening the judiciary and that these people 
would be prosecuted; both counsel for the state and for the defence had also 
urged the judge not to recuse himself and expressed their confidence that he 
would decide the case fairly and undeterred by the abuse and threats from a 
small section of the population. 
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As O'Linn J aptly put it, 
"[t]his simply means that it is also not subject to the dictates of political parties, even if 
the party is the majority party. Similarly it is not subject to any other pressure group 11 • 212 
Not only does article 78 protect the independence of the judiciary in general; 
article 78(3) goes even further to prohibit members of the cabinet or the 
legislature from interfering with the judiciary in the exercise of its judicial 
function, be it before, during or after judicial proceedings. 213 Article 78(3) 
also places a positive legal duty on all organs of the state to provide such 
assistance as the courts may require to protect their independence, dignity and 
effectiveness. Failure by these organs to protect the independence of the 
judiciary would be an "evasion and abrogation of their legal duties" and an 
"open invitation to the disgruntled and uninformed members of the public to 
do their damnedest, without fear of interference or action from the organs of 
government". 214 
O'Linn J emphasised that it was not only the independence of the judiciary 
that must be protected but also its dignity and effectiveness. It was precisely 
because judges were expected to perform their function of adjudicating legal 
disputes and protecting the rights of individuals impartially and effectively that 
interference with the judiciary was prohibited and legal duties to protect 
judicial independence were imposed. In this regard O'Linn J said: 
11 The aforesaid prohibitions and legal duties are imposed to make it possible for Judges 
and judicial officers to perform effectively their very onerous and responsible functions - which 
include their role a...;; guardians of the Constitution, protectors of the fundamental human rights of 
the citizen and guarantors of a fair trial to those accused who appear before them on criminal 
charges or those who are engaged in civil suits or actions. 11215 
212At 789E. 
213See O'Linn J's observation at 789F. 
214At 790C-E. 
215At 791B. 
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The judgment of O'Linn J on the independence of the judiciary is also 
important in another respect. It dispels the misconception that the granting of 
fundamental human rights and their constitutional guarantee are necessarily 
absolute. No doubt article 21 of the Namibian Constitution guarantees freedom 
of speech and expression; however, subarticle (2) restricts this freedom in that 
it must be exercised only 
11
subject to the law of Namibia, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms conferred by the said subarticle (subarticle (1) ), which 
are necessary in a democratic society and are required in the interests of the sovereignty and 
integrity of Namibia, national security, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence 11 • 216 
The restriction of freedom of speech in so far as it relates to judicial 
independence is without doubt reasonable and necessary in a democratic 
society. The specific restriction of freedom of speech and expression in 
relation to contempt of court217 is "necessary to protect the independence of 
the courts and the independence, dignity and effectiveness of the courts and 
their judicial officers" .218 In essence, judicial independence ensures the very 
same democratic ideal for which the constitutional guarantee of fundamental 
human rights stands. 
The post-independence judgments of the Namibian High Court and the 
Namibian Supreme Court represent a positive development in judicial 
interpretation and application of the provisions of a supreme Constitution. The 
court viewed the Constitution as a supreme law which embodies the values 
and aspirations of the people and recognised that in its interpretation and 
application these values must be objectively articulated and identified. Most 
importantly, cognisance must be taken of prevailing social conditions, 
21
'At 792D. 
217It may be noted that contempt of court is also a crime. 
218At 793A. 
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experiences and perceptions of the people. 
The judgment of O'Linn J in S v Heita219 , in particular, contains the 
important warning that the successful implementation of the provisions of a 
supreme Constitution depends on the independence of the judiciary and the 
government's commitment to upholding the Constitution. 
219Supra. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION OF 
1993. 
1. Introduction. 
The operation of the doctrine of legislative supremacy in South Africa has had 
a negative impact on the role of the judiciary in the field of the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. In accordance with this doctrine the courts 
were obliged to enforce an Act of Parliament, even if it infringed or 
unnecessarily curtailed the rights and freedoms of individuals as recognised 
at common law .1 The courts were obliged to give effect to the clear intention 
of the legislature; norms of the common law, international law and morality 
which advanced the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms had to give 
way to the intention of the legislature.2 
In its original Westminster context the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
from which the concept of legislative supremacy originated, is generally 
regarded as one of the pillars of the Constitution. In its historical context in 
English constitutional law, the sovereignty of Parliament was regarded as a 
1L. Boulle, B. Harris & C. Hoexter Constitutional and 
Administrative Law - Basic Principles (1989) at 112;D. Basson & 
H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (1988) at 226; M.G 
Cowling "Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa" 1987 
SAJHR 177 at 181. 
2See for example S v Meer 1981 (4) SA 604(A); S v Christie 1982 
(1) SA 464 (A). 
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victory over the despotism of the monarchs;' when Parliament became the 
champion of the rights and freedoms of the ordinary citizen, its sovereignty 
came to be seen as necessary for the protection of these rights against the 
despotism of the monarch. 
The fear of legislative despotism in England has by and large been mitigated 
by Parliament's respect for conventions, a high regard for civil liberties, 
respect for the rule of law', universal adult suffrage and full parliamentary 
representation. However, in South Africa, limited parliamentary 
representation, the absence of universal adult suffrage, Parliament's disregard 
for fundamental human rights and a disrespect for the rule of law led in the 
past to legislative and executive high-handedness and a violation of the rights 
and freedoms of citizens. 5 
Although the 1983 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa represented 
a marked departure from the traditional Westminster system, it did not 
completely abandon the concept of legislative supremacy;6 it instead retained 
the concept in substance. 7 There was as yet no substantive review of 
legislation; the role of the judiciary remained restricted to formal testing of 
compliance with certain structural or procedural provisions of the 
'E.C.S Wade & A.W Bradley Constitutional Law (1965) at 47; 0 
Hood Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (1973); J.D 
van der Vyver "Parliamentary Sovereignty, Fundamental Freedoms and a Bill 
of Rights" 1982 SALJ 557 at 559. 
4See J.D van der Vyver 1982 SALJ at 557. 
5Van der Vyver 1982 SALJ at 557; Cowling 1987 SAJHR at 180. 
6See Chapt. 4 for a discussion of the 1983 Constitution. 
7G. Carpenter Introduction to South African Constitutional 
Law (1987) at 330; D. Basson & H. Viljoen South African 
Constitutional Law (1988) at 199; F. Venter "Die Grondwet van die 
Tweede Republiek van Suid-Afrika" 1985 THRHR 253 at 275. 
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Constitution. 
The 1983 Constitution was essentially an attempt to accommodate and involve 
the 'Coloured' and Indian population groups in the main-stream of 
government; it was, however, not well received, mainly because it excluded 
blacks, the majority of the South African population. The Constitution's lack 
of credibility meant that there would have to be an earnest search for a new 
constitutional dispensation which catered for all the peoples of South Africa. 
Tentative steps towards a new constitutional dispensation began with the 
request by the National Party government to the South African Law 
Commission to investigate and make recommendations on the protection of 
human rights and the role of the courts in connection with such protection.8 
The Law Commission subsequently published a working paper9 , an interim 
report on group and human rights10 and a report on constitutional models. 11 
In September 1990 the former State President, Mr F.W de Klerk, announced 
that the government accepted the protection of human rights in principle. The 
majority of the participants at the first Conference for a Democratic South 
Africa expressed their support for a new constitutional dispensation which 
protected human rights in a Bill of Rights; however, the African National 
Congress, one of the major parties at the negotiations, suspended its 
participation after the Boipatong massacre on 17 June 1992. 
Constitutional talks resumed on 1 April 1993 after almost 11 months of 
8See Hansard, 23 April 1986 columns 4014-4015. 
9Working Paper 25, Project 58 Group and Human Rights, 1989. 
10Project 58, Group and Human Rights, Interim Report, August 
1991. 
11Project 77, Report on Constitutional Models October 1991. 
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interruption. On 2 July 1993 the Negotiating Council of the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Process accepted a package of Constitutional Principles with 
which a new constitutional dispensation and all subsequent dispensations would 
have to comply;12 it also agreed on a date for a non-racial and democratic 
election, namely 27 April 1994. This agreement was followed by a further 
agreement, on 7 September 1993, to set up a Transitional Executive Council 
(TEC); Parliament subsequently passed the Transitional Executive Council 
Act13 , which established the TEC. 
It became clear throughout the negotiations for a new constitutional 
dispensation that the majority of the participants were in favour of a supreme 
Constitution with a justiciable Bill of Rights; this was a clear indication of an 
intention to abandon the doctrine of legislative supremacy and an acceptance 
of the principles of constitutional supremacy and the constitutional protection 
of fundamental human rights. On 18 November 1993 the Negotiating Council 
agreed on an interim Constitution, to operate until April 1999 when a final 
Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Assembly will come into operation. 
Parliament enacted the 1993 Constitution14 on 22 December 1993. 15 
2. The 1993 Constitution. 
The 1993 Constitution was adopted on the basis that some of its provisions, 
12The package initially consisted of twenty-seven Constitutional Principles 
but was expanded on 17 November 1993 by an additional six principles. With 
the later addition of another principle there are now thirty-four principles in 
all. 
13 Act No. 151 of 1993. 
14Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
15For a detailed account of constitutional development leading to the 
adoption of the 1993 Constitution see inter alia B. De Villiers (ed) Birth 
of a Constitution (1994); L. Du Plessis & H. Corder Understanding 
South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) Chapters 1 and 2. 
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especially those which establish a multi-party Government, will operate for 
only five years. It provides a framework on which the Constitutional 
Assembly will draw up a final Constitution. 
The 1993 Constitution differs from all other previous Constitutions in that it 
breaks away from a past of racial and gender inequality, violation of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, strife and injustice and establishes, 
for the first time in South African history, a democratic constitutional state. 
The preamble makes mention of 
"the need to create a new order in which all South African will be entitled to a common 
South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there is 
equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens sha11 be able to enjoy 
and exercise their fundamenta1 rights and freedoms 11 • 
In systems of legislative supremacy the preamble does not have the same 
status as the provisions of the Constitution and is generally regarded as being 
of little use in the interpretation of these provisions; it is usually referred to 
when interpreting an uncertain or unclear provision. 16 In S V Mhlungu 
and Others,17 however, Sachs J emphasised the importance of the 
preamble in the interpretation of the 1993 Constitution: 
'
1The preamble in particular should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational and throat-
clearing exercise of little interpretative value. It connects up. reinforces and underlies all the text 
that fol1ows. It helps to establish the basic design of the Constitution and to indicate its 
fundamental purposes. 11 
The 'postamble', 18 which is entitled National Unity and Reconciliation, 
16See D. Basson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law 
(1988) at 230. 
171995(7) BCLR 793 (CC) at 8400. 
18 The 'postamble' is also called the 'commitment' or 'afterword'. Unlike 
the preamble, it is expressly given the same status as any other provision of 
the Constitution (section 232(4)); it provides an important guidance in the 
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characterises the Constitution as 
"a bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, 
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights. democracy 
and peaceful co~existence and development of opportunities for al] South Africans, irrespective 
of colour. racei class, beJief or sex 11 • 
The Constitution is in essence a vehicle for transforming the state from one 
characterised by a culture of authoritarianism to one characterised by a culture 
of justification. 19 It not only makes provision for the structure and powers 
of government but also sets out the limits of government power in relation to 
the rights and freedoms of individuals as guaranteed in it. A government 
limitation on these rights and freedoms is valid only if it is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality 
and does not negate the essential content of the right or freedom in 
question. 20 
The Constitution is divided into 15 chapters. For present purposes the most 
important these are chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9. Chapter 1 deals with the 
constituent and formal provisions; chapter 2 makes provision for the 
enjoyment of the rights, privileges and benefits of South African citizenship 
by all South Africans21 and extends the franchise to all South African citizens 
of or over the age of 18 years. 22 Chapter 3 entrenches fundamental human 
rights and freedoms , subject to the limitations contained in section 33(1) and 
section 34(4); this chapter also contains a general interpretation clause.23 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
19See E. Mureinik "A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of 
Rights" 1994 SAJHR 31 at 32. 
20Section 33(1). 
21Section 5(3). 
22Section 6. 
23Section 35. 
-397-
Chapter 4 makes provision for a legislature which consists of two houses, the 
National Assembly and the Senate24; chapter 6 makes provision for a multi-
party cabinet. Chapter 7 deals with the judiciary and the administration of the 
judiciary; it establishes, in addition to the existing Supreme Court, a 
Constitutional Court25 and makes provision, inter alia, for the appointment, 
removal from office and remuneration of judges26 , the independence of the 
judiciary27 and the establishment of a Judicial Service Commission28 • 
Chapter 9 deals with provincial government. 
2.1. The Nature of the Constitution. 
Save for stating that the Republic of South Africa shall be "one, sovereign 
state", 29 the 1993 Constitution does not specify whether it establishes a 
unitary or a federal state. There are, however, federal features; there is a 
good deal of devolution of power between the national government and 
provincial governments30 • While the central legislature has plenary power to 
make laws for the Republic in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, 31 provincial legislatures are competent to make Jaws for the 
province with regard to certain matters, which are specified in Schedule 6. 32 
2
'Section 36. 
25Section 98(1). 
26Sections 97, 99 and 104. 
27Sections 96(2) and (3). 
28Section 105(1). 
29Section 1. 
30The national territory is divided into nine provinces, each with its own 
government. 
31Section 37. 
32Section 126(1). 
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Although the legislative power of provincial legislatures is greatly enhanced, 
the central government still retains its ultimate supremacy. The central 
legislature is competent, in addition to its plenary legislative power, to make 
laws with regard to matters which fall within the competence of provincial 
legislatures as specified in Schedule 6. 33 However, section 126(3) limits 
central legislature's legislative power with regard to these matters. 34 The 
central and provincial legislatures have concurrent powers. In essence, the 
Constitution provides for a system which is neither fully federal nor fully 
unitary. 
The 1993 Constitution replaces the doctrine of legislative supremacy with the 
principles of constitutional supremacy and the entrenchment of fundamental 
human rights. Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution is 
the supreme law of the land; any law or act which is inconsistent with its 
provisions, including those which guarantee fundamental human rights, is to 
the extent of the inconsistency of no force and effect35 ; the provisions of the 
Constitution are binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs of 
"Section 126(2A). 
34In terms of section 126(3) a law passed by a provincial legislature 
prevails over an Act of the central legislature which deals with matters within 
the competence of provincial legislatures, except in so far as (1) such Act 
deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by provincial 
legislation; (2) such Act deals with a matter that, to be performed effectively, 
requires to be co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards that apply generally 
throughout the country; (3) such Act is necessary to set uniform standards 
across the nation for the rendering of public services; ( 4) such Act is 
necessary for the maintenance of economic unity, the protection of the 
environment, the promotion of interprovincial commerce, the protection of the 
common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital or 
labour, or the maintenance of national security; or (5) the provincial law 
materially prejudices the economic, health or security interests of another 
province or the country as a whole, or impedes the implementation of national 
economic· policies. Furthermore, section 126(4) provides that an Act of the 
central legislature will prevail over a provincial law only if it applies 
uniformly in all parts of the country. 
35Section 4(1). 
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state at all levels of government36 • Section 4 must be read together with 
sections 7(4), 98(2) and 102(3) and 102(3); these provisions are what may 
appropriately be called the justiciability provisions and deal with judicial 
enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution.37 
In contrast to the principle of legislative supremacy, the principle of 
constitutional supremacy means that the Constitution has the status of a higher 
law. All state organs are subject to its provisions; it operates with supreme 
authority and the legislature or the executive organs may not act contrary to 
its provisions; the judicial organ is bound to apply its provisions when called 
upon to do so. 
A supreme Constitution usually derives its supremacy from the fact that it is 
an original act of the people, usually through their representatives at a 
constitution-making body. Its supremacy is based on the rationale that the will 
of the people is superior to all other wills, be they legislative or executive38; 
all legislative and executive powers are derived from and therefore subordinate 
to it39 • Although the 1993 Constitution cannot be said to be an original act 
of the people in the strict sense, 40 it lays down the foundation for the 
reflection of the will of the people in a final Constitution.41 
36Section 4(2). 
37See infra. 
38See B.O Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States 
(1973) at 28. 
39Nwabueze ibid at 5. 
"'The Constitution was negotiated by the major parties represented at the 
Negotiating Council of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process and adopted by the 
former Parliament. 
41Chapter 5 of the 1993 Constitution makes provision for the adoption of 
the new Constitution. In terms of section 68(2) the Constitutional Assembly, 
which consists of the National Assembly and the Senate sitting jointly, is to 
draft and adopt the new Constitution. In terms of section 71(1)(a) the new 
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The supremacy of the Constitution does not mean, however, that its provisions 
are completely incapable of repeal or amendment. A more difficult method for 
its repeal or amendment is laid down. In terms of section 62(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, a two-thirds majority of all the members of both houses of 
Parliament sitting jointly is required for any amendment of its provisions, 
except where the proposed amendment relates to the legislative competences 
of the provinces as contained in section 126 and the executive authority of the 
provinces as contained in section 144, in which case a two-thirds majority of 
all the members of each house sitting separately is required for any 
amendment; in addition, an alteration of the boundaries and legislative and 
executive competencies of a province can only be effected with the consent of 
the provincial legislature concerned. 42 
Whether a Constitution will be easy or difficult to amend depends largely on 
the sufficiency of the mechanism for its amendment. It is submitted that a 
parliamentary majority, as required by section 62 of the Constitution, does not 
provide a sufficient preventive measure against the amendment of certain core 
provisions of the Constitution. Provisions which entrench fundamental human 
rights and those which constitute the organs of state and prescribe their 
powers, for example, require more than a parliamentary majority for their 
amendment or repeal; such provisions are the essence of the will of the 
people. If the Constitution is to bear the mark of a document emanating from 
the will of the people and therefore its supreme force, something more than 
a parliamentary majority is required for the amendment of core provisions. 
The sanction of the electorate at a referendum, as in Belgium or the 
dissolution of the legislature and new elections before the proposed 
constitutional text must comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in 
Schedule 4 of the 1993 Constitution; these Constitutional Principles are an 
agreed pact which was negotiated and adopted by the majority of all political 
parties and formations at the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum and are binding 
upon the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly. 
42Section 62(2). 
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amendment is made, would reflect the supreme force of a Constitution and 
also constitute effective preventive measures against its repeal or amendment. 
2.L The Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights. 
The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in a supreme Constitution is 
a significant step in South African constitutional development. The 
constitutional entrenchment of fundamental human rights is premised on the 
principle of limited government and the idea that the individual must be free 
legitimately to pursue his interests, with little interference from the 
government; 43 the principles of limited government and the entrenchment of 
human rights are an expression of the fundamental principles of natural law, 
right and justice and the religious, philosophical and moral concepts which 
have developed through the ages and are still valid today. These historical, 
religious, philosophical and moral concepts form the basis of higher legal 
values in terms of which the validity of positive law must be judged.44 
The entrenchment of fundamental rights in a Constitution determines the scope 
of individual rights while at the same time determining the scope of state 
power in relation to these rights. The exercise of state power is limited to the 
extent that state organs may not, in the exercise of their powers, violate the 
rights entrenched in the Constitution.45 An effective guarantee of the rights 
set out in the Constitution is secured through justiciability and the sanction of 
invalidity; any legislative or executive act which infringes these rights can be 
43See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of the paradoxical notion of the power of 
the judiciary to enforce constitutional guarantees ahead of the legislature as a 
representative of the will of the people. 
440. Basson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law 
(1988) at 1-3 and 217-219. 
45 As Mureinik 1994 SAJHR at 32 points out, the entrenchment of human 
rights fosters a culture of justification, one in which "every exercise of 
(governmental) power is expected to be justified; ... " 
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'declared invalid by courts of law. 
Section 7(1) of the Constitution specifically provides that the Chapter in which 
fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed (Chapter 3 or the Bill of 
Rights) shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of 
state. Unlike 4(2) of the Constitution, which is part of the supremacy clause, 
section 7(1) does not provide that the judiciary, as an organ of state, is also 
bound by the provisions of Chapter 3. This seems to suggest that the courts 
are excluded from the binding effect of the Chapter. This, however, is not 
necessarily so. 
There are certain provisions of Chapter 3 which are necessarily binding on the 
courts because they also lay down the manner in which judicial proceedings 
must to be conducted. Section 8(1) for example, makes provision for equal 
protection of the law; courts are therefore obliged to give every person equal 
protection of the law. Section 22, which makes provision for access to the 
courts, obliges the courts to settle justiciable disputes. Section 25(3) of the 
Constitution, for example, guarantees the right to a fair trial. The rights 
entrenched in section 25 are by their nature procedural rights which form an 
integral part of judicial proceedings46 and therefore bind the judiciary. 47 
A possible explanation of the omission of the judiciary in section 7(1) is that 
46There are instances where a person may be tried by an administrative 
tribunal for an administrative misconduct (the so-called 'misconduct trials'). 
Administrative tribunals are a part of the executive machinery and are, in 
terms of section 7(1), bound by Chapter 3: see the definition of 'organ of 
state' in section 233(1)(ix). 
47See for example S v Sefadi 1994 (2) BCLR 23 (D); S v Shangase 
and Another 1994 (2) BCLR 42 (D); S v Solo 1995(1) SACR 499 (E) 
S v Mtyuda 1995 (5) BCLR 646 (E) and S v Zuma and Others 1995 
(4) BCLR 401 (CC) where it was held that the courts were in essence bound 
by the provisions of section 25(3). See P. W Hogg Constitutional Law of 
Canada (1985) at 672 on the position in Canada. 
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the traditional function of the judiciary is to protect fundamental human rights 
and freedoms against infringements by the legislative and executive organs of 
state in terms of the principle of the separation of powers;48 the legislature 
and the executive, on the other hand, are the organs which traditionally 
endanger these rights and freedoms. According to this explanation section 7(1) 
merely indicates that the legislative and executive organs of state are obliged 
not to infringe unconstitutionally upon the fundamental rights entrenched in 
Chapter 3. 49 Since the function of the judiciary is to resolve legal disputes, 
it is obliged to grant appropriate relief when an infringement of or any threat 
to any right entrenched in the Chapter is alleged.so In addition, section 35 
obliges the courts to promote the values which underlie an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality and, where applicable, to 
have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the 
entrenched rights when interpreting the provisions of Chapter 3. Section 35 
in essence obliges the courts to interpret and protect the entrenched rights in 
accordance with the ethos of Chapter 3. 
The question also arises whether the omission of the judiciary from the 
binding effect of section 7(1) was intended to make it clear that the judiciary 
is not obliged to enforce the rights and freedoms entrenched in Chapter 3 
when dealing with matters which do not involve an organ of the states' as a 
48See Chap!. 5 for a discussion of the principle of the separation of 
powers. 
49See D. Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution (1994) at 
14. 
so see section 7 ( 4). 
51In Directory Advertising Cost Cutters CC v Minister of 
Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting and Others 
[1996] 2 All SA 83 (T) the court held that the test to be adopted to determine 
whether a particular organ or body was an organ of state was whether the 
state was in control. 
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litigant, that is matters involving private individuals inter se. 52 
The Canadian Supreme Court held in Retail, Wholesale and 
Department Store Union Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery 
Ltd53 that the Canadian Charter does not ordinarily apply to the common 
law in litigation between private individuals; it will apply only in so far as the 
common law is the basis of some governmental action which is alleged to 
infringe a guaranteed right or freedom. This approach cannot, however, be 
applied to the South African situation. In terms of section 98(2)(a) and section 
101(3)(a) of the Constitution, an action or defence to an action at common law 
can be founded on the provisions of Chapter 3.54 Furthermore, section 35(3) 
of the Constitution specifically obliges the court to have regard to the spirit, 
purport and objects of Chapter 3 in the interpretation of any law and the 
application and development of the common law and customary law. 55 The 
provisions of section 35(3) and the fact that section 7( 4) does not confine 
justiciable infringements to those by organs of state seem to indicate that 
Chapter 3 also operates 'horizontally' .56 Section 7(4) does not say that an 
52The question in essence is whether the omission is intended to indicate 
that the Bill of Rights operates only vertically and not horizontally. 
"Supra. 
54See J.D Van der Vyver "The Private Sphere in Constitutional Litigation" 
1994 THRHR 378 at 383. 
55See A. van Aswegen "The Implications of a Bill of Rights for the Law 
of Contract and Delict" 1995 SAJHR 50 at 56-58 for a discussion of the 
effect of section 35(3) on private law. 
56Basson op cit at 15. This view is confirmed by the judgments in 
Mandela v Falati 1994(4) BCLR 1 (W), especially at 6H-J; Gardener 
v Whitaker 1994(5) BCLR 19 (E), especially at 30G-31B; Jurgens v 
The Editor, The Sunday Times Newspaper and Another 
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infringement must be by an organ of a state. 57 
In terms of section 7(4), any person who alleges that his right as entrenched 
in Chapter 3 has been infringed or is being threatened is entitled to apply to 
a competent court of law58 for appropriate relief; juristic persons are also 
entitled to the rights entrenched in Chapter 3, in so far as the relevant rights 
may by their nature be enjoyed by juristic persons. 59 Enforcement of the 
rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 is not limited to a person whose interests are 
directly affected; persons acting as members of interest groups or acting in the 
public interest, inter alia, may also approach the court for appropriate 
relief. 60 
Chapter 3 guarantees a wide range of fundamental human rights. These rights 
1995(1) BCLR 97 (W), especially at 103C. But contra De Klerk and 
Another v Du Plessis and Others 1994(6) BCLR 124 (T). 
57The reason for the omission of the judiciary from section 7(1), and the 
whole question of the limits of horizontal operation of Chapter 3 have not yet 
been finally resolved: see Du Plessis & Corder op cit at 110-114. 
Addendum: The Constitutional Court has held in Gardener v Whitaker 
CCT 26/94, judgment delivered on 15 May 1996 and De Klerk v Du 
Plessis CCT 8/95, judgment delivered on 15 May 1996 that the provisions 
of Chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution do not operate horizontally. However, 
the new Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) now 
provides in section 8(1) that the Bill of Rights "binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state". 
58See infra in connection with the question of which court is competent 
to determine the constitutionality of a law which is alleged to infringe the 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution. 
59Section 7(3). 
60Section 7(4)(b). 
-406-
may be divided into six categories,61 namely equality rights62, private law 
rights63, fundamental freedoms64 , mobility, citizenship and political 
rights65 , administrative justice66 , economic, welfare and educational 
rights67, language and cultural rights68 and procedural rights69• 
Chapter 3 does not provide for an absolute guarantee of the rights prescribed 
61There are various ways of categorising rights. One of the ways is to 
distinguish between first generation, second generation and third generation 
rights. First generation rights include political, civil and procedural rights; 
second generation rights include social, economic and cultural rights; third 
generation rights are the so-called peoples' rights and include the right to 
peace, the right to self-determination, the right to control over resources, the 
right to development and the right to a clean environment: see Du Plessis & 
Corder op cit. at 24; "Albie Sachs on Human Rights in South Africa" 1990 
SAJHR 29. Van der Vyver Seven Lectures on Human Rights 
(1976) at 57 et seq. distinguishes between substantive rights and freedoms, 
which include personal rights, civil rights, political rights, economic rights 
and social rights, and procedural rights, which are concerned with the 
administration of justice; see also G. Carpenter Introduction to South 
African Constitutional Law (1987) at 94. 
62Sections 8(1) and (2). 
63Sections 9, 10, 12, 13 and 28. 
64Sections 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. 
65section 20 and 21. 
66Section 24. 
67Sections 26, 27, 29, 30 and 32. 
68Section 31. 
69Sections 23 and 25. 
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in it. The chapter makes provision for three types of curtailment. 70 Section 
33(1) makes provision for limitation by Jaw of general application, provided, 
however, that such limitation is reasonable, justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality, and does not negate the 
essential content of the right in question;71 a limitation of the rights 
enumerated in section 33(l)(aa) must, in addition to being reasonable, also be 
necessary; a limitation of the rights enumerated in section 33(l)(bb) must, in 
addition to being reasonable, also be necessary in so far as they relate to free 
and fair political activity. 
The first type of curtailment affects what may be called the 'least protected 
category' of rights; these are all the rights which are not enumerated in 
sections 33(l)(aa) and 33(l)(bb), as long as those enumerated in section 
33(l)(bb) do not relate to free and political activity. 
The second type of curtailment affects what may be called the 'most protected 
category' of rights. These are those enumerated in section 33(l)(aa), namely 
the rights to human dignity,72 freedom and security of the person,73 the 
right not to be subjected to servitude and forced labour, 74 the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, including 
academic freedom, 75 the right freely to engage in political activities, 76 the 
70See J.D van der Vyver "Limitation Provisions of the Bophuthatswanan 
Bill of Rights" 1994 THRHR 46 at 58-65 for a distinction between the 
various types of curtailment. 
71See infra for a discussion of the interpretation and application of 
section 33(1). 
nsection 10. 
73Section 11. 
74Section 12. 
75Section 14(1). 
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rights of detained, arrested and accused persons, 77 the rights of children not 
to be neglected or abused and not to be subjected to exploitative labour 
practices or required or permitted to perform work which is hazardous or 
harmful to their education, health or well-being,7' the right of detained 
children to be kept under conditions and to be treated in a manner that takes 
into account of his or her age. 79 
The rights enumerated in section 33(1)(bb), namely the right to freedom of 
speech and expression, including freedom of the press and other media and 
freedom of artistic creativity and scientific research,8° the rights of assembly, 
to demonstrate and to present petitions, 81 freedom of association,82 freedom 
of movement, 83 the right of access to information84 and administrative 
justice85 fall under the most protected category only in so far as they relate 
to free and fair political activity;86 they enjoy the least protection if they do 
not relate to free and fair political activity. Section 33(1)(bb) in essence 
76Section 21. 
77Section 25. 
78Sections 30(1)(d) and (e). 
79Section 30(2). 
80Section 15(1). 
81Section 16. 
s:'Section 17. 
83Section 18. 
"Section 23. 
85Section 24. 
86The distinction between the categories of protection is inconsistent and 
arbitrary. For example, freedom of speech and expression, which constitutes 
the foundation of democracy, falls into the intermediate category of protection; 
the right to life, which is one of the most important rights, falls into the least 
protected category: see Mureinik 1994 SAJHR at 33-35. 
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creates a intermediate and hybrid category. 87 
The strict requirement that any limitation of the two classes of rights specified 
in section 33(1)(aa) and (bb) must, in addition to being reasonable, also be 
necessary, is based on the fact that these rights emphasise the worth of the 
human being as a member of political and civil society; as a member of 
political and civil society the individual ought to be sufficiently protected in 
his person, religion, belief, opinion and participation in political activities and 
also ought to be treated fairly and justly in criminal proceedings. The 
guarantee of the second class of rights, in particular, is necessary for free and 
fair political activity and forms part of the process of democracy. 
The second type of curtailment of the rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 is 
contained in section 34. This curtailment must, however, be distinguished 
from the ordinary limitation contained in section 33. It is a curtailment which 
is based on the constitutional law rule that a state is entitled defend itself or 
to protect its supremacy when faced with a situation of necessity. 88 In terms 
of section 34(4) the rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 may be suspended during 
a state of emergency if such suspension is necessary to restore peace or 
order. 89 Section 34(4) is based on the principle that the state is, m 
87Mureinik 1994 SAJHR at 33. 
88See in general Basson & Viljoen op cit at 245 et seq. 
89Section 34 suggests that a suspension of the rights entrenched in Chapter 
3 means a temporary deprivation or inoperation (a temporary but total holding 
in abeyance) of the rights and not their abolition: see Van der Vyver 1994 
THRHR at 61. The power to extend the state of emergency beyond the 21 
days limit is restricted by the requirement that at least two-thirds of all elected 
representatives of the National Assembly must support a resolution to extend 
(section 34(2); this power is also limited by means of judicial controls in 
terms of section 34(3). Section 34( 4) specifically provides that the rights 
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circumstances which constitute necessity, entitled to restrict or suspend the 
rights of individuals in order to secure the interests of the general public and 
to maintain the continued existence of the state.90 Section 34, however, 
contains a number of regulatory and protective mechanisms, including the 
competence of the court to inquire into the validity of a declaration of a state 
of emergency and any action under such declaration. 
Chapter 3 also contains in section 35 an interpretation clause which is intended 
to serve as a general guide in the interpretation and application of its 
provisions by the courts. Section 35 contains some key guides to the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter 3. In the first place, 
in the interpretation of the provisions of the Chapter, due regard must be 
taken of 
11 the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights entrenched in (Chapter 3). and may have regard to comparable foreign 
lawn.91 
In the second place, 
"no law which limits any of the rights entrenched in (Chapter 3), shall be constitutionally 
invalid solely by reason of the fact that the wording used prima facie exceeds the limits imposed 
in (the) Chapter, provided such Jaw is reasonably capable of a more restricted interpretation which 
does not exceed such limits. in which event such Jaw sha11 be construed as having a meaning in 
entrenched in Chapter 3 may be suspended only to the extent necessary to 
restore peace and order. See Chapt. 11 for a discussion of the role of the 
judiciary in a state of emergency. 
90See infra. 
91Section 35(1). See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the usefulness of 
international law and foreign law as sources of constitutional values. 
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accordance with the said more restricted interpretation 11 • 92 
Lastly, "in the interpretation of any law and the development of the common 
law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport 
and objects of (Chapter 3)" .93 
Section 35(1) merely provides a general interpretative framework based on the 
nature of the Constitution; it is in itself too wide and open-ended to constitute 
a specific interpretative framework; the phrase "open and democratic society" 
requires further judicial construction, as does the phrase "spirit ... of this 
Chapter" in section 35(3). However, the requirement that the court must, 
where applicable, have regard to public international law provides a basis for 
the search of values which underlie an open and democratic society. 
The spirit of Chapter 3 can be gleaned from the postamble. In terms of the 
postamble the Constitution is intended to lead to "a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and 
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, 
class, belief or sex". The spirit and larger object of Chapter 3 is to bring 
about the ideal of a democratic state in which the freedom, rights and dignity 
of persons are protected and respected. 
The requirement that the court must have regard to public international law 
does not mean that the court must apply all rules of public international law. 
Section 35(1) refers to the interpretation of the human rights provisions 
contained in Chapter 3; the applicable public international law is therefore 
international human rights law, which promotes the legal values of democratic 
92Section 35(2). Section 35(2) is simply a reading down provision; it does 
not, strictly speaking, create a presumption of constitutionality: see Chap!. 11. 
93Section 35(3). 
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government based on freedom, equality and human dignity .9' The section in 
essence acknowledges that in certain instances national human rights Jaw may 
be deficient and that it should in such instances be supplemented by 
international human rights Jaw .95 
While the court has a duty to have regard to public international law where 
applicable, it merely has a discretion to have regard to comparable foreign 
case law. 96 It is important to note that the court may only have regard to 
comparable foreign case law; this means that only those foreign cases in 
which constitutional texts which are contextually comparable to our 
Constitution have been interpreted and applied are relevant. The Constitution 
of Canada, in particular, is contextually comparable to our Constitution; the 
section 33(1) limitation, which is vital to the interpretation and application of 
the provisions of Chapter 3, has a predominantly Canadian influence. German, 
Indian, Zimbabwean, Botswanan and Namibian case Jaw is also relevant. 
Canada, Namibia and South Africa, in particular, share a common tradition 
of legislative supremacy which was superseded by constitutional supremacy 
and the entrenchment of fundamental human rights. Despite the fact that the 
Constitution of the United States is different from the South African 
Constitution, American constitutional case law will also be persuasive; many 
cases of constitutional importance have been decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in particular. 
940n international human rights law see L. Henkin "The 
Internationalization of Human Rights" in L. Henkin et al Human Rights: 
A Symposium (1977) 6. 
95See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the extent of the application of 
international human rights law in the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of Chapter 3. 
96This is clear from the use of "shall" in respect of public international law 
and "may" in respect of comparable foreign case law. 
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2.3. Justiciability. 
The efficacy of a Constitution with supreme authority is ensured by the 
sanction of invalidity, in the sense that any law which is in conflict with its 
provisions may be declared invalid by a court of law. In practical terms this 
means that a person who alleges that the provisions of the Constitution have 
been infringed, may approach the court for a determination of the 
constitutionality of the law in question and an order that it is invalid, should 
the court find that it is unconstitutional. The justiciability of a Constitution is 
an essential characteristic of constitutional supremacy; it gives the courts a 
fundamental role in the process of government and is an effective means of 
preserving constitutional limitations on the exercise of government 
authority97• 
The justiciability of the provisions of the Constitution derives from the 
provisions of sections 4(1), 7(4), 98(2) and 101(3). Section 4(1) constitutes the 
basis of justiciability; it provides that any law which is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution shall be of no force and effect to the extent of 
the inconsistency. Section 4(1) in essence makes provision for the sanction of 
invalidity, a sanction which is enforceable by courts of law. Section 7(4)(a), 
on the other hand, relates specifically to laws which are alleged to infringe the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 of the Constitution; the section 
entitles a person, as specified in subsection (b ), who alleges that any of his 
rights as guaranteed in the Chapter has been infringed or is being threatened, 
to apply to a competent court of law for relief. Sections 4(1) and 7(4)(a) do 
not state specifically which court is competent to determine constitutionality. 
Section 7(4)(a) of the Constitution makes express provision for a remedial or 
enforcement measure. However, the section merely states that a person who 
97See B.O Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: 
The Role of the Courts in Government (1977) at 27. 
-414-
has locus standi as specified in section 7(4)(b)98 and who alleges an 
infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in Chapter 3 is "entitled to 
apply to a competent court of law for appropriate relief, which may include 
a declaration of rights". In terms of the Constitution, competent courts of law 
are the Constitutional Court, in terms of its exclusive constitutional 
jurisdiction99 , and the Supreme Court, in terms of the concurrent 
constitutional jurisdiction it shares with the Constitutional Court. 100 
The Constitution envisages an order of invalidity as the major form of relief. 
In terms of section 4(1) any law or act inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary 
implication in the Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the 
inconsistency. In essence, section 4(1 ), which is the supremacy clause, 
empowers a competent court of Jaw, at the instance of an applicant who has 
locus standi, to declare a law or act which is inconsistent with the provisions 
of the Constitution invalid and of no force and effect to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 101 
98Locus standi is granted to persons acting in their own interest, to an 
association acting in the interest of its members, to a person acting on behalf 
of another person who is not in a position to seek relief in his or her own 
name, to a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class 
of persons and to a person acting in the public interest. 
99Section 98(2). 
100Section 101(3)(a). 
101The court may, however, in terms of sections 98(5) and 101(4), also 
make an order, in the interests of justice and good government, requiring 
Parliament or any other competent authority, within a period specified by it, 
to correct a defect in the law or provision in issue, in which event the law 
remains in force pending correction or the expiry of the specified period: see 
Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences v Park-Ross 
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, In instances where there is a threat to any of the rights entrenched in Chapter 
3, an appropriate form of relief would be an interim interdict. It has been held 
that the Supreme Court is competent to grant interim relief pending the 
decision of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of an Act of 
Parliament. 102 
There are various other forms of relief which the court may grant. In criminal 
·proceedings the court may quash the proceedings or order that an accused be 
furnished with information in terms of section 23 of the Constitution or that 
he be released on bail in terms of section 25(2)(d). Another form of relief 
would be the exclusion of evidence obtained in contravention of the provisions 
of, for example, section 11(2) of the Constitution. Section 11(2) prohibits 
torture and cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment; evidence obtained by the 
police through torture can be excluded on the basis that it was obtained in 
contravention of section 11(2).103 
In certain instances, appropriate relief may involve the restoration of the 
plaintiff's rights, or to compensate him or her for the deprivation or 
infringement of such rights. Appropriate relief for an infringement of the right 
to freedom of the person,1°4 for example, will be a restoration of the 
and Another 1995(5) BCLR 652 (C). 
102See Matiso and Others v The Commanding Officer, Port 
Elizabeth Prison and Others 1994(3) BCLR 80 (SE) and 
Wehmeyer v Lane NO and Others 1994(2) BCLR 14 (C). Matiso 
is discussed in detail in Chap!. 10. 
103The exclusion of a confession on the basis that it was obtained in 
contravention of section 11(2) would be consistent with the common Jaw rule 
that a confession is admissible only if it is made freely and voluntarily and 
without any undue influence. 
104Section 11(1). 
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,plaintiff's physical liberty. The payment of monetary damages might, for 
,example, be the most appropriate remedy for infringements that also constitute 
private law wrongs, such as infringements of the right to dignity105 or the 
right to privacy. 106 
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security107 the court stated that 
there might be instances where a violation of a constitutional right might 
require the recognition of constitutional damages, because the common law 
does not provide a remedy. As opposed to delictual damages, constitutional 
damages serve a fourfold purpose, namely (1) the prevention and deterrence 
of violations of fundamental rights; (2) the vindication of the values of the 
rights themselves; (3) the punishment of the violator where the conduct was 
egregious; and (4) the compensation of the litigant for harm suffered. 
Section 7(4)(a) specifically mentions a declaration of rights as one of the 
appropriate forms of relief. A declaration of rights is a common law remedy 
which may be sought by an applicant where there is a clear legal dispute or 
legal uncertainty in regard to the act of an administrative organ or in order to 
ensure that an administrative organ performs a statutory duty it is obliged to 
perform. 108 The advantage of declarations of right is that they can be made 
in instances where the law does not provide for a more specific remedy. A 
court will not, however, make a declaration of rights where the dispute is 
merely academic. 109 
105Section 10. 
106Section 13. 
1071996(2) BCLR 232 (W), at 235J-236A. 
108See M. Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) at 268-269. 
109Trustees JC Ponyton Property Trust v Secretary for 
Inland Revenue 1970 (2) SA 618 (T); Reinecke v Incorporated 
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3. Constitutionalism and the New Constitution. 
The doctrine of constitutionalism is a prescriptive doctrine which indicates 
how state power should be exercised; it is also a normative doctrine which 
indicates the values which should be upheld in the governing process. 110 As 
a normative doctrine, constitutionalism means more than formal adherence to 
the letter of the Constitution; it recognises the necessity for government but 
demands that government should be limited, accountable and not 
arbitrary. 111 
The fact that there is a formal written Constitution does not necessarily mean 
that the government is a constitutional one or that any action taken by the 
government which is technically within the provisions of the Constitution is 
constitutional. Whether a Constitution will be able to foster constitutionalism 
largely depends on the sufficiency of the limitations it imposes upon the 
powers of the government and their adequacy. More than anything else, 
however, constitutionalism depends on the willingness and ability of those who 
operate the state system, namely the legislators, the policy makers, the 
administrators, and most importantly the judges, to respect its principles. 
The 1993 Constitution contains a number of fundamental principles of 
constitutionalism, namely the creation of a sovereign and democratic 
constitutional state112, the supremacy of the Constitution113 , the 
General Insurances Ltd 1974(2) SA 84 (A). 
110Boulle, Harris & Hoexter op cit. at 20. 
111Nwabueze op cit. note 38 at 1. 
112The Preamble. Section 1(1) declares the Republic of South Africa to be 
one sovereign state. 
113Section 4(1) of the Constitution. 
-418-
entrenchment of fundamental human rights114, judicial review of legislative 
and executive acts as a means of ensuring compliance with the provisions of 
the Constitution115 and the separation of powers between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches, with a guarantee of the independence of the 
judiciary .n• These principles, together with a number of other democratic 
principles, are also contained in Schedule 4 (the Constitutional Principles);117 
they provide a standard by which the record of future governments can he 
measured. 
The supremacy of the Constitution is one of the important principles of 
modem constitutionalism; section 4(1) specifically entrenches this principle. 
It limits the exercise of state power in that those who operate the state system 
must adhere to the values which underlie an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality; they may not make any law or perform any 
act which is inconsistent with these values.U8 The judiciary, on the other 
hand is obliged, in terms of section 35(1), to promote these values. Any act 
or law which is inconsistent with the values embodied in the Constitution must 
yield to its superior force. The supremacy of the Constitution also demands 
that the judiciary, as the organ which is responsible for interpreting and 
114Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
115Sections 98(2) and 101(3), read with section 4. 
116There is a clear distinction between the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary, and a prescription of the different powers of these organs. : see 
sections 37, 75 and 96. The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed in 
section 96(2). 
117In terms of section 71(1) the final Constitution must comply with the 
Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4. The Constitutional Court 
must also certify that the final Constitution complies with the Constitutional 
Principles (section 7(2)). 
118See section 33(1). 
-419-
applying the law, must vigorously enforce the supreme law of the Constitution 
by invalidating any act or law which is inconsistent with its provisions. 
The entrenchment of fundamental human rights, on the other hand, 
specifically limits the exercise of state power in relation to the individual. It 
is based on the notion that there are certain individual interests and 
fundamental values of society which those who exercise state power must 
respect. In so far as these interests and values are entrenched in a supreme 
Constitution, they determine and limit the scope of state power. Any act or 
law which infringes the rights entrenched in the Constitution may be declared 
invalid; coupled with the fact that the fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Constitution are enforceable by an independent judiciary, their entrenchment 
therefore constitutes a substantive element of constitutionalism. 
The separation of powers and functions between the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary necessarily operates as a limitation upon arbitrary exercise 
of state power; each of the three organs of state is required by the Constitution 
to exercise its powers according to the differentiation of functions prescribed 
in the Constitution. 
The separation of powers is particularly important in relation to the judicial 
function. Since it is the judiciary that interprets and enforces the limitations 
which the Constitution imposes upon the legislature and the executive, it is 
necessary that it be separate and independent from these other branches of 
government119• Section 96(2) of the 1993 Constitution specifically provides 
that "[t]he judiciary shall be Independent, impartial and subject only to this 
Constitution and the Jaw. "120 
119See Chapt. 5. 
1201! is significant to note that in previous Constitutions the independence 
of the judiciary was mentioned in the preamble only; the preamble was, 
juridically speaking, of little value. It could be used only in cases of 
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It may be said that the separation of the judiciary from the other two branches 
of government, and its independence, are some of the most significant features 
of constitutionalism. 121 It may also be said, however, that it is not only the 
separation of the judicial branch and its independence that will determine the 
standard of constitutionalism under the new Constitution but, by and large, 
how the judiciary itself will interpret and apply the supreme law of the 
Constitution. 
4. The Jurisdiction of the Courts under the 1993 Constitution 
4.1. Abstract Review 
Traditionally, the role of the South African judiciary was confined to the 
interpretation and application of those norms which have concretised into law, 
when personal interests are involved and there is a legally recognised basis for 
an action. Proposed legislation, or a bill, is as such not yet law in a formal 
sense and does not at that stage materially affect personal interests; the 
judiciary does not therefore in general have the power to determine the 
constitutionality of such an instrument. 122 The most appropriate way of 
controlling the constitutionality of such an instrument is through political 
means, whereby it is either prevented from acquiring the force of law or 
uncertainty. The preamble now enjoys the same status as the rest of the 
Constitution. The provision of the independence of the judiciary in a supreme 
Constitution amounts to an express guarantee of judicial independence. 
121See Nwabueze op cit. note 38 at 16. 
122Constitutionality is not necessarily the same thing as constitutionalism. 
Constitutionality refers to a formal compliance with the principles of the 
Constitution. Constitutionalism, on the other hand, has two meanings; as a 
prescriptive doctrine it indicates how state power should be exercised; as a 
normative doctrine it means that the state must not only exercise its power 
according to the letter of the Constitution but must also be responsible and 
accountable. The concept of constitutiona!ism is therefore wider than that of 
constitutionality. 
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amendments are effected to ensure that it complies with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
However, the 1993 Constitution has introduced a new feature in relation to the 
power of the judiciary to determine the constitutionality of bills. In terms of 
section 98(2)(d) the Constitutional Court is empowered to determine any 
dispute over the constitutionality of any bill before Parliament or a provincial 
legislature; provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court are 
empowered to determine disputes over the constitutionality of bills before a 
provincial legislature. 123 This is a form of abstract review. 
The Constitution does not, however, create a right of action in respect of bills 
which allegedly violate its provisions. Sections 98(9) and 101(3)(e) limit locus 
standi in respect of the constitutionality of bills; they qualify judicial 
determination of the constitutionality of bills by providing that the court can 
exercise its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of bills only at the 
request of the Speaker of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate 
or the Speaker of a provincial legislature; furthermore, the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, the President of the Senate or the Speaker of a provincial 
legislature can request the court to determine the constitutionality of a bill 
only upon receipt of a petition by at least a third of the members of the 
National Assembly, the Senate or a provincial legislature requiring such 
determination. 
Sections 98(2)(d) and 101(3)(e) of the Constitution make the judiciary an 
important body in the legislative process. These sections, whenever they are 
invoked, will ensure that the legislature passes laws which are in accordance 
with the Constitution. It is doubtful whether the courts will suddenly find 
themselves flooded with requests for determinations of the constitutionality of 
bills; the provisions of these sections seem to be aimed at highly contentious 
123Section 101(3)(e). 
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bills to ensure that they comply with the provisions of the Constitution. The 
provisions are, however, significant in another respect; they reflect a desire 
to ensure legality and constitutionalism in that they seek to achieve clarity and 
certainty and to prevent arbitrary and excessive exercise of power. This 
formal 'sifting' process for legislation is an interesting constitutional 
mechanism which is foreign to South African constitutional law and practice. 
As a process which is aimed at bringing about legality it is to be welcomed. 
In the majority of cases, determinations of constitutionality take place by way 
of direct review, when an instrument has already become law and when an 
individual whose interests are affected approaches the court for relief. Once 
an individual approaches the court for relief, and there is a justiciable dispute 
relating to a violation of the law, the court has a duty to determine the alleged 
violation and to apply the law. Section 7(1)(b) of the Constitution specifically 
stipulates which persons may approach the court for relief where there is an 
allegation of an infringement of or threat to any of the rights entrenched in 
Chapter 3. 
4.2. Direct Review. 
The Constitution stipulates which courts may exercise direct review. Section 
96(1) of the interim Constitution vests the judicial authority in the courts 
established by the Constitution and any other law. The only court established 
by the Constitution is the Constitutional Court; courts established by "any 
other law" are the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, the provincial or 
local divisions of the Supreme Court, 124 Supreme Courts of the former 
TBVC states, 125 Magistrates' Courts126 and other specialised courts such 
124Established in terms of section 2 of the Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959. 
125These courts were established in terms of the Constitutions of the 
former TBVC states. In terms of section 241(1) of the 1993 Constitution they 
continue to function in terms of the laws applicable to them until changed by 
a competent authority. 
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as the Industrial Court. 
Not all courts are, however, vested with constitutional jurisdiction. The 
Constitution makes provision for a two-tiered system of review of 
constitutionality. This system contains elements of both centralisation and 
decentralisation. 
In accordance with the two-tiered system of control, the determination of 
constitutionality takes place at the Constitutional Court level 127 and the 
Supreme Court level128 . The Constitutional Court level constitutes the higher 
level of review; the Supreme Court level constitutes the lower level of review. 
Section 98(2) specifically assigns the determination of constitutionality to the 
Constitutional Court. In terms of this section, the Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction as a court of final instance over all matters relating to the 
interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions of the 
Constitution, including, a determination of the constitutionality of any law, 
including an Act of Parliament, executive or administrative acts and bills 
before parliament, and a determination of disputes of a constitutional nature 
between organs of state at any level of government. 
At the lower level of review, a provincial or local division of the Supreme 
Court retains the jurisdiction which it had before the commencement of the 
Constitution. 129 Provincial or local divisions are also assigned jurisdiction 
in respect of violations or threatened violations of the rights entrenched in 
126Established in terms of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 32 of 1944. 
127Section 98(2) and (3). 
128Section 101(3) & (4). 
129Section 101(2). 
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Chapter 3, the constitutionality of executive or administrative acts, 130 bills 
.before a provincial legislature and laws applicable within their area of 
jurisdiction, and disputes of a constitutional nature between local governments 
or between a local and a provincial government. 
The jurisdiction of provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court to 
determine the constitutionality of laws applicable within their area of 
jurisdiction does not, however, extend to Acts of Parliament; in terms of 
section 101(3)(c) a provincial or local division has jurisdiction to determine 
"the constitutionality of any law applicable within its area of jurisdiction, 
other than an Act of Parliament ... "131 Unless the parties consent to the 
jurisdiction of a local or provincial division of the Supreme Court in terms of 
section 101(6), only the Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. 132 
The retention in section 101(2) of the jurisdiction which vested in the Supreme 
Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution raises the 
130Strictly speaking, the section 101(3)(b) area of jurisdiction forms part 
of the inherent jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court immediately before 
the commencement of the Constitution. Section 103(3)(b) should therefore be 
seen as an explicit recognition of the Supreme Court's power to review the 
constitutionality of executive or administrative acts. 
131See Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others 1995(4) 
SA 615 (CC). The Constitutional Court held in this case that the words 'Act 
of Parliament' as used in the 1993 Constitution refer to an Act passed by the 
South African Parliament sitting in Cape Town and not to an Act passed by 
any of the former TBVC legislatures; provincial or local divisions have 
jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutionality of Acts of the former TBVC 
legislatures applicable within their areas of jurisdiction. 
132Sections 98(2)(c), 98(3) and 101(3)(c). In JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd 
v Directorate of Publications and Another 1995(1) BCLR 70(T) 
it was held that where parties consent to the jurisdiction of a provincial or 
local division of the Supreme Court in terms of section 101(6) and the relief 
sought includes an order that provisions of an Act of Parliament be declared 
invalid, the government must be represented by the responsible minister, 
notwithstanding that it is already represented by one of its functionaries. 
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question whether a provincial or local division would be competent, under the 
Constitution, to inquire into the requirements governing the manner and form 
of Acts of Parliament, that is the requirements governing the structural 
composition of Parliament as well as the procedure according to which 
Parliament must legislate, as opposed to the substantive validity of 
legislation. 133 Under previous Constitutions it was an accepted principle that 
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in respect of Parliament's manner and 
form of legislating. 134 
If section 101(3)(c) excludes the jurisdiction of the provincial or local 
divisions of the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament, it is unlikely that section 101(2) will be interpreted as conferring 
jurisdiction upon these divisions in respect of Parliament's manner and form 
of legislating as set out in the Constitution. An inquiry into the question 
whether an Act of Parliament was enacted in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution, be they procedural or substantive, amounts to a 
determination of the constitutionality of that Act. The words " [ s ]ubject to this 
Constitution ... " in section 101(2) make it clear that the section does not confer 
133Section 62 of the Constitution contains procedural requirements 
regarding the amendment of the Constitution, the boundaries and legislative 
and executive competences of the provinces. In terms of section 62(1) an 
amendment of the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of the total 
number of members of both the National Assembly and the Senate at a joint 
sitting of the two houses for its adoption as law. In terms of section 62(2), an 
amendment of the provisions dealing with the legislative competence of the 
provinces (section 126) and with the executive authority of provinces (section 
144) requires a two thirds majority of the members of each house sitting 
separately; furthermore, the consent of the relevant provincial legislature is 
required for an amendment of the boundaries and legislative competencies of 
the provinces. Section 74(2) also contains a procedural requirement regarding 
the provisions dealing with the adoption of the new Constitution (Chapter 5); 
in terms of this section the provisions of Chapter 5, except section 74(1), 
which may not be amended or repealed at all, may be amended by the 
Constitutional Assembly by a resolution of a two-thirds majority of all its 
members. 
134See Chapt. 4. 
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upon a provincial or local division jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of 
the Constitution. 
Another question which arises, is whether section 101(3)(a) can be interpreted 
to mean that a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament which 
violate or threaten to violate the fundamental rights in Chapter 3. Section 
103(3(a) simply states that a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction in respect of any violation or threatened violation of any 
fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 3, without specifying whether 
violations by Acts of Parliament are excluded or not. 
The Constitution specifically assigns jurisdiction in respect of violations of the 
fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 3 to both the Constitutional Court 
and the provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court. In terms of section 
98(2)(a) the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction in respect of "any violation 
or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 3"; 
section 101(3)(a) makes use of exactly the same wording to confer jurisdiction 
upon a provincial or local division in respect of violations or threatened 
violations of the rights entrenched in Chapter. 
It would seem, therefore, that, on a wide interpretation of section 101(3)(a), 
section 101(3)(c) does not preclude a provincial or local division of the 
Supreme Court from inquiring into the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament 
which violate or threaten to violate the rights entrenched in Chapter 3. 
Cachalia et al135 prefer this interpretation. According to them this 
interpretation accords with the fact that all decisions of provincial or local 
divisions on constitutional matters are subject to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court and relieves the Constitutional Court of the burden of having to deal 
135A. Cachalia, H. Cheadle, D. Davis, N. Haysom, P. Maduna & G. 
Marcus Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (1994) at 14. 
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with an unmanageable load of cases involving violations of the rights 
entrenched in Chapter 3 by Acts of Parliament. It seems illogical, however, 
to argue that a provincial or local division can inquire into the constitutionality 
of an Act, whereas it is clearly not empowered to invalidate the Act should 
it be found to be unconstitutional. 
Claassen 136 argues that any interpretation which would permit a provincial 
or local division of the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of Acts 
of Parliament would be a deviation from the express exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of these courts to review the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament. According to him such a wide interpretation would undermine the 
"spirit, purport and objects" of the Constitution. He argues that the extension 
of jurisdiction by agreement to a provincial or local division as provided for 
in section 101(6) is an indication that such jurisdiction is ordinarily excluded. 
As in the case of jurisdiction in respect of Parliament's manner and form of 
legislating, 137 the words "[s]ubject to this Constitution ... " in section 101(2) 
make it clear that section 101(3)(c) does not confer upon a provincial or local 
division of the Supreme Court jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
The fact that the Constitutional Court is given wide constitutional jurisdiction 
and provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court limited constitutional 
jurisdiction gives force to the argument that sections 98(2)(c) and section 
101(3)(c) are express jurisdictional provisions which give the Constitutional 
Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament. 
It is clear from the express provisions of sections 98(2)(c) and 101(3)(c) that 
136C.J Claassen "The Functioning and Structure of the Constitutional 
Court" 1994 THRHR 412 at 427. 
137See supra. 
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unless the parties have agreed to jurisdiction in terms of section 101(6), 
,provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court do not have jurisdiction to 
determine the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament which violate the 
fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 3. In essence, a local or provincial 
division of the Supreme Court is competent to hear any case which involves 
a human rights violation, except where this would involve a determination of 
the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament. It is not clear from the 
Constitution, however, whether provincial or local divisions have jurisdiction 
to dispense interim relief pending the final determination of the 
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament by the Constitutional Court. 
There were conflicting decisions on the question whether a provincial or local 
division of the Supreme Court can dispense interim relief pending a final 
determination of the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament by the 
Constitutional Court. 138 The question has now been settled. In terms of 
section 101(7) of the Constitution any division of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa is competent to grant interim relief, pending a determination of 
constitutionality by the Constitutional Court. 139 
138For cases in which it was held that a provincial or local division of the 
Supreme Court is competent to grant interim relief see: Wehmeyer V 
Lane NO and Others 1994(2) BCLR 14 (C); Matiso and Others 
v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and 
Others 1994(3) BCLR so (SE); Ferreira v Levin and Others; 
Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1995(4) BCLR 
437 (W). For cases in which it was held that a provincial or local division is 
not competent to grant interim relief see: De Kock en 'n Ander v 
Prokureur-Generaal van Transvaal 1994(2) SACR 113 (T); 
Rudolph and Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
and Others 1994(2) BCLR 9 (W); Podlas v Cohen NO and 
Others 1994(3) BCLR 137 (T); Bux v The Officer Commanding 
the Pietermaritzburg Prison and Others 1994(4) BCLR 10 (N). 
139Section 101(7) was inserted by section 3 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 44 of 1995. 
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An approach which denies the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant 
interim relief where the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament is in issue 
leaves an applicant with no immediate legal remedy to protect his 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 140 In terms of the rules of the 
Constitutional Court direct access to that court will be allowed in exceptional 
cases on! y. 141 
The granting of jurisdiction to provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court to grant interim relief is a positive development which promotes the 
spirit, purport and objects of Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The spirit and 
purport of Chapter 3 is to give individuals the full benefit of the rights and 
freedoms entrenched in it; this involves full protection of these rights and 
freedoms by the courts. Section 101(7) therefore encapsulates one of the most 
important principles of the Constitution, namely the realisation of fundamental 
constitutional values through judicial protection of human rights. As Froneman 
J stated in Matiso and Others v The Commanding Officer, Port 
Elizabeth Prison and Others, 142 
140The only course open to the applicant would be to seek the other party's 
consent or to request a referral to the Constitutional Court. 
141According to the Rules of the Constitutional Court (Government Notice 
R1584, published in Regulation Gazette 5394 of 16 September 1994 and 
repealed and replaced by Government Notice R5, published in Regulation 
Gazette 5450 of 6 January 1995) direct access will be allowed only where the 
opinion of the court is sought on the proposed constitutional text in terms of 
section 71( 4) of the Constitution (rule 12), where there is a dispute over the 
constitutionality of any Bill (rule 13), where there is a dispute between parties 
in Parliament or between organs of state (rule 14(1)), when the court is 
required to certify the new constitutional text (rule 15) and when it is required 
to certify a provincial Constitution (rule 16); other than these instances direct 
access will be allowed in exceptional circumstances only, "which will 
ordinarily e·xist only where the matter is of such urgency, or otherwise of such 
public importance, that the delay necessitated by the use of the ordinary 
procedures would prejudice the public interest or prejudice the ends of justice 
or good government" (rule 17(1)). 
142Supra. 
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11 [t]he inherent values of the Constitution are ... better served by recognising the 
',possibility of interim relief pending decisions of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality 
of an Act of Parliament, rather than the exclusion of interim relief altogether" .143 
From a practical point of view, issues concerning violations of fundamental 
rights are more likely to arise either by means of petitions for declaratory 
orders in ordinary proceedings before provincial or local divisions of the 
Supreme Court or disputes of constitutionality in criminal proceedings before 
these divisions. 144 
In the absence of the consent of parties, the section 103(3)(c) exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court to inquire 
into the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament which violate the rights 
entrenched in Chapter 3, confines the constitutional jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court under section 103(l)(a) to dispensing interim relief pending 
determination by the Constitutional Court, referrals to the Constitutional 
Court, violations by executive or administrative acts or conduct or arising 
from the operation of a rule of common law or customary law, violations by 
provincial or local laws and violations of a procedural nature. In most cases 
jurisdiction will be exercised in respect of violations by executive or 
administrative acts, those arising from operation of a rule of common law and 
those of a procedural nature. 
In the absence of consent to the jurisdiction of a provincial or local division 
of the Supreme Court, determinations of the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament will be through direct access to the Constitutional Court, which 
will be very difficult in terms of the rules of the Constitutional Court, or 
through referrals by provincial or local divisions in terms of section 102(1) or 
143At 90!. 
144In most cases these issues will arise in criminal appeals from the 
Magistrates' Courts. 
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other courts in terms of section 103(3) and (4).145 
The constitutional entrenchment of fundamental human rights and the nature 
and spirit of the Constitution demands that human rights violations must be 
determined and resolved as speedily and as efficiently as possible in order to 
give individuals the full benefit of their constitutional guarantees. Since most 
violations will be raised at the provincial or local division level, these courts 
are the appropriate forum for a determination of the constitutionality of such 
violations, including violations where the constitutionality of an Act of 
Parliament is in issue. 
The exclusion of provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court from 
determining the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament means that, in the 
absence of consent by the parties, the role of provincial or local divisions in 
respect of the protection of the entrenched rights against violations by Acts of 
Parliament is limited to placing such issues before the Constitutional Court in 
order to obtain a binding decision from it. The apparent inconsistency here 
is that a referral of an issue to the Constitutional Court by a provincial or 
local division would generally first involve a determination by the latter as to 
whether an issue of constitutionality in fact exists or not. This position also 
involves the cumbersome and expensive procedure of suspending the 
resolution of a dispute pending a determination of constitutionality by the 
Constitutional Court, which may take time to give a decision. 146 
145The Constitutional Court has indicated that it will not readily decide a 
constitutional issue referred to it unless it is in the interests of justice to do so 
and there are compelling reasons that the issue should be decided: see Zantsi 
v Council of State, Ciskei and Others 1995(1) BCLR 1224 (CC) 
at 1428-1429; S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 (CC) at 821F-G. In 
Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v 
Powell NO and Others 1996(1) BCLR 1 (CC) the court added the 
implied requirement that there must be a reasonable prospect of success before 
an issue is referred to it for decision. 
146See section 102(2). 
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The role of the Constitutional Court should rather be seen as that of a court 
of final instance in constitutional matters. 147 The only exception to the role 
'of the Constitutional Court as a court of final instance would be in respect of 
determining the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament which does not 
violate or threaten to violate the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 or an Act of 
Parliament which violates or threatens to violate the entrenched rights but 
deals with matters of national importance or of a highly sensitive nature, 
determining disputes over the constitutionality of any Bill before Parliament 
and determining any dispute of a constitutional nature between organs of state 
at any level of government.148 
An assignment of determinations of constitutionality to both the Constitutional 
Court and provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court would encourage 
the judiciary at all levels of judicial activity to develop a 'constitutional 
conscience'. A constitutional conscience contributes to the performance of 
regular judicial duties, with an eye to a maximum prevention of violations of 
constitutional guarantees. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the provincial or 
local divisions level to determine the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament 
which violate fundamental rights, which are likely to constitute most 
violations, will result in a corresponding lessening of constitutional awareness 
at the provincial or local level of judicial activity. 
The exclusion of provincial or local divisions from determining the 
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament which violate the fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Constitution may in the long run lead to a development of 
a high degree of constitutional and human rights awareness at Constitutional 
Court level and a lesser degree of awareness and vigilance at provincial or 
147See section 98(2). 
148Questions revolving around the division of legislative power between 
Parliament and provincial legislatures, the constitutionality of Bills before 
Parliament and any dispute of a constitutional nature between organs of state 
are highly sensitive matters which are of national importance. 
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local division level; furthermore, the Constitutional Court may inevitably tend 
to focus on the constitutionality of a specific, abstract instrument, rather than 
on a factual situation in relation to which there has been a violation of the 
provisions of the Constitution. Provincial or local divisions, on the other hand, 
as courts of first instance, would be in a better position to assess not only the 
violating legislation but also the relevant factual issues. 
An interesting feature of the Constitution's assignment of jurisdiction in 
respect of the determination of constitutionality is that section 101(5) 
specifically precludes the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, which is 
the highest forum at Supreme Court level, from adjudicating any matter within 
the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Since the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court covers virtually all issues of a constitutional nature, 
section 101(5) effectively excludes the Appellate Division from any 
determination of constitutionality. This means that the jurisdiction of Appellate 
Division is now confined to hearing appeals of a non-constitutional nature; if 
an appeal from a provincial or a local division raises a question of a 
constitutional nature such an appeal will have to go the Constitutional Court. 
This scheme is in line with the idea of a specialised Constitutional Court 
which has the final say in all matters in which constitutional issues are raised; 
to give the Appellate Division a final say in such matters would be 
inconsistent with this scheme. It is somewhat anomalous, however, that a 
junior ordinary judge of the Supreme Court may adjudicate on violations of 
fundamental rights, but the most senior judges of appeal, including the Chief 
Justice, may not do so. 149 
149While the advantage of a Constitutional Court is that as a specialised 
court it concentrates specifically on constitutional issues, it also has the 
disadvantage that it may become politicised; the Appellate Division, on the 
other hand, has the advantage that it is unlikely to be politicised because the 
judges have wide experience of other 'neutral' aspects of the legal system. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
JUDICIARY UNDER THE NEW 
CONSTITUTION. 
1. Judicial Review and the "Higher Law" Nature of the New 
Constitution. 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions will, unless otherwise provided expressly or 
by necessary implication in the Constitution, be of no force and effect to the 
extent of the inconsistency. This means that the Constitution ranks higher in 
status than any other law, including Acts of Parliament. 
In one of his celebrated judgments, McCulloch v Maryland1, Chief 
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court summed up the nature 
of a supreme Constitution and the role of the judiciary in the interpretation 
and application of its provisions when he said: 
11 [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding;2 [it has] great 
outlines [and] important objects3 [and] intended for ages to come 11 • 4 
117 US (Wheat.) 36 (1819). 
2At 407. 
'Idem. 
4At 415. Although the 1993 Constitution is an interim document, it is 
largely based on the constitutional principles contained in schedule 4. In terms 
of section 71(1)(a) of the Constitution the new fully-fledged constitutional text 
must comply with these constitutional principles. 
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Chief Justice Marshall was alluding to the fact that a Constitution with 
supreme authority needs to be interpreted as a supreme law which stands 
above all other laws and reflects the ideals and aspirations of present and 
future generations; its provisions are enacted in such a way that they are 
capable of regulating present and future events. 
As an original higher law from which all other laws derive their authority, 5 
a supreme Constitution stands as a standard against which all other laws must 
be measured. It is an act of faith through which people establish the structure 
and mechanism of government and also limit the exercise of state authority by 
guaranteeing the individual fundamental rights which those who exercise the 
authority of the state must respect. 6 The government may not, either through 
ordinary legislation or through executive acts, violate the rights which have 
been given a higher status through their entrenchment in the Constitution. 
The essence of a Constitution as a 'higher law' is that it is based on principles 
of right and justice which, by virtue of their intrinsic excellence, are superior 
and valid, regardless of the attitude of those who wield political power at any 
given time. These principles contain immutable fundamental values which 
ought to bind the legislative, executive and judicial organs of government.7 
In practical terms, the nature of the Constitution as a higher law implies that 
the Constitution is the sum total of the elements of the politico-legal system 
around which legislative, executive and judicial powers revolve. In relation to 
the judiciary, this means that the judiciary, as a co-ordinate branch of 
5B.O Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States 
(1973) at 28. 
6A.R Brewer-Carias Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1989) 
at 96. 
7E.S Corwin The 'Higher Law' Background of American 
Constitutional Law (1957) at 4-5. 
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government which is charged with the interpretation and application of the 
law, must diligently exercise its power to keep the powers of the legislature 
and the executive within the limits of the Constitution.' The Constitution 
exists as a real norm which is supreme to the whole political and legal order 
and therefore ought to control it.9 
Referring to the role of the judiciary in relation to the Constitution, Alexander 
Hamilton stated in The Federalist that, as a fundamental law which stands 
above all other laws, the Constitution enjoys preference over ordinary 
legislation; the courts are duty bound to prefer the meaning of the superior 
Constitution where there is an irreconcilable variance between its provisions 
and those of ordinary legislation. 10 
The Constitution binds all co-ordinate branches of government and obliges the 
judiciary to give effect to its superior provisions. This was essentially the 
basis upon which Chief Justice Marshall held in Marbury v Madison11 
that the courts were empowered to review Acts of Congress. Chief Justice 
Marshall considered the supremacy of the Constitution to be one of the 
fundamental principles of society and reasoned that the essence of judicial duty 
is to determine the rules that govern the case. He concluded that, in relation 
to the Constitution, the rule is that the Constitution is superior to ordinary 
8The supremacy of a Constitution does not necessarily mean . that the 
judiciary is supreme, in the sense that it has substantive judicial review. The 
power of judicial review is subject to institutional and jurisdictional limits. See 
Chapt. 5 for a distinction between constitutional supremacy and 'judicial 
supremacy'; see also infra for a discussion of the institutional and 
jurisdictional limits of judicial review and the democratic dilemma of judicial 
review. 
9Brewer-Carias op cit. at 97. 
10Alexander Hamilton The Federalist (1878), as cited by Brewer-
Carias op cit. at 99. 
115 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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'laws and therefore enjoys precedence over them. 
The nature of a supreme Constitution as a higher law distinguishes it from 
ordinary laws and implies that the Constitution cannot be overridden or 
modified by them. In preferring and enforcing the provisions of the 
Constitution a judge merely acts in accordance with the essence of the judicial 
function to accord pre-eminence to those legal provisions or principles which 
bind him most. This has nothing to do with judicial activism, 12 since the 
judge is merely applying the provisions of the Constitution. 
The concept of a Constitution as a higher law which contains fundamental 
principles and values confers on the judiciary the power to expound the 
Constitution and to review the validity of laws against the yardstick of its 
superior provisions. When faced with laws which allegedly violate provisions 
of the Constitution, the judiciary interprets the laws and the provisions of the 
Constitution to determine, whether these laws fall within the confines of tbe 
Constitution or not. Should the Jaws fall outside the confines of the 
Constitution, it is the duty of the judiciary to enforce the superior provisions 
of the Constitution. The overall effect is that arbitrary and excessive exercise 
of governmental power is controlled. 
2. Interpreting the New Constitution. 
"Interpretation", according to Cross13 "is the process by which the courts 
determine the meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it 
to a situation before them". Constitutional interpretation, however, goes 
further than that because not only must the meaning of a statutory provision 
which is alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution be determined, but also 
12See infra for a discussion of judicial activism. 
13R. Cross Statutory Interpretation (1976) at 40. 
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the meaning of the Constitution on that particular subject. 
The traditional approach to the interpretation of legal instruments is generally 
descriptive, whereby aids of interpretation are set out with a view to using 
them in practice; these aids are drawn from within the instrument itself and 
outside it. 14 The basic premise of this approach is that the process of 
interpretation involves a search for the intention of the author of the 
instrument from the text of the instrument itself;15 sources extraneous to the 
instrument may, however, be consulted in order to shed light on the text when 
the intention of the author does not appear clearly from the text. 16 
Transposed to the interpretation of a Constitution, this approach would mean 
that the paramount concern of the interpreter is to seek and give effect to the 
intention of the framers of the document. 
2.1. The Intention of the Framers. 
The rationale behind the approach that the interpreter must seek and give 
effect to the intention of the framers is that the values which must be applied 
and enforced are those values which the framers of the Constitution intended 
to be applied and enforced; according to this approach, these values are 
discoverable from the document itself. A question which then arises is: what 
is actually the intention of the framers? 
The English case of Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd17, which was 
concerned with the interpretation of an ordinary statute, provides some 
indication of what "the intention of the framers" may mean. With reference 
14lbid. at 99-141. 
"Ibid. at 99-121. 
16lbid. at 122-141. 
17(1897] AC 22. 
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to "the intention of the legislature",18 Lord Watson stated that the phrase is 
a common but very slippery one 
11
which, popularly understood. may signify anything from intention embodied in a 
positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, 
although there has been an omission to enact it. In a court of law or equity, what the legislature 
intended to be done or not to be done can only legitimately be ascertained from that which it has 
chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication. 1119 
What appears to be paramount in the statement of Lord Watson is that the 
phrase "intention of the legislature" means what the legislature originally 
intended to convey. 
The intentionalist approach was generally accepted in South Africa;20 it uses 
as its primary source of interpretation the language used in an instrument. In 
statutory interpretation it is generally accepted that the intention of the 
legislature should first and foremost be sought in the words used. 21 In terms 
of this approach the meaning which the court must give to a statute is that 
found in the words used in the statute. 
18The 'intention of the legislature', as the phrase is used in the 
interpretation of ordinary statutes, is not the same as 'intention of the 
framers', as the phrase is used in the interpretation of a supreme Constitution. 
While 'intention of the framers' is more concerned with the values the framers 
intended to be applied, 'intention of the legislature' is concerned with what the 
legislature intended a phrase or provision of a statute to mean. The similarity 
between the two is that they emphasise the importance of language as a 
medium of giving meaning to what was intended. A significant difference 
between the two phrases is that constitutional language is a distinct form of 
legislative language: see L. du Plessis & H. Corder Understanding 
South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 47. 
19At 38. 
2
°For a criticism of the approach see Du Plessis & Corder op cit. at 63-
67. 
21See Union Government v Mack 1917 AD 731 at 750; Dadoo 
Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 554. 
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,Jn constitutional interpretation the intentionalist approach, which is sometimes 
:called the 'original intent' approach, implies that the Constitution must be 
interpreted according to its original meaning. The values which the court must 
apply are those which the framers of the Constitution intended to be applied; 
these values are discoverable from the language which the framers used in the 
Constitution. 
An obvious difficulty with the language used in the Constitution or a statute 
is that it is usually not the framers or the legislators, either individually or 
collectively, who put the words into a statute; this is usually done by 
draftsmen. Even if it is accepted that draftsmen act as agents of the framers 
or the legislators and receive instructions from them,22 the words they choose 
to use may not always accurately reflect what the framers or the legislators 
actually intended; very few words are capable of being given a single and 
clear meaning; moreover, words do always not have a fixed and immutable 
meaning. This is true of all theories based on intention. 
Literalism, that is construction according to the primary meaning of words, 
does recognise the difficulty inherent in the nature of words. 23 As a result, 
interpretive help is sometimes sought from sources external to the instrument 
which is being interpreted. These sources include facts known to the framers 
at the time of enactment and surrounding circumstances, or legislative 
history. 24 Devenish25 notes, however, that the South African approach to 
statutory interpretation is characterised by an anomalous reluctance to use 
legislative materials that are remote from the law-making process. He also 
22See Cross op cit. at 35. 
23See R v Venter 1907 TS 910 at 913. 
24See G. E Devenish "External Aids to Construction - Some Inconsistencies 
and Anomalies in the South African Approach which Obstruct an Unqualified 
Contextual Methodology in the Interpretation of Statutes" 1991THRHR58. 
25Devenish 1991 THRHR at 75. 
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notes that some external sources such as reports of commissions and 
surrounding circumstances are used without qualification, whereas some 
internal sources such as headings and the preamble are used with qualification. 
The interpretation of a Constitution is not confined to finding the meaning of 
a specific constitutional provision; it also involves applying that provision to 
a factual situation with which the court is confronted. In applying a provision 
of a Constitution to a factual situation the court must take into account all the 
underlying values, both expressed and unexpressed. In interpreting a 
constitutional provision the interpreter should give it a meaning which 
harmonises it with the whole legal system.26 Contemporary legal principles 
and values are as much a part of the legal system as the Constitution itse!f.27 
The 'original intent' approach has become a perennial issue in American 
constitutional law whenever the question of the proper theory of constitutional 
adjudication arises. Arguments in support of the 'original intent' approach are 
mainly based on strict originalism and Borkean originalism. 28 
Strict originalism advocates that judges should apply only those norms that are 
stated or clearly implicit in the provisions of the Constitution and reflect what 
the framers thought about specific constitutional issues; these norms are 
discoverable by having recourse to the historically demonstrable intention of 
26H. Stone Law and its Administration (1915) at 25; D. V Cowen 
"The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of "the Intention of the 
Legislature" 1980 THRHR 374 at 378. 
27See J.M.T Labuschagne "Regsnormvorming : Riglyne vir 'n Nuwe 
Benadering tot die Tradisionele Reels van Wetsuitleg" 1989 SA Publiekreg 
202. 
28See D.H van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism (1994) at 
11-18 for a discussion of strict originalism and Borkean originalism. 
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:the framers. 29 This approach is based on the argument that the framers 
. presupposed that their intention would be carried out. 30 Its justification is that 
applying those norms originally intended by the framers limits the discretion 
of judges to the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution and also 
promotes consistent interpretation. 31 
Borkean originalism, on the other hand, is not premised on a strict adherence 
to the intention of the framers. According to Bork, "a judge is to apply the 
Constitution according to the principles intended by those who ratified the 
document" .32 The framers of the Constitution or those who ratified it 
intended that principles which are neutral in derivation, definition and 
application must be applied; 33 these principles are found in the language used 
in the Constitution. Judges must accept the value choices of the legislature 
unless such choices are clearly contrary to the choices of the framers;34 they 
can override the wishes of a representative legislature only if they can show 
by means of principled reasoning that the express words of the Constitution 
justify such action. Bork argues that originalism preserves the Constitution, 
the separation of powers and the liberties of the people.35 
29R. Berger Government by Judiciary (1977) at 1-19. 
'"Berger op cit. at 365-366. 
31See Van Wyk et al op cit. at 12. 
32R. Bork The Tempting of America - The Political 
Seduction of the Law (1990) at 143. 
33See Bork's explanation of originalism at 143-160. 
34R. Bork "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems" 1971 
Indiana W 1 at 10-11. 
35(1989) at 159. Bork's concern that non-originalism erodes the separation 
of powers and does not encourage respect for precedent is justified. This 
concern cannot, however, be addressed by strictly adhering to the 'original 
intent' theory. The erosion of the separation of powers is an issue which 
revolves around defining the proper role of the judiciary in constitutional 
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Powell36 examines the cultural resources available to the framers of the 
iConstitution and those who ratified the document and which could have been 
used to conceptualise the task of interpreting a written Constitution and comes 
to the conclusion that the assumption that the framers of the Constitution or 
those who ratified it expected that it would be interpreted according to their 
intentions is historically mistaken. According to Powell, 'original intent', in 
relation to American constitutional law, is more of a reference to the 
'intentions' of the American states party to the constitutional compact 
concerning the rights and powers which they could delegate to a common 
agent without destroying their own autonomy, than to the personal intentions 
of the framers of the Constitution or those who ratified it.37 
The major problem of the intentionalist approach is that the intention of the 
framers, like that of the legislature in ordinary statutory interpretation, is a 
fiction and is therefore not readily ascertainable. Bork's originalism, for 
example, immediate] y raises the problem that it cannot be determined with 
certainty whether a particular principle of the Constitution is neutral in 
derivation, definition and application. 
According to the American constitutional lawyer Sandalow, 38 constitutional 
law is a means whereby effect is given to the ideals and values which are, 
from time to time, regarded as fundamental. The Constitution itself is an 
decision-making; while respect for precedent brings about legal certainty, it 
should not be allowed to undermine the application of underlying or 
unexpressed constitutional values. 
36H.J Powell "The Original Understanding of Original Intent" 1985 
Harv. LR 885. 
37Powell 1985 Harv. LR at 888 and 948. See also H. Wechsler 
"Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" 1959 Harv. LR 1 for 
a criticism of originalism. 
38T. Sandalow "Judicial Protection of Minorities" 1977 Michigan LR 
1162 at 1184. 
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:expression of those ideals and values and constitutes the very fabric of 
political society; its principles and values are "intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, must be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs". 39 
An intentionalist approach is not suited to constitutional interpretation because 
a Constitution is an instrument soi generis which is framed in a broad and 
inclusive style; 40 its provisions do not have a fixed meaning; they range from 
the relatively specific to the extremely open textured. More importantly, 
however, the questions that may face later generations may not be those that 
the framers ever thought about or anticipated. 41 A Constitution which 
operates with supreme authority often contains provisions which invite one to 
look beyond its four corners;42 its provisions are framed in value-laden terms 
which call for the making of substantive choices between competing values 
and considerations of unsettled political, moral and social conceptions. 43 
2.2. Constitutional Interpretation and Fundamental Values. 
A supreme Constitution is a fundamental law which embodies basic principles 
and fundamental values that must be applied to constitutional cases which 
39Per Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v Maryland (supra) at 
415. 
•
0nu Plessis & Corder op cit. at 75 and 93. See also L. M du Plessis & 
J.R de Ville "Bill of Rights Interpretation in the South African Context (3): 
Comparative Perspectives and Future Prospects" 1993 Stellenbosch LR 
364 at 365. 
41See T. Sandalow "Constitutional Interpretation" 1981 Michigan LR 
1033 at 1035. 
42See J.H Ely Democracy and Distrust: A theory of Judicial 
Review (1980) at 13. 
43See L. Tribe American Constitutional Law (1978) at 452. 
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11come before the courts. 44 It is the function of the judiciary to interpret the 
Constitution in order to identify, define and evolve those principles and values 
with a view to applying them to the case at hand. 45 
In his role as interpreter of fundamental values, the judge is confronted by an 
array of principles, concepts and values from which he may choose. In the 
first place, he functions as an individual who has his own conceptions and 
value influences which derive from his own socio-politico and educational 
background as well as from his self-constructed world-viewpoint. 
The most important source of fundamental values is the Constitution itself. 46 
However, the values embodied in the Constitution can only have meaning in 
the light of the concept of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is a normative 
concept which prescribes the norms and values of a democratic and 
constitutional government. Central to this concept is the idea of a limited 
government which recognises and respects the rights and freedoms of 
individuals so as to enable them to pursue their legitimate interests to the full. 
In this sense constitutionalism is libertarian and value-oriented. 
Other important sources of fundamental values are international law and 
foreign law.47 These sources become particularly relevant where some of the 
44Ely op cit. at 43; A. Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch 
(1962) at 68 and 109. See H. Botha "The Values and Principles underlying the 
1993 Constitution" 1994 SA Public Law 233 for a discussion of the source 
and origin of the values contained in the 1993 Constitution. 
45Bickel ibid. at 55. 
46Sections 35(1) and 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution specifically call for the 
application of value judgments: see J. Kruger "Is Interpretation a question of 
common sense? Some reflections on value judgments and section 35" 1995 
CILSA 1. 
47See infra for a discussion of international law and foreign Jaw as 
sources of fundamental values. 
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,provisions of the Constitution are similar to prov1s10ns of international 
[instruments or foreign constitutional instruments. Judicial pronouncements and 
commentaries on international instruments and foreign constitutional 
instruments that bear a resemblance to the Constitution are therefore useful in 
the identification and development of constitutional values. 
2.2.1. Personal Judicial Values. 
It is hardly contestable that in his role as interpreter of the Constitution the 
judge is not supposed to elevate his personal views regarding fundamental 
values to the status of the sole measure. His task is that of objectively defining 
and interpreting those values which are constitutionally justifiable to be 
applied to a particular case, taking into consideration the particular 
circumstances of the case. 
However, no person, not even a judge, can ever be completely objective. 48 
Like everybody else, judges' conceptions are sometimes formulated against the 
background of time, culture and personal and ideological influences. 49 
Judicial conceptions cannot always be divorced from the inner subconscious 
forces which constitute the mental make-up of all human beings. 
Criticism of the influence of personal values on judicial decisions in South 
Africa is not uncommon. 50 The pro-executive stance of some members of the 
South African judiciary has been explained in terms of the influence of racial 
48See D. Basson & H. Viljoen South African Constitutional Law 
(1988) at 265. 
49H.J Erasmus Regspleging in die gedrang, paper read at the 
University of Stellenbosch, February 1986 at 24-25. 
50See R. Suttner "The Ideological Role of the Judiciary in South Africa" 
in J. Hund (ed) Law and Justice in South Africa (1988) at 81; B. van 
Niekerk " ... Hanged by the Neck until you are Dead" 1969 SALJ 457 and 
1970 SAW 60. 
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and class background as well as legal education and training.51 Such criticism 
may not be surprising in a heterogeneous society with different, and often 
contradictory, value conceptions. It does not follow, however, that because 
personal values sometimes influence judicial decisions they always shape 
them. It also does not mean that because one or a few judges allow their 
personal value systems which are not in line with the values of society in 
general to influence their decisions, all judges are likely to act similarly. 
Personal judicial values are, however, unacceptable precisely because judges, 
who are appointed and not politically representative, should not run the 
country by imposing their own values on citizens; the imposition of personal 
judicial values is inconsistent with democratic theory. The role of judges is to 
interpret and apply the law in accordance with those principles and values 
which emanate from and are consistent with the legal system. 
Because of their training as lawyers, judges are equipped with the skills to 
interpret and apply the law objectively and without bias. Judges, therefore, are 
less likely than the executive or the legislature to be influenced by passion or 
prejudice. This is one of the important factors which make the judiciary an 
organ which is best suited to determine the constitutionality of legislative and 
executive acts. 
2.2.2. Constitutionalism and Libertarian Values. 
Constitutionalism, it has been noted, implies limited government and 
prescribes principles which determine the limits of the exercise of government 
51See H. Corder Judges at Work - The Role and Attitudes of 
the South African Appellate Judiciary (1984) at 237 and 238; C.F 
Forsyth In Danger for their Talents - A Study of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (1985) at 227 and 
228. 
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'authority in relation to citizens. 52 In practical terms, constitutionalism in 
,relation to a Constitution with supreme authority means that the limits 
prescribed in the Constitution must be observed; it means, in relation to the 
individual in particular, that the individual must enjoy the full benefit of his 
rights and freedoms as guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The essence of constitutionalism is that good government is based on 
principles of justice, fairness and freedom; these principles demand that the 
individual must be treated justly and fairly, and that his rights and freedoms 
must be protected from arbitrary and excessive exercise of government 
power.53 To this extent there is a link between constitutionalism, democracy, 
legitimacy and the rule of law and the Rechtsstaat idea. Justice, which is a 
fundamental value of democratic government, is 
11the co-ordination of the diversified efforts and activities of the members of the 
conununity and the allocation of rightst powers and duties among them in a way which will satisfy 
the reasonable needs and aspirations of individuals while at the same time promoting the maximum 
d . ff <l ·a1 h . " 54 pro ucttve e art an soc1 co esion . 
In so far as constitutionalism prescribes principles of justice, fairness and 
freedom, it is normative. The entrenchment of fundamental individual rights 
and freedoms as a means of limiting the exercise of government authority in 
relation to the individual is an important normative aspect of modern 
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism as such, therefore, contains fundamental 
values which ought to be applied in cases which come before the courts. 
The theoretical underpinning of individual rights and freedoms can be traced 
52See Chap!. 9 for a discussion of the concept of constitutionalism. 
53See J. Rawls "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice" in C.J 
Friedrich & J.W Chapman (eds) Justice (1963) at 23 et seq. 
54C.R.M Dlamini "Law and Justice: A South African Perspective" 1987 
De Jure 270 at 271-272. 
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to the philosophy of natural law. In terms of this philosophy man is imbued 
with certain inalienable rights.55 These rights are fundamental because they 
are derived from a higher law which is an expression of principles or values 
against which the validity of positive law can be tested. 56 Modem man, 
however, seldom rationalises about, and hardly strives to justify, the concept 
of rights and freedoms because 
11
taking rights for granted ... is the mark of he (sic) who has ripened into full 
civilisation. To such a man rights reptesent not only legal security, but also morality, social 
refinement, the highest ethic. a measure for high humanity and a yardstick for pure 
government 11 • 57 
In the spirit of constitutionalism, the interpretation of the Constitution should 
be approached in a critical and normative fashion. According to Sasson & 
Viljoen, 58 positive constitutional law must be evaluated by means of those 
legal values which are based on a libertarian tradition. These legal values are 
11 the centuries-old products of history and the religious, philosophical and moral concepts 
which have developed through the ages and are still valid today. The actualization of these legal 
values always takes the existing (social, economic and political) circumstances within a particular 
dispensation at a given time into consideration 11 • 
In terms of the concept of constitutionalism, the interpretation of the 
Constitution must therefore proceed on the basis that, in relation to the 
exercise of government authority, the individual is the bearer of certain rights 
and freedoms which ought to operate to limit the arbitrary and excessive 
exercise of government authority. The function of constitutional law, in 
55See W.J Hosten, A.B Edwards et al Introduction to South 
African Law and Legal Theory (1995) at 62 et seq. 
56Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 216. 
57F. Venter "The Western Concept of Rights and Liberties in the South 
African Constitution" 1986 CILSA 99 at 100. 
58Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 1 and 218. 
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jrelation to the relationship between the government and the individual, is to 
;determine the scope of government authority and the scope of individual rights 
i 
and freedoms and to resolve conflicts between the government and the 
individual. 59 The relationship between the government and the individual 
must be based on the fundamental values of justice and fairness, which 
demand that individuals should be treated justly and fairly and that their rights 
and freedoms must be protected. 60 
The legal values inherent in the concept of constitutionalism are not foreign 
to South African law. The South African common law is rich with expressions 
of commonly shared values and conceptions of reasonableness, fairness and 
justice. 61 According to Basson & Viljoen, 62 the legal values underlying the 
common law are largely based on the value of justice which fosters individual 
freedom. The Appellate Division in S v Ebrahim6' also recognised that 
the common law embodies fundamental legal principles which maintain and 
promote individual rights. 
2.2.3. International Law and Foreign Law as Sources of 
Constitutional Values. 
The recognition and protection of fundamental human rights is universally 
accepted today. 64 According to Lauterpacht, 65 international law is a source 
59L. Duguit Law in the Modern State (1970) at 20 and 25 et seq. 
60Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 219. 
61See infra, section 2.2.4. 
62Basson & Viljoen op cit. at 265. 
631991(2) SA 553(A) at 582B-C. 
64See L. Henkin "The Internationalization of Human Rights" m L. 
Henkin, C. Frankel & R.M Dworkin (eds) Human Rights : A 
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which constitutes the ultimate safeguard of the rights of man. International 
,human rights provisions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as decisions of 
the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
dealing with human rights violations, provide abundant material from which 
fundamental values may be sought. 
The applicability of international and foreign human rights norms in South 
African law was not readily accepted in the past. The 1993 Constitution now 
expressly directs the courts to have regard to applicable international law 
norms in the interpretation and enforcement of the rights entrenched in 
Chapter 3. 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution provides that the court must 
11 [i]n interpreting the provisions of this Chapter (Chapter 3) promote the values which 
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights 
entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law 11 • 
In terms of section 231(4) 
11 [t]he rules of customary international law binding on the Republic, shall, unless 
inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, form part of the law of the 
Republic". 66 
The provisions of section 35(1) and section 231(4) are consistent with the 
Symposium (1977) at 6. 
65H. Lauterpacht International Law and Human Rights (1950) 
at 93. 
66See J. Dugard "The Role of International Law in Interpreting the Bill of 
Rights" 1994 SAJHR 208 at 210-214 for a discussion of the effect of these 
provisions on South African Law. 
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principle of harmonisation. According to O'Connell,67 "harmonisation 
assumes that international law, as a rule of human behaviour, forms part of 
municipal law and hence is available to a municipal judge". O'Connell adds 
that 
11 international law and municipal law are concordant bodies of doctrine, each autonomous 
in the sense that it is directed to a specific, and, to some extent an exclusive, area of human 
conduct, but harmonious in that in their totality the several rules aim at a basic human good". 
From a jurisprudential point of view the decisions of the South African courts 
support harmonisation. 68 The decision of the United States Court of Appeals 
in Filartiga v Pena Irala69 also supports harmonisation; in this case it 
was held that certain core provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
rights are part of international customary law. There are other decisions of 
courts of the United States of America which also support the view that 
international human rights norms are useful in the search for fundamental 
values. 70 Zimbabwean and Namibian courts have also in some instances 
67D.P O'Connell International Law vol. I (1970) at 45. 
68See J. Dugard "International Law is part of our Law" 1971 SALJ 13 
at 15; R.P Schaffer "The Inter-Relationship between Public International Law 
and the Law of South Africa: An Overview" 1983 ICLQ 277. Cf. Nduli & 
Another v Minister of Justice & Others 1978(1) SA 893 (A); 
Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Republica Popular da Mocambique 1980(2) SA lll(T); Kaffraria 
Property v Government of the Republic of Zambia 1980(2) SA 
709(E). For a contrary view see H. Booysen Volkereg en Sy 
Verhouding met die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2nd ed. (1989) at 157; 
N .J Botha "Municipal Application of International Law: Seizure in Foreign 
Territory, Terrorism and Self-Defence" 1978 SAYIL 170; D.J Devine 
"Recognition: Newly Independent States and General International Law" 1984 
SAYIL 18 at 19-20. 
691980 ILM 966; 630 Fed. Rep 876 (1980). 
10See Lareau v Manson 507 F. Supp. 1177 (1980); Fernandez 
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made use of international human rights norms as a source of fundamental 
values. 71 South African courts have, since the coming into operation of the 
1993 Constitution, invoked international human rights norms as a guide to the 
interpretation of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 72 
The search for and discovery of fundamental values in international human 
rights norms and foreign law ensures that the interpretation and application of 
the Constitution is harmonised with universally recognised and accepted 
practices; it enhances the global concern for the effective protection of the 
rights of man. According to Lauterpacht, 73 the global concern for the rights 
of man provides an ultimate safeguard of these rights. 
Section 35(1) does not, however, mean that the courts must apply all rules of 
public international law. The court is obliged to apply only those rules which 
are applicable to the rights entrenched in Chapter 3. These are rules which are 
concerned with the protection of those fundamental human rights and freedoms 
v Wilkinson 505 F. Supp 787 (1980); Sterling v Cupp OR 625 P 2d 
123. 
11see S v Ncube; S v Tshuma; S v Ndlovu 1982(2) SA 102 
(ZSC); S VA Juvenile 1990(4) SA 151 (ZSC); Ex Parte Attorney-
General, Namibia : In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of 
the State (Supra). See also the Botswanan case of The Attorney-
General v Dow 1994(6) BCLR 1 (Botswana) at 431-441. The 
Zimbabwean and Namibian Constitutions do not contain provisions which are 
similar, though not identical, to section 35(1); article 144 of Namibian 
Constitution provides, however, that, unless the Constitution provides 
otherwise, the general rules of public international law and international 
agreements binding upon Namibia under the Constitution form part of the law 
of Namibia. 
72See inter alia Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and 
Another 1994(1) BCLR 75(E) at 881; S v Lombard en 'n Ander 
1994(3) SA 776(T) at 782F-H; S v Williams and Others 1995(7) 
BCLR 861(CC) at 871C-E. 
73Lauterpacht op cit. at 93. 
!I 
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lentrenched in Chapter 3; they are mainly found in international agreements74 
in which states commit themselves to recognise, respect and promote 
fundamental human rights for the inhabitants of their own countries. 75 
The directive in section 35 (1) to have regard to international law applicable 
to the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 provides a standard in terms of which 
the protection of the entrenched rights can be brought in line with international 
practice. International human rights law is concerned with the promotion and 
encouragement of fundamental values such as freedom, equality, human 
dignity, justice and democracy. 
The thrust of section 35(1) is the promotion of the values which underlie an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. 76 The, directive 
to have regard to applicable international law in essence implies that the court 
must in interpreting the provisions of Chapter 3 identify and apply those 
values which, in line with international human rights law, promote the 
fundamental values of freedom, equality, human dignity, justice and 
democracy. 
The foundational concern of the Constitution is to build 
'
1a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, 
conflict, lUltold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
74Thcse are agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights. 
75See J.Lourens & M. Frantzen "The South African Bill of Rights -
Public, Private or Both : A Viewpoint on its Sphere of Application" 1994 
CILSA 340 at 349. 
76See D. Davis "Democracy - Its Influence upon the Process of 
Constitutional Interpretation" 1994 SAJHR 103 at 120. 
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. . f I I b 1· f " 77 !1rrespectJ.ve o co our, race, c ass, e ie or sex . 
In essence, the 1993 Constitution emphasises the importance of building a new 
South Africa which is founded on those values which are regarded by the 
majority of the people as the highest values78 which promote the democratic 
ideal of justification and accountability. 79 International human rights law has 
a significant role in the realisation of this goal in that its aim is the 
recognition and promotion of human rights and democracy based on 
justification and accountability. 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular, 
encourages the building of a democratic state founded on justification and 
accountability. It provides that everyone has the right to take part in the 
government of his country directly or indirectly through elected 
representatives and the right to equal access to public service in his country; 
it also provides that the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority 
of government. 
Many other international human rights law provisions are relevant to the 
interpretation of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Article 
1(1) of the Declaration and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, for example, prohibits racial discrimination, based on, 
inter alia, race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, having the 
77See the postamble entitled "National Unity and Reconciliation". The 
preamble also refers to "a need to create a new order in which all South 
Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign 
and democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men and 
women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and 
exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms". 
78See J. Kruger "Die Beregting van Fundamentele Regte Gedurende Die 
Oorgangsbedeling" 1994 THRHR 396 at 398. 
79See E. Mureinik "A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of 
Rights" 1994 SAJHR 31 at 32. 
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purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
]exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 80 
Article 8(2) of the Constitution similarly prohibits discrimination based on, 
inter alia, race, ethnic or social origin, colour, culture or language; it does 
not, however, state what the purpose or effect of the discrimination must be 
for it to be unconstitutional. In terms of section 35(1) of the Constitution, the 
court should therefore have regard to article 1(1) of the Declaration and 
Convention in order to determine whether discrimination having a specific 
purpose or effect is unconstitutional in terms of section 8(2). 
The definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment provides a basis for the interpretation of 
section 11(2). 81 Article 3 of the European Convention, on the other hand, is 
relevant in deciding whether corporal punishment is inhuman or degrading and 
therefore also violates the right to dignity (section 10).82 In S v Williams 
and Others83 the Constitutional Court relied, inter aiia, on article 3 of the 
European Convention and the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Tyrer v United Kingdom84 to determine whether juvenile 
whipping as a sentencing option was constitutional. The court held that 
80See G.N Barrie "International Human Rights Conventions: Public 
International Law Applicable to the Protection of Rights" 1995 TSAR 66 at 
74. 
81Section 11(2) entrenches the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
82See S v A Juvenile (supra) at 156D-F; Ex Parte Attorney-
General, Namibia: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of 
the State (supra) at 89. 
8
'Supra at 871 and 873. 
84(1979-1980) 2 EHRR 19. 
-457-
juvenile whipping as a sentencing option violated section 11(2) of the 
,constitution. 
An important aspect of international human rights is that it recognises that the 
protection of human rights is not absolute. Article 29(2) of the Universal 
Declaration, for example, permits a limitation of the exercise of these rights, 
provided that the purpose of the limitation is to secure "due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society". 85 The article therefore provides a guideline for the interpretation of 
the section 33 limitation. It may be said that, in general, a limitation of any 
of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 will be "reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality" and therefore 
permissible86 if its purpose is to recognise and respect the rights and freedom 
of others and of meeting the requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 87 
Most important, however, is the fact that Chapter 3 itself was influenced by 
international human rights conventions and instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
85 Barrie 1995 TSAR at 70. 
86Section 33(l)(a). 
87Decisions of international courts and tribunals may, however, be of 
limited value in the interpretation of national limitation clauses because 
domestic judges and authorities are in a better position than an international 
judge to assess whether, in terms of the provisions of the Constitution and 
prevailing circumstances, a limitation of a right is reasonable or justifiable or 
necessary: see the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Handyside Case, Judgment of 7 December 1976, A24 (1976) at 22 where 
it was stated that "[b ]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the 
vital forces of their countries, State authorities are, in principle, in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content 
of these requirements [of the values or morals] as well as the 'necessity' of 
a restriction' or penalty' intended to meet them". 
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1and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
land the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 88 Moreover, it is similar to the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the European Convention in language and tone. 
According to Dugard, these international human rights instruments therefore 
provide an important guide to South African courts in the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of Chapter 3. 89 
The interpretation and application of a Constitution and the search for 
fundamental constitutional values is, however, not a haphazard and baseless 
process; it is a rational process which makes use of legal reasoning and also 
,takes into account the purpose of the specific rights, the wider purpose of the 
Constitution and the function of law in society. The interpretation and 
application of the Constitution and law as a whole ought therefore to involve 
a careful analysis of the Constitution and the law in issue, as well as an 
examination of the circumstances to which the texts apply. 
2.2.4. The Common Law as a Source of Fundamental Values. 
The main common law source of South African constitutional law is English 
common law; however, the Roman Dutch law features of our common Jaw 
were not supplanted by English law. The common law of South Africa, as 
derived from Roman Dutch law, is rich in principles that are capable of 
promoting judicial enforcement of the values enshrined in the new 
Constitution. These principles are the result of a process of reasoning by 
jurists over a long period of time and express the commonly shared values and 
88See Du Plessis & Corder op cit. at 47. 
89See J. Dugard International Law: A South African 
Perspective (1994) at 350. 
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conceptions of justice, reasonableness and the common good.9° They provide 
standards of reason by which the protection of individual rights and freedoms 
can be fostered and therefore constitute a sound basis upon which legislation 
can be interpreted to advance and strengthen the fundamental rights enshrined 
in the Constitution. 
In considering the relevance of common law in the interpretation of statutes, 
a distinction is made between the common law approach and the plain-fact 
approach; 91 this distinction is also relevant in the interpretation and 
application of a Constitution. The plain-fact approach plays down the 
importance of value considerations in the interpretation and application of 
legislation and emphasises the intention of the legislature as a paramount 
consideration. The common law approach, on the other hand, dictates that 
those principles of the common law which express the commonly shared 
values of justice, reasonableness and the common good should be applied 
where legislation which adversely affects the rights and freedoms of the 
individual is interpreted. 
The common law approach has a significant role to play in the interpretation 
and application of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
Central to these fundamental rights are values of justice, equality, human 
dignity and freedom; these values are also inherent in the common law. The 
dissenting judgment of Gardiner AJA in Minister of Posts and 
Telegraphs v Rasool92 emphasises the significance of principles of the 
common law as a reflection of fundamental values and moral standards. 
90See J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal 
Order (1978) at 382-383. 
91See Chapt. 4 for a discussion of the two approaches. 
92Supra. 
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'Rasool was concerned with the validity of an instruction by the Postmaster-
' !General which had the effect of dividing a post office into two sections, one 
for 'Europeans' and another for 'non-Europeans'. The Postmaster-General had 
been empowered by Act 10 of 1911 to issue instructions which he "deemed 
necessary for the carrying out of official duties". A judge in chambers had on 
the application of Rasool, an Indian affected by the instruction, issued a 
mandamus compelling the Postmaster-General to withdraw the instruction on 
the ground that it was unreasonable; the full bench of the Transvaal Provincial 
Division having confirmed the order, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 
appealed to the Appellate Division. 
The majority of the appeal judges reversed the decision of the full bench. The 
majority implicitly relied on the 'separate but equal' doctrine,. a doctrine 
which was adopted by the United Stated Supreme Court in Plessy v 
Ferguson93 but later rejected in Brown v Board of Education94, 
and held that the mere division of a post office into two separate sections did 
not amount to unequal treatment and was therefore not unreasonable. Gardiner 
AJA delivered a dissenting judgment. 
In his judgment Gardiner AJA took the view that the distinction of persons on 
the basis of colour was a humiliating treatment which relegated other groups 
of persons into an inferior order of civilisation; such treatment was an 
impairment of the dignity of the persons affected. Gardiner AJA invoked the 
fundamental principle of the common law that in the eyes of the law all men 
are equal. He harmonised the interpretation of statutes with the protection of 
the rights of the individual by holding that the court should presume that the 
legislature and government officials who are involved in the implementation 
of legislation intend to honour principles of the common law. This approach 
93 163 U.S 537 (1896). 
94347 u .s 483 (1954). 
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'implies that courts should always endeavour to interpret legislation in favour 
of the rights and freedoms of individuals.95 
The interpretation and application of the Constitution should be harmonised 
with those principles of the common Jaw which promote the values of 
reasonableness, justice and the common good in order to give full effect to its 
letter and spirit and to give individuals the full benefit of its fundamental 
human rights provisions. Common Jaw presumptions such as the presumption 
against absurd or anomalous results and the presumption against harshness or 
unreasonableness could play an important role in the harmonisation process. 
In an address to Lawyers for Human Rights, Mr Justice Milne recognised that 
the contents of declarations of human rights overlap with "a great many of the 
fundamental presumptions that guide our interpretation of what the legislature 
'intended"'.% 
The common Jaw approach provides a sound basis for the development of a 
value-oriented jurisprudence; it provides value-based principles and concepts 
which can be harmonised with the values enshrined in the Constitution so as 
to enhance the full protection of human rights and freedoms. Where 
constitutional values have not yet been properly identified and articulated, the 
common Jaw approach provides a sound starting point. 
2.3. Purpose, Rationality and Teleological Reasoning m the 
Interpretation of the Constitution. 
While the interpretation of a Constitution rests mainly on the meaning of its 
provisions and the fundamental values which are discoverable from them and 
other sources, the meaning of these provisions and the application of 
95See Nxasana v Minister of Justice 1976(3} SA 745(D) at 747-
748. 
96LHR Bulletin No.3 (January 1984) 43 at 48. 
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'!fundamental values are not the sole object of interpretation. Both the 
Constitution and ordinary laws are enacted with the view of achieving certain 
I 
goals, purposes and functions which advance the interests of individual 
members of society and society as a whole. These goals, purposes and 
functions must be identified and realised in accordance with their relevance 
and importance. This view presupposes purposive, rational and teleological 
approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
2.3.1. Purpose and Rationality. 
According to Devenish, 97 the purposive approach is based on the rationale 
that an enactment is an inherently purposive communication between the law-
maker and the public. In order to bring about this purposive communication, 
the interpreter must examine all the internal and external sources in the light 
of the overall context. 
The use of purpose in English and South African law is usually associated 
with the so-called mischief rule. 98 In terms of this rule, the purpose of 
legislation can be inferred from its historical motivation; the words used can 
then be read in the light of that purpose. There must, however, be some 
970.E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) at 36. 
98This rule was expounded in Heydon's case (1854) 3 Rep. 7a; its 
essence is that if Parliament has provided a remedy for a specific conduct, 
situation or defect, the court must consider the conduct, situation or defect and 
adopt an interpretation which would suppress the mischief and advance the 
remedy according to the true intent of Parliament. Mischief in this sense 
means the conduct, situation or defect which Parliament sought to remedy. 
For an application of the mischief rule in South African case law see Hleka 
v Johannesburg Council 1949(1) SA 842 (A); Reek NO v 
Registrateur van Aktes 1969(1) SA 589 (T); S v Conifer (Pty) Ltd 
1974(1) SA 651 (A). 
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'ambiguity or obscurity before the mischief rule can be applied. 99 The 
application of the mischief rule therefore amounts to a qualified purposive 
approach. 100 
In contrast to the qualified purposive approach, an authentic purposive 
approach does not depend on the presence of an ambiguity or obscurity for its 
application; it talces into account the purpose of a statute and all the 
surrounding circumstances, regardless of the presence or absence of an 
ambiguity or obscurity. 101 The purposive method of interpretation is applied 
on the European continent102 and has become increasingly acceptable in the 
United Kingdom. 103 Roman-Dutch authority also seems to support an anti-
literalist purposive approach. 104 
Legislative purpose becomes particularly important when the constitutionality 
of legislation which deals with the treatment of different classes of persons is 
in issue. In the United States the Supreme Court has sought to buttress the 
equal protection clause by first seeking the purpose of legislation and then 
99Devenish op cit. (1992) at 132. See also Santam Insurance Ltd 
v Taylor 1985(1) SA 514 (A) at 526I-527A-G. 
100Devenish ibid. at 36. 
101Idem. 
102Devenish ibid. at 37. 
103See A. Denning The Discipline of Law (1979) at 21; see also the 
remarks of Lord Diplock in R v National Insurance Commissioners 
[1972] AC 944 at 1005D-E. 
104See L.M du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) at 36; 
D. V Cowen "Prolegomenon of a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation" 1976 TSAR 131 at 144. 
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asking whether the statute is rationally related to that purpose. 105 The court 
has held that a statute which treats classes of citizens differently will only be 
upheld only if it is rationally related to the purpose it seeks to achieve.106 
Where minorities or special groups are involved, the court has required a 
higher degree of rationality and a compelling interest which justifies the 
statute. 107 
Purpose and rationality have also been used in Canada, the former 
Bophuthatswana and Namibia as means of determining the constitutionality of 
legislation which is alleged to discriminate against persons. In Andrews V 
Law Society of British Columbia, 108 the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that a law which discriminated against a class of persons solely on the 
basis of lack of some attribute would be invalid if there was no sufficiently 
rational connection between that attribute and the purpose of the law. 
In Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana109 Friedman J, 
sitting in the Bophuthatswana General Division, applied the rationality and 
compelling interest tests in order to determine the constitutionality of a law 
which prohibited non-citizens from participating at political gatherings. The 
105See J. Tussman & J. Ten-Broek "The Equal Protection of the Laws" 
(1949) 37 California Law Rev. 341 at 356-364. 
10
•see for example Rinaldi v Yeager 384 US 305 (1966); 
Dandridge v Williams 404 US 471 (1970); Eisenstadt v Baird 405 
US 438 (1972); see also Tussman & Ten-Broek 1949 California Law 
Rev. at 343-353. 
107See for example Shapiro v Thompson 394 US 618 (1969) at 634. 
108[1989] 1 S.C.R 143. See also in general on the relevance of purpose R 
v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1S.C.R295; R v Oakes (Supra); 
Edward Books & Art Ltd v The Queen (Supra). See Chapt. 6 for 
a discussion of these cases. 
1091992(4) SA 540 (B). See Chapt. 7 for a discussion of this case. 
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,judge held that the prohibition would be permissible if it was rationally related 
to a legitimate government interest. 
The relevance of purpose and rationality in relation to discriminatory 
legislation also appears from the judgment of Grosskopf JA, sitting in the 
Appellate Division, in Cabinet for the Territory of South West 
Africa v Chikane and AnotherY0 The judge of appeal held that a 
classification which violates the rule against discrimination will be permissible 
only if it was rationally related to the object which the classifying law sought 
to achieve. 
Although the purposive approach provides a valuable aid to construction in the 
determination of constitutionality, the purpose of the statute in issue may not 
be clear, or it may be inconclusive. 111 Mureinik112 also notes that "if the 
policy of a statute is iniquitous, a purposive interpretation may well foster 
iniquity". A difficult situation may also arise where a statute is found to be 
rationally related to more than one purpose, all of which are controversial and 
difficult to resolve. 113 
The use of purpose is also somewhat limited because the court is likely to 
frame legislative purpose as a unitary value, whereas there may be many other 
important values. Fundamental rights which are entrenched in a Constitution 
are in themselves values which limit the exercise of government authority; 
1101989(1) SA 349 (A). See Chap!. 8 for a discussion of this case. 
111See R. Dickerson The Interpretation and Application of 
Statutes (1975) at 91. 
112E. Mureinik "Administrative Law in South Africa" 1986 SAL.J 615 at 
624. 
113See N.J Singer (ed) Sutherland's Statutory Construction 
(1984) vol. 2A 40 para. 45.09. 
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1they are therefore paramount, if not overriding, indicators to whether a piece 
[of legislation which affects individuals is constitutional or not. Apart from 
those values which are found in the Constitution itself, there are also those 
commonly shared conceptions of justice, fairness and common good, and 
.those values which have, through universal recognition and acceptance, come 
to be regarded as part of all civilised legal systems. 
The 1993 Constitution calls for an approach which is wider than the purposive 
approach. In terms of section 35(1) the court must in interpreting the 
provisions which guarantee fundamental rights promote the values which 
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the 
section also respectively directs and permits the court to have regard to public 
international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in 
Chapter 3 and to comparable foreign law. 
However, foreign law ought to be used with caution because Constitutions are 
"born to different countries in different ages and in very different 
circumstances"; 114 foreign law should rather be seen as "a tool, not as a 
master. "115 The court should therefore seek guidance from those foreign 
cases which deal with human rights provisions which are similar to the 
provisions contained in Chapter 3, such as the provisions of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982, the German Basic Law of 1949 and 
the Namibian Chapter on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia of 1990. Although the Constitution 
of the United States is different from ours, decisions of United States courts 
114Per La Forest Jin Rabey v The Queen (1987] 39 D,L.R (4th) 
481at517. (A similar warning was sounded by Cioete Jin Sbabalala and 
Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others 
1994(6) BCLR 85 (T) at 117E and Marais Jin Nortje and Another v 
Attorney-General of the Cape and Another 1995(2) BCLR 236 
(C) at 240H-241E). 
115ldem. 
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will be persuasive authority. 
The relevance of the phrase "open and democratic society" is not confined 
only to the interpretation and application of the provisions which guarantee the 
rights and freedoms of individuals in general; it also operates as a means of 
determining whether a limitation of the rights entrenched in the Constitution 
is permissible in terms of section 33(l)(a). By requiring that a limitation of the 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution must not only be reasonable but must 
also be justifiable in an open and democratic society, section 33(l)(a) 
envisages an approach which is wider than the purposive approach; such an 
approach must take into account all the values which are the hallmark of an 
open and democratic society and reflect the function of law in society. 
2.3.2. The Teleological Approach. 
The word 'teleology' comes from the Greek word telos, which means an end 
or design. Teleology as a concept refers to a purpose or design which 
something is aimed at fulfilling. It is associated with the idea that mechanisms 
or processes alone cannot explain the facts of nature or life; these can only be 
explained in full by taking into account the purpose or design which nature or 
life are intended to fulfil. Explanations of facts in the light of their purpose or 
design also attempt to show a coherence between these facts and their purpose 
or design. 
Teleological reasoning is also used in statutory interpretation. The teleological 
approach, however, is not confined to the isolated purpose of an individual 
statute. 116 It is wider than the purposive approach in that it not only revolves 
around purpose and rationality but also seeks to harmonise purpose as a value 
116See Devenish op cit. at 39-48; Mureinik 1986 SAW at 623-626; 
J.M.T Labuschagne "Die Opkoms van die Teleologiese Benadering tot die 
Uitleg van Welte in Suid- Afrika" 1990 SALJ 569. 
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!with other fundamental values such as justice, equity, human dignity, freedom 
'and equality. These values reflect the ideals of democracy and the function of 
law in society; law is seen as an instrument which serves humanity and not as 
one which inhibits human endeavour and the legitimate interests of 
individuals. The essence of the teleological approach, therefore, is that the 
interpretation and application of a Constitution should have as its aim the 
maximisation of those values which best advance the legitimate interests of 
individuals in a just and equitable way. The Constitution is seen as a means 
of ensuring that citizens are governed in a just and equitable way. 
The teleological approach uses as its major premise justice117 and 
equity, 118 in the light of the reason and moral sense of men generally. 119 
As an approach which involves a moral evaluation, the teleological approach 
infuses morality into the interpretation of the Constitution and is clearly 
inconsistent with positivism, which seeks to separate law from morality. By 
applying the teleological approach, a court recognises that morality provides 
a standard in terms of which law and its function in society can be 
understood. The judge's understanding of constitutional values such as 
equality, liberty, security of the person, property, cruel and inhumane 
treatment, etc is necessarily shaped by the prevailing morality. 120 
The teleological approach to interpretation takes into account the morality of 
the whole legal system and harmonises it with, and as a result lends legitimacy 
to, that system. The ultimate aim of the interpretation of a Constitution is seen 
1170n the concept of justice see J. Rawls A Theory of Justice (1972) 
at 3-4 and 60. 
118See P.V Baker & P. St. J Langen (eds) Snell's Principles of 
Equity (1982) at 5-6. 
"
9See E.T Crawford The Construction of Statutes (1940) at 243. 
1200.M Piss "Objectivity and Interpretation" 1982 Stanford LR 739 at 
753. 
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as one of epitomising just, equitable and good government. 
Traces of the teleological approach can be found in some South African 
judgments. In Dadoo Ltd & Others v Krugersdorp Municipal 
Council 121 Innes CJ spoke in favour of a construction of statutory 
provisions which least interferes with elementary rights. Innes CJ took the 
view that this approach "should be applied not only in interpreting a doubtful 
phrase, but in ascertaining the law as a whole". Innes CJ's reference to "law 
as a whole" is, on a superficial level, a manifestation of an unqualified 
contextual methodology, in terms of which interpretation is harmonised with 
the protection of elementary rights and the spirit of the whole legal system. 
The only criticism that can be levelled against Innes CJ's judgment is that it 
specifically refers to the intent of the law and appears, on that basis, to be an 
example of a literal, 'intent' based approach. 
Schreiner JA's dissenting judgment in Collins v Minister of the 
lnterior122 is perhaps the best classic pre-1994 case of a purposive and 
teleological approach in South African constitutional law. The judgment 
emphasises the centrality of the overall purpose of legislation in the 
determination of constitutionality. A closer examination of the judgment 
reveals, however, that it was not premised purely on a narrow purposive 
approach but also, intrinsically, on a wider teleological or functional 
approach. 
Although Schreiner JA was throughout his judgment concerned with the 
purpose of the legislation in issue, he also referred to the 'substance' of the 
Act and drew a careful distinction between an inquiry into the psychological 
1211920 AD 530 at 532. 
122Supra. See Chapt. 4 for a full discussion of the Collins case. 
I 
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l'motive' of the Act and an inquiry into its 'function' .123 Schreiner JA 
1examined the 'purpose', 'substance' and 'function' of legislation in order to 
I 
:arrive at a result which can be considered to be just and equitable in the light 
'of the circumstances of the case; his approach was based on a form of 
teleological reasoning. 124 
Schreiner JA implicitly recognised that purpose sets a standard for evaluating 
established practice and provides a source for controlling the exercise of 
power to bring about just and equitable results. Schreiner JA's approach is 
functional or teleological in that, in addition to purpose, it makes use of 
creative reasoning and the moral sense of men to bring about just and 
equitable results. 
That the approach in Schreiner JA's judgment was indeed teleological can be 
gleaned from his rejection of the respondents' reasoning. The respondents had 
argued that although the cumulative effect of the two statutes which were in 
issue was to destroy the voting rights of 'Coloured' persons, the two statutes 
were, looked at individually, perfectly legally enacted. The judge of appeal 
rejected this argument as being "contrary to principle". The essence of 
Schreiner JA's reasoning was that the Constitution made provision for an 
effective guarantee of voting rights; any legislative scheme in terms of which 
this effective guarantee was circumvented was contrary to the principle of 
ieffective guarantee of these voting rights. 
The rejection of the respondents' argument on the basis of principle is of 
particular significance in relation to the protection of fundamental rights, 
which are based on normative standards. According to Mureinik, 125 
123At 577A-B. 
124See J. Hund "Aspects of Judicial Review in Southern Africa" 1982 
CILSA 276 at 277, footnote 6. 
125Mureinik 1986 SALJ at 620. 
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principles are important normative standards that are not rules; they are values 
!in terms of which rules must be justified.126 Unlike a rule, which must be 
justified for it to have force, a principle derives its strength from its innate 
moral appeal and influence. 127 
The Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4 of the Constitution 
provide a good example of normative standards; they are values which were 
identified by the Multi-Party Negotiating Process to serve as a test in terms 
of which the new constitutional text must be justified. In terms of section 
71(1) the new constitutional text must comply with these Principles; 
furthermore, in terms of section 71(2) the Constitutional Court must certify 
that all the clause of the new text comply with these Principles. 
Viewed in its proper perspective, Schreiner JA's purposive and teleological 
approach in the Collins case was a justification of the constitutional rule 
contained in sections 35 and 152; the rule contained in these sections was that 
Parliament could not abolish the voting rights guaranteed in the South Africa 
Act except through a two-thirds majority of both houses of Parliament in a 
joint sitting. Schreiner JA justified this rule by invoking the principle that a 
lawful scheme cannot be used to get around legal obstacles to achieve an 
unlawful purpose. In his view, the same principle applied where the obstacle 
was a constitutional protection of voting rights, and the means of achieving the 
purpose of abolishing this right was a lawful legislative scheme. This view is 
in line with the idea of justice and fairness in the political process. 
126Literalists may argue that a rule which is clearly expressed need not be 
justified. Although there may be no factual need to justify such a rule, there 
is always a principle which justifies it. The crucial issue in dealing with such 
an argument is whether the principle which justifies the rule is also clearly 
identifiable. It is because of this that the purposive approach is preferable; this 
approach seeks to justify a rule in terms of its purpose, from which the 
principle that justifies it is derived. 
127D.M Davis "Integrity and Ideology: Towards a Critical Theory of the 
Judicial Function" 1995 SALJ 105 at 107. 
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1Mureinik128 points out that a principle retains its truth and value as part of 
ithe legal system as long as there is a single rule of the system that it justifies; 
together with other principles it constitutes a morality which explains and 
justifies the whole legal system. It is in this way that Schreiner JA's judgment 
in the Collins case is intrinsically teleological. 
The judgment of the majority in the Collins case, on the other hand, is 
characterised by a commitment to known legal rules and artificial reasoning, 
which tend to limit the scope of interpretation. The judgment proceeded on the 
basis that the known legal rule was that Parliament must follow the prescribed 
procedure to enact valid legislation; once it had been shown that the rule had 
been followed, no other rule became relevant. The contradiction between the 
"validly" enacted legislation and its purpose, namely to remove Coloured 
voters from the common voters's roll by a reconstituted Parliament, was 
resolved through artificial reasoning; once it was found that Parliament had 
followed the prescribed procedure the purpose of the legislation and the 
motive behind its enactment became irrelevant. 
Nonet and Selznick129 have constructed a theory of Jaw which shows the 
usefulness of teleological reasoning. This theory is based on three modalities 
of Jaw in society, namely repressive law, autonomous law and responsive 
law.13° 
Repressive law is characterised by the institutionalisation of class justice; it 
consolidates and legitimises patterns of social subordination and is mainly 
preoccupied with the preservation of authority and maintaining a close 
128Mureinik 1986 SALJ at 621. 
129P. Nonet & P. Selznick Law and Society in Transition 
Towards Responsive Law (1978). 
BO{bid. at 14-16. 
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relationship between political power and legal institutions. 131 
Autonomous law separates law from politics, inhibits judicial creativity and 
limits the judicial role to maintaining obedience to rules of positive law .132 
It reduces the risk of repression through a commitment to a distinctive mission 
or accountability to external controls but accentuates the separation of law and 
politics. 133 
Responsive law, on the other hand, acknowledges the need for integrity or 
principle within the legal system, while at the same time encouraging 
openness; it seeks to resolve the tension between integrity and openness. The 
tension between integrity and openness arises because the one leads to an 
urgency to achieve accountability through bureaucratic tendencies, formalism 
and rigidity, while the other leads to an urgency to achieve accountability 
through "unguided adaptation to events and pressures". 134 
According to Nonet & Selznick, 135 an institution's commitment to a 
distinctive mission or accountability to external controls protects its integrity. 
However, when an institution becomes too wedded to its mission or to 
accountability, it easily becomes entrapped in formalism and rigidity and loses 
its capability to cope with new contingencies. Openness, on the other hand, 
presumes wide grants of discretion and encourages officials to be flexible, 
adaptive and self-corrective; its danger is that it may easily degenerate into 
opportunism. Responsive law resolves the tension between integrity and 
openness by maintaining accountability while at the same time responding to 
131lbid. at 33. 
132lbid. at 54. 
133lbid. at 57-60. 
134lbid. at 76. 
135ldem. 
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new forces within the social order. 136 
To a large extent, None! and Selznick's theory solves the problem which 
advocates of critical legal studies raise and seek to address, namely that of 
delegitimating patterns of social subordination in the judicial legal process and 
the liberal legal order as it exists. Critical legal studies is opposed to 
repressive law and denies the autonomy or neutrality of law. 137 Responsive 
law, like critical theory, is characterised by the need for openness, the 
possibility of choice, change, reconstruction and development. It recognises 
that law and society are not fixed but change constantly. 
Within the framework of None! & Selznick's systems of law the formalistic, 
mechanical approach to judicial interpretation which is implicit in a system of 
legislative supremacy can be characterised as consistent with autonomous law 
and, in the extreme, with repressive law. Both autonomous and repressive law 
adopt a narrow conception of justiciability and promote judicial deference to 
the legislature and the executive; they inhibit judicial creativity and confine the 
judicial role to giving effect to positive law and lack a balance between the 
need to maintain integrity and the need to respond to new forces within the 
social order. 
Responsive law is functional or teleological in that it recognises that law has 
social and moral purposes; it responds to society's needs and aspirations in 
order to promote that which is good or desirable as an end to be achieved; Jaw 
is seen as an instrument which ought to serve society's needs and aspirations 
136lbid. at 77. 
137For an exposition of critical legal theory and critical legal studies see 
D. Held Introduction to Critical Theory (1980); R.W Gordon "New 
Development in Legal Theory" in D. Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: 
A Progressive Critique (1982) 281; A. Hunt "The Theory of Critical 
Legal Studies" 1986 Oxford JLS 1; M. Tushnet "Critical Legal Studies and 
Constitutional Law" 1984 Stanford LR 623. 
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in order to promote the interests of society and its individual members. The 
igeneral purposes of law, therefore, provide a standard upon which the courts 
can creatively interpret legislation in order to mitigate its negative impact on 
individuals and respond to the needs of society and its individual 
members. 138 
Although the risk of repression is reduced in a system of autonomous law, 
the judiciary often engages in artificial reasoning139 and becomes 
preoccupied with seeking and enforcing the intention of the legislature. In a 
system of responsive law the judiciary engages in legal reasoning based on 
principles sueh as justice, fairness and security, and principles of 
democracy. 140 Indeed, principles and standards of morality, even though 
they may not be stated in legislation, provide authoritative grounds for legal 
argument and decision141 and help to reduce the arbitrariness of legal 
interpretation. 142 
The usefulness of the functional or teleological approach in the South African 
context is that it could help to facilitate a change from the formalistic 
approach to the interpretation of legislation of the past to a more value-
oriented approach which gives full effect to the provisions of the Constitution 
and reflects the proper role of the judiciary as a co-ordinate branch of 
government which is capable of actualising the values, ideals and standards of 
138Nonet & Selznick op cit. at 77; J.M Kernochan "Statutory 
Interpretation : An Outline of Method" (1976-1977) 3 Dalhousie lJ 333 
at 344. 
139Nonel & Selznick op cit. at 62. 
140lbid. at 80-81; Kernochan 1976-1977 Dalhousie 1J at 344. 
141See R. Dworkin "The Model of Rules" 1967 Univ. of Chicago LR 
at 22. 
142Nonet & Selznick op cit. at 80. 
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:morality as embodied in the Constitution, and of rising to the changing needs 
and aspirations of society. 
3. The Scope of Judicial Review of Constitutionality. 
In terms of the doctrine of the separation of powers, only the legislature may 
legislate. The judiciary may not legislate; its function is to apply the law to 
cases at hand. A direct question which arises in relation to judicial 
determination of constitutionality and the separation of powers is: how far may 
the judiciary go in exercising its power of interpreting and applying the 
provisions of the Constitution without usurping the function of the legislature? 
,It is hardly open to doubt that in applying the law judges have to interpret the 
,Jaw, and, in doing so, sometimes make law;143 this happens even in a 
system of legislative supremacy. 144 There can also be little doubt that 
judicially enforceable, open-ended and value-laden human rights provisions 
create more room for judicial creativity and Jaw-making.145 
The dividing line between judicial interpretation and judicial Jaw-making is 
very fine. On the one hand, the judiciary is not supposed to legislate, for that 
is the function of the legislature; on the other hand, judicial interpretation 
inevitably invites a form of law-making, because it is a creative enterprise 
which involves the definition of nuances, the filling of gaps and the 
clarification of ambiguities. 
143See H.J Abraham The Judicial Process (1986) at 338-339; M. 
Cappelletti "The Law-making Power of the Judge and its Limits: A 
Comparative Perspective" 1981 Monash Univ. LR 15. 
144See Lord Denning The Discipline of Law (1979); A Lester 
"English Judges as Law Makers" 1993 Public Law 269. 
145See M. Cappelletti "Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective" 1970 
California LR 1017. 
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!The controversy surrounding judicial interpretation and judicial law-making 
[essentially revolves around two major concepts which are related to the 
judicial role, namely judicial self-restraint and judicial activism. The former 
concept informs us that in order to guard itself against usurping the function 
of the legislature and acting as a sort of a 'super-legislature', the judiciary 
ought to restrain itself in the exercise of its power to determine 
constitutionality and not be too eager to strike down Iegislation;146 the latter 
concept implies that the judiciary fulfils a watchdog role and should therefore 
creatively and vigorously interpret the Constitution in order to ensure full 
compliance with its letter and spirit. 147 
The problem with judicial self-restraint and judicial activism is that they have 
not been universally defined; they mean different things to different people. 
Properly understood, the two concepts are, however, not necessarily 
inconsistent. The determination of constitutionality not only implies the power 
to declare legislation invalid; it also involves exercising that power 
responsibly. The danger that lies within and beyond the exercise of judicial 
power to declare legislation invalid is that the judiciary may exercise this 
power beyond permissible or acceptable limits, to the extent of usurping the 
functions of the legislature and becoming a sort of a 'super-legislature', or 
may abdicate its function and completely defer to the legislature. 148 
3.1. Judicial Self-Restraint. 
146See E. McWhinney Judicial Review in the English Speaking 
World (1969) at 177. 
1
'
1lbid. at 178. 
148Judicial deference to the legislature is in a sense also a form of activism 
which influences the course of law; a judiciary which abdicates its 
constitutional function and defers to the legislature for policy reasons or 
political motives in essence actively supports the legislature and undermines 
constitutional restraints. 
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!Judicial approaches and attitudes to determinations of constitutionality in South 
iAfrica will largely determine the course and success or failure of the 
constitutional entrenchment of human rights and freedoms. Judicial self-
restraint, the ability with which judges restrain themselves in the exercise of 
their power to determine constitutionality, is one of the important aspects 
which may very well determine that course. 
Hiemstra CJ's dictum in Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana149 contains a caution which expresses the need for 
some form of restraint in judicial determination of constitutionality: 
'
1 A court which is over-active in striking down legislation can destroy the exalted 
instrument it is trying to bring to life, it can incur the resentment of the Legislature and cause the 
Declaration (of human rights), which was meant to be a charter of freedom, to become a clog 
upon the wheels of government. "150 
Hiemstra CJ was, however, not calling for judicial inaction. He warned later 
on in his judgment that 
11 
on the other hand the court dare not abdicate its function as upholder of the long term 
aims and ideals of the Constitution 11 • 151 
It may be said, therefore, that the essence of judicial determination of 
constitutionality is a fine balance between judicial activism and judicial 
restraint. 
There is no power which does not call for some form of restraint; unrestrained 
power eventually becomes autocratic. It is a dictate of prudence that the courts 
should always, without compromising their power to determine 
149(Supra). See Chapt. 7 for a discussion of this case. 
150At 199. 
151ldem. 
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jconstitutionality, be conscious of the need to uphold the Constitution, while 
i 
',at the same time recognising the legal and practical limits of that power, as 
well as the delicate nature of their relationship with the political branches of 
government. 152 
Judicial self-restraint ought not, however, be elevated to judicial inaction. 153 
A formalistic approach to the determination of constitutionality is one of the 
approaches which may lead to an elevation of judicial self-restraint to judicial 
abdication. Whereas the interpretation of a supreme Constitution which 
entrenches fundamental human rights requires judges to be creative and to 
make value choices, 154 a formalistic approach tends to encourage a purely 
mechanical decision-making process and discourages a voluntaristic, 
discretionary making of value choices. The formalistic approach can be 
attributed to the misconceived notion that judges Jack the authority and 
competence to make law; judges do in fact make Jaw in the process of 
interpretation. 155 
A formalistic approach is inconsistent with the spirit of a Constitution which 
guarantees fundamental human rights. Human rights provisions are couched 
in wide and open-ended terms which call for greater creativity and, as a 
result, increase the scope of judicial law-making; they are intended to 
safeguard the rights of the present generation and future generations and 
152See B.O Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: 
The Role of the Courts in Government (1977) at 72. 
"'Idem. 
154Cappelleti 1981 Monash Univ. LR at 21. According to Cappelletti, 
the making of value choices involves "evaluation and balancing; it means 
giving consideration to the choice's practical and moral results; and it means 
employment of not only the arguments of abstract logic, but those of 
economics and politics, ethics, sociology and psychology". 
155See S.D Smith "Courts, Creativity and the Duty to Decide a Case" 1985 
Univ. of Illinois LR 573 at 577-585; Lester 1993 Public Law 269. 
! 
-480-
' ltherefore ought to be adapted to changing circumstances;156 in giving content 
,to such wide and open-ended terms, judicial law-making is inevitable. 
! 
Although judges ought to exercise some restraint in their determination of the 
constitutionality of laws, there is another important factor which calls for 
some form of judicial activism. Constitutional guarantees are prohibitions 
:against arbitrary and excessive exercise of power. Non-enforcement of such 
prohibitions renders them meaningless and makes a mockery of the 
entrenchment of fundamental human rights. The efficacy of constitutional 
guarantees depends on "a vigorous, courageous activism on the part of the 
court 11 • 157 
The essence of judicial self-restraint, far from being an invitation to judicial 
abdication, is that it serves as a reminder that the power to determine 
constitutionality is not a general licence for striking down laws; it reminds 
judges that there may very well be instances where individual interests must 
yield to the legitimate will of elected representatives of the people, especially 
where there·is a compelling state or national interest. Judicial restraint informs 
the court that the power of judicial review is a power which must be exercised 
:properly and responsibly; it implies that judicial power, like any other power, 
has both legal and practical limits. Justice Frankfurter meant precisely this 
when, quoting Madison's phrase, he said that "all power is 'of an encroaching 
nature' " and admonished that "[j]udicial power is not immune against this 
human weakness. It must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper 
bounds, and not the less since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint" .158 
156Cappelletti 1981 Monash Univ. LR at 41. 
157C.L Black The People and the Court (1960) at 100. 
158Per Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Trop v Dulles 356 US 86 
(1958) at 113. 
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Precisely what the proper limits of judicial power are, is not clear. 
:Abraham159 provides some pointers to the essence of judicial self-restraint; 
he has identified sixteen "maxims of judicial self-restraint. "160 These maxims 
may appropriately be divided into two broad categories, namely institutional 
or jurisdictional limits and political limits. 
3.1.1. Institutional or Jurisdictional Limits. 
Institutional or jurisdictional limits are those which are inherent in the function 
of the judiciary as a specialised and unique organ of government. As an organ 
of government which is concerned with the resolution of disputes of a legal 
nature, the judiciary has certain attributes which define its composition, its 
manner of operation and its objective within the whole structure of 
government. 
First and foremost, the judiciary, as an institution of government which is 
charged with the resolution of disputes, does not have the power to initiate the 
process of litigation or determination of constitutionality; it has to wait for a 
dispute to arise and for parties to the dispute to approach it for a resolution 
of the dispute. 161 This lack of initiative implies certain limitations on judicial 
power; these limitations are related to both the dispute and the parties to the 
dispute. 
Before the court can entertain a complaint, it must be satisfied that there is a 
real and substantial dispute and not merely a trivial or fanciful one. In relation 
to the determination of constitutionality, this means that before the court can 
1590p cit. at 369-392. 
160See also Justice Brandeis' judgment in Aswander v Tennessee 
Valley Authority 297 US 288 (1936) for some of the rules of judicial self-
restraint. 
161See Nwabueze op cit. at 49. 
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! 
!entertain a matter it must be satisfied that there is a definite case or 
!controversy at law or in equity between bona fide adversaries under the 
Constitution, involving the protection or enforcement of valuable legal rights, 
or the punishment, prevention or redress of wrongs directly concerning the 
party or parties bringing the justiciable suit. 162 This is the most fundamental 
limitation upon the power of the judiciary to determine constitutionality. 163 
It implies that the court, as a distinct and specialised institution, should 
restrain itself from getting involved with trivial, fanciful, abstract or 
contingent issues. 164 The institutional function of the judiciary is to 
determine and resolve real, concrete and justiciable issues. 
'The requirement that there must be an actual controversy also implies that the 
court does not ordinarily render advisory opinions upon hypothetical facts. As 
an institution with a specific purpose, its function is to resolve legal disputes 
by rendering declaratory judgments which are final and binding on existing 
parties to a dispute. 165 
162Abraham op cit. at 369. However, some jurisdictions permit of a 
greater degree of abstract review even when there is no clear case or 
controversy. 
163R.H Jackson The Supreme Court in the American System 
of Government (1955) at 11. The American system provides for concrete 
review only. 
164lbid. at 12. 
165The South African Appellate Division may, however, in appropriate 
cases render opinions even when there are no existing parties to a dispute: see 
'section 333 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 and section 23 of the 
Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959. Such opinions are intended for future 
guidance and to ensure the proper administration of justice. The 1993 
Constitution does not make express provision for the request of an opinion 
from the Constitutional Court by a Minister or some other official where a 
constitutional issue of importance has arisen and no person has approached the 
court for a determination of constitutionality. Section 7(4)(v) can, however, 
be interpreted as empowering a Minister or an official of the State, such as the 
Attorney-General, to seek an opinion of the Constitutional Court or a local or 
provincial division of the Supreme Court where an infringement of or threat 
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Logically associated with the requirement that there must be an actual dispute 
is the requirement that the parties must have locus standi to bring the 
suit. 166 In South African law this requirement was associated with the non-
recognition of the actio popularis of Roman law, whereby every person was 
entitled to challenge the validity of government activity to ensure due 
performance. 167 
South African courts have required that for a party to have locus standi he or 
she must have a direct and substantial interest, although it need not be a 
special interest. 168 This requirement led to a denial of locus standi in cases 
where an individual sought to challenge in the broader general interest action 
which threatened the environment, such as air or water pollution. 169 
A strict requirement of locus standi inhibits the participation of interest 
groups and the general public in ensuring that the government must honour the 
to any of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 is alleged. Another instance 
where a public official may approach the court for a determination of 
constitutionality is in relation to the constitutionality of a Bill before 
Parliament or a provincial legislature ( section 98(2)( d), read with section 
98(9) ). The 1993 Constitution therefore makes provision for a measure of 
abstract review; it is more reminiscent of the German than the American 
Constitution. 
166See Abraham op cit. at 370. 
167See J.D van der Vyver "Actiones Populares and the Problem of 
Standing in Roman, South African Law and American Law" 1978 Acta 
Juridica 191; see also Director of Education, Transvaal v 
McCagie 1918 AD 616 at 621. 
168See L. Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 650 et seq.; C. Loots 
"Locus Standi to claim relief in the public interest in matters involving the 
enforcement of legislation" 1989 SALJ at 131-132; C. Loots "Standing to 
Enforce Fundamental Rights" 1994 SAJHR 49. 
169See Baxter op cit. at 658 et seq.; Loots 1989 SALJ at 132 et seq. 
and 141 et seq. 
I 
! -484-
jvalues enshrined in the Constitution. There may be instances where a 
lgovemment activity violates one or more of the rights entrenched in the 
I 
'Constitution, but does not affect any specific individual or affected individuals 
do not approach the court for relief; in such instances an interest group or 
somebody else may wish to challenge the offending government action in 
order to ensure due performance. 
Section 7(4)(b) of the 1993 Constitution liberalises locus standi in relation to 
the protection and enforcement of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution; it extends locus standi to a wide range of litigants in instances 
where violations or threatened violations of the rights entrenched in Chapter 
3 are alleged. 170 This extension promotes the fundamental value of justice 
and is therefore to be welcomed. 171 
In addition to persons who act in their own interest, an association acting in 
the interest of its members, a person acting on behalf of another person who 
is not in a position to seek relief in his or her own name, a person acting as 
a member of or in the interest of a group or class of persons or a person 
iacting in the public interest, now have locus standi where a violation or an 
alleged violation of any of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 is alleged. These 
extensions of locus standi in essence introduce the actio popularis in the field 
of human rights law and are particularly relevant in those instances where 
government action threatens the environment. 172 Section 7(4)(b) does not, 
however, contain any measure to prevent frivolous litigation; the courts have, 
170Rule 9(1) of the Constitutional Court Rules also makes provision for the 
admission of a person in a matter before the court as amicus curiae; the 
written consent of the parties is, however, required. 
171See Loots 1994 SAJHR at 49-51 for a discussion of the significance 
of extending locus standi. 
1
-nsee E. Bray "The Liberation of Locus Standi in the Interim 
Constitution : An Environmental Angle" 1994 THRHR 481. 
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however, in the past developed mechanisms to prevent such litigation. 173 In 
addition, the rules of the Constitutional Court also serve to contain the volume 
of cases. 174 
Another self-imposed restraint is the requirement that a litigant must exhaust 
all available remedies before he can approach the court for relief. 175 This 
requirement is of particular significance in relation to judicial control of the 
exercise of administrative powers;176 thus, where an administrative structure 
itself provides for some form of redress or appeal, an individual affected by 
its action is required to exhaust those remedies before he can approach the 
court for relief. 177 The remedies may, however, be external in the sense that 
another organ which is not related to the violating organ is also empowered 
to consider the dispute (another tribunal, for example), in which case a litigant 
will not be heard by the court before the matter has been exhaustively dealt 
with by the lower tribunal. 
The requirement that a litigant must exhaust all available remedies is closely 
related to the requirement that only those issues which have been substantially 
raised in the court a quo are appealable. The Constitutional Court will, on this 
173See D. Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution (1994) at 
21. It may be required, for example, that the applicant must show why a 
person whose rights are affected is not able to approach the court personally 
and that had he been in a position to do so he would have done so: see 
Wood v Ondangwa Tribal Authority 1975(2) SA 294 (A) at 311G. 
174Government Notice R1584 published in Regulation Gazette 5394 of 16 
September, 1994 and repealed and replaced by Government Notice R5 
published in Regulation Gazette 5450 of 6 January 1995. 
175Abraham op cit. at 377. 
176Judicial control of the exercise of administrative powers becomes 
particularly relevant in the constitutional law context in the light of the 
entrenchment of administrative justice in section 24 of the Constitution. 
177See M. Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) at 270-275. 
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'!basis, be able to refuse to consider an appeal involving a constitutional issue 
,from a provincial or local division unless it is satisfied that a question 
constituting an appropriate ground for a determination of constitutionality by 
these divisions as envisaged in section 101(3) of the Constitution has been 
raised, argued and decided. 178 The power of review is also restrained in that 
the court will express itself only on a matter in issue; even when a peripheral 
issue of major importance is raised the court can simply leave the matter 
undecided. 179 
The court may also restrain itself from coming to the relief of an individual 
where he has accepted state action which violates his rights or where he has 
availed himself of the benefits of the action. 180 The essence of this form of 
,self-restraint is that if a person accepts an act or its benefit, it can hardly be 
said that he is prejudiced by its operation. 
3.1.2. Political Limits. 
'Political limits', in the sense in which the phrase is used here, refers to those 
limits which are based on judicial respect for the legislature and the executive 
as the political branches of government; the legislature, in particular, is 
traditionally regarded as the branch best suited to make laws. The traditional 
view that the legislature is the organ which is best suited to make Jaws is 
based on the view that, as a body elected by the people and representing them, 
178See Abraham op cit. at 377 in relation to the position in the United 
States. It is clear from the Constitutional Court Rules that the court will 
entertain a matter only if it is satisfied that the matter has been fully canvassed 
and dealt with in the local or provincial division of the Supreme Court. Rule 
18(e)(ii) requires a judge or judges of any of these divisions to certify that 
"the evidence in the proceedings is sufficient to enable the Court to deal with 
and dispose of the matter without having to refer the case back to the division 
for further evidence". 
1~he court may, however, comment obiter. 
180Abraham op cit. at 377. 
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it is the proper body to make laws which should govern the people; 
itheoretically, the legislature has a mandate from the people to make laws as 
' 
it deems fit. According to Lord Hailsham, the legislature is an 'elective 
dictatorship' whose powers "are restrained only by the consciences of its 
members, the checks and balances of its different members and the need, 
recognised in practice if capable in theory of being deferred, for periodic 
elections". 181 
In terms of the conception that the function of law-making traditionally falls 
within the domain of the legislature, law-making is seen as a political process 
which ought to be left to the judgment of those politicians who have been 
elected, and therefore mandated, by the people to make laws which ought to 
govern them. The judiciary is an appointed and non-elected body which can 
make no valid claim to having a popular mandate and therefore ought not to 
make law; its prestige and public standing depend on its political non-
involvement and the extent to which it is able to stand aloof from the 
mainstream of politics. 182 Members of the judiciary are generally regarded 
as being not well-equipped for the determination of purely political 
controversies. 183 
This conception is associated with the idea that courts should decide disputes 
on principle and leave policy issues to politicians. It says much about the 
supposed limits of judicial power and the relationship between the judiciary 
and the political branches of government; it constitutes one of the bases upon 
which judges may restrain themselves in the exercise of their power to 
181Lord Hailsham The Dilemma of Democracy - Diagnosis and 
Prescription (1978) at 126. 
182see E. McWhinney "The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights -
Lessons in Comparative Jurisprudence" 1959 Can. Bar Rev. 16 at 34-35; 
Bickel op cit. at 172. 
183McWhinney 1959 Can. Bar Rev. at 35. 
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determine constitutionality. It implies, in essence, that there are certain 
"conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action" .184 These limits 
dictate that the judiciary ought to show a measure of respect for political will; 
they are self-imposed limits which seek to draw a line between the political 
playing field and the judicial playing field. Chief among these limits are the 
'political question' doctrine, the presumption of constitutionality and the non-
imputation of illegal motives to the legislature. 
3.1.2.1. The 'Political Question' Doctrine. 
The phrase 'political question' refers to those issues which, although of a legal 
,nature, impose a duty which is peculiarly political; their observance depends 
upon legislative or executive fidelity. 185 However, whether a particular issue 
which the court is called upon to decide is a 'political question' may be 
controversial because almost every constitutional question or issue is to some 
extent political. 186 
The 'political question' doctrine has received prominent attention in American 
constitutional law. Until the decision in Baker v Carr,187 the United 
States Supreme Court for a long time consistently refused to determine the 
constitutionality of constitutional and legislative delimitation or apportionment 
of state or congressional districts, holding that such issues were political 
184Nwabueze op cit. at 25. 
'
85Nwabueze op cit. at 25; E.S Corwin The Supreme Court and 
Political Questions (1936) at 11. 
186Nwabueze op cit. at 25-26; Abraham op cit. at 380. De Toqueville 
aptly noted that "there is hardly a political question in the United States that 
does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one": see J.P Mayer (ed) 
Democracy in America (1969) at 270. 
187369 us 186 (1962). 
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questions. 188 According to Justice Frankfurter, one of the chief proponents 
of the 'political question' doctrine, the court should not become involved in 
a "patently political question"; to Justice Frankfurter, political questions were 
a 'political thicket' which was the exclusive domain of legislatures.189 
Baker V Carr190 represents a turning point on the question whether the 
delimitation or apportionment of districts is a non-justiciable 'political 
question' or not. Justice Brennan, who wrote the judgment of the court, held 
that the delimitation or apportionment of districts was a justiciable controversy 
in respect of which the court has jurisdiction. 191 
Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker v Carr was that the political question 
doctrine was confined to a function of the separation of powers. He elaborated 
this view in the following terms: 
"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable conunitment of the issue to a co-ordinate political department; or a Jack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initia1 policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the 
impossibi1ity of a court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack of respect 
188See Abraham op cit. at 381. 
189See Justice Frankfurter's judgment in Colegrove v Green 328 US 
549 (1946) and his dissenting judgment in Baker v Carr (supra). 
190Supra. For later cases in which Baker v Carr was followed see 
inter alia Gray v Sanders 372 us 368 (1963); Wesberry v Sanders 
376 us 1 (1964); Reynolds v Sims 377 us 533 (1964). 
191It is conceivable that the South African Constitutional Court may be 
called upon to deal with the question of demarcation of provinces. The 
existing boundaries of the provinces were accepted on the basis that there 
would be further discussion and that a process which allows for an amendment 
of the boundaries would be put in place; see C de Coning "The Territorial 
Imperative : Towards an Evaluation of the Provincial Demarcation Process" 
in B. de Villiers Birth of a Constitution (ed) (1994) at 189, especially 
at 216-219. 
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'1due to co-ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to 
1a political decision a1ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
I 
I b · d . 11192 1pronouncements y various epartments on one question. 
' 
American constitutional scholars, however, hold divergent views on the 
'political question' doctrine. The views of Wechsler and Bickel represent the 
two divergent streams of thought. According to Wechsler, 193 the doctrine 
implies that "the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitution has 
committed to another agency of government the autonomous determination of 
the issue raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation", but which is 
"toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or to intervene". 194 
Bickel, 195 on the other hand, rejects Wechs!er's view about the interpretation 
of the Constitution and the court's discretion whether to abstain from 
determining political questions or to intervene where a political question is 
involved; he argues that "only by a play of words can a broad discretion that 
1the courts have in fact exercised be turned into an act of constitutional 
interpretation". 196 
In Bickel' s view, the political question doctrine can be explained in terms of 
the very nature of the judicial process. According to him political questions 
are not justiciable because of 
"the court's lack of capacity. compounded in unequal parts of the strangeness of the issue 
and the suspicion that it will have to yie]d more often and more substantially to expediency than 
'to principle; the sheer momentousness of it, which unbalances judgment and prevents one from 
192At 217. 
193H. Wechsler "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" 1959 
Harv. LR 1. 
194Wechsler 1959 Harv. LR at 7-9. 
195A. Bickel "The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues" 1961 Harv. LR 40. 
196Bickel 1961 Harv. LR at 46. 
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:subsuming the normal calculations of probabilities; the anxiety not so much that judicial judgment 
iwill be ignored, as that perhaps it should be but will not; finally and in sum (in a mature 
I 
idemocracy), the inner vulnerability of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no 
'earth to draw strength from 11 • 197 
Bickel's view about the political question doctrine is based on the separation 
of powers and judicial prudence in relation to institutional functions of the co-
ordinate branches of government. This view emphasises the political function 
of the legislature and the executive as well as the 'passive virtues' 198 and the 
techniques of prudence through which the courts exercise a discretion to 
abstain from determining issues of a highly political nature as an important 
aspect of the 'political question' doctrine. In terms of this view, policy issues 
whose determination cannot be based on principle should rather be left to the 
political branches of government. 
Although both the separation of powers and respect for political branches of 
government are necessary ingredients of democracy, an unbridled 
discretionary abstention from the determination of justiciable controversies 
may turn into judicial abdication. An explanation of the 'political question' 
doctrine strictly in terms of the separation of powers poses the danger of 
judicial avoidance of determinations of constitutionality simply because a case 
has a political undertone or serious political implications. 
Nwabueze199 warns about "the disturbing implication that the political 
question doctrine might be extended to 'infinite' categories of questions". The 
danger of the doctrine in relation to constitutionally entrenched rights and 
freedoms is obvious; when an uncontrolled discretion, grounded only on 
prudence, is used to abstain from determining the constitutionality of 
197Bickel 1961 Harv. LR at 75. See also Bickel op cit (1962) at 172. 
198Bickel 1961 Harv. LR at 69-71; passim. 
1990p cit. at 38. 
I 
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Uusticiable violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, the constitutional 
lentrenchment of these rights and freedoms loses much of its meaning. An 
I 
extension of the political question doctrine to shelter legislative and executive 
violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms opens the door 
wide to judicial abdication.200 
The 'political question' doctrine should rather be seen as nothing but a matter 
of justiciability .201 It simply means that there are no judicially cognisable 
standards for a claim of unconstitutionality; there is simply no justiciable 
issue. To say that there is a political question is no different from saying that 
there is no constitutional violation, either in law or on the merits. One may 
therefore be tempted to say that there is in reality no 'political question' 
doctrine. "'2 
3.1.2.2. The Presumption of Constitutionality, Non-imputation of 
Illegal Motives and Legislative Wisdom . 
These forms of judicial self-restraint are related. They are largely based on the 
courts' respect for legislative wisdom, integrity and patriotism. Like the 
'political question' doctrine, they have as their basis the idea that the function 
of the judiciary is to decide cases on principle and that policy issues should 
be left to the political branches of government; according to this idea, it is 
therefore not the function of the judiciary to question the wisdom, integrity 
and patriotism of the legislature; that function falls within the political process 
and not within the judicial process. 
ZOOfbid. at 39. 
201Ibid. at 37-39. 
"'
2See L. Henkin "Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?" 1976 Yale 
LJ 597. 
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! 
iThe presumption of constitutionality is based on the notion that an elected 
!legislature represents the will of the people; legislation, as an expression of 
the will of the people through their elected representatives, ought not to be 
easily tampered with, unless it can clearly be shown that such legislation 
violates another superior expression of the will of the people, namely the 
Constitution which sets out the powers of government and also limits the 
exercise of such power in relation to the individual. 
The operation of the presumption of constitutionality in relation to judicial 
determination of constitutionality implies that, since legislation is an 
expression of the will of elected representatives of the people, the court should 
assume in favour of constitutionality. It is said that when courts assume in 
favour of constitutionality they allow the ordinary political process to take its 
course, in the sense that if the legislation in issue is regarded as undesirable 
it will be repealed or amended by the elected representatives;203 
furthermore, elected representatives who constantly enact unpopular legislation 
always run the risk of not being re-elected. 
Speaking about the presumption of constitutionality, Justice Bushrod 
Washington of the United States Supreme Court said: 
"It is but a decent respect to the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of the Jegislative body, 
by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity. until its violation of the 
Constitution is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. "204 
Justice Washington expressed the same view about the presumption of 
constitutionality in Cooper v Telfair"05 when he said: 
203See McWhinney Judicial Review (1969) at 179. 
2040gden v Sanders 12 Wheat. 213 (1827), as quoted in Abraham op 
cit. at 385. 
205(1800) 4 Dallas (4 US) 14, as quoted in A.R Brewer-Carias Judicial 
Review in Comparative Law (1989) at 351, footnote 4. 
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I 
I 
I "The presumption indeed must aJways be in favour of the validity of laws, if the contrary 
! 
lis not clearly demonstrated." 
I 
What appears from Justice Washington's dicta is that the presumption of 
constitutionality essentially implies that the court will not readily declare 
legislation invalid, unless the party alleging invalidity clearly shows that the 
act or law in issue prejudicially affects his rights and freedoms in 
contravention of an existing constitutional provision. The initial onus of 
showing that an act or a law violates a constitutionally entrenched right rests 
on the challenger and not on the organs of state;206 once a violation has been 
shown the state bears the onus to justify it. 207 
Whether the presumption of constitutionality is, in its wider sense, applicable 
in each and every instance may be problematic. Justice Harlan Stone, in the 
Carotene Products footnote,208 implied an exception to the presumption 
when he stated that there may be a narrower scope of operation of the 
presumption when challenged legislation involves a restriction or curtailment 
of the ordinary political process or rights within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution. Justice Stone had in mind legislation involving, for example, a 
curtailment of the right to vote, or specific prohibitions such as the prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion etc; in such instances the 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality may be limited in the sense 
that the state would be required to show the existence of a compelling state 
206Cf. Zimbabwe Township Developers (Pvt) Ltd v Lou's 
Shoes (Pvt) Ltd 1984 (2) SA 778 (ZS) at 783H. 
207See Chapt. 6 where the analytical framework used to measure 
constitutionality, as laid down in R v Oakes (Supra), is discussed. 
20•United States v Carotene Products Co. (Supra) at 152-153, 
footnote 4. 
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interest to justify constitutionality. 209 
It does not seem, however, that the Carolene Products footnote exception 
to the presumption of constitutionality implies a deviation from the 
requirement that the onus of showing that an act or law violates 
constitutionally entrenched rights lies on the challenger. What the exception 
amounts to is that once the challenger proves a violation of any of those rights 
which arc related to the political process or which form part of specific 
prohibitions of the Constitution, the presumption of constitutionality falls 
away; in such instances a compelling state interest is required to justify 
constitutionality. Justice Stone's implied exception was also, in another sense, 
a caveat against an extremely strict application of the presumption, which 
might be inappropriate in cases involving certain fundamental rights and 
freedoms which constitute the very essence of democracy. 
Much in the same way as the presumption of constitutionality reflects the 
courts' respect for legislative wisdom, integrity and patriotism, so does the 
courts' unwillingness to impute illegal motives to the legislature. The courts 
will always assume that the legislature acted with good motives. 210 
The basic premise for the non-imputation of illegal motives is that as long as 
the legislature acts within its constitutional powers, the court has no authority 
to question the motives behind the exercise of that power. 211 The court is 
209This corresponds to the section 33(1) limitation requirements, namely 
that a limitation of any of the rights entrenched in Chapter must be reasonable 
and justifiable in a democratic state based on freedom and equality. A state 
interest will generally be regarded as 'compelling' if it is reasonable and 
justifiable in a democratic state based on freedom and equality. However, 
although factors which indicate the existence of a 'compelling state interest' 
may also indicate that a state of affairs is 'reasonable and justifiable in a 
democratic state', the two phrases are not synonymous. 
210Abraham op cit. at 387. 
211Idem. See Barenblatt v United States 360 us 109 (1959). 
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,supposed not to consider the motives of the legislature at all.212 Motive 
should, however, be distinguished from intent and purpose, concepts with 
which the courts often grapple in the interpretation of legislation. 
The exercise of judicial self-restraint in order to respect the wisdom, integrity 
and patriotism of the legislature upholds, in an indirect way, the separation of 
powers. The legislature, being the elected representative of the people, is 
presumed to possess the necessary wisdom, integrity and patriotism to make 
good laws; unless there is a clearly demonstrable violation of a provision of 
the Constitution, the court ought to refrain from replacing legislative wisdom 
with its own. 213 
.3.1.3. Judicial Self-restraint and a Policy of Avoidance. 
On closer scrutiny, some instances of judicial self-restraint may reveal a 
policy of avoidance, whereby judges deliberately avoid the determination of 
justiciable constitutional disputes simply because they do not want to offend 
the legislature or the executive. According to Justice Frankfurter, a proponent 
of a policy of avoidance, "[t]he most fundamental principle of constitutional 
adjudication is not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all 
possible". 214 
Adherents to a policy of avoidance regard this policy as prudent; they base the 
legitimacy of judicial review on the assumption that the court should not only 
perform its function in a principled and sober manner but should also avoid 
212Abraham op cit. at 388. 
' 
213Under the general concept of legislative wisdom may also be mentioned 
'the courts' reluctance to check inept, unwise, emotional or unrepresentative 
legislators. Such issues are best resolved through the political process and not 
through the legal process: see Abraham op cit. at 292. 
214See United States v Lovett 328 us 303 (1946) at 320. 
-497-
1engaging in sensitive issues. 215 They argue that the court may legitimately 
' \refrain from deciding a constitutional issue if it in its prudence thinks this is 
the proper course to follow. 216 
The problem with avoiding the determination of constitutional issues simply 
on the grounds of prudence is that it negates the basic notion that the 
fundamental function of the court is to determine justiciable issues properly 
before it, regardless of the sensitivity of the issue. Part of the function of the 
judiciary involves the determination of questions which are relevant to the 
outcome of the dispute before it. 217 It is one thing to say that an issue is 
simply not justiciable, but to avoid the determination of a justiciable issue 
simply because it is prudent to avoid engaging in sensitive issues, is 
tantamount to judicial abdication. 
Judicial avoidance is improper because it takes away the individual's means 
of protecting his constitutionally guaranteed rights against government 
excesses; the judiciary is the only institution which stands between the 
individual in his quest to pursue his constitutionally recognised interests and 
the state in the exercise of its power. It is improper for a court to avoid a 
determination of justiciable constitutional issues when the Constitution confers 
upon it the power to do so; the Constitution itself, as the ultimate will of the 
people,218 specifically mandates and directs the courts to determine the 
constitutionality of acts of the elected representatives of the people. 
215See Bickel op cit. (1962) at 67-71. 
216See F.W Scharff "Judicial Review and the Political Question: A 
Functional Analysis" 1966 Yale W 517 at 520. 
211Idem. 
218The question of the extent of judicial power to determine 
constitutionality is a complex and difficult one and revolves around judicial 
creativity and judicial law-making: see infra. 
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!As soon as society begins to realise the implication of constitutional limitations 
1of the exercise of state authority and the guarantees of fundamental rights and 
i 
!freedoms, and begins to value these limitations and guarantees, it soon begins 
to rely more and more on the courts' authoritative determination of 
constitutional disputes between the individual and the state organs. The court's 
willingness and ability to face constitutional issues before it, and a fearless and 
bold protection of constitutional limitations and guarantees, help to shape and 
direct the future course of political decisions and to provide better 
constitutional options to law-makers. 219 
3.2. Judicial Activism, Creativity and the Proper Role of the 
Judiciary. 
In a system of constitutional supremacy, the constitutional role of the judiciary 
is essentially determined by the nature of the Constitution. A supreme 
Constitution operates as a fundamental law which limits the exercise of power 
by state organs, and declares and guarantees the rights and freedoms of 
individuals. It is an expression of the values, ideals and aspirations of the 
people; it is directly applicable by the courts to limit the exercise of power by 
state organs in relation to individuals. 
The fundamental values, ideals and aspirations upon which a supreme 
Constitution is based are the foundation of freedom and justice in a democratic 
society. The supremacy of the Constitution operates as a directive to the 
courts, as interpreters and enforcers of the law, to uphold the supreme law of 
the Constitution in the event of conflicts between its provisions and inferior 
acts of state organs; its provisions operate as a yardstick for judicial 
determinations of the validity of acts of state organs. 
The justiciability of a supreme Constitution is intended to give the individual 
219Scharff 1966 Yale LJ at 534. 
I 
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lthe full benefit of its values and ideals; unless its provisions are enforced 
!fearlessly and courageously, its noble ideals are as dead as the proverbial 
'dodo. A Constitution which declares and guarantees fundamental human rights 
and freedoms has very little meaning on its own; it is what the courts choose 
to do with its jural postulates or values that determines its efficacy no 
The supreme nature of the Constitution does not, however, per se grant the 
courts the power to grind each and every constitutional issue that arises. The 
institutional function of a court of law is confined to the determination of 
justiciable legal disputes which are brought before it by individuals who 
complain that one or more of their legally recognised and guaranteed rights 
has been violated or denied. As Nwabueze221 points out, "the court is not 
the prime mover or instigator of its discomfiture, its only role is to interpose 
its machinery between the government and its opponents ... " The crucial point, 
therefore, with regard to the constitutional role of the judiciary, is that the 
court exercises its power in order to decide justiciable legal disputes. 
There is, however, another dimension of the role of the judiciary which is 
associated with the nature of a supreme Constitution which guarantees 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. The provisions of the Constitution 
do not have a meaning unless the meaning of the words used is determined. 
Human rights provisions are often framed in wide and vague terms that must 
be interpreted and given meaning before they can be applied to cases which 
come before the courts. Given the generality of constitutional provisions, a 
question which arises pertinently is: What permissible limits are there to the 
way in which the provisions of the Constitution are interpreted in order to 
give them meaning? 
The question of the permissible limits of constitutional interpretation arises 
220E. McWhinney 1959 Can. Bar Rev. at 33. 
221Nwabueze op cit. at 49. 
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from the danger that a judiciary which is not vigilant may easily lose sight of 
!the real controversy, namely an alleged violation of the provisions of the 
i 
!Constitution. Courts are not supposed to grapple with each and every 
constitutional issue that arises222 or to question policy choices by the elected 
political branches of government; their function is to resolve justiciable legal 
disputes. 
A judiciary which questions policy choices by the elected representatives of 
the people, and substitutes its views for those of the legislature, invades the 
legislative sphere and also, as a result, undermines the separation of powers 
between the legislature and the judiciary; it functions as "a judicial 'super-
legislature' and stretches its power beyond the reach of Parliament ... and the 
electorate". ""3 On the other hand, a judiciary which is clothed with the 
power to review legislative and executive acts and deliberately avoids the 
,determination of justiciable constitutional issues and simply defers to the 
legislature or the executive abdicates its constitutional function of resolving 
disputes which are brought before it; such a judiciary runs the risk of losing 
its legitimacy. 
The demarcation of the boundary between permissible constitutional 
interpretation and judicial usurpation of legislative functions essentially 
revolves around the dividing line between creative constitutional interpretation 
and judicial legislating. 224 The real issue, however, is not whether judges do 
=see L.H Pollack "Securing Liberty through Litigation - The Proper Role 
of the United States Supreme Court" 1973 MLR 113 at 114. 
223Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act [1985) 
2 S.C.R 486 at 497. 
™The term 'judicial legislating' is preferable to 'judicial law-making'. 
The term 'judicial law-making' can be misleading; it presupposes that judges 
,do not make law. Judges do make law, not in the sense of legislating but in 
the sense of developing the law through interpretation and filling legislative 
vacuums. 'Judicial legislating', in the sense in which the term is used here, 
connotes a judiciary which misperceives its adjudicatory function, or simply 
I 
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!or should make law when they interpret the provisions of the constitution but 
I 
kather one of defining the limits of creative constitutional interpretation. 225 
I 
Constitutional interpretation, in relation to a supreme Constitution, essentially 
involves giving the wide, elastic and open-ended terms of the Constitution 
meaning; these terms contain values, goals and ideals which have been 
positivised into fundamental social and economic rights. Constitutional 
interpretation, therefore, is unavoidably a creative process226 which involves 
finding the meaning of words, defining the nuances, clarifying ambiguities and 
applying the meanings, within the context in which they are used, to the 
controversy with which the court is faced. 227 As Cappelletti228 points out, 
"judicial interpretation of social rights necessarily implies a high degree of 
creativi l y" . 
The main objection to judicial creativity is that it involves the judiciary in 
politics and policy issues. Critics of judicial creativity argue that in 
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution creatively, judges meddle with 
political and policy issues; they contend that when judges interpret the 
provisions of the Constitution, they not only meddle with politics and policy 
issues but also make law, something which is reserved for the Iegislature.229 
ignores it, and acts as if it were a legislator for the general good; it in essence 
refers to judicial usurpation of legislative functions. 
225See B. Dickson "The Judiciary - Law Interpreters or Law-makers?" 
1982 Manitoba W 701. 
226It may even be argued that, in formulating constitutional provisions in 
wide and open-ended terms, the framers of the Constitution left room for 
judicial creativity. 
227See M. Cappelletti 1981 Monash Univ. LR at 17. 
""'Ibid. at 40. 
229See in general R.H Bork The Tempting of America The 
Political Seduction of the Law (1990). 
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I The 
' 
important thing to remember in defining the limits of creative 
,constitutional interpretation is that although judges do make law when they 
I 
'give meaning to the provisions of the Constitution, the law which they make 
is not the same thing as the 'law' which issues from Parliament. Unlike 
1Parliament, judges do not deliberately make policy decisions which they then 
enact into law intended for the general good; judges make law within the 
context of their institutional function, which is to interpret the law in order to 
apply it to concrete justiciable disputes between parties to a suit. 23° Creative 
constitutional interpretation is, therefore, first and foremost limited by the 
institutional function of the judiciary. 
Creative constitutional interpretation is not the same as arbitrary interpretation. 
In giving meaning to the terms of the Constitution, a judge is faced with more 
than one meaning and values from which he has to choose; this process 
involves the exercise of a discretion and the making of a principled 
choice. 231 Creative constitutional interpretation, therefore, is essentially 
based on principle. 
The making of a principled choice is not an arbitrary and mechanical process. 
It means, in relation to judicial interpretation, 
11
evaluation and balancing; it means giving consideration to the choice's practical and 
moral results; and it means employment of not only the arguments of abstract logic, but those of 
. 1· . th' - I d h I " 232 economics, po Jtics, e ics, socio ogy an psyc o ogy . 
230The bulk of the common law exemplifies judge-made law; the common 
law developed as a result of the creation of new legal concepts; these legal 
concepts were further developed and expanded to accommodate new demands 
for appropriate legal remedies. 
231The making of a principled choice involves a consideration of legal 
principles; these principles, in relation to constitutional interpretation, are 
discoverable from the Constitution itself, from outside sources, such as 
international law and comparable foreign law, as well as from the evolving 
conceptions about rights and freedoms. 
232Cappelletti 1981 Monash Univ. LR at 21. 
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'Wechsler233 has aptly stated the relationship between principle and creativity 
lin constitutional interpretation; according to him, "constitutional interpretation 
! 
must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is 
involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the 
immediate result that is achieved". This means that a judgment which is 
arrived at in any determination of constitutionality must be supported by 
reasons that are adequate to maintain any choices that are made during the 
process of interpretation. 234 
The argument that judges are called upon to interpret the provisions of the 
Constitution in order to apply them to cases before them creates the illusion 
that judges are not supposed to engage in policy issues. Of course, judges are 
supposed to decide cases on principle and not on policy. They cannot, 
however, at all times avoid policy issues; objective determinations of 
constitutionality can only be made by having regard to the policies that lie at 
the root of legislation, the values that underlie the rights in issue, as well as 
the different conceptions of rights and freedoms. 235 
A Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms is 
essentially a political document, and interpreting it is inescapably a political 
activity. 236 This does not mean, however, that the political nature of the 
Constitution entitles judges to enter the political arena; interpreting the 
233H. Wechsler 1959 Harvard LR at 15. 
234[bid. at 20. 
235For a discussion of the influence of public policy on judicial 
interpretation see R.S Abella "Public Policy and the Judicial Role" 1989 
McGill W 1021; P.C.A Snyman "Public Policy in Anglo-American Law" 
1986 CILSA 220. 
236L.M Du Plessis "The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa: 
Taking Stock" in J. Kruger & B. Currin Interpreting a Bill of Rights 
(1994) at 20-22; M. Dlamini "The Political Nature of the Judicial Function" 
1992 THRHR 411. 
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I 
]Constitution is a political activity of a special kind and not of a 'party-
political' kind. 237 The duty of judges is to decide cases in accordance with 
their understanding of justice and sound policy and not to substitute their 
views or policies for those of the legislature. 
In many instances, the principles which judges fashion have to be applied to 
political and policy issues. In exercising their interpretive and adjudicatory 
role, judges express the values and fundamental ideals of a political 
community; they interpret and apply the provisions of a Constitution which 
limits the exercise of power by the leaders of a political community and, in 
doing so, also give direction to society and help to maintain social order.238 
In this sense, the constitutional role of the judiciary is policy-oriented. 239 
Constitutional values, in particular, are about public policy. 240 
The fact that constitutional values are about public policy does not necessarily 
mean that judges should decide cases on grounds of policy. The primary 
instrument of judicial decision-making is principle; policy is merely an issue 
which the court may become involved with in the application of principle. 
Policy becomes an issue when, in applying principle in constitutional decision-
mak.ing, the judge interprets and articulates the fundamental constitutional 
'values and ideals of society and, in this way, gives direction to society and 
helps to maintain social order. 
Judges are of course expected to be neutral and impartial when they interpret 
the law in order to resolve legal disputes. Neutrality and impartiality do not 
mean, however, that judges ought to be unmindful of policy issues. There is 
237ldem. 
238Bell op cit. at 7. 
239Nwabueze op cit. at 138 and 139. 
240Abella 1989 McGill LJ at 1021. 
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1 
la close relationship between policy and the judicial role. Abella241 explains 
' 
!this relationship as follows: 
"Tue interpretive judicial function ... has always necessarily involved the sifting of 
normative considerations, not only because laws derive from and operate in a social system and 
culture of values, but because judges are conditioned to operate in the same system. In so far as 
the sifting of legal choices is the sifting of policy values, judges. in interpreting law, do always 
and have always considered, in addition to logic and precedent, the values or policy implications 
their legal conclusions represent. 11 
Creativity and the sifting of policy considerations in constitutional 
interpretation calls for a measure of judicial activism, as opposed to judicial 
deference to, and respect for, legislative determinations of policy. In essence, 
judicial activism is a courageous and constructive interpretation of the 
Constitution in order to give individuals the full benefit of these provisions 
within the limits of what is constitutionally proper. It proceeds on the basis 
that as long as the Constitution continues to operate as the supreme law of the 
land and to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, it is the duty of the 
judiciary to interpret its provisions creatively, imaginatively and courageously 
and to strike down any legislative or executive act which is in conflict with 
these provisions; it reflects a greater readiness to preserve and to extend by 
interpretation, where appropriate, constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
freedoms, and implies that judges, as interpreters and upholders of the law, 
should assume a 'watch-dog role' and courageously and fearlessly uphold the 
supremacy of the Constitution. 242 
Although judges ought to interpret the open-ended provisions of the 
Constitution creatively and courageously, and dare not abdicate their function 
to uphold the supreme law of the land, unprincipled activism, especially in the 
interpretation and implementation of human rights provisions, has its dangers. 
241ldem. 
242See McWhinney op cit. note 200 at 178. 
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!The greatest danger which faces an activist judiciary is that "[l]egal rights are 
I 
!extremely volatile, tending to enlarge their reach and content beyond their 
I 
'original meaning and purpose". 243 Judicial activism can therefore be both 
courageous and presumptuous, constructive and obstructive. 244 
Judges can avoid presumptuous and obstructive activism by constantly 
reminding themselves that, although the provisions of the Constitution leave 
room for creative interpretation and adaptation to changes in social conditions 
and human aspirations, they ought to interpret the Constitution within the 
context of their institutional function, namely the resolution of justiciable legal 
disputes. Within the context of the institutional function of the judiciary, 
constitutional interpretation is confined to defining the terms of the 
Constitution and setting out the duties they impose, To determine exactly what 
measures and conditions these terms require in each particular case, and to 
dictate to the legislature and to the executive what they must do, is to go 
beyond the confines of constitutional interpretation; it is a violation of the 
separation of powers and an indication of lack of self-restraint.245 Judicial 
activism, therefore, requires some form of restraint. 
Judicial self-restraint, however, is not the same thing as strict constructionism. 
'Strict constructionism follows a strict and literal interpretation of the terms of 
the Constitution. Judicial self-restraint, on the other hand, is based on 
.limitations to the creative and 'activist' role of the judiciary. Properly 
exercised, judicial self-restraint is a means of acknowledging the limits of 
judicial review and showing respect for the democratic decisions of the 
legislature and the executive as chief policy-making bodies while at the same 
time creatively and courageously interpreting and applying the provisions of 
2431. Jenkins "Judicial Activism and Constitutional Government" 1984 
Am. J Jur. 169 at 171. 
244Jenkins 1984 Am. J Jur. at 172. 
245{bid. at 171. 
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the Constitution. In other words, judicial activism and judicial self-restraint 
are compatible with each other if correctly interpreted. It implies, for 
example, that the court will not entertain a dispute unless the parties have 
locus standi and there is a ripe justiciable dispute;240 it also implies that the 
court will not impose its will upon the legislature or the executive where the 
issues it is asked to decide are not capable of impartial and principled judicial 
determination. 
The distinguishing feature between a judiciary which exercises improper self-
restraint and adopts a policy of avoidance and a creative judiciary is that the 
former is bound more than the later by self-imposed limits to its interpretive 
functions; it refrains from creative interpretation by prescribing for itself strict 
limits for its interpretive role and often adopts a strict and purely mechanical 
approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution. Such a 
judiciary allows itself little freedom to articulate constitutional values and the 
ideals and aspirations of the people as enshrined in the Constitution and shies 
away from pursuing the goals of the wider governmental process as set out in 
the wide and open-ended terms of the Constitution. 
A creative judiciary, on the other hand, strives to arrive at just results by 
seeking guidance in the high-level values, great ideals and visions implicit in 
the libertarian tradition of the Constitution. It recognises that constitutional 
guarantees are expressions of values and principles and that constitutional 
provisions ought to be interpreted courageously, creatively and imaginatively 
in order to give individuals their full benefit. 
The process of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution to meet the 
"various crises of human affairs" ,247 new social changes and the ideals and 
246Section 7(b) of the Constitution significantly extends locus standi in 
respect of violations of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3. 
247See McCulloch v Maryland (Supra) at 417. 
I 
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!aspirations of society is necessarily a creative task. Such is the logical demand 
iimplicit in the interpretation of provisions which are framed in wide and open-
ended terms; wide and open-ended terms call for imaginative clarifications and 
amplification. 
Improper self-restraint and undue deference to the political branches of 
government undermine the high-level values and great ideals of a Constitution 
which is intended to operate as the supreme law of the land; on the other 
hand, courage, fearlessness and judicial creativity advance the constitutional 
values which are intended to regulate the exercise of government power and 
to protect the legitimate interests of individuals. In general, a Constitution 
which entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms is intended to operate as 
a deliberate limitation of the exercise of governmental power and unless the 
values, ideals and aspirations it enshrines are realised, its provisions remain 
hollow promises. 
Both judicial extremism and judicial inaction may lead to a degeneration of not 
only the Constitution but also of the whole legal system. Proper judicial 
activism and judicial restraint are necessary ingredients of judicial review; 
they constitute the life-blood of constitutional jurisprudence; their interplay 
and interaction are the essence of judicial power. 248 
In a modern African state, in particular, the judiciary carries the heavy burden 
of adapting the provisions of the Constitution to the values, ideals and 
aspiration of an evolving African society. 249 In interpreting and applying the 
provisions of the Constitution, the social, political and economic conditions 
peculiar to this society cannot be lost sight of. 
In the South African context, the task of the judiciary is compounded by a 
248See McWhinney 1959 Can. Bar Rev. at 33. 
249Nwabueze op cit. at 140. 
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imultiplicity of complex value systems and conflicting ideals and aspirations. 
!,The task of the judiciary could become easier if fundamental and widely 
I 
shared values, ideals and aspirations, as opposed to the sectional values, ideals 
and aspirations of a particular group or the ruling party or parties, are 
identified and defined with a sufficient degree of precision."0 
4. Judicial Approaches to the Interpretation of the New 
Constitution. 
Since the coming into operation of the 1993 Constitution provincial or local 
divisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have already had 
to deal with a number of cases which involve the interpretation of the 
Constitution. Some of these cases provide some pointers to the approach of 
the courts to the interpretation of the Constitution. 251 
The first three reported cases, namely S v Fani & Others252 , S v 
James253 and S v Smith & Another2'4 dealt with the interpretation 
of section 23 and section 25(3)(b) of the Constitution. Section 23 entrenches 
the right to information; section 25(3)(b) entrenches the right of an accused 
250Nwabueze ibid. at 141. 
251The analysis of the approach of the courts will be confined to cases 
which were decided before the judgment of the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane 1995(6) BCLR 665 (CC). The Makwanyane case and 
other cases which were decided after it will be referred to only when it is 
appropriate to do so. 
2521994(1) BCLR 43 (E). Also reported in 1994(1) SACR 635 (E); 
1994(3) SA 619 (E). 
2531994(1) BCLR 57 (E). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 141 (E); 
1994(3) SA 881 (E). 
2541994(1) BCLR 63 (SE). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 116 (SE); 
1994(3) SA 887 (SE). 
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lperson to be informed with sufficient particularity of the charge brought 
I 
jagainst him. In all three cases the accused claimed access to the contents of 
I 
'police dockets. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution documents 
contained in police dockets were regarded as privileged. 
In the Fani case the court held that although it was necessary to furnish the 
accused with information to apprise him of the charge with sufficient 
particularity, the privilege attaching to police dockets was reasonable and 
justifiable in a democratic society based on freedom and equality and was 
therefore not inconsistent with the Constitution. Jones J based his decision on 
the section 33 limitation, in terms of which a limitation of the entrenched 
rights is permissible if it is reasonable, necessary, justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality and does not negate the 
essential content of the right in issue. 
Although Jones J spoke in favour of giving effect to the larger object of the 
Constitution as contained in section 35(1), namely "to promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality" 255 and stated that the provisions of the Constitution are not to be 
interpreted restrictively, he did not go far enough. The judge did not lay down 
any definitive interpretative approach; neither did he adopt any framework for 
determining the reasonableness and justifiability of the privilege attaching to 
police dockets. Nor did he refer to the important Canadian case of R v 
1 0akes256 where the question whether an alleged infringement of an 
entrenched right was reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society was 
considered and an analytical framework for a determination of such question 
was laid down. 
255At 45D (BCLR). 
256[1986] 1 S.C.R 103. 
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In the James case Zietsman JP adopted a narrow approach to the 
jinterpretation of sections 23 and 25(3) of the Constitution and held that it 
!could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the 
right of access to information as entrenched in section 23 should entitle the 
defence to the contents of police dockets. He found that the privilege attaching 
to police dockets was not affected by section 23. He reached this conclusion 
without having fully considered the content of sections 23 and the nature of 
the Constitution as an organic instrument which entrenches the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals. 257 
S v Smith went somewhat further than the Fani and James cases. In that 
case Van Rooyen AJ acknowledged that the Constitution brought about a 
fundamental change in respect of the privilege attaching to the contents of 
police dockets. The judge agreed with the reasoning in the Fani case that the 
privilege attaching to the statements of witnesses is not inconsistent with the 
Constitution but nevertheless found that effect should be given to the meaning 
and spirit of section 25(3) without encroaching on the privilege. 258 
According to Van Rooyen AJ an accused person is entitled to information 
which would enable him to adduce and challenge evidence; the protection of 
information in terms of the privilege continues to exist, however, if such 
protection is, as required by section 33, reasonable, necessary, justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and does not 
negate the essential content of the entrenched right.259 The judge opined that 
257The judge's approach was remarkably literalist. He proceeded on the 
basis that section 23 did not deal specifically with criminal trials and left the 
matter there (at 61B), without venturing into the larger objects of the 
Constitution, namely to promote the values of an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality. 
258At 701-71B and 74D-E (BCLR). 
259At 71E (BCLR). 
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an approach similar to that laid down in R v Oakes2"' would be 
appropriate in considering the section 33 limitation. 261 This approach 
involves a two stage enquiry, firstly, whether the challenged law violates any 
of the entrenched rights; secondly, whether the limitation contained in the 
challenged law is consonant with the limitation clause. 262 
Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another= is one 
of the most far-reaching cases on the interpretation of section 23 to come after 
the Smith case. In that case Froneman J (with Kroon J concurring) 
attempted to formulate the proper approach to the interpretation and 
application of the Constitution. The judge looked not only at section 23 but 
.also at the nature of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, its 
:object and the other related rights entrenched in it in order to interpret its 
provisions. 
Although Froneman J warned against the use of labels such as a "purposive" 
approach to constitutional interpretation264 , the approach he preferred and 
followed is the purposive approach. According to this approach the interpreter 
searches for the design or purpose which lies behind the instrument he is 
interpreting. 265 With regad to 'purpose' the judge referred to the approach 
enunciated in the Canadian case of R V Big M Drug Mart Ltd266: 
260Supra. 
261At 738-I (BCLR). 
262See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the Oakes analytical framework. 
2631994(1) BCLR 75 (E). 
264At 800 (BCLR). 
265See supra for a discussion of this approach. 
21
>
6(1985) 18 D .L.R (4th) 321 (SCC) at 359-360. 
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11 The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter must be ascertained by 
,·an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words. in the 
!light of the interests it was meant to protect. In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and 
the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and 
'the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or 
freedom, to the historical origin of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning 
and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the context 
of the Charter. 11 
It is clear from this dictum that the purpose in issue is not only the narrow 
purpose of the specific right with which the court is concerned but also the 
larger purpose or object of the Constitution and the purpose of the other 
specific rights associated with the right in issue. This is precisely the approach 
which Froneman J followed. The purpose of section 23 is to enable a litigant 
to protect his rights and, taken together with section 8(1) (the right to 
equality) to provide him with an "equality of arms" so that he may have a fair 
trial; this purpose fits in with the larger purpose of the Constitution, namely 
to bring about an open and democratic society committed to the princi pies of 
openness and accountability. 267 
Froneman J emphasised the supremacy of the Constitution as the most 
important factor to be taken into account in its interpretation. There may very 
well be other factors relevant to the interpretation of the Constitution, but its 
supremacy constitutes the most important guide: 
"Far more useful is to recognise that because the Constinuion is the supreme law of the 
land against which all law or conduct is to be tested, it must be examined with a view to 
extracting from it those principles or values against which such law or conduct can be 
measured. 11268 
Section 35 of the Constitution, the Preamble and the Post-amble, provide a 
267At 88I-89C (BCLR). 
268At 80E (BCLR). 
' ~~ 
lframework of the principles and values against which laws and conduct can 
' 
lbe measured. The essence of these principles and values is to create and 
I 
'sustain a society which is characterised by "openness, democratic principles, 
human rights, reconciliation, reconstruction and peaceful co-existence between 
:the people of the country" .269 
As for the section 33 limitation, Froneman J approved the two-pronged 
inquiry similar to that laid down in the Canadian case of R v Oakes27°, 
namely whether there has been an infringement of the right, the onus resting 
'On the party alleging the infringement and, secondly whether the infringement 
is justifiable in terms of section 33, the onus resting on the person alleging 
that the right is subject to the limitation. 271 The judge stated that some kind 
'of proportionality test, in terms of which the means used to protect the interest 
underlying the limitation must be proportional to the object of the limitation, 
may have to be adopted in the interpretation of section 33.272 
The judgment of Froneman J in Qozeleni is also significant because the 
judge specifically recognised the special responsibility which rests on the 
judiciary in a system of judicial review based on the supremacy of the 
Constitution, especially one with a tradition of legislative supremacy, an 
absence of substantive judicial review and a neo-positivistic approach to the 
judicial function; as the judge pointed out, the role of the judiciary is "bound 
to be controversial in any event, but the judicial history of this country makes 
269At 80H (BCLR). 
210Supra. 
271At 87C-E and H (BCLR). 
272At 90D-F (BCLR). See the discussion of Smith v Attorney-
General of Bophuthatswana 1984 (1) SA 196 (BSC) in Chapt. 7 and 
R v Oakes (supra) in Chapt. 6 where the proportionality principle is 
discussed. 
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lit even more likely if due regard is not given to possible deficiencies in the 
!past". 273 It is the responsibility of the judiciary to bring the Constitution to 
llife by interpreting its provisions in such a way that its values and the ideal 
of an open democratic society based on freedom and equality are realised; in 
doing so it has to be constantly aware of the deficiencies of the past which it 
seeks to redress. 
Froneman J has a keen awareness of the greater responsibility of a judiciary 
which, having been schooled in the Westminster tradition of parliamentary 
sovereignty, is entrusted with the interpretation and application of a supreme 
Constitution. In Matiso and Others v The Commanding Officer, 
Port Elizabeth Prison and Others274 the judge once again 
emphasised the need for our judiciary to recognise the different nature of the 
Constitution and the changed role of the judiciary: 
11 Despite the apparent general recognition that constitutional interpretation is different 
from 'ordinary' statutory interpretation it is, in my view, important to understand why this should 
be the case, especially for us in South Africa who were schooled in the tradition and concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the Westminster mould. Such an understanding is not merely a 
theoretical exercise, but in my view an essential one for all judicial officers who are entrusted with 
the judicial review of law and administrative action, ba.;;ed on the supremacy of the Constitution, 
. th .th c . . 275 ao;; IS e case WI our present onst1tut1on ... 
In a constitutional system based on parliamentary sovereignty it makes good sense to start from 
the premise of seeking 'the intention of the legislature' in statutory interpretation, because the 
interpreting judge's value judgment of the content of the statute is, theoretically at least, 
irrelevant. .. 276 
273At 79H (BCLR). 
2741994(3) BCLR 80 (SE). 
275At 86I-87A. 
276 At 87B. Even in a system based on parliamentary sovereignty it is 
questionable whether it makes good sense to start from the premise of seeking 
'the intention of the legislature'. 'Intention of the legislature' is a fiction; the 
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1
The interpretive notion of ascertaining the 'intention of the legislature' does not apply in a system 
lof judicial review based on the supremacy of the Constitution, for the simple reason that the 
I 
:Constitution is sovereign and not the legislature.277 This means that both the purpose and method 
of statutory interpretation in our law should be different from what it was before the 
commencement of the Constitution on 27 April 1994. The purpose is now to test legislation and 
administrative action against the va1ues and principles imposed by the Constitution. "278 
An important aspect of Fron em an J's judgment in the Matiso case is that the 
judge recognised that interpreting a supreme Constitution involves judicial 
creativity and also warned about the dangers which face our judiciary: 
11 The values and principles contained in the Constitution are, and could only be, 
formulated and expressed in wide and general terms, because they are to be of general application. 
In terms of the Constitution the courts bear the responsibility of giving specific content to those 
values and principles in any given situation. In doing so judges will invariably 'create law'. For 
those steeped in the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty the notion of judges creating law and 
not merely implementing and applying the law is an uncomfortable one. Whether the traditional 
view was ever correct is debatable, but the danger exists that it will inhibit judges from doing 
what they are called upon to do in terms of the Constitution. This does not mean that judges 
should now suddenly enter into the orgy of judicia1 law-making,279 but that they should recognise 
that their function of judicial review. based on the supremacy of the Constitution, should not be 
hidden under the guise of simply seeking and giving expression to the will of the majority in 
use of the term implies that the interpreter seeks to reconstruct the mental 
state of the legislature without a consideration of the on-going time-frame 
within which statutes operate: see D. V Cowen "The Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Concept of the Intention of the Legislature" 19SO THRHR 375 at 
391. 
277The fact that the Constitution is 'sovereign' or supreme and not the 
legislature does not, however, preclude the possibility of an intentionalist 
approach to the interpretation of the Constitution. It may also mean that the 
'intention' of the legislature in enacting other laws is subjected to the overall 
'intention' of the Constitution. 
278At S7F. 
279 As Froneman J noted (at SSC) "judicial Jaw-making in the form of 
judicial review is fundamentally different from making Jaw by legislation". 
-517-
Parliament. 280 Judicial review has a different function, but is still subject to important 
constraints. Recognition of those constraints is the best guarantee or shield against criticism that 
!such a system of judicial review is essentially undemocratic 11 •281 
Froneman J's dictum underlines the tension between a tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review in a system of constitutional 
supremacy, and also identifies the main doctrinal problem arising from 
substantive judicial review, namely its undemocratic nature. It emphasises that 
while judicial review in a system of constitutional supremacy invariably 
involves judicial creativity, it also has its limits; these limits imply that the 
judiciary must, in 'creating law' during constitutional interpretation, constantly 
keep in mind that the function of making law falls in the hands of the 
legislature as a democratically elected representative of the people. A tradition 
of parliamentary sovereignty does not permit substantive judicial review and 
therefore gives pre-eminence to the will of democratically elected 
representatives of the people; it carries with it, however, the danger of a 
policy of avoiding judicial creativity under the guise of seeking and giving 
expression to the will of the legislature. 282 
The cases which came after Qozeleni and in which the courts were 
concerned with section 23 of the Constitution follow basically the same 
interpretative approach as that adopted in the Qozeleni case, namely to view 
280Van Blerk AJ made a similar observation in Magano and Another 
v District Magistrate, JHB and Others (2) 1994(2) SACR 304 (at 
306d-e ): "·The provisions establishing fundamental guarantees in Chapter 3 are couched in broad 
and wide language. This is no doubt to afford flexibility to the Constitution. The result thereof is 
to impose upon the Constitutional Court and this Court the duty to determine the precise limits 
of the guarantees afforded under the Constitution to c,':itizens and other persons. In doing so, it 
seems to be that this Court should steer a course between the Scylla of inflexibility, on the one 
hand. and the Charybdis of uncertainty, on the other. Ultimately. the Judges of this Court are put 
in the unfamiliar role of exercising a greater function in lawmaking than they have in the p~'t. In 
doing so, they are required to make value judgments". 
281At 871-888. 
282See supra. 
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lthe Constitution as the supreme law of the land which has as its ideal an open 
land democratic society based on the values of equality and freedom. 
Thus in S v Majavu283, Khala v The Minister of Safety and 
Security284 and S v Botha and Others285 , the court considered the 
Constitution as an instrument sui generis which calls for a purposive and 
generous interpretation so as to give effect to the values and principles 
contained in it. The court surveyed the position in other countries and came 
to the conclusion that an accused or litigant is entitled to the information 
contained in a police docket in order to protect his rights. 
In all these cases the court placed great reliance on the judgment of Sopinka 
J in the Canadian case of R v Stinchcombe286 and took the view that 
although section 23 gives a person the right to information in order to protect 
his rights, such a right was not absolute; an accused or a litigant may be 
denied access to certain information if such a denial is shown to be reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, does not negate the essential content of the right and is necessary, 
the onus resting the person seeking to limit the right to information. In 
essence, if the State wishes to limit the right by invoking the common law 
privilege, it will have to satisfy the requirements of section 33.287 
2831994(2) BCLR 56 (CkGD). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 265 
(Ck); 1994(4) SA 268 (CkGD). 
2841994(2) BCLR 89 (W). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 361 (W); 
1994(4) SA 218 (W). 
2851994(3) BCLR 93(W). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 541 (W). 
2861992 LRC (Crim) 68. See Chapt. 6 for a discussion of this case. 
287A similar approach was followed in S V Sefadi 1994(2) BCLR 23 
(D). See also S v Khoza en Andere 1994(2) SACR 611 (W). 
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The interpretation of section 23 and the proper approach to the interpretation 
of fundamental human rights was also dealt with extensively in Phato v 
:Attorney-General, Eastern Cape and Another; Commissioner 
of South African Police Services v Attorney-General, Eastern 
Cape and Others288 • The judgment of Froneman J in Qozeleni was 
.approved. Jones J considered foreign case law, in particular the Canadian case 
of R V Stinchcombe289, and came to the conclusion that the blanket 
common law docket privilege is prima facie unconstitutional. The court 
adopted a purposive approach which "gives recognition to the constitutional 
themes of openness and accountability in respect of official action by an organ 
of State in the performance of its powers and functions". 290 
Jones J also pointed out that a purposive interpretation of a provision of the 
Constitution is not synonymous with a generous or liberal interpretation. A 
generous interpretation requires a court to interpret a constitutional provision 
in the widest possible manner. A purposive interpretation has as its main 
consideration the purpose of the right; if this interpretation is followed, the 
widest possible interpretation is not necessarily the one which will be 
2881994(5) BCLR 99 (E). Also reported in 1995(1) SA 799 (E). 
289Supra. 
290At 129G. In S v Shabalala and Others 1995(12) BCLR 1593 
(CC) the Constitutional Court endorsed the view that a blanket docket 
privilege is unconstitutional because it is unreasonable and not justified in an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. The Court 
reasoned (per Mahomed DP) that, apart from the provisions of section 23 of 
the Constitution, the right to fair trial as entrenched in section 25(3) entitles 
an accused person to have access at least to the statements of prosecution 
witnesses; the prosecution may, however, in a particular case, be able to 
justify a denial of such access on the grounds that it is not justified for the 
purposes of a fair trial. 
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supported. 291 
Jones J approved the view of the Canadian writer Hogg on the overriding role 
of purpose in relation to the question whether a restriction upon a guaranteed 
right is justified. 292 Hogg293 argues, with reference to R V Oakes294 , 
that the high standard of justification prescribed in Oakes295 is inconsistent 
with the generous approach, which was suggested in R v Big M Drug 
:Mart Ltd296 . The generous approach underlines the importance of 
constitutionally protected values; the purposive approach, on the other hand, 
restricts the scope of constitutionally protected rights to the purpose of the 
rights. 
The two approaches raise the problem of how to restrict the scope of 
constitutionally protected rights without undermining their values. According 
to Hogg297 this problem can be resolved by ascertaining the purpose of the 
right from the language in which it is expressed, the context in which it is 
protected and its relationship to other rights. He argues that the same standard 
291See P. Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (1992) at 814-815; 
A. Cachalia, H. Cheadle et al Fundamental Rights in the New 
Constitution (1994) at 11; D. Davis "Democracy - Its Influence upon the 
Process of Constitutional Interpretation" 1994 SAJHR 103 at 119. 
292In terms of section 33(1) of the 1993 Constitution a limitation of a right 
entrenched in Chapter 3 is permissible if, inter alia, it is "justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality". 
2930p cit. at 812-813 and 819. 
294Supra. 
295See Chap!. 6 for a discussion of the Oakes standard of justification. 
296Supra: see Chapt. 6. 
297P. Hogg "Interpreting the Charter of Rights" 1990 Osgoode Hall W 
817 at 820. 
,. 
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must apply to the scope of the right and the scope of the limitation. He prefers 
the purposive approach because its reach does not go beyond behaviour that 
-is outside the scope of the right; furthermore, it reduces the volume of 
litigation and limits the policy making role of the courts. 
Adherents to the purposive approach criticise the generous approach largely 
because they feel that it gives judges unconstrained judicial choice. Bakan,298 
a Canadian constitutional lawyer, has noted that these adherents understand the 
purposive approach as 
11 
a 'compromise' between the implausible view that judicial decision-making can be 
constrained by the constitutional text and doctrine, and the unacceptable view that judicial 
decision-making is nothing more than judicial policy-making. The burden of the argument in 
favour is that purposive reasoning does constrain judicial choice and discretion". 
The purposive approach cannot, however, always successfully constrain 
judicial choice and discretion in the interpretation and application of human 
rights provisions. Bakan299 has shown, with reference to the decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Reference Re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act, Labour Relations Act and Police Officers 
Collective Bargaining Act, 300 that conflicting characterisations of 
purpose make the assumption that judicial choice and discretion can be 
avoided through purposive reasoning implausible. In this case the judges 
understood the purpose of freedom of association in relation to the right to 
strike in quite different terms. 
Le Dain J and Mcintyre J, who wrote the majority judgment, found that the 
298J .C Bakan "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in 
Canadian Constitutional Thought" 1989 Osgoode Hall W 123 at 153. 
2991989 Osgoode Hall W at 157. 
300(1987) 38 DLR (4th) 161. 
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purpose of freedom of association was to protect the freedom of individuals 
to associate with one another and not the freedom of an association to pursue 
jts activities. Dickson CJC on the other hand, in a dissenting judgment, found 
that the purpose of freedom of association was to protect the activities of 
associations in so far as these are essential to achieve collective goals. Bakan 
points out that the disagreement was in essence a manifestation of a conflict 
between two competing political visions, namely 'individualism' and 
'collectivism'. 301 
Questions about the purpose of rights such as freedom of association, freedom 
of expression and equality will always raise highly contentious political, 
'ideological and policy issues that will often not elicit the same answers from 
judges, lawyers, politicians and the general public. Moreover, human rights 
provisions are framed in vague and indeterminate terms which do not have a 
settled meaning and do not usually give rise to consistent characterisations. 
Judicial determination of constitutional disputes involves the articulation of 
competing interests, balancing the interests against one another and deciding 
which interest ought to prevail. 302 Deciding which interest ought to prevail 
invariably involves judicial choice and discretion. In making choices and 
exercising a discretion, judges must of course do so impartially, basing their 
choices on analysis and reasoning transcending the immediate result that is 
achieved. 
A generous interpretation involves an articulation of the particular interests of 
the individual and the ~overnment at stake, and deciding which interest is 
weightier. It involves the making of a value judgment in a juridically qualified 
way, in the sense that the values to be considered must either be 
301At 155-156. 
302Bakan 1989 Osgoode Hall Wat 169. 
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constitutionally related or connected. Kruger303 makes this point with 
reference to the judgment of Mahomed AJA in Ex Parte Attorney-
1General, Namibia: in re Corporal Punishment by Organs of 
State:3o• 
"Tue methodology followed by the latter was, however, juridically qualified; the values 
"to be considered were either constitutionally related or connected eg fundamental humanist 
constitutional philosophy' or the norms. aspirations etc as expressed in the Constitution, or were 
ascertained by way of legal comparison, bearing in mind the historical background to the 
constitution. All the constitutionally related factors as they are embodied in the preamble and the 
manifold structures of the constitution were taken into consideration. Mahomed AJA furthermore 
stressed that the value judgment requires to be objectively articulated and identified' 11 • 305 
The problem that interpreting a right in the widest possible manner may lead 
to a lack of proportionality between it and a government restriction or its 
limitation need not arise if one bears in mind that constitutional adjudication 
involves a balancing of competing interests and deciding which interest ought 
to prevail. If the court cannot 'strike a balance' between the interests,3°6 it 
will have to determine which interest is important or 'compelling' and 
30
-'J. Kruger "Towards a new Interpretive Theory" in J. Kruger & B. 
Currin (eds) Interpreting a Bill of Rights (1994) 103 at 115. 
3041991(3) SA 76 (Nm SC). 
305My emphasis. 
306Convergence of interests is difficult to achieve .in a society which is 
characterised by social and economic domination. Although public opinion 
may have some relevance in the resolution of conflicting interests, it is no 
substitute for the duty of the court to interpret and apply the provisions of the 
Constitution. In applying these provisions judges invariably make value 
choices; the court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its duty as an 
impartial and independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the 
basis of public opinion; the assessment of public opinion is essentially a 
legislative and not a judicial function: see S V Makwanyane 1995(6) 
BCLR 665 (CC) at 703f-704C. 
I -524-
ftherefore ought to prevail.3°7 The same process applies where rights 
jcompete; the court is called upon to balance competing interests and to decide 
'which interest should prevail in the context in which the conflict occurs.308 
The 1993 Constitution has the advantage that it places greater emphasis on the 
importance of certain fundamental rights. Section 33(1) requires that a 
limitation of the rights specified in subsections (l)(aa) and (bb) shall be 
permissible if, in addition to being reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality, it is also necessary; this 
additional requirement indicates that greater importance is attached to these 
rights. 
It is submitted that the section 33(1) high degree of scrutiny in the 
interpretation of the rights specified in section 33(1)(aa) and (bb) of 
government in essence suggests that the rights specified in the section must be 
given greater protection whenever the government seeks to limit them; the 
section therefore encourages a generous approach, one which allows the 
widest possible interpretation in order to give individuals the full benefit of the 
specified rights. 
An adoption of the generous approach does not mean, however, that a 
purposive approach should not be applied; neither does it mean that the 
Constitution must be interpreted freely; the rights must be interpreted 
generously in the light of their specific objects, the larger object of the 
Constitution and the prevailing "norms, aspirations, expectations and 
sensitivities of the (South African) people as expressed, inter alia, in the 
307See Chapt. 11 where constitutional adjudication and balancing 
conflicting interests are discussed. 
'°'See Gardener v Whitaker 1994(5) BCLR 19 (E) at 37A-B. 
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Constitution". 309 
In De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis and Others'10 Van 
Dijkhorst J stated the correct approach to be applied when the provisions of 
a Constitution are interpreted purposively and generously. The judge said: 311 
11 If the word "generousn is read ... as qualifying the word 11purposive 11 I have no problem 
with it. If, however, it is intended as an entirely separate concept. a free floating interpretation 
unanchored in the aims of the Constitution, it might lead to interpretation based on personal 
·predilections and preferences. In interpreting the Constitution one should guard against using it 
like a ventriloquist's dummy, making it utter what you want to hear. That danger lurks in applying 
as a yardstick in interpretation such phra~es as 11generous approach" which might tempt one to 
read into the text of the Constitution one's O\Vll social preferences and subjective sympathies. 
In my view one must apply the purposive approach to the interpretation of our Constitution, 
determining from it as a whole what was the aim of Chapter 3 and its constituent sections 
individua1ly, what problems and aspirations did it seek to address, and what does it have in mind 
for our society, In short, what are the values and norms our society cherishes and intends to 
uphold. This approach does not mean that in some or many instances this will not result in 
a "generous'1 interpretation312 • It will, but that is not the starting point 11 • 
Van Dijkhorst's dictum is significant in that it shows that the generous 
approach in essence amounts to a qualified purposive approach. A genuine 
generous approach does not ignore the usefulness of purpose. It takes into 
account purpose as a value and seeks to harmonise it with other fundamental 
309See the judgments of Mahomed AJA and Berker CJ in Ex Parte 
Attorney-General, Namibia: In Re Corporal Punishment by 
Organs of the State (supra), discussed in Chapt. 8. 
3101994(6) BCLR 124 (T). Although this case did not involve the 
interpretation and application of section 23, it lays down principles which are 
applicable to the interpretation and application of all the provisions of Chapter 
3 of the Constitution. 
311At 128E-H. 
312My emphasis. 
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lconstitutional values which reflect the norms, aspirations and ideals of civil 
I 
1society; it seeks to maximise not only purpose as a value but also other values 
which best advance the interests of individuals in a just and equitable and is 
therefore in this sense teleological. 313 
Van Dijkhorst J did not, however, adopt this approach when he dealt with the 
question whether some of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 also operate 
horizontally. He held that Chapter 3 was intended to be of vertical application 
only.314 He disagreed with the judgment of Van Schalkwyk Jin Mandela 
V Falati315 in which the judge adopted a broader and generous approach 
in terms of which certain rights entrenched in Chapter 3 pre-eminently require 
horizontal application. In his view the application of Chapter 3 in litigation 
involving individuals among themselves would have a chaotic effect on the 
common law. It is submitted that the approach followed by Van Schalkwyk 
J is the correct one; it harmonises the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 with 
principles of the common law. 316 Although many of the rights are by their 
nature exclusively vertical in operation, some of them are not. 
The generous approach to the question whether some of the rights entrenched 
in Chapter 3 also operate horizontally is implicit in the judgments of 
313See supra where the teleological approach is discussed. 
314In Kalla and Another v The Master and Others 1994(4) 
BCLR 79 (T) Van Dijkhorst also went back to the intentionalist approach. 
He took the view that it could not have been the intention of the framers of 
the Constitution that section 14(1), which guarantees freedom of religion, 
should have the effect of validating marriages under a system of religious law 
permitting polygamous unions. 
3151994(4) BCLR 1 (W). See infra for a discussion of this case. 
316See Motala and Another v University of Natal 1995(3) 
BCLR 374 (D) at 382H where Hurt J opined that the rights entrenched in 
sections 8(1), 8(2) and 32 are enforceable not only against the State or its 
organs, but also against natural or juristic persons. 
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:Froneman J in Gardener v Whitaker317 and that of Friedman J in 
'[Baloro and Others v University of Bophuthatswana and 
:others318 • In these cases the court considered that the values contained in 
the Constitution and its basic concern to transform the South African legal 
system into one concerned with openness, accountability, democratic 
principles and a genuine protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals 
call for a horizontal application of certain rights. 
Although approaches such as the purposive approach and the generous 
approach as applied in other jurisdictions are useful in the interpretation of 
human rights provisions, they are not golden rules of interpretation. One 
should be careful not simply to take over how other courts approach their 
task. As Marais J pointed out in Nortje and Another v Attorney-
General of the Cape and Another319, a case dealing with the 
interpretation and application of section 23 of the Constitution, 
'
1 [t]he approaches adopted by other Courts and constitutional lawyers to the 
interpretation. limitation and application of constitutionally entrenched rights are undoubtedly a 
valuable aid to understanding what is entailed in those process. Logically structured and systematic 
approaches have an inherent appeal for lawyers. However, they remain what they are, not holy 
writ, but simply methodological approaches which are not necessarily the only legitimate 
approaches to the task. 11320 
In his judgment Marais J identified two important aspects which have to be 
borne in mind when interpreting the provisions Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
First of all, the Constitution itself contains in section 35 an injunction as to 
3171994(5) BCLR 19 (E). See infra for a discussion of this case. 
3181995(8) BCLR 1018 (B). See infra for a discussion of this case. 
3191995(2) BCLR 236 (C). 
320At 248H. 
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'how these provisions have to be interpreted. 321 Secondly, the Constitution 
jis legislation sui generis; it provides a set of societal values which operate as 
' 
a standard against which laws must be measured in order to be valid Jaw. 322 
A Constitution differs from ordinary legislation; the traditional canons of 
interpretation, which are suited to the interpretation of ordinary legislation, are 
therefore inappropriate in interpreting provisions of the Constitution.323 
An important aspect of Marais J's judgment in the Nortje case is that the 
~udge emphasised the need to take into account the nature of the society which 
the court serves when adopting or importing a principle of foreign law. 
Circumstances such as a high rate of crime, lawlessness, political intolerance 
and non-co-operation may force the courts to adopt a less indulgent attitude 
when applying the provisions of Chapter 3. Indeed, such circumstances run 
counter to the spirit and object of the Constitution, namely to secure for all 
citizens, peace, freedom and equality in an open and democratic society; a less 
indulgent attitude in the application of the provisions of Chapter 3 under such 
circumstances would be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality. 
'The interpretation of section 25 of the Constitution has also featured in the 
decisions of the courts. Section 25 entrenches a wide range of rights of 
321At 2561. 
322At 247E. Marais J also pointed out that the provisions in which the 
values are contained are couched in wide and all-embracing terms such that 
paring down of one kind or another is required in order to avoid absurdity (at 
247F). In so far as a paring down involves a narrower interpretation of the 
right it militates against a generous approach to some extent; as Marais J 
pointed out, this may not be justified in a given case. It is submitted, 
however, that a paring down should depend on the scope or reach of the 
specific right as established by the court, having regard to the particular 
circumstances of the case. If paring down is sought to be achieved by means 
of legislation, such legislation will have to conform to the section 33 limitation 
standard. 
323At 247H. 
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detained, arrested and accused persons. 
In S v Shangase and Another'24 the court had to consider the 
constitutionality of the presumption in section 217(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 requiring an accused person to prove that a 
confession was not made freely and voluntarily. With reference to the 
Canadian case of R v Oakes325 the court found that the rights entrenched 
in sections 25(2)(a) (the right to be informed of the right to remain silent), 
25(2)(c) (the right not to be compelled to make a confession or an admission), 
25(3)(c) (the right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent) and 25(3)(d) 
(the right to adduce and challenge evidence and not to be a compellable 
witness against oneself) are the "very pillars of a criminal justice system in an 
open and democratic society". 326 
The court held that the section 217(1) presumption was in conflict with section 
25(2)(a) and 25(2)(c) of the Constitution and ruled that the State bore the onus 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the admissibility of an accused's 
statement; this standard of proof, the court observed, was "the very essence 
of the fundamental right to have a fair trial" .327 
The right to a fair trial, which is entrenched in section 25(3) is in fact the 
essence of the rights of an accused person; all the other rights which he has 
as an accused person are merely a corollary of it. 
The section 217(1) presumption was dealt with extensively in the first reported 
3241994(2) BCLR 42 (D). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 659 (D). 
'
25Supra. 
'
26At 45F (BCLR). 
327At 46A (BCLR). 
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case of the Constitutional Court, S v Zuma.328 The Constitutional Court 
held that S v Shangase was correctly decided. 329 However, Kentridge AJ 
went much further and held that the right to fair trial embraces more than 
what is contained in the list of specific rights enumerated in section 25(3); it 
encompasses the notions of substantive fairness and justice and it is the duty 
of the courts to give content to these notions.330 
'Kentridge AJ laid down the principles which ought to be applied in 
interpreting the fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution. He approved the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in the Privy 
Council case of Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v Fisher331 
;in which it was stated that the provisions of a supreme Constitution ought to 
:be given a generous interpretation, one which gives to individuals the full 
;measure of the rights and freedoms entrenched in it. 
It is clear from Kentridge AJ's judgment that a generous interpretation is not 
the same thing as free interpretation. Although a supreme Constitution calls 
for principles of interpretation of its own, respect must be paid to the language 
used and to the traditions and the usages which give meaning to that language. 
Paying respect to the language used is not in any way literalistic because the 
language used is not the starting point; the starting point is the character and 
origin of the Constitution; the language, together with the principle of giving 
3281995(4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
'"'The question whether the section 217(1) presumption was constitutional 
was in essence one of the constitutionality of a reverse onus. The 
Constitutional Court also held in S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1995(12) 
BCLR 1579 (CC) that a reverse onus provision, which created a presumption 
of dealing in dagga once it is proved that an accused was found in possession 
of dagga exceeding 115g, was unconstitutional. 
330At 411H-J. 
331(1980) AC 319 (PC). 
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full effect recognition and effect to the entrenched rights provide a guide in 
lthe process of interpretation. 
! 
What appears from Kentridge AJ's judgment is that the purpose of a right 
provides a means through which the meaning of a right and the interests 
sought to be protected can be ascertained. 332 The specific purpose cannot 
be looked at in isolation; it has to be sought by reference to the character and 
larger objects of Chapter 3. This process is consistent with a purposive and 
generous approach rather than a legalistic one. 
The judge also referred to and approved the judgment of Froneman J in 
'Qozeleni. 333 He qualified the value-oriented approach adopted by 
'Froneman J by stating that a Constitution embodying fundamental rights 
should be given a broad or generous interpretation as far as its language 
,permits. 334 While Froneman J's approach in the Qozeleni case is bold and 
places greater emphasis on constitutional values than on language, Kentridge 
AJ's approach in the Zuma case is more cautious and conducive to legal 
certainty and continuity. 335 Nevertheless the bold and value-oriented 
approach adopted by Froneman J is important because it shows that our judges 
are willing and able to undertake an empirical analysis of constitutional values 
and the social forces that revolve around them. 
The effect of section 25 of the Constitution on the release of accused persons 
on bail has also been considered by the courts. Section 25(2)(d) guarantees the 
332At 4110. 
333Supra. 
334At 412H. 
335Kentridge AJ remarked for example (at 412F) that the principles of law 
which have hitherto governed our courts should not be ignored because they 
contain much of lasting value. 
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right "to be released from detention with or without bail, unless the interests 
lof justice require otherwise". Prior to the commencement of the 1993 
I 
Constitution it was generally accepted that the accused carried the onus to 
show that he was entitled to be released on bail. However, Van Blerk AJ held 
in Magano and Another v The District Magistrate, Johnson 
NO and Others336 that the state bears the onus to show that an accused's 
release on bail is not in the interests of justice.337 He based his decision on 
the reasoning that section 25(2)(d) does not merely give an accused the right 
,to apply for bail; this right already exists under the Criminal Procedure Act, 
51 of 1977. Section 25(2)(d) guarantees the right to be released on bail and 
this right can only be denied where the interests of justice require otherwise. 
In his view the word 'unless' adds weight to the argument that the interests 
:of justice must require the continued detention of the accused if he is to be 
.denied bail. 338 
In Prokureur-generaal van die Witwatersrand Afdeling v Van 
Heerden en Andere339 Eloff JP took a different view and held that there 
is no indication in section 25(2)(d) that the state bears the onus to prove that 
the interests of justice outweighed an accused's claim to liberty and to be 
: released on bail. This view was confirmed by the decision of the majority of 
the full bench in Ellish en andere v Prokureur-Generaal, 
.WPA.340 The court found that although it was clear from the wording of 
section 25(2)(d) that the state had to commence with the presentation of 
evidence, there was no onus on the state to prove that it is not in the interests 
3361994(2) BCLR 125 (W). 
337See also S v Njadayi 1994(5) BCLR 90 (E) at 96C-D. 
338At 128F. 
3391994(2) SACR 467 (W). 
3401994(2) SACR 579 (W). 
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of justice to release the accused on bail; it held that bail proceedings were sui 
generis proceedings in which the court had to speculate about a future 
.prospect. 341 It appears from this decision that what the court has to consider 
is whether, considering all the evidence before it, there are circumstances 
which in the interests of justice militate against the release of the accused on 
bail; one of the major considerations is whether the accused will come back 
to stand trial if released on bail. 
The effect of the decision of the court in Ellish is that the accused is in a 
more favourable position than the State. The overriding factor is no longer 
whether the accused has satisfied the court on a balance of probabilities that 
he is entitled to be released on bail but whether, weighing the interests of the 
accused and the interests of justice, he is entitled to be released on bail. The 
State bears the initial burden of showing that the interests of justice require 
that the accused should not be released on bail. 
The courts have also had an opportunity to deal with other entrenched rights 
which are not concerned with criminal justice, namely the right to 
equality342 and freedom of expression. 343 
In AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and Security 
341See also in general S v Mabaza en 'n ander 1994(5) BCLR 42 
(W). 
342AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Others 1994(4) BCLR 31 (E); Motala and Another v 
University of Natal 1995(3) BCLR 374 (N); Baloro and Others v 
University of Bophuthatswana and Others (supra). 
"'Mandela v Falati (supra); Gardener v Whitaker (supra); 
Jurgens v The Editor, Sunday Times Newspaper and Another 
1995(1) BCLR 97 (W); Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v The Sunday Times Newspaper and Another 1995(2) 
BCLR 182 (T). 
I 
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land Others344 the court was concerned with the interpretation of section 
18 (the right to equality). The applicant contended that the police acted 
selectively when they carried out certain raids on its casino and seized its 
equipment, while others were not raided. This amounted to an infringement 
of its right to equality before the law (section 8(1)) and its right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against (section 8(2)). The court adopted an approach 
which is similar to that enunciated in the Canadian case of Andrews v 
Law Society of British Columbia345 and held that it is not every 
distinction or differentiation in treatment at law which transgresses the section; 
it is only those distinctions or differentiations which are unfair, in the sense 
that they cause prejudice to the person discriminated against, that are hit by 
the equality section. 
The court found that the discrimination complained of did not arise because 
of the content of the law but because of the manner in which the law is 
applied by an organ of State; in such an event an infringement of section 8 
will arise only if the organ of State applies the law unequally or enforces it 
according to a principle which discriminates against a person because of some 
particular characteristic which he possesses. It concluded that the police may 
'have applied the law inconsistently, but that in itself did not amount to an 
unfair discrimination against the applicant in contravention of section 8. 
It may be that an inconsistent application of the law amounts to 
1discrimination; however, such discrimination is not necessarily unfair and 
therefore inconsistent with the provisions of section 8(2). As Melunsky J 
noted, 346 for a discrimination to be unfair it must be shown that the law in 
344Supra. 
345(1989) 56 D.L.R (4th) 13; [1989] 1S.C.R143. See Chapt. 6 for a 
discussion of the Andrews case. 
346At 40G. 
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issue is applied unequally or is enforced according to a principle which has a 
discriminatory effect due to some particular characteristic of the 
'discriminatee. 347 In essence, what is prohibited is not simply any 
discrimination but discrimination which has the effect of inequitably benefiting 
or disadvantaging certain groups or persons on the basis of some identifiable 
characteristic. Some of these characteristics are enumerated in section 8(2). 
The dispute in AK Entertainment involved an individual and an organ of 
the State; the question whether section 8 also operated where the parties are 
private litigants (the so-called horizontal operation) was not therefore in issue. 
This question arose in Motala and Another v The University of 
Natal.348 
The question in issue in Motala was whether the policy adopted by the 
University of Natal for the selection of first-year students for admission to the 
University amounted to unfair discrimination. The selection procedure was 
such that it favoured African pupils but not Indian pupils. 
Before dealing with the question whether the University's selection policy was 
in conflict with section 8(2) of the Constitution, Hurt 1 considered the question 
whether the section operates horizontally. He held that the fundamental rights 
entrenched in Chapter 3 do not exclusively operate vertically and came to the 
conclusion that the provision in section 7(1) that the Chapter binds "all 
347In Cherry v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 
1995(5) BCLR 570 (SE), for example, the applicant sought to show that the 
Liqour Act, 27 of 1989 is applied according to a policy which has the effect 
of discriminating against him as a member of a disadvantaged community. 
This contention in essence distinguishes this case from AK 
Entertainment. The contention was, however, rejected. It was held that 
the licensing and control of the sale constituted a justifiable limitation on the 
applicant's right in terms of section 33(1). 
'
48Supra. 
I 
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llegislative and executive organs of State" does not preclude the horizontal 
lapplication of certain fundamental rights. 
In his judgment Hurt J adopted a broad rather than a restrictive approach to 
the question whether some of the fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 3 
;operate horizontally. He not only considered the provisions of section 7(1) but 
:also other provisions of the Constitution. In his view section 7(1) was enacted 
to stress that the state and its organs are to honour the entrenched rights both 
in legislation and in administration; there are other provisions of the 
Constitution, however, which indicate that the Courts, as guardians of a 
supreme Constitution, must bring the common law into conformity with the 
:entrenchment of fundamental rights in the Constitution. The judge expressed 
the following opinion: 
11 One of the primary objectives of the Constitution was to replace the system of 
parliamentary supremacy with one of constitutiona1 supremacy. This was achieved in section 4. 
With a metaphorical stroke of the pen, the framers avoided ·any law or act inconsistent with' the 
provisions of the Constitution 'to the extent of the inconsistency'. Section 33(2) expressly 
stipulates that the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 are not to be limited, save in terms of subsection 
33(1), by any law 'whether a rule of the common law, customary law or legislation'. Section 
35(3) charges courts to 'have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter'. Having 
regard to these admonitions, I do not consider that it was intended or contemplated that the courts 
would leave it to the legislator to pass legislation aimed at bringing the common law into 
conformity with Chapter 3. By giving the judicial arm of the State the power to avoid or ignore 
statutory provisions inimical to the Constitution, and more particularly to the rights entrenched in 
Chapter 3. it seems clear to me that the framers of the Constitution intended to make the Courts 
the custodians of those rights. 11349 
What appears from Hurt J's judgment is that there is a distinction between 
rights which are by their nature exclusively vertical in their operation and 
those which operate vertically as well as horizontally. The right to equality, 
in particular, falls under the second category. 350 
349At 3811-3828. 
350At 382H. 
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Turning to the question whether the University's selection policy was in 
conflict with section 8(2) or section 32(a)35', the court found that it was not. 
ilt held that the selection policy fell within the scope of section 8(3) and was 
therefore not unfairly discriminatory. 352 
The question whether certain provisions of Chapter 3 operate horizontally was 
also considered by Friedman J in Baloro and Others v University of 
Bophuthatswana and Others. 353 He disagreed with the judgment of 
Van Dijkhorst J in De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis and 
Others354 and endorsed the judgments in Mandela v Falati355 and 
Gardener v Whitaker.356 He held that some of the provisions 
entrenched in Chapter 3 applied horizontally in certain instances.357 Like 
351Section 32(a) entrenches the right to basic education and to equal access 
to educational institutions. 
352Section 8(3) is the so-called 'affirmative action' provision; it constitutes 
an exception to the operation of the section 8 equality provision. The court 
found that there was evidence that African pupils were more severely 
disadvantaged than their Indian counterparts under the apartheid education 
system. 
353Supra. 
35
•Supra. 
'"Supra. 
356Supra. 
357Addendum: The argument that Chapter 3 applied horizontally was 
rejected by the Constitutional Court in Gardener v Whitaker CCT 
26/94, judgment delivered on 15 May 1996 and De Klerk v Du Plessis 
CCT 8/95, judgment delivered on 15 May 1996. However, the new 
Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) opens the 
·door to horizontal aapplication. Section 8(2) of the new Constitution provides 
that "a provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and 
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right 
and any duty imposed by the right. " 
I 
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IMotata, Baloro was also concerned with the application of section 8 of the 
l 
'.Constitution. 
Friedman J based his decision concerning the horizontal application of some 
of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 on the larger purpose which the framers 
had in mind when they adopted the Constitution. The larger purpose of the 
Constitution was to restructure the South African legal, social and economic 
order into an order based on the ideals of a constitutional state based on a 
supreme Constitution;358 this purpose was implicit from the entrenchment of 
'fundamental rights in a justiciable Bill of Rights and the directive to the courts 
!to promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based 
,on freedom and equality when they interpret the Constitution359 and also to 
have due regard to its spirit and objectives in the application and development 
of the common law and customary law. 360 He found that the objectives of 
!the Constitution, the values embodied in it, the justiciability clause361 and 
the directive to the courts contained in section 35 point to an interpretation 
which gives certain rights a horizontal dimension. 362 
,The approach adopted by Friedman J is, like that of Hurt J in the Motala 
case, broad rather than restrictive. It recognises the significance of the 
Constitution as not only a catalogue of fundamental human rights but also an 
organic instrument which seeks to realise the ideals of justice, equality and the 
enjoyment of human rights and manifests a quest for an open and democratic 
society: 
11 The Constitution contains a most vivid and elaborate illustration of a vision of 
358At 1044H and 1045F. 
359Section 35(1). 
360Section 35(3). 
361Section 7(4). 
362At 1049E and 1050E. 
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fundamental rights, expanded almost to the limit for the manifold application of human rights to 
life in the country by the government and the courts, in order that principles of justice operate in 
the formation of an egalitarian society.363 
If the fundamental rights are to be of vertical application only, between the State and the 
individual, then the refreshing breeze of humanism calculated to blow through 'the co~1itution' 
·would be relegated to the cellar in the hierarchy of values contained therein. 364 
The individual, apart from his relations with the State, would be moored between the sacred (the 
verticaJ application) and the profane (the horizontal application). '1365 
A significant aspect of Friedman J's judgment is that he sounded a caution 
about over-extending the horizontal dimension of Chapter 3366 and also laid 
down a useful test to determine when its provisions will apply to 'non-State' 
activity. The warning arises from the fact that an over-extension of the 
horizontal dimension may lead to a right such as the right to equality clashing 
with other rights such as the right to privacy and the right to freedom of 
association. This clash can be avoided by qualifying the horizontal dimension 
and recognising that ordinary private Jaw activity and relationships are in 
general not subject to the horizontal application of fundamental human rights 
provisions. 
In his judgment Friedman J formulated a test to determine under what 
circumstances the provisions of Chapter 3 will have horizontal application. 
According to this test any activity, operation, undertaking or enterprise 
operating in the community and open to the public falls within the scope of the 
363 At 10558. 
364At 10551. 
365At 10551. 
366At 10591. 
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horizontal operation of Chapter 3.367 Corporations, companies, commercial 
or professional firms, hotels, restaurants etc, hospitals, universities, clubs and 
transport enterprises that deal with the public or are open to the public fall in 
this category. 368 
Friedman J also referred to the 'state action' doctrine of American law as 
another approach which can be usefully employed. 369 In terms of this 
doctrine an activity or conduct falls within the scope of the horizontal 
dimension if (i) it is a 'public function' or takes place within the public 
domain or (ii) it is so linked or intertwined with public action that the private 
actor becomes equated with the public domain or (iii) where the actor is a 
private person and the conduct has been approved, authorised or encouraged 
by the State or public institutions in such a way so as to be responsible for it. 
The test formulated by Friedman J corresponds to some extent to the 'public 
function/public domain' leg of the 'state action' doctrine. 
It is not clear, however, whether Friedman J intended the 'State action' 
,doctrine approach to operate as an independent test in relation to the 
provisions of Chapter 3 or whether it supplements the test he laid down. 
Except in instances where the Thirteenth Amendment is invoked, 370 the 
'State action' doctrine is generally invoked where the State has some form of 
367At 1059D. 
368At 1058H-1059C. 
""'This doctrine was first enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases 109 US 
3 (1883). 
370In Jones v Alfred H Meyer Co. 392 us 409 (1968) it was held 
that the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlaws slavery, could be applied in 
purely private relations. The decision was based on the argument that the 
Amendment covers almost all incidents of racial discrimination which were 
'manifestations of incidents of slavery. 
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relationship with the private violator of the Bill of Rights.371 On the other 
hand, the test laid down by Friedman J does not seem to be based on some 
11 form of relationship between the State and the private violator; it seems to be 
based on the fact that the activity in issue cannot be performed or that the 
operation, undertaking or enterprise cannot operate without participation by 
members of the general public or the community. It would seem therefore that 
this test goes further than the 'State action' doctrine. 
One can draw an analogy from judicial review of the acts of private or 
domestic tribunals in administrative law to explain the broad or generous 
approach adopted by the courts concerning the horizontal dimension of some 
of the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, especially where large 
corporations and organisations which owe their existence to the participation 
of members of the public are involved. In administrative law the courts have 
reviewed the acts of private or domestic tribunals such as disciplinary 
tribunals of churches and clubs. 372 In doing so they aqopted a broad or 
liberal approach based on the realisation that there exists an unequal 
relationship between corporations or organisations and their members or 
patrons and that the relationship is in many respects analogous to the 
authoritative public law relationship. This approach is realistic.373 
371See for example Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority 365 
US 715 (1961) (space rented by restaurant owner in state-owned parking lot); 
Evans v Moose 382 US 296 (1966) (state nominated as trustee in will); 
Moose Lodge v lrvis 407 US 409 (1972) (club required to have state 
liquor licence). 
372See for example Motaung v Makubela NO 1975(1) SA 618 (O); 
Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in 
'Suid-Afrika 1976(2) SA 1 (A) at 9C-G and 21D-F; Dawnlaan 
Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
1983(3) SA 344 (W); Grundling v Van Rensburg 1984(3) SA 207 
(W). 
373See J. Taitz "The Audi Alteram Partem Rule and the Obligation to 
Exbaust Domestic Remedies" 1976 SALJ 552 at 554-555. 
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However, a right such as freedom of expression has by its nature some 
1seepage into the horizontal dimension even in instances where there is no state 
involvement or an authoritative relationship whatsoever in disputes between 
private individuals among themselves. 
In Mandela v Falati374 Van Schalkwyk J found that the Constitution did 
not spell out in clear terms whether Chapter 3 was intended to operate only 
horizontally or also vertically. He held that the right to freedom of 
expression, 375 in so far as it relates to political activity, can be enforced in 
a private dispute because political activity occurs not only between the State 
and its organs and private individuals but also between individuals among 
'themselves. 376 In coming to this conclusion the judge adopted a broad or 
!liberal approach which takes into account the spirit, purport and objects of the 
,Constitution and extends the protection of fundamental human rights beyond 
circumstances for which the common law makes provision. 377 
The case was concerned with an application for an interdict restraining the 
respondent from making defamatory statements about the applicant. In dealing 
with the question whether an interim interdict which was granted by consent 
should be postponed and extended, the court considered whether such a 
postponement and extension was justified in the light of the respondent's right 
to freedom of speech and expression as entrenched in section 15(1) of the 
Constitution and the applicant's right to dignity as entrenched in section 10. 
374Supra. 
375Section 15. 
376At 6H. 
377At 61. Sasson South Africa's Interim Constitution (1994) at 
15 also argues in favour of this view. This view is based on the section 35(3) 
directive that the courts should have due regard to the spirit, purport and 
objects of Chapter 3 in the interpretation of any law and the development of 
the common law and customary law. 
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' !Crisply, Mandela v Falati raised the question of balancing freedom of 
speech and expression with the right to dignity. Van Schalkwyk J, after 
referring to various authorities, emphasised the importance of freedom of 
speech: 
11 The history of liberty shows that the currency of every free society is to be found in 
the market-place of ideas where, without restraint, individuals exchange the most sacred of al] 
.commodities. If the market is sometimes corrupt or abused or appears to serve the interest of the 
wicked and unscrupulous, that is reason enough to accept that it operates in accordance with the 
rules of human nature. 11378 
Van Schalkwyk J's dictum is in accord with the idea of an open and free 
society. Freedom of speech is the hallmark of a free and democratic society; 
it enables citizens to point out and correct wickedness and corruption in the 
interests of society. The judge also pointed out, however, that the importance 
of freedom of speech did not mean that whenever the right of freedom of 
speech comes into conflict with the right to dignity the former must prevail: 
"To allow that to happen would be to abrogate the law of defamation, and would in any 
·Case violate the provisions of section 33(1) of the Constitution 11 • 379 
The question of the horizontal dimension of Chapter 3 and the importance of 
freedom of speech in relation to other fundamental rights was also dealt with 
in Gardener v Whitaker380. In this case Froneman J considered the 
position in other jurisdictions and found that although fundamental human 
rights charters primarily apply to litigation between an individual and organs 
of the state, fundamental constitutional values ought to permeate throughout 
the entire legal system. 381 It is the duty of the courts to adapt the common 
'1'At SD. 
379At SF. 
3801994(5) BCLR 19 (E). Addendum: Gardener v Whitaker was 
overturned by the Constitutional Court: see footnote 357. 
381At 29J-30B. 
-544-
I 
'[law to the broader objects of the Constitution;382 this duty stems from the 
fact that sections 35(1) and 35(3) oblige the courts to harmonise the common 
law with the values of the Constitution. 383 The judge concluded that aspects 
of the common law must therefore be scrutinised to determine whether they 
accorded with the provisions of the Constitution.384 
The dispute in Gardener, like that in Mandela, raised the question of 
balancing the competing rights of freedom of speech and human dignity, 
which incorporates the common law of defamation. Under the common law 
: greater weight is attached to the right to one's good name or reputation than 
the right to freedom of speech. 385 However, under the Constitution both 
,rights are fundamental and therefore equal in weight; the Constitution does not 
,create a hierarchy of fundamental rights where an alleged infringement of the 
right to free speech and expression has to be determined in the context of 
another, competing, fundamental right. 386 In order to determine whether one 
right should take precedence over another in a competing situation, one should 
look at the context in which the clash of interests occurs and decide the matter 
by means of a process of balancing the competing interests.387 
382At 30H-I. 
383At 301. 
384 As Froneman J pointed out (at 318), the nature and extent of a 
particular right and the values that underlie it are important in determining 
whether it operates horizontally. 
385This is clear from the fact that a defamatory statement is presumed to 
be wrongful. The defendant bears the onus to rebut the presumption: see inter 
alia SAUK v O'Malley 1977(3) SA 394 (A) at 401-402; Borgin v De 
Villiers 1980(3) SA 556 (A) at 571; Marais v Richard 1981(1) SA 
1157 (A) at 1166-1167. 
386 At 35I-36A. 
387 At 37 A. See Chapter 11 for a discussion of balancing competing 
interests in constitutional litigation. 
-545-
In the United States of America freedom of speech and expression is highly 
valued. 388 Freedom of speech is seen as essential to advance the search for 
truth and to enable people, especially where issues of public importance are 
involved, to hear and consider different points of view .389 Hate speech is 
therefore afforded protection as a result of the high value placed on freedom 
of expression. 390 This stems mainly from the fact that American society has 
in the course of building a strong democracy developed a high degree of 
political tolerance; hate speech which is aimed at promoting political ideals is 
therefore tolerated. 391 
Hate speech is also tolerated in Canada, although not to the same extent as in 
the United States. In R v Keegstra392 the Canadian Supreme Court held 
that a provision of legislation which prohibited wilful promotion of group 
:hatred infringed the right of free speech as guaranteed in section 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is significant to note, however, 
that the court held, by a majority of four to three, that the legislative 
infringement in issue was a demonstrably justifiable limitation under section 
1 of the Charter. 
388See for example Roth v United States 354 US 476 (1957) at 484; 
New York Times v Sullivan 376 us 254 (1964) at 270-271. 
389See E. Neisser "Hate Speech in the New South Africa: Constitutional 
Considerations for a Land Recovering from Decades of Racial Repression and 
Violence" 1994 SAJHR 336 at 344-345. 
390See for example Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969) (right 
of Ku Klux Klan to call for the expulsion of blacks and Jews upheld); Smith 
v Collins 439 US 916 (1978) (right of Nazis to march and chant in a suburb 
populated by survivors of Jewish concentration camps affirmed). 
391Hate speech which does not form part of dialogue or exposition of ideas 
,does not fall under the protected category: see D. van Wyk, J. Dugard et al 
Rights and Constitutionalism (1994) at 275. 
392(1990) 3 SCR 697. 
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:South Africa is still a young democracy which has just emerged from a long 
I 
!history of discrimination, division and racial tensions; it has not yet developed 
a high degree of political tolerance; affording hate speech, especially speech 
.with a racial tone, protection risks tension and disunity. 393 Legislation 
prohibiting hate speech will have to be measured against the section 33 
'reasonable' and 'justifiable in an open democratic society based on freedom 
and equality' criteria, bearing in mind the infancy of our democracy and the 
need to advance national unity and reconciliation. 394 
Section 33(1)(bb) requires a high degree of justification where freedom of 
:expression relates to free and fair political activity; if legislation prohibiting 
'hate speech which relates to political activity is to be saved it must also be 
shown that it is necessary. 395 The challenger will have to show, however, 
that the speech in issue relates to fair political activity. It is submitted that 
once South Africa develops into a mature democracy, hate speech which 
.promotes the aspirations and ideals of members of the various sections of the 
community and their participation in the political process should be afforded 
protection. 
:In the Mandela case the court approved the rule adopted in New York 
393The postamble, which is entitled 'national unity and reconciliation, 
specifically states that the 1993 Constitution provides a "historic bridge 
'.between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, 
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of 
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex" (my 
emphasis). 
394Addendum: Section 16(2) of the new Constitution (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996) now provides that freedom of expression 
"does not extend to advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or 
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm." 
395lt may be argued that such legislation is necessary to realise the ideal 
of national unity and reconciliation as provided in the postamble and to 
nurture our young democracy. 
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Times Co v The United States,396 namely that a system of prior 
restraint of expression places a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity; a party who seeks to have a prior restraint upheld carries a heavy 
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. 397 If 
a defamation occurs the aggrieved party has recourse in an action for 
damages. 
,Mandela v Falati and Gardener v Whitaker are also important 
because they recognise the special position of public figures in relation to 
freedom of expression. Public figures should not be permitted to silence their 
critics because of their influential position in society; the very fact that they 
are prominent public figures exposes them to a high degree of scrutiny and 
criticism. As Van Schalkwyk J stated in the Mandela case: 
11 11 is a matter of the most fundamental importance that such criticism should be free, 
open robust and even unrestrained. This is so because of the inordinate power and influence which 
is wielded by politicians, and the seductive influence which these attributes have upon corrupt men 
and women. The most appalling crimes have been committed by politicians because their baseness 
and perversity was hidden from public scrutiny. 11398 
.However, Van Schalkwyk J did not deal with the question whether the fact 
that a litigant is a public official or figure has any bearing in an action for 
damages based on defamation. In New York Times Co. v Sullivan'99 
the United States Supreme Court held that a public official or figure cannot 
recover damages for defamation unless he can prove that the defamatory 
396403 us 713. 
397See D. Spitz "Eschewing Silence Coerced by Law: The Political Core 
and Protected Periphery of Freedom of Expression" 1994 SAJHR 301 at 
318-321 for a discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint. 
398At 9B-C. 
399Supra. 
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!matter was published with malice; in essence, it must be shown that the matter 
!was published with the knowledge of its falsehood or with reckless disregard 
as to whether it was true or not. 400 
The position at common law in South Africa is that once a public official or 
figure proves that a publication is defamatory, he is entitled to recover 
damages, unless the defendant proves the existence of one of the ground of 
justification, namely privilege, truth and public interest and fair comment.401 
;Malice is relevant only to show that the defendant exceeded permissible limits 
,where privilege and fair comment are raised as grounds of justification.402 
Malice is not relevant where truth and public interest are raised as grounds of 
justification. 403 
In Neethling v Du Preez and Others; Neethling v The Weekly 
Mail and Others404 the Appellate Division held that a defendant in a 
defamation case bears the full onus to prove that a publication was true and 
in the public interest; it also declined to recognise a general media privilege. 
Jn Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd v Esselen's Estate<05 
the court also rejected the contention that a public official (in this case a 
judge) should be barred from recovering defamation damages for the criticism 
400See also Gertz v Robert Welch Inc. 418 US 323. 
401See J. Neethling, J.M Potgieter & P.J Visser Law of Delict (1989) 
at 284-287. 
402See for example Jordaan v Van Biljon 1962 (1) SA 286 (A) at 
295-296; Naidoo v Vengtas 1965 (1) SA 1 (A) at 21; Marais v 
Richard 1981 (1) SA 1157 (A) at 1170. 
403See Schourie v Afrikaanse Pers Publikasies 1966 (1) PH 11 
(W). 
4041994(1) SA 708 (A). 
4051994(2) SA 1 (A). 
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of the performance of his official duties. 
The Neethling and Esselen's Estate cases were decided in the light of 
the common law of defamation; at the time they were decided the 1993 
Constitution had not yet come into operation. The Constitution, which seeks 
to create an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality 
provides a proper basis for a re-evaluation of rules of the common law. 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution provides a standard against which principles of 
the common law can be measured. 406 In this way the common law 
principles of defamation can be harmonised with constitutionally guaranteed 
rights such as freedom of speech in order to encourage candid dialogue and 
public participation in the democratic process. 
In the Gardener case Froneman J considered the impact of the Constitution 
,on the common law rules of defamation in a case where the plaintiff is a 
public figure. He held that public figure plaintiff bears the onus of proving (1) 
that the statement made by the defendant referred to him; (2) that the 
statement would have been understood as infringing his right to his reputation; 
and (3) that the statement is not worthy of protection as an expression of free 
speech. 407 As Froneman J opined, the Constitution has changed the common 
law position. 408 What used to be defences which relied upon freedom of 
expression as their basis, such as public interest, privilege, fair comment, and 
the like in an action of defamation are now available to the public figure 
plaintiff to show that the defendant's statement is not worthy of protection as 
an expression of free speech; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the 
statement is not in the public interest, is not protected by privilege, is not true 
or was published with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or false. 
406See H. Botha "Privatism, Authoritarianism and the Constitution: The 
Case of Neethling and Potgieter" 1995 THRHR 496 at 498-489. 
407At 37E. 
408At 37G. 
-550-
In Bogoshi v National Media Limited and others409 Eloff JP did 
not approve the judgment of Froneman J in the Gardener case. According 
to Eloff JP the defendant in a defamation case can escape liability only if he 
can at least establish that a defamatory statement was true; it is no answer to 
say that the statement was published in good faith and without an intention to 
defame, and that it was published in the public interest. The judge concluded 
that section 15 of the Constitution should not be interpreted so as to alter the 
common law liability of the media for defamatory statements. 
It is important to distinguish, however, between a defamatory statement that 
is in the public interest or relates to free and political activity and one which 
does not. It is clear from Froneman J's judgment that the principles he 
enunciated are applicable to a defamation case that has a public dimension and 
not to 'purely private altercations' ;410 in essence, free speech which relates 
to matters of public interest or to free and fair political activity merits more 
weight than one which occurs in 'purely private altercations' because it 
contributes to the development of public opinion. The publisher of a 
'newspaper will ordinarily not be able to rely on the section 15 guarantee of 
freedom of expression where it publishes defamatory statements which are not 
in the public interest or do not relate to free and fair political activity. 
The importance of free speech that has a public dimension was recognised by 
Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd411 . The judge 
approved the judgment of Froneman J in the Gardener case and reaffirmed 
the approach that the values of the Constitution must be given primacy over 
the rules of the common Jaw. This approach entails that where there is a clash 
between an individual's interest to protect his good name and the right to 
409[1996] 1 All SA 670 (W) 
410At 35G, 36C and 390. 
411[1996] 1 All SA 478 (W). 
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1freedom of speech and expression, the competing values must be weighed up 
Jin the light of the Constitution's ethos of openness and accountability. 
I 
' 
The approach adopted by Cameron J in the Holomisa case relating to the 
onus with regard to defamatory statements that have a public dimension 
corresponds to that adopted by Froneman J in the Gardener case; the 
plaintiff bears the onus of showing that the defendant has forfeited entitlement 
.to constitutional protection412 or, as stated in the Gardener case, that the 
statement is not worthy of protection as an expression of free speech. The test 
is whether the defendant acted reasonably. 413 
The Mandela, Gardener and Holomisa cases reflect the spirit and ideal 
of the 1993 Constitution, namely to usher in a new order founded on the 
recognition and protection of human rights and democratic principles. 
Responsible criticism of public officials or figures made in good faith is an 
essential component of the democratic order. 
The approach adopted by the court in Mandela and Gardener is in accord 
with the broad and liberal approach suited to the interpretation of a supreme 
Constitution. It recognises the importance of the protection of human rights 
in a supreme Constitution and seeks to give individuals the full benefit of 
human rights guarantees and the need to harmonise the human rights 
,provisions of the Constitution with the rest of the legal system. 
A generous approach, as opposed to a literalist approach, to the interpretation 
of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3, was also supported in the judgment of 
412At 504d. 
413Holomisa at 504e. The judge rejected the argument that the 'actual 
malice' test enunciated in New York Times Co. v Sullivan (supra) 
should be imported into our law. 
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1Joffe J in Government of the Republic of South Africa v The 
I 
!Sunday Times Newspaper and Another. 414 In this case, which, 
like the Mandela and Gardener cases, was concerned with the 
interpretation and application of freedom of speech, 415 Joffe J opined that 
although respect must be paid "to the language which has been used and to the 
traditions and usages which have given meaning to that language" in the 
interpretation of the Constitution, a generous approach must be adopted if the 
'court is to determine "the full ambit of the rights enshrined in the Constitution 
and be vigorous in the protection thereof". 416 
In his judgment in the Sunday Times Newspaper case Joffe J referred 
with approval to the judgment of Van Schalkwyk J in Mandela v Falati, 
in which it was stated that freedom of speech and expression is vital to the 
,protection and promotion of democracy. Freedom of expression, as it relates 
!to the press in a democratic society in particular, is vital in ferreting out 
I 
corruption, dishonesty and graft and exposing the perpetrators; the press 
facilitates the exchange of ideas, advances communication between the 
governors and the governed and serves as a watchdog of the governed. 417 
'The court held that a regulation, 418 which prohibited the publication of a 
report of a Commission of Inquiry before the President had released it and 
before it was tabled in Parliament was unconstitutional as it constituted an 
414Supra. 
415The difference between Mandela and Gardener, on the one hand, 
and the Sunday Times Newspaper case, on the other, was that while the 
former involved disputes between private individuals, the government was a 
party in the latter. 
416At 186E. 
417At 188G-H. 
418Regulation 13 (Government Gazette of 8 June 1993, notice RSO), made 
in terms of the Commissions Act, 8 of 1947. 
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improper prior restraint. 
IThe broad and generous approach to the interpretation of the Constitution was 
also apparent from Froneman J's judgment in the Gardener case when he 
dealt with the question whether section 241(8) has the effect of excluding the 
operation of the provisions of the Constitution to pending proceedings. The 
judge adopted the approach that the provisions of Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution apply to cases which were pending before the coming into 
operation of the Constitution on 27 April 1994. Although the judge mainly 
based his decision on the view that the purpose of section 241 (8) is to ensure 
a continuation of the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which a case was 
pending immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, he 
preferred a "broader approach based on the inherent values of the 
Constitution". 419 
In S V Saib'20 , however, Thirion J adopted a literalist/intentionalist 
approach to the interpretation of section 241(8) of the Constitution. He came 
to the conclusion that the intention of the legislature, when it enacted section 
241, was that the provisions of the Constitution did not apply in respect of 
matters which were pending before the coming into operation of the 
;constitution. 421 
Thirion J did not agree with counsel's argument that the Constitution should 
be interpreted as an instrument sui generis, generously and with a view to 
giving individuals the full benefit of the fundamental rights entrenched in it. 
419At 25H. 
4201994(2) BCLR 48 (D). Also reported in 1994(2) SACR 517 (D). 
421By contrast, in S v Smith and Another (supra) Van Rooyen AJ 
found that the intention of section 241(8) was to ensure that a court which had 
jurisdiction in a matter pending before 27 April 1994 would not lose it as a 
result of the coming into operation of the Constitution. 
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According to the judge the rules for the interpretation of the Constitution do 
1
not "differ materially from the ordinary rules of the interpretation of statutes. 
One still has to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature". 422 
In terms of the approach preferred by Thirion J the intention of the legislature 
:is fundamental. The role of the interpreter is to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature from the words used; clear and unambiguous words reflect the 
intention of the legislature, which must be given effect to. This approach not 
only fails to distinguish between interpreting ordinary statutes and giving 
,effect to the fundamental values contained in a supreme Constitution but also 
'severely restricts judicial creativity in constitutional interpretation. 
The correct approach to the interpretation of section 241(8) is the purposive 
and generous approach preferred by Froneman J in the Gardener case.423 
This approach is set out fully by Froneman Jin the Qozeleni case. 424 The 
judge considered that the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 were so fundamental 
that their violation cannot be allowed simply because proceedings were 
pending at the time of the coming into operation of the Constitution.425 He 
saw the larger purpose of the Constitution as an important consideration: 
422At 53I (BCLR). See also Kalla and Another v The Master 
:and Others (supra) at 87J. 
423Supra. There are, however, decisions which support the decision in 
Saib: see for example S v Ndima and Others 1994(2) SACR 517 (D), 
'S v Lombard 1994(3) BCLR 126 (T), S v Vermaas 1994(4) BCLR 
'18 (T) and S v Coetzee and Others 1994(4) BCLR 58 (W). 
42•Supra. 
425See also S v W 1994(2) BCLR 135 (C) at 1458-C; Shabalala and 
Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others 
(supra) at 92C; Jurgens v The Editor, Sunday Times 
Newspaper and Another (supra) at 102G. 
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11 The Constitution is envisaged as a bridge from a despairing past to a hopeful future, 
not as an extended bypass to prevent one from ever getting to the bridge. 11426 
The purposive and generous approach to the interpretation of section 241(8) 
was endorsed by Mahomed J in his majority judgment in the Constitutional 
Court case of S v Mhlungu and Others.427 This approach gives force 
and effect to the values, purpose and spirit of the Constitution. The purpose 
and spirit of the Constitution is to usher in a new political, constitutional and 
legal dispensation based on the values of openness, freedom and equality; its 
human rights provisions should be given "a construction which is 'most 
beneficial to the widest possible amplitude' if the language and context of the 
relevant sections reasonably permits such a course". 428 By contrast, 
Kentridge AJ, in a minority judgment, adopted a literalist\intentionalist 
approach. He found that the 'clear' language of section 241(8) expressly 
426At 86C (BCLR). The 'bridge' metaphor is taken from the postamble 
and was used by Mureinik as well in his article "A Bridge too Where? 
Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights" 1994 SAJHR 31. 
4271995(7) BCLR 793 (CC), especially at 799-800A. Although the judge 
took the view that the special emphasis on 'territorial jurisdiction' in the 
Gardener and Qozeleni cases was not justified by section 241(8), he 
found that the emphasis on the jurisdictional objectives the section provided 
a basis for an alternative approach to its meaning. He found that the purpose 
of the section was to create constitutional legitimacy for the courts which were 
established before the Constitution came into operation; such courts are 
deemed to have been established in terms of the Constitution (section 241(1)); 
section 241(8) merely preserve their authority to continue to function as courts 
for the purpose of adjudication in pending cases. (at 804H and 805H). 
428At 8000. See also the authorities cited by Mahomed J. Although one 
should make a distinction between the interpretation of formal structural 
provisions such as section 241(8) and the interpretation of the provisions of 
a Bill of Rights, section 241(8) called for a value-oriented, purposive and 
generous approach similar to that applicable in the interpretation of the 
provisions of a Bill of Rights because it directly impacted on the question 
whether individuals should have the benefit of the rights entrenched in Chapter 
3 or not. In essence, where a formal structural provision impacts on 
fundamental human rights, an approach which is similar to that applicble in 
the interpretation of human rights provisions should be adopted. 
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' !excluded the operation of the provisions of Chapter 3 to pending cases; he 
took the view that the section is a transitional provision, intended to deal with 
.a limited number of cases, covering a defined short period of time. 429 
iA literalist/intentionalist approach is not suited to the interpretation and 
application of a supreme Constitution; it flies in the face of Chief Justice 
Marshall's warning: 
11 [W]e must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding ... [It has] great 
tl . [ dl . b" " 430 , ou 1nes an important o 1ects . 
,Du Plessis431 points out that the literalist/intentionalist approach "is not 
!seriously concerned about what meaning, understanding and interpretation 
.really entail". The interpretation of a supreme Constitution involves not only 
seeking and understanding the meaning of words used but also the underlying 
principles and values, both expressed and unexpressed. Constitutional 
principles and values are as much part of the Constitution as the words used 
in it. 
429At 828H and 830D. A similar approach was adopted by Didcott Jin 
Bux v The Officer Commanding the Pietermaritzburg Prison 
and Others 1994(4) BCLR 10 (N). Although the judge agreed with the 
;generous and value-oriented approach adopted by Froneman J in Matiso 
'(supra), the approach he adopted is a technical one characteristic of literal 
:interpretation. He decided that a provincial or local division of the Supreme 
Court was not competent to grant interim relief pending final determination 
of the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament by the Constitutional Court; 
he reasoned that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude the 
jurisdiction of a provincial or local division to grant interim relief when they 
created a special Constitution Court which is specifically empowered to 
inquire into the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. Section 101(7) of the 
Constitution now empowers provincial or local division to grant interim relief 
pending final determination of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court. 
430McCulloch v Maryland 17 us (Wheat.) 36 (1819) at 407. 
431L.M Du Plessis "The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa: 
'Taking Stock" in Kruger & Currin Interpreting a Bill of Rights (1994) 
at 18. 
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The preamble and the post-amble of the 1993 Constitution set out certain 
!fundamental ideals which can only be realised by seeking and giving effect to 
the principles and values contained in the Constitution; the meaning of words 
'alone is not sufficient.432 Some judgments of the Supreme Court, notably the 
judgments of Froneman 1 in Qozeleni, Matiso and Gardener, the 
judgment of Van Dijkhorst in De Klerk, the judgment of Van Schalkwyk 
in Mandela and the judgment of Joffe 1 in the Sunday Times 
:Newspaper case have made a good start in identifying and giving effect to 
the principles and values embodied in the Constitution. The first judgments of 
the Constitutional Court in the Zuma and Mhlungu cases, on the other 
hand, have laid down a sound basis for the interpretation of the Constitution 
in a manner which gives effect to fundamental constitutional values. 
432This is precisely what Mahomed AJA meant when he said, in Ex 
Parte Attorney-General, Namibia In re Corporal 
Punishment by Organs of State (supra): " .. (T]he Constitution 
must... be read not in isolation but within the context of a fundamental 
humanistic philosophy introduced in the preamble and woven into the manifold 
structure of the Constitution" (at 78C). 
CHAPTER 11 
! 
!CONCLUSION. 
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\Justice Jerome Frank of the United States once posed the question whether 
!decisions of the South African judiciary, had they been supported by a Bill of 
I 
\Rights, would have done much to rein in the exercise of power by the 
I 
\apartheid regime under former Westminster-based Constitutions.' South 
I
; Africa now has a Constitution which incorporates a justiciable Bill of Rights. 2 
,Yet, the question posed by Justice Frank remains, although in a somewhat 
I 
jdifferent form, as relevant today as it was then: What success will decisions 
I 
lof the South African judiciary, supported by a Bill of Rights, be able to 
.achieve in reining in the exercise of power by a new government? 
I 
!The success or failure of the judiciary in bringing to life the noble ideals 
!contained in the Constitution, and giving individuals the full benefit of the 
!provisions of the Bill of Rights, will depend on judicial approaches to the 
linterpretation and application of the provisions of the Constitution. No matter 
1
how noble and well-written constitutional provisions are, they are not self-
1--
'I 'Jerome N Frank "Some 
Chicago LR 666 at 698. 
Reflections on Judge Learned Hand" 1957 
2Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993. 
1
Although the Constitution of 1993 was adopted and enacted as an interim 
!Constitution, it can be accepted that the final Constitution will not differ 
ljmaterially from the interim Constitution and will contain a Bill of Rights 
which is substantially the same as the present Bill of Rights. In terms of 
section 71(1) of the interim Constitution, a new constitutional text must 
comply with the constitutional principles contained in schedule 4, a number 
of which deal with the protection of fundamental rights; the interim 
!Constitution itself is also largely based on the constitutional principles 
;contained in schedule 4. 
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executing; they require judicial elaboration and concretisation. 
The South African judiciary has been accustomed to a system of legislative 
!supremacy. Under the Westminster-type system of legislative supremacy 
i 
'Parliament was supreme and its intention paramount; the role of the courts 
was by and large limited to determining and applying the intention of the 
legislature. The shift from a subordinate role under the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy to a position of guardian of the Constitution and arbiter of the 
constitutionality of legislative and executive acts in the light of the Bill of 
I Rights brings with it new challenges to the South African judiciary. In the new 
lsouth Africa, the role of the judiciary will be more important and prominent 
I 
than it was in the past. 
An analysis of the role of the South African judiciary under a system of 
!legislative supremacy has highlighted some of the challenges which faced the 
judiciary in the constitutional arena;' on the other hand, a comparative 
]analysis of the role of the judiciary in countries which have made a transition 
i from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and 
constitutional guarantees of fundamental human rights highlights the challenges 
!which face a judiciary operating under a human rights regime. 4 Indeed, South 
!Africa has much to learn from the failures, mistakes and successes of the 
!judiciary in Canada, the former Bophuthatswana and Namibia. 
!An analysis of the role of the South African judiciary under the new 
I 
!Constitution reveals that there is a great difference between interpreting 
ordinary statutes and interpreting a Constitution which operates as the supreme 
1Jaw and entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms. A supreme Constitution 
!which guarantees fundamental human rights and freedoms contains values 
which reflect the ideals and aspirations of the society which it serves; it is the 
3 See Chapt. 4. 
4See Chapts. 6, 7 and 8. 
! 
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function of the judiciary, in interpreting and applying the provisions of the 
Constitution, to identify and articulate these values and to give individuals 
their full benefit. 
To conclude this thesis, the role of the South African judiciary during the 
transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional 
supremacy and constitutional guarantee of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms and the lessons from comparative constitutional law is evaluated. 
ITwo other issues which are related to the role of the judiciary, namely the 
!balancing of conflicting interests in judicial adjudication, and the role of the 
!judiciary in a democracy, are discussed briefly; an approach to the 
!interpretation of the provisions of the· Bill of Rights is then finally suggested. 
I Ii. Crossing the Bridge: From Legislative Supremacy to 
jConstitutional Supremacy. 
I 
! 
Numerous studies on the role of the South African judiciary in the field of 
human rights under former Constitutions have illustrated how lamentable the 
performance of the judiciary has been. 5 It is encouraging to know, however, 
that existing judges of the Supreme Court have reacted positively to the 
11challenge of actualising the fundamental values contained in the human rights 
provisions of the 1993 Constitution.• 
I 
' 
' I 
, __________ _ 
I i 5See inter alia J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (1973); H. Corder Judges at Work - The Role and 
Attitudes of the South African Appellate Division (1984); C.F 
Forsyth In Danger for their Talents - A Study of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (1985); D. 
Dyzenhaus Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African 
ILaw in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991). 
I 
I 
6See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of some of the cases where the provisions 
lof the 1993 Constitution have been interpreted and applied. Even before the 
l
ooming into operation of the 1993 Constitution there were judges who spoke 
out in favour of a justiciable Bill of Rights: see, inter alia, Mr Justice M.M 
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The starting point in the transition from legislative supremacy to constitutional 
,supremacy with regard to the role of the judiciary is the Constitution itself. 
I Section 4, the supremacy clause, tells much about the role of the judiciary; the 
supremacy clause is a directive to the judiciary, as interpreters and 
implementors of the law, to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and to 
strike down any Jaw which is inconsistent with its provisions. Sections 101(3) 
and 98(2) expressly place the interpretation and application of the provisions 
: of the Constitution squarely on the shoulders of the judiciary. 
The parties to the constitutional agreement chose not to entrust the upholding 
of the agreement and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
entrenched in it to a parliamentary majority but to the judiciary. The judiciary, 
as the institution which occupies a pivotal position in upholding the 
'1constitution, has the important function of ascertaining what the norms of the 
'Constitution are and to apply them to the relevant facts of the case. 
!The greatest challenge which faces the judiciary is to adopt an interpretative 
1stance which is suited to the Constitution, in particular its Bill of Rights, for 
ithere is a great deal of difference between interpreting the provisions of a 
supreme Constitution and the provisions of an ordinary statute. The difficulty 
1with many Constitutions, when their provisions come up for interpretation by 
1the courts, is that there may not be explicit guiding principles in the event of 
!there being a conflict of interpretations. 
The 1993 Constitution contains a number of pointers to the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Section 35(1) specifically directs the court 
Corbett "Human Rights: the Road Ahead" 1979 SALJ 192; Mr Justice Leon 
"A Bill of Rights for South Africa" 1986 SAJHR 60; Mr Justice G.P Kotze 
l"Menseregte: Suid-Afrika se Dilemma" in J. van der Westhuizen & H. 
1 Viljoen A Bill of Rights for South Africa (1988) 1 at 4; J. van der 
1Westhuizen "An Interview with the Hon. Mr Justice P.J.J Olivier" 1988 
ISAJHR99. 
' 
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to "promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality". The position in other democratic societies and 
international law affords a valuable starting point in promoting the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; 
iin terms of section 35(1), in interpreting the provisions of which entrench 
fundamental human rights the judiciary must have regard to international law 
applicable to the protection of human rights and may have regard to 
!comparable foreign case law. 7 
I 
!Section 35(3) of the Constitution contains another important directive to the 
1
judiciary with regard to the interpretation of laws which are alleged to be in 
I 
!conflict with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Section 35(3) directs that any 
!law must be interpreted with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of 
! 
'the Bill of Rights. 
!The spirit, purport and objects of a Bill of Rights emanate from the 
!Constitution in which it is contained and appear from its terms. When the 
!framers of the new Constitution adopted and enacted it, they desired to create 
la new order under a democratic constitutional state based on freedom and 
!equality and the protection of the inalienable rights of man.8 The desire to 
I 
!create a new order was also a desire to move away from the past, where the 
' 
rights and freedoms of citizens were at the mercy of parliamentary majorities. 
7As to the use of comparative foreign law, the courts have repeatedly 
called for circumspection because Constitutions have different contexts and 
social milieu within which and historical backgrounds against which they are 
drafted: see Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994(1) BCLR 
75 (E) at SOC; Park-Ross v Director, Office for Serious 
!Economic Offences 1995(2) BCLR 198 (C) at 208D, approved in 
Potgieter en 'n Ander v Kilian 1995(11) BCLR 1498 (N) at 1513J-
l1514A; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1996(2) BCLR 232 
(W) at 237H. 
8See preamble to the Constitution. 
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The 1993 Constitution defines the powers of government and also limits the 
exercise of these powers in relation to the citizen by entrenching fundamental 
1rights and freedoms. The resolution of disputes concerning the exercise of 
,power and the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms demands an 
!appraisal and an articulation of constitutional values. The impact of the new 
i 
iConstitution is profound: it urges the upholding of the fundamental values of 
' 
!fairness, freedom under the law, equality and justice. 
Jt may be that the 1993 Constitution sets out and entrenches fundamental 
!human rights and freedoms to which the individual is entitled. It is worth 
',remembering, however, that human rights and freedoms do not operate in a 
vacuum. The interpretation and application of human rights provisions involve 
'the arbitration of social conflicts; the judiciary, as a societal institution, must 
,promote and serve the interests and values of the society in which it operates. 
Judicial power, particularly in relation to the resolution of disputes concerning 
the exercise of governmental power and the protection of fundamental human 
I 
!rights, lies in the judiciary's ability to mediate and harmonise existing social 
' ; relations within society. 
:The ability to do this depends on the judiciary's approach to the interpretation 
I and application of the law. There are two approaches which are open to the 
~udiciary: it may either follow a strict, literalist and mechanical approach, in 
\ . 
iwhich event the new constitutional values will have very little effect in the 
,mediation and harmonisation of social relations, or it may follow a purposive 
1and generous approach,9 which promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution as an instrument which is intended to regulate social relations by 
,defining the powers of government and limiting the exercise of these powers 
,through the entrenchment of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
A comparative study of the performance of the judiciary in those countries 
9See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of the difference. 
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which have made a transition from legislative supremacy to constitutional 
supremacy shows that an approach which is suited to the interpretation and 
application of a Bill of Rights is the purposive and generous approach. 10 This 
approach recognises the special nature of the Constitution, its value-based 
terms and objects as well as the ideals, needs and aspirations of the society it 
I serves. 
I 
!Section 35(2) contains another pointer to the interpretation and application of 
i 
!the provisions of the Bill of Rights. However, the provisions of section 35(2) 
are applicable only in relation to the interpretation and application of a law 
which limits any of the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. In terms of 
jsection 35(2), a law which limits any of the rights entrenched in the Bill of 
[Rights cannot be held to be unconstitutional solely by reason of the fact that 
lthe wording used prima facie exceeds the limits imposed in the Bill of Rights; 
if the law in question is reasonably capable of having a more restricted 
meaning, it must be interpreted in accordance with the more restricted 
!meaning. 11 
!Section 35(2) must be read with section 33(1). Section 33(1) permits 
limitations of the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights by means of a law of 
general application, provided that the limitation in question is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality 
and does not negate the content of the right in questionn Read with section 
133(1), section 35(2) means that prima facie proof that a law, in terms of its 
!wording, limits any of the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights is not to be 
! 
[ 10See Chapt. 6, Chap!. 7 and Chap!. 8. See infra for an evaluation of the 
'valuable lessons from comparative constitutional law. 
"Section 232(3) contains a similar provision m respect of the 
interpretation of the Constitution as a whole. 
, 
12In terms of sections 33(1)(b)(aa) and (bb) a law which limits the rights 
!entrenched in the enumerated sections must, in addition to being reasonable 
1and justifiable in an open and democratic society, also be necessary. 
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regarded as proof of unconstitutionality. 
Cachalia et al13 are of the view that section 35(2) embraces a presumption 
!of constitutionality. Basson14 is also of the same view. However, viewed in 
its proper perspective, section 35(2) is more of a 'reading down' provision 
I
, than a provision which 
: constitutionality. 15 
embraces or creates a presumption of 
!Section 35(2) therefore does not direct the court to presume in favour of 
iconstitutionality; it instead directs the court to adopt a restrictive interpretation 
,if that is possible. The essence of the section is that if a limiting statute can 
lbe interpreted in two ways, namely one which would render the statute 
!unconstitutional and another which would have a less invasive effect but still 
i 
fall within the criteria laid down in section 33(1), the court must choose the 
latter interpretation. 
llf a statute is capable of more than one interpretation, it makes sense to prefer 
Ian interpretation which does not violate Chapter 3 and to avoid one which 
I 
lviolates it. In this way the court ensures that the statute survives judicial 
I 
!review, while at the same time ensuring that it is consistent with the 
!provisions of the Constitution. This interpretation protects the individual's 
rights, while at the same time eliminating the need for legislation to be 
13A. Cachalia, H. Cheadle, D. Davis Fundamental Rights in the 
INew Constitution (1994) at 122. See also G. Marcus "Interpreting the 
!Chapter on Fundamental Rjghts" 1994 SAJHR 92 at 96. 
140. Sasson South Africa's Interim Constitution (1994) at 58. 
1 
15See L. du Plessis & H. Corder Understanding South Africa's 
!Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 121; L. du Plessis "A Note on the 
!Application, Interpretation, Limitation and Suspension Clauses in South 
'Africa's Transitional Bill of Rjghts" 1994 Stellenbosch LR 86 at 87. 
I 
' 
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promulgated all over again. 16 
Section 35(2) merely incorporates a rule of interpretation. It cannot be used 
Ito justify legislative lacunae which are inconsistent with the provisions of 
1section 33(1). A similar view was stated by Dickson CJ in the Canadian case 
of Hunter v Southam Inc:17 
"While the courts are guardians of the Constitution and of individuals' rights under it, 
lit, is the Jegislature's responsibility to enact legislation that embodies appropriate safeguards to 
comply with the Constitution's requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details 
ithat will render legislative lacunae constitutional. Without appropriate safeguards legislation 
authorizing search and seizure is inconsistent withs. 8 of the Charter.~ I have said, any law 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no 
force or effect 11 • 
!The postamble contains another important guide to the interpretation of the 
!Constitution; it sets out the wider purpose of the Constitution as the building 
of a future "founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and 
peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex". It is clear from the 
,postamble that the Constitution is based on the ideal of a new democratic 
!order in which there is freedom under the law, equality and respect for and 
lthe protection of fundamental human rights. It is therefore the function of the 
pudiciary to ensure that this ideal and the values attached to it are actualised. 
Constitutional principles are enacted to promote and realise the values, ideals, 
needs and aspirations of society. An interpretation and application of the 
!Provisions of the Constitution in such a way that these principles "operate 
1-----
1 '"This interpretation is common in the interpretation of ordinary statutes, 
where a statute which is capable of more than one meaning must be given a 
meaning which is in favorem libertatis: See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp 
,Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 552. 
I 
17(1984] 2 S.C.R 145 at 168-169. 
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lcovertly producing results that are both undemocratic and also inefficient, 
jwithout full and adequate consideration of the policy alternative actually 
!available to the court, "18 carries with it the danger of a legitimacy crisis; lack 
,of confidence in the courts inevitably leads to a degeneration of the legal 
:system. 
1Cowling19 aptly summarised the greatest challenge which faces the South 
African judiciary when he stated that in order to extricate the South African 
1legal system from past crises, formal impartiality 
"must be broadened into genuine objectivity, neutraJity and independence ~ essential 
ingredients for the protection of human rights - which should be the most important and 
fundamental purpose of any functioning legal system 11 • 
2. The Lessons from Comparative Constitutional Law. 
A comparative analysis of judicial interpretation and application of the 
Constitutions of Canada, the former Bophuthatswana and Namibia aptly 
lillustrates the difficult constitutional role of the judiciary in those countries 
1that have made a transition from legislative supremacy to constitutional 
:supremacy and the constitutional guarantee of fundamental human rights and 
'freedoms. The role of the judiciary in these countries contains valuable lessons 
1for the judiciary in the new South Africa. 
' 
The transition from legislative supremacy to constitutional supremacy involves 
a radical change in the relationship between the judiciary and the political 
'branches of government. The role of the judiciary in relation to the exercise 
jof power by the political branches is increased. The supremacy of the 
. 
18E. McWhinney Judicial Review in the English-Speaking 
!world (1969) at 186-187. 
19M.G Cowling "Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South 
!Africa: Articulating the Inarticulate Premiss" 1987 SAJHR 176 at 200. 
I 
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Constitution vests in the courts the power to determine the constitutionality of 
acts of the political branches and to invalidate any law which is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution. 
It would be incorrect to say that judicial review in those countries that have 
made a transition from legislative supremacy to constitutional supremacy and 
the constitutional entrenchment of human rights, necessarily brought about full 
protection of the rights of the individual against legislative and executive 
i 
iencroachments. The threat to individual rights comes not only from the 
!legislature or the executive, but also from judicial attitudes and approaches to 
lthe interpretation of provisions of the Constitution. 
iA conservative and restrained approach, one which emphasises judicial ! 
!deference to the legislature and the executive, poses as much of a threat to the 
! 
lrights and freedoms of the individual as legislative and executive excesses. On 
ithe other hand, some measure of judicial deference is necessary if the courts 
1are not to usurp the function of the legislature. Judicial over-activism holds 
the danger that politicians may resort to unconstitutional means if their policy 
' 
idecisions are continuously being undermined by the courts. 
!The Canadian, Bophuthatswanan and Namibian courts' approach to the 
! 
!interpretation of constitutional provisions which guarantee human rights and 
ifreedoms illustrates that words alone, unless they are brought into life through 
!creative interpretation, do not afford sufficient protection of human rights and 
freedoms. The lesson to be learnt from the decisions of these courts is that the 
approach of the court to the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the 
pivotal point upon which the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights 
land freedoms ultimately rests. 
The early decisions, in particular the Canadian and Namibian decisions 
dealing with the unentrenched Bills of Rights, reveal a cautious approach. 
Although the courts did not deny the existence of the constitutional guarantee 
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of individual rights and their role in protecting these rights, they were not 
readily prepared to articulate and apply the values implicit in these rights. 
In Canada, with the notable exception of R v Drybones,2° the Supreme 
Court was reluctant to give individuals the full benefit of the Bill of Rights. 
Thus, a law which disenfranchised Indian women - but not Indian men - who 
' 
married non-Indians was upheld, despite the fact that the law was 
;discriminatory and violated the provisions of the Bill of Rights;21 evidence 
!obtained in violation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights was held to be 
'admissible22; and the question whether an accused had a right to counsel was 
held to be merely a factor to be considered in deciding whether to admit a 
1
confession. 23 
I 
IIn the case of Namibia/South West Africa, with a few exceptions,24 the court 
adopted a cautious and conservative approach to the interpretation and 
!application of the transitional Bill of Rights. Either too much reliance was 
placed on well-established common law or administrative law principles, 
.without an analysis and articulation of the fundamental values embodied in the 
I provisions of the Bill of Rights, 25 or a narrow and legalistic approach was 
20(1969) 9 D.L.R (3d) 473. 
21Attorney-General, Canada v Lavell [1974] S.C.R 1349. 
Laskin J's comment on the legislation in issue, in his dissenting judgment, was 
particularly scathing; he called the legislation 'invidious', 'a statutory 
1
excommunication' and a 'banishment'. 
' 
22Hogan v R [1975] S.C.R 579. 
23R v Chow [1978] 43 C.C.C (2d) 215 (B.C.C.A). 
24Notably S v Heita & Others 1987(1) SA 311 (SWA). 
I
. 
25See for example Katofa v Administrator-General, South 
West Africa and Another 1985(4) SA 211 (SWA), Akweenda v 
Cabinet for the Transitional Government of South West 
,Africa 1987(1) SA 311 (SWA) and S v Nathaniel 1987(2) SA 225 
I 
I 
i 
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adopted. 26 It was only after the judgment of Grosskopf JA in Cabinet for 
the Territory of South West Africa v Chikane27 that some change 
became noticeable; 28 a generous approach, one which gave individuals the 
full benefit of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, was adopted. 
It may be argued that the operation of the doctrine of legislative supremacy 
in Canada and Namibia at the time of the 1960 Bill of Rights and the 
Namibian transitional Bill of Rights explains the courts' cautious and 
conservative approach. The judiciary was still used to the supremacy of the 
1
Iegislature as the basic principle of the legal system and not yet fully 
i 
!committed to the constitutional protection of fundamental human rights. There 
1was as yet no full realisation that the positivising of fundamental human rights 
in a constitutional document is an express legislative and popular recognition 
of their importance and an indication that the courts were called upon to 
(SWA). 
26See for example S v Angola 1986(2) SA 540 (SWA) and the decision 
of the Appellate Division in Cabinet for the Transitional 
Government for the Territory of South West Africa v Eins 
1988(3) SA 369 (A). It is significant to note, however, that in the Eins case 
!the court a quo had adopted a generous approach and held, after an analysis 
1of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, that the legislation in issue violated the 
!right to equality as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. A narrow and mechanical 
japproach is also discernible in some of the Bophuthatswanan decisions: see for 
!example Monnakale and Others v Government of the Republic 
l
of Bophuthatswana and Others 1991(1) SA 598 (B), Government 
,of Bophuthatswana v Segale 1990(1) SA 434 (B) and Lewis v 
Minister of Internal Affairs 1991(3) SA 628 (B). 
271989(1) SA 349 (A). 
I 28 Although Grosskopf JA extensively analysed and articulated the right to 
!equality, he avoided a direct application of the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
I 
by deciding the matter as if on exception, without making a value judgment 
about the reasonableness of the legislative distinction in issue. 
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ensure their efficacy. 29 
Kaufman30 offers another plausible explanation for the Canadian Supreme 
:Court's early conservatism and cautious approach. According to him, 
\suspicion and fear were partly to blame; "suspicion of an act of Parliament 
'which told us how to construe and apply other acts, and fear that chaos might 
result from bold and progressive interpretations". Judicial deference to the 
1egislature and 'fear that chaos might result from bold and progressive 
interpretations' may also explain the conservativism of the court in the 
!interpretation of the Namibian transitional Bill of Rights. Added to this was 
lperhaps the fact that the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights and the Namibian 
ftransitional Bill of Rights were not constitutionally entrenched and therefore 
!took the form of ordinary statutes, enjoying no special status. 
, The explanation for the conservatism of the courts in the Bophuthatswanan 
lcases31 can be found in the court's fear of incurring the resentment of the 
II legislature. Hiemstra CJ's somewhat stern admonition, in the Smith case, 32 
that "[t]he court helps to shape the Declaration of Human Rights with great 
29The judgment of Martland J in the Canadian case of R v Burnshire 
1[1975] 1 S.C.R 693 illustrates the lack of appreciation that a Bill of Rights 
,was an express recognition of the importance of constitutionally guaranteed 
:human rights. According to Martland J, the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights 
merely protected rights which already existed at common law and did not 
purport to define new rights; yet the fact of the matter is that the positivising 
and express protection of these rights gives them a new perspective altogether. 
3
°F. Kaufman "The Canadian Charter : A Time for Bold Spirits, 
Timorous Souls" 1986 McGill W 456 at 459. 
Not 
I 31The only exceptions in the Bophuthatswanan cases are S V Marwane 
J982(3) SA 717 (A), Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana 
j1984(1) SA 196 (BSC), Mfolo and Others v Minister of 
!Education, Bophuthatswana 1992(3) SA 181 (B) and Nyamakazi 
\v President of Bophuthatswana 1992(4) SA 540 (B). 
I 
32Supra. 
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deference to the Legislature "33 seems to have been taken too seriously. 
Starting with S v Chabalala34 , (but with the exception of the Mfolo'5 
!and Nyamakazi'0 cases) the court adopted a mechanical, conservative 
I 
japproach and abdicated its function as "upholder of the long tenn aims and 
!ideals of the Constitution". 37 The intentionalist mind-set was not abandoned; 
lit did not occur to the judiciary that a supreme Constitution called for an 
ialtogether new interpretative approach. 
! 
The adoption of supreme Constitution which entrenched human rights in 
Canada, Bophuthatswana and Namibia provided the courts in these countries 
with a new mandate. It was no longer the legislature which was supreme but 
!the Constitution. The justiciability of the provisions of the Constitution was 
1a mandate to the courts to review the constitutionality of legislative and 
I 
!executive acts and to strike down any such act which they found to be in 
1
conflict with its supreme provisions; the new mandate was a directive to 
i 
luphold the supremacy of the Constitution with vigour and vigilance. Whether 
[the courts would obey this mandate and use it to promote and realise the 
lneeds, expectations, ideals and aspirations of the nation as expressed in the 
!provisions of the Constitution, was therefore up to the courts themselves. 
!The difficulty which faces a court that is called upon to uphold the provisions 
i 
I.of a supreme Constitution is that the mandate involves the interpretation of 
provisions which are often framed in wide and general tenns. However, 
although these provisions are framed in wide and general tenns, they are 
"At 199C. 
341986(3) SA 623 (BA). 
35Supra. 
3
•Supra. 
37Smith's case (supra) at 199E. 
' 
' 
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nevertheless meaningful and express the values, ideals and aspirations of the 
I
' nation; if judges fail to perceive these provisions as a new mandate, the needs, 
expectations, ideals and aspirations of the nation can be frustrated and 
confidence in the courts and the Constitution, the very basis of the legal 
system and civil society, can be severely damaged.38 
In Canada the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that it was engaged in 
.a new task. The court also cautioned, however, that the development of the 
' !Charter of Rights and Freedoms must necessarily be a careful process; where 
1comment on the new Charter provisions is not called for the court ought to 
refrain from such comment. 39 Although this was a prudent caution, it was 
dearly not a sanction for judicial abdication of duty. 
The judgments of the Namibian High Court and the Namibian Supreme Court 
in the post-independence cases, notably Ex Parte Attorney-General, 
Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the 
State•• and Mwandingi v Minister of Defence41, clearly illustrate 
!that the special nature of a supreme Constitution gives judges a mandate to 
I 
lidentify and articulate the norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of 
the people as expressed in the Constitution and to give individuals the full 
!benefit of the provisions which guarantee their fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
1-----------
1 
38N. Lyon "The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Guarantee : 
IWhat to do with Vague but Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Supreme 
ICourt Rev. 57 at 58. 
39See Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker [1984] 9 
D.L.R (4th) 161at181. 
401991(3) SA 76 (Nm SC). 
411991(1) SA 851 (Nm HC). 
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As Mahomed AJA noted in the Corporal Punishment by Organs of 
the State case, 42 the full import and true meaning of the wide and general 
jterms of the provisions of the Constitution "can often only be appreciated 
!when considered, as the years go on, in relation to the vicissitudes of fact 
i 
!which from time to time emerge". 
I 
1The dictum of Hiemstra CJ in the Smith case, 43 on the other hand, makes 
it clear that although the interpretation of the provisions of a Bill of Rights 
calls for a purposive and generous approach, it also involves a careful and 
balanced process. According to the judge, the court must "exercise its powers 
of controlling legislation with a scalpel and not with a sledgehammer". The 
power to review the constitutionality of legislation is not a licence for a 
wholesale striking down of legislation; the court must strike down legislation 
only after an objective determination of the constitutionality of the legislation 
in issue and only when there has been a demonstrable violation of a specific 
provision of the Constitution. 
An important lesson to be learnt from the judgments of the courts in Canada 
land Namibia is that the courts specifically acknowledged that the interpretation 
land application of the provisions of a supreme Constitution which entrenches 
!fundamental human rights and freedoms differs significantly from the 
!interpretation and application of ordinary legislation.44 The courts recognised 
lthat the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution must take into 
!account its sui generis character; a Constitution expresses the norms, ideals, 
!expectations, aspirations and sensitivities of the nation; it is drafted with an 
I 
I 
42Supra, with reference to what was stated by Lord Wright in James 
v Commonwealth of Australia 1936 CA 574 at 614. 
I 
I "Supra, at 200C. 
I 
j 44See for example Hunter v Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R 145, the 
INyamakazi case (supra) and the Namibian post-independence cases. 
I 
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eye to the future and intended to be capable of growth and development over 
itime to meet new social, political and economic realities. 
I 
I 
!In all the cases where the courts were prepared to perceive the interpretation 
:of the Bill of Rights as a new mandate, they adopted a generous and purposive 
iapproach which gives individuals the full benefit of constitutional guarantees. 
: Emphasis was placed on the purpose of the specific rights, the spirit and 
larger purpose of the Constitution, its fundamental values and the ideals and 
1aspirations it represented. 
45 
! 
i 
IIt is significant to note, however, that the Canadian Supreme Court, in 
particular, did not simply, and in general, advocate a 'purposive and 
generous' approach. On the contrary, the court also laid down a framework 
within which this approach ought to be applied. In R v OakeS"6 the court 
laid down a two-phased framework within which the purposive and generous 
,approach ought to be applied in the determination of the constitutionality of 
legislation. The first phase involves proof by the challenger that the legislation 
complained of actually infringes a constitutionally guaranteed right or freedom 
of his; this phase entails establishing a factual basis for the complaint and 
I 
[showing that the interest or activity for which protection is sought is covered 
by one or more of the rights or freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. The 
second phase arises only if the first phase has been completed; once the 
1 requirements for the first phase have been complied with, the onus shifts to 
ithe government to prove that the infringement is rational and in proportion to 
I 
lthe purpose or objective of the infringing legislation. 
The principles of rationality and proportionality have also been considered and 
45ldem. 
46[1986] 1 S.C.R 103. 
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applied by the Bophuthatswanan and Namibian courts. In the Smith case47 
Hiemstra CJ applied these principles to determine the constitutionality of 
legislation which made the granting of bail dependent on the ipse dixit of the 
Attorney-General. In Namibian National Students' Organisation 
I 
land Others v Speaker of the National Assembly for South 
,West Africa and Others48 Hendler AJ applied the rationality and 
! 
jproportionality principles to determine whether a legislative provision which 
imposed an 'inverted onus' was constitutional.49 These principles were also 
considered by Grosskopf JA in the Chikane50 case when he determined the 
iconstitutionality of a statute which discriminated against non-citizens. 
I 
!Although the two-phase analytical framework provides a suitable criterion for 
I a purposive and generous approach to the interpretation and provisions of the 
Constitution, it has an element of judicial deference to the legislature in 
' 
' !respect of certain types of legislation. In the Oakes case51 the Canadian 
I Supreme Court suggested that judicial deference was called for where the 
I 
!legislation in issue dealt with social and economic policies; it was stated that 
' !the legislature is not required to choose the 'best possible means' to 
'accomplish the objectives of legislation dealing with social and economic 
:policies; all that the legislature needs to show is that there is a 'rational basis' 
1----
47Supra. 
481990(1) SA 617 (SWA). 
49The 'inverted onus' was held to be unconstitutional in S v Shangase 
and Another 1994(2) BCLR 42 (D) and S v Zuma 1995(4) BCLR 401 
l
(CC). See also the post-independence Namibian cases of S V Pineiro 
1993(2) SA 412 (Nm) and Freiremar SA v The Prosecutor-General 
of Namibia and Another 1994(6) BCLR 73 (NmH). 
50Supra. 
51Supra. 
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for choosing the policy it did, even if 'best possible' means were available. 52 
!The rationale for the court's view with regard to legislation dealing with social 
iand economic policies is that it is prudent to respect legislative determinations 
' !of social and economic policy issues; these issues are usually highly 
!controversial and legislation dealing with them usually involves 
'accommodation and compromise by elected representatives. Judicial deference 
;in relation to policy issues is in line with the separation of powers; policy 
I 
1issues fall within the domain of the political branches of government and are 
! jnot capable of principled judicial determination. 
iDicta from Canadian cases indicate that the courts do in fact defer to the 
legislature where the exercise of the power to strike down legislation would 
'!undermine the division of governmental powers.53 In Edward Books & 
1Art Ltd v The Queen54 Dickson CJ stated that "[t]he courts are not 
called upon to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones". A similar view 
was expressed by Mcintyre J in R V Andrews": 
I 
"[U]nless the court can find that choice (of the legislature) unreasonable. it has no power 
under the Charter to strike it down ... [to] invade the legislative field and substitute its view for 
that of the legislature". 56 
I 
52See D. Beaty "The Rule (and Role) of Law in a New South Africa: 
'some Lessons From Abroad" 1992 SALJ 408 at 419. 
53See Chapt. 10 for a discussion of the dividing line between judicial law-
, making and judicial creativity and the proper limits of judicial review in a 
'system of constitutional supremacy. 
I 
54(1986] 2 S.C.R 713 at 781-782. 
55[1989] 1 S.C.R 143 at 191. 
56See also Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle 
Act [1985] 2 S.C.R 486 at 497; Amax Potash Ltd v Government 
of Saskatchewan [1977] 2 S.C.R 576 at 590. 
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The type of judicial deference which appears from the dicta of Dickson CJ 
and Mcintyre J is not indicative of judicial abdication of duty but rather of 
judicial restraint and respect for the separation of powers. However, whether 
·udicial self-restraint and respect for the separation of powers in a particular 
instance will be consistent with the effective protection of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and freedoms will depend on the court's ability to find the 
proper limits of judicial review. 57 While the courts are empowered to 
interpret the law creatively and to uphold the superior law of the Constitution, 
they are certainly not empowered to usurp the functions of the political 
branches of government . 
. Legislation which deals with controversial social and economic policies may 
jbecome problematic. Such legislation may benefit the general good and yet 
clearly infringe constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. In such 
instances the judiciary ought to tread carefully and take cognisance of the fact 
!that it is the function of the legislature and the executive to make important 
lsocial and economic choices in the interest of the common good. The dictum 
iof La Forest J in the Andrews case58 epitomises the restricted role of the 
~udiciary in the determination of the constitutionality of legislation which 
involves important legislative choices: 
I 
11 [I]t bears repeating that considerations of institutional functions and resources should 
make courts wary about questioning legislative and government choices". 
IThe important lesson to be learnt from comparative constitutional law is that 
! 
!while the judiciary ought to interpret and apply the provisions of the 
Constitution purposively and generously to give individuals their full benefit 
and to uphold them with vigour and vigilance, it must at the same time avoid 
"the dangers of a judicial 'super-legislature' [which functions] beyond the 
57See Cha pt. 10. 
58Supra at 194. 
reach of Parliament 
I policy-making. 60 
i 
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and the electorate "59 and embarks upon capricious 
!Judicial respect for the separation of powers between the legislature and the 
i 
[judiciary does not necessarily mean that judges are precluded from engaging 
lin policy issues; nor is it an open invitation to abdication of judicial duty. It 
i remains the function of the judiciary to interpret legislative policies which are 
ialleged to violate constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. The 
1interpretation of value-laden constitutional provisions involves a consideration 
lof the different social, economic and political conceptions of the rights and 
freedoms in issue; it also involves a consideration of the social, economic and 
political milieu within which these rights and freedoms are to operate and an 
1
articulation of the values, ideals and aspirations of society. The consideration 
of social, economic and political standards and the articulation of the ideals 
I and aspirations of society involves the making of choices between competing 
!values. 
;ilt is heartening that in most of the cases in which provisions of the 1993 
Constitution have been interpreted and applied judges of the Supreme Court 
have risen above the narrow, mechanical and legalistic approach and adopted 
a purposive and generous approach which articulates fundamental 
!constitutional principles and values and upholds the supremacy of the 
!constitution. Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order,61 S v 
IMajavu,62 Matiso and Others v The Commanding Officer, 
59Reference 
(supra) at 497. 
I 
60See Amax 
j(supra) at 590. 
re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 
Potash Ltd v Government of Saskatchewan 
I 
611994(1) BCLR 75 (E). 
621994(2) BCLR 56 (CkGD). 
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Port Elizabeth Prison and Others,63 and Mandela v Falati64 
are among such cases. 65 On the other hand, in S v Saib66 and in Kalla 
and Another v The Master and Another67 the court adopted an 
intentionalist/literalist approach. While Kentridge AJ adopted a cautious 
]approach in the first reported case decided by the Constitutional Court, 
i 
[namely S v Zuma and Others,68 Mahomed J, in a majority judgment, 
!adopted a purposive and generous approach in the later case of S V 
IMhlungu and Others.69 
I 
13. Balancing Conflicting Interests. 
The discussion on the role of the judiciary has so far centred on the 
jinterpretation and enforcement of constitutional guarantees of human rights 
! 
!and freedoms. The interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of the 
' i 
I Constitution do not only involve, however, a consideration of the values 
'embodied in the Constitution but also of the values chosen by the legislature 
and embodied in a statute which is alleged to be in conflict with the provisions 
! 
jof the Constitution. Judicial determination of constitutionality involves, 
1
therefore, a consideration of conflicting and competing interests; since both 
the individual and the legislature (or the state) allege that they have legitimate 
claims to certain interests, the constitutional role of the judiciary involves a 
631994(3) BCLR 80 (SE). 
641994(4) BCLR 1 (W). 
65See Chap!. 10 for a discussion of these cases. 
661994 BCLR 48 (D). 
671994(4) BCLR 79 (T). 
681995(4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
691995(7) BCLR 793 (CC). 
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weighing and balancing of conflicting interests. Constitutional adjudication, 
like any other form of adjudication, is invariably concerned with the weighing 
and balancing of conflicting interests or values. 
\The concept of balancing as an aspect of adjudication is associated with the 
I idea and function of law in society. According to the noted American jurist, 
I 
\Roscoe Pound, 70 
Ii, 
' 
"law is an attempt to satisfy. to reconcile, to harmonise, to adjust ... overlapping and 
' ioften conflicting claims and demands, either securing certain individual interests, or through 
' 
delimitations or compromises of individua1 interests, so as to give effect to the greatest total of 
interests or to interests that weigh most in our civilisation, with the least sacrifice of the scheme 
' f • 10 interests as a whole . 
Balancing as an aspect of constitutional adjudication has received scant 
attention in South African legal literature. It is an important conceptual 
I joperation which occurs in almost all conflicts which come before the 
I !courts. 71 The determination of a conflict necessarily involves the making of 
la choice between two or more outcomes; the making of a choice is preceded 
lby some form of weighing and balancing, with the result that the chosen 
!outcome is regarded as the one that yields the greatest net benefit.72 
3.1. Constitutional Adjudication and Balancing Conflicting 
i 
]Interests. 
I 
I . !Balancmg as an aspect of constitutional adjudication involves the 
i 
70R. Pound "A Survey of Social Interests" 1943 Harv. LR 1. 
11Ex Parte Minister van Justisie: in re S v Van Wyk 1967(1) 
1SA 488 (A) affords a good example of judicial balancing of conflicting 
I interests in the field of criminal law. 
I 72See T.A Aleinikoff "Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing" 1987 
IYale LJ 943. 
i 
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identification, evaluation and comparison or weighing of those values, ideals 
and aspirations to which either individuals inter se or both individuals and the 
state lay a legitimate claim. It involves an identification of conflicting interests 
jand an explicit or implicit assignment of values to the identified interests. 73 
I 
[When a court is faced with conflicting interests, it has to weigh the interests 
Jin order to determine which interest outweighs the other and should therefore 
I ]prevail. With regard to conflicts between the interests of the individual and 
state interests, a state interest has to be 'compelling' or important74 if it is to 
outweigh an individual interest. 75 The interests need not, however, always 
!outweigh each other absolutely; the court may seek to 'strike a balance' 
]between or among competing interests by recognising and regarding each of 
'the interests as worthy of protection.76 
Balancing in constitutional adjudication becomes particularly important where, 
in the process of addressing social and economic issues, the court has to 
!weigh state interests against individual interests; a significant clash between 
! 
Jstate interests and individual interests is likely to occur where the state passes 
,legislation which is aimed at addressing social and economic imbalances and 
' 
'lat the same time violates constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
Legislation making provision for or promoting 'affirmative action' is likely to 
I 
igive rise to constitutional litigation which will involve a delicate weighing and 
I 
!balancing of individual interests and state interests in the area of social and 
73Aleinikoff 1987 Yale Wat 945. 
'I 
74In terms of section 33(1) a state interest will be 'compelling' or 
important, in relation to the rights entrenched in Chapter 3, if it is reasonable 
1
and justifiable in a democratic state based on freedom and equality. 
I 75Aleinikoff 1987 Yale Wat 946. 
1•Idem. 
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economic activity. 77 In terms of section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution, the 
guarantee of the right to equality does not preclude 'affirmative action' 
measures; similarly, in terms of section 26(2), the guarantee of the right to 
free economic activity does not preclude 'affirmative action' measures. 
The implication of these 'affirmative action' provisions is that the legislature 
may enact legislation which violates the right to equality or the right to free 
economic activity; section 8(3)(a) and section 26(2) do not, however, take 
away the rights in issue or negate their essential content. It is still open to an 
affected individual to assert them in court, in which event the court will have 
1to weigh and balance the interests of the state to embark upon and promote 
I 
!'affirmative action' programmes and the interests of the affected individual. 
Section 26(2) provides some indication of what the court must take into 
account in weighing and balancing the interests of the affected individual. In 
terms of section 26(2), an 'affirmative action' measure must be "justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality". 78 This 
means that the court will have to evaluate the justifiability of the legislation 
in issue in the light of the needs or objectives, values and principles of an 
open and democratic society, bearing in mind that an open and democratic 
I society is committed to social justice and equality, accommodates a wide 
variety of beliefs, respects cultural and group identity and has faith in social 
.and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and 
I 
igroups in society. 79 The practice in other open and democratic societies will 
I 
I 
I 77Judicial weighing and balancing of individual interests and state interests 
lin the enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution is not, however, 
1confined to social and economic issues; every interpretation and application 
1of human rights provisions in essence involves a weighing and balancing of 
conflicting interests. 
I 
I 
78Section 26(2) is not restricted to affirmative action measures; its terms 
are wider and can encompass other Jabour or economic measures as well. 
' 
79See R v Oakes (supra). 
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also provide material for evaluating the justifiability of 'affirmative action' 
programmes under section 26(2). However, affirmative action policies in 
South Africa will, to a certain extent, inevitably be different from policies in 
jother countries because of unique South African historical circumstances. 
I 
Section 8(3)(a) does not, on the other hand, provide a guideline for the 
weighing and balancing of conflicting state and individual interests. 80 It may 
lbe argued, however, that, although there is no express provision to that effect, 
section 8(3)(a) envisages justifiable 'affirmative action' programmes and that 
the same criterion of 'justifiable in an open and democratic society' should 
:apply in weighing and balancing the conflicting interests, the rationale being 
i 
that in most cases such programmes limit someone's rights. 81 This argument 
can be supported by the further argument that the express guarantee of the 
right to equality is an essential aspect of an open and democratic society. 
IThe weight which the court has to attach to respective competing interests may 
' 
turn out to be a contentious issue in practice. The court may in the process 
invite for itself either a liberal or conservative label.82 The danger of labels 
80See C. Albertyn and J. Kentridge "Introducing the Right to Equality in 
I jthe Interim Constitution" 1994 SAJHR 149 at 172-174; N. Smith 
'"Affirmative Action under the New Constitution" 1995 SAJHR 84 for a 
discussion of section 8(3). See also in general D.J Joubert "Affirmative Action 
iin Employment: the Rationale" 1994 De Jure 116. 
i 
81There is no express indication in the Constitution that section 8(3) is 
jinsulated from the provisions of section 33(1). However, du Plessis & Corder 
I 
Understanding South Africa' Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 
(at 130) argue that section 8(3)(a) is not subject to the section 33(1) limitation; 
l
according to them section 8(3)(a) does not entrench a limitable right but 
merely authorises a procedure which may result in entitlements for certain 
!categories of people. The operation of section 8(3)(a) was considered in 
IMotala and Another v The University of Natal 1995(3) BCLR 
i374 (N); the court did not consider, however, whether the section was subject 
Ito the section 33(1) limitation. 
82The words 'liberal' and 'conservative' are used here in a jurisprudential 
sense and not in the political sense. 
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may be avoided if the court seeks to strike a balance by a careful analysis of 
the particular interests at stake, without dealing with interests as absolutes. 83 
A careful analysis of competing interests implies objectivity; it implies that 
! 
!adjudication should be based on juridical norms that transcend the viewpoint 
1
!of the adjudicator, the individual and the legislator;84 it implies, in essence, 
ithat the overriding values are those constitutional values which reflect the 
!needs, expectations, ideals and aspirations of society as a whole. 
'.No absolute method of weighing and balancing can be constructed. Elevating 
!constitutional adjudication beyond personal preferences and viewpoints does, 
]however, provide some solution. Answers as to how much weight must be 
i 
jattached to competing interests do not lie in personal preferences and 
!viewpoints but in an objective analysis and evaluation of external sources. 
External sources such as history, current 'social consensus' and the 
importance or significance of an interest to society as a whole might provide 
:an answer. 85 
I 
The German principle of proportionality (Verhaltnismassigkeit), which was 
applied m the case of Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana86 , provides another method of weighing and balancing 
lconflicting interests. In terms of this principle, interference with 
\constitutionally guaranteed rights is permissible only if it is (a) sanctioned by 
:the Constitution; (b) capable of achieving its purported objective; (c) necessary 
Ito achieve its objective and (c) reasonable or proportional in the sense that 
!the purported objective of the interference is lawful, adequate, necessary and 
83See Aleinikoff 1987 Yale LJ at 961. 
84See 0.M Fiss "Objectivity and Interpretation" 1982 Stanford LR 739 
at 744. 
I "s~ AJe;o;Jroff 1987 Yale L.J.< 984. 
861984(1) SA 196 (B). 
I ,, 
-586-
of equal or superior weight when balanced against the affected right. 87 The 
application of the proportionality principle therefore involves a weighing and 
\balancing of conflicting interests. 
,The value of weighing and balancing in constitutional adjudication is that it 
I 
\helps to identify, and to give proper weight to, those interests which the 
l1egislature or the executive tend to overlook in a rushed attempt to rectify 
'!social or economic imbalances. In this process the court plays two 
fundamental roles; first, it helps to ensure that the rights of underprivileged 
or minority groups are fully protected and, secondly, it helps to ensure that 
!those constitutional rights and freedoms that are sometimes under-enforced are 
I 
lgiven their full worth. 88 
3.2. Balancing Individual Interests and State Interests in a State of 
Emergency. 
10ne other area that will involve a delicate weighing and balancing of 
!individual interests and state interests is the declaration of a state of 
!emergency. Section 34 of the Constitution permits the declaration of a state 
lof emergency89 and a suspension of the rights guaranteed in Chapter 390 
' 
'where the security of the Republic is threatened by war, invasion, general 
!insurrection or disorder at a time of national disaster, in order to restore peace 
jor order. 
! 
The determination of whether a situation is serious enough to justify a state 
!of emergency lies with the government. However, section 34(1) specifically 
87Smith's case (supra) at 201A-C. 
88See Aleinikoff 1987 Yale LJ at 984 . 
. 
89Section 34(1). 
90Section 34(4). 
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lays down the circumstances which would justify the declaration of a state of 
emergency, namely, threat of war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder 
or national disaster; furthermore, the declaration of a state of emergency must 
!be objectively necessary to restore peace or order. 
The role of the judiciary in relation to a declaration of a state of emergency 
1
will arise when an individual complains that his rights have been suspended 
)or violated. In terms of section 34(3), any superior court is competent to 
! 
1enquire into the validity of a state of emergency and any action taken under 
'Such declaration. Action taken under the declaration includes the suspension 
or violation of some of the rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
The judicial function in relation to a declaration of a state of emergency and 
complaints by individuals that their rights have been suspended or violated 
involves a three-stage inquiry. The first stage involves determining whether 
ithe prescribed circumstances for the declaration exist, that is whether the 
security of the Republic is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection 
or disorder or there is a national disaster; the second stage involves 
ldetermining whether the declaration is necessary to restore peace or order; the 
·third stage involves determining whether the actions taken in terms of a 
necessary declaration of a state of emergency are themselves proportionate or 
necessary to achieve the objective of the declaration. 
1In relation to the first and second stages of the inquiry it is the government 
llwhich makes the first judgment as to whether any of the prescribed 
circumstances exists and whether a declaration of a state of emergency is 
necessary to restore peace and order. A question which then arises is whether 
the court is obliged to accept the government's judgment of the situation, or 
!whether it must make its own judgment. 
Section 34 does not contain any suggestion that the court must defer to the 
government's judgment as to whether a situation justifies a declaration of a 
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state of emergency and whether the declaration is necessary to restore peace 
and order. Section 34(3) makes it clear that it is within the court's power to 
examine the facts for itself and to determine whether the prescribed 
,circumstances exist and justify a declaration of a state of emergency to restore 
,peace and order. 91 
I 
I 
!Judicial inquiry into the validity of a state of emergency involves a factual 
\inquiry and an objective determination. The question whether the prescribed 
i jcircumstances exist is a question of fact which must be decided in the light of 
jthe prevailing circumstances; the question whether a state of emergency is 
!necessary to restore peace or order involves an objective determination 
!whether the circumstances are grave enough and disturb peace or order 
I sufficiently to justify a declaration of a state of emergency. 
IA finding that the prescribed circumstances under which a state of emergency 
may constitutionally be declared are present, and that such a declaration is 
,necessary to restore peace and order does not, however, necessarily mean that 
: any suspension of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the Constitution would 
' lbe constitutional. In terms of section 34(4) these rights may only be suspended 
jin consequence of the declaration only to the extent necessary to restore 
lpeace or order. 
I 
.This last stage of the inquiry implies that there must be a direct and proximate 
I 
91In so far as a decision to declare a state of emergency amounts to a 
l
'political question', section 34(3) appears to entail a rejection of the 'political 
question' doctrine: see Chap!. 10. It has been suggested, however, that, since 
'it would be difficult for courts to weigh the gravity of a threat to peace or 
order or to determine whether particular steps need to be taken in a situation 
which the government regarded so serious as to warrant a declaration of a 
state of emergency, some judicial deference to the government's judgment will 
!be appropriate: see S. Ellmann "A Constitution for All Seasons: Providing 
Against Emergencies in a Post-Apartheid Constitution" 1989 Columbia 
HRLR 163 at 187-188. It has been argued elsewhere in this thesis that 
where the court has been called upon to adjudicate justiciable legal disputes, 
simply deferring to the political branches is tantamount to abdication of duty. 
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nexus or a reasonable connection between government action in consequence 
of a necessary state of emergency and the need to restore peace or order; it 
involves a consideration of the question whether a suspension of any of the 
entrenched rights will result in or contribute to the restoration of peace and 
:order. This consideration also involves a weighing and balancing of the 
! 
:interests of the state to restore and maintain peace or order and the interests 
:of the individual to enjoy his constitutionally entrenched rights. The decisive 
ifactor is whether the interests of the state to restore peace or order outweigh 
:the interests of the individual in enjoying any of his constitutionally entrenched 
:rights. 
! 
!Section 34 contains certain safeguards of the rights of individuals under a 
!necessary state of emergency. In the first place, section 34(5)(c) expressly 
!prohibits the suspension of the provisions dealing with the application of 
! 
!Chapter 3 of the Constitution92, those entrenching certain fundamental 
! 
rights93 and those making provision for the circumstances under which 
,limitations of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 would be permissible94 ; in 
l,the second place, section 34(5)(a) prohibits the creation of retrospective 
!crimes; in the third place, the state is not indemnified against liability for 
92Section 7. 
93Sections 8(2) (the right not to be unfairly discriminated against), 9 (the 
]
'right to life), IO (the right to human dignity), 11(2) (the right not to be 
subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 
112 (the right not to be subjected to servitude or forced labour), 14 (freedom 
!of religion, belief and opinion), 27(1) and (2) (the rights to fair labour 
practices and to form and join trade unions or employers' organisations) , 
30(l)(d) and (e) (children's rights not to be subjected to neglect or abuse, not 
,to subjected to exploitative labour practices nor to be required or permitted to 
,perform work which is hazardous or harmful to their education, health or 
!well-being) and 30(2) (the right of a detained child to be detained under 
jconditions and to be treated in a manner that takes into account his or her 
,age). 
94Sections 33(1) and (2). 
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unlawful actions during the state of emergency95 ; in the fourth place, section 
34( 6) makes provision for certain procedural conditions which have to be 
observed where a person is detained under a state of emergency96; finally, 
i section 34(7) prohibits the re-detention of a person on the same grounds where 
I 
11a court has previously found that the grounds for the detention were 
! 
1unjustified, unless the state shows good cause to the court prior to the re-
' 
I detention . 
. south African constitutional law is already rich with judicial decisions about 
1
1
emergency regulations. 97 A number of these decisions show that the South 
African judiciary, even when not supported by a justiciable Bill of Rights, was 
I 
:able and willing to control, within the context of judicial review, the exercise 
I 
of government authority and to protect the rights of individuals during a state 
of emergency. 98 
111 is the courts' willingness to enforce constitutional guarantees, and an ability 
95Section 34(5)(b). 
'I 
96Section 34(6)(c) makes provision for a special safeguard where the rights 
entrenched in section 11 (freedom and security of the person) or 25 (the rights 
!of detained, arrested and accused persons) have been suspended during a state 
1of emergency. In terms of section 34(6)(c)(i) the detention of a detainee 
ibecomes reviewable by a court of law as soon as it is reasonably possible but 
' inot later than 10 days after the detention; if the court is satisfied that the 
I detention is not necessary to restore peace or order, it is obliged to order the 
I 
release of the detainee; after the expiry of 10 days after the review, a detainee 
is, in terms of section 34(6)(c)(ii), entitled to apply to the court for a further 
lreview and an order for his release. 
I 
! 
97For an examination of some of these cases see D. Basson "Judicial 
Activism in a State Of Emergency: An Examination of Recent Decisions of 
the South African Courts" 1987 SAJHR 28. 
98See in particular Dempsey v Minister of Law and Order 1986 
1(4) SA 530 (C); Radebe v Minister of Law and Order & another 
11987 (1) SA 586 (W); The State President & others v Tsenoli; 
IKerchoff & Another v The Minister of Law and Order & 
!Others 1986 (4) SA 1150. 
I 
! 
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to strike a proper balance between individual interests and state interests 
during normal times, that will to a large extent shape the process of 
constitutional adjudication during a state of emergency. The judiciary ought 
1therefore to cultivate a culture of objectivity during ordinary constitutional 
11litigation; this culture will help to shape appropriate principles for the 
weighing and balancing of conflicting interests in constitutional litigation 
!during a state of emergency. 
! 
I 
' 
14. Democracy and Judicial Responsibility. 
I 
! 
14.1. Democracy and the Judiciary. 
Judicial control of legislative and executive acts essentially takes place within 
the context of the separation of powers and checks and balances. Within the 
context of this concept, judicial control implies that while the judiciary has the 
!power to review legislative and executive acts in order to check and balance 
tthe exercise of power by the other two organs of government, each organ 
I 
!retains its powers as prescribed in the Constitution. Judicial control is 
jtherefore only a tool for checking and balancing widely dispersed 
governmental powers; it does not permit undue judicial encroachment on the 
proper sphere of the powers of the other organs of government. 
!The traditional basis for opposing judicial control of legislation is that it is 
jundemocratic.99 Opponents of judicial control essentially question the power 
of an unelected and unrepresentative body to set aside acts of elected, 
representative and politically accountable bodies. 100 Within the context of the 
99This has been a major topic of discussion in the United States of 
America, largely because the Constitution does not expressly confer review 
jpowers on the judiciary. 
I 100See D.V Cowen The Foundations of Freedom (1961) at 139-
1140. 
! 
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separation of powers and checks and balances, judicial control of legislative 
and executive acts is, however, a necessary ingredient of democratic 
lgovernment;101 it does not amount to a usurpation of legislative or executive 
. 
1 power but constitutes a means of keeping the exercise of governmental power 
within constitutional limits and brings about effective protection of individual 
i rights in order to maintain a free and democratic society. 102 The ideals of 
!democracy are achieved not only through the election of representatives who 
Jare mandated to govern through legislative and executive acts but also through 
1a proper exercise of legislative and executive powers; judicial determination 
i 
iof justiciable disputes which arise over the proper boundaries of the powers 
! 
'granted to the elected representatives is one of the legitimate means of 
ensuring that these powers are properly exercised. 
!Although judicial control over the exercise of governmental power is an 
I 
!essential component of democracy, the very concept of democracy also limits 
ithe exercise of judicial power. The essence of this observation is that the 
function of the court is not to substitute its own views for those of the elected 
branches; the function of the court is simply to ascertain and declare whether 
.government action complained of is in accordance with, or in contravention 
iof, those provisions of the Constitution which delimit the exercise of 
,governmental power in relation to those rights of the individual which are 
1guaranteed in the Constitution; it is not the function of the court to condemn 
the policies of the elected organs of government, unless these conflict 
irreconcilably with the Constitution. In a democracy, the approval or 
j '°'The scope of this thesis does not permit a detailed discussion of the 
!arguments in favour of or against judicial review. For a detailed discussion of 
!democracy and the judiciary see J.H Ely Democracy and Distrust: A 
1
Theory of Judicial Review (1980); E. V Rostow "The Democratic 
!Character of Judicial Review" 1952 Harv. LR 193. 
i 
102The specific reference to 'an open and democratic society' in section 
l33(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution and the justiciability of the rights guaranteed 
!in Chapter 3 in terms of section 7(4)(a) are clear indications of the recognition 
!of the fundamental role of the judiciary in the democratic process. 
I 
I 
I 
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disapproval of the policies of the elected organs of government lies with the 
people and their representatives. 
!Whether the judiciary has in the performance of its function in a specific case 
! 
I descended into the political arena may in some instances not always be easy 
ito tell. Issues such as 'political questions' and 'affirmative action' 103 may 
' 
!become contentious in this regard. Whatever the full implication of these 
issues may be in relation to the role of the South African judiciary under the 
new Constitution, they do, however, emphasise that even if the judiciary is 
empowered to determine the constitutionality of acts of the elected organs of 
government, democracy dictates that the judiciary ought to respect the elected 
land representative branches and to exercise its power of judicial review within 
the confines of its sphere of operation. 
4.2. Judicial Responsibility. 
'The entrenchment of fundamental human rights and freedoms in South Africa 
will no doubt be accompanied by a corresponding growth in judicial activity. 
IAs social and economic needs arise and expectations are raised, government 
activity to cater for these needs will also increase. In the process of trying to 
' 
I address these needs and expectations, various individual interests will be 
!affected and the courts will increasingly be called upon to determine whether 
certain government programmes are constitutional or unconstitutional. This 
state of affairs brings into sharp focus the relationship between the judicial 
function and judicial responsibility. 
I 
]Judicial responsibility in relation to the role of the judiciary has two meanings. 
llt means, in the first place, the duty of the judiciary to perform its functions 
responsibly, without either acting like a 'super-legislature' or abdicating its 
103See supra. 
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duty to decide justiciable legal disputes104• In the sense in which it is used 
here, judicial responsibility, however, also means accountability. 
As a body which is not elected and does not represent any specific 
.constituency, the judiciary may on a superficial level appear to be accountable 
i 
Ito no one. Judicial power, like any other power, however, implies 
1accountability. There are two main forms of judicial accountability, namely 
I 
!political accountability and public or societal accountability. 
Political accountability has as its basis the concept of the separation of powers 
and checks and balances. In terms of this concept, the judiciary must not only 
be separate from the political branches of government, but these other 
branches ought also to some extent check and balance the exercise of judicial 
power. This checking and balancing of the exercise of judicial power implies 
a measure of judicial accountability to the political branches of government. 
!
Judges are, for example, expected to behave properly and, in the event of 
misbehaviour105 or incompetence, may be impeached. 106 The idea of 
impeachment, therefore, operates as an admonition for judges to behave 
properly; proper judicial behaviour is an indication of accountability .1°7 
I 
104This aspect has already been discussed in relation to judicial activism 
and judicial self-restraint: see Chap!. 10. 
105Examples of judicial misbehaviour or misconduct are adjudicating a 
dispute in which the judge has a personal interest, using judicial influence to 
obtain a personal favour and openly advocating the cause of a specific political 
party. 
106See section 104(4) of the Constitution. No judge has been impeached or 
dismissed on the ground of misbehaviour since Union: see G. Carpenter 
Introduction to South African Constitutional Law 1987 at 258. 
107See M. Cappelletti "Who watches the Watchmen? : A Comparative 
Study of Judicial Responsibility" in S. Shetreet & J. Deschenes (eds) 
Judicial Independence : The Contemporary Debate (1985) 550 
at 558. 
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More importantly, however, the concept of separation of powers also serves 
as a constant reminder that the judicial function should be confined to 
adjudication and that judges should not involve themselves in day-to-day 
]politics, which is the domain of politicians. Members of the judiciary may 
I 
!thus not become members of the legislature or the executive, or involve 
I !themselves in party politics. 
I 
j1t is public or societal accountability, however, which constitutes the most 
1important form of judicial accountability. The judiciary, like all other organs 
of government, is an organ which serves the interests of society as a whole 
1and is therefore in the final analysis accountable to the society it serves. 
Public or societal accountability ensures proper judicial performance and 
serves as a means of harmonising the judicial function with democracy. 
Public or societal accountability is largely generated by the judiciary's 
exposure to fair and justified criticism, either through the media or through 
1critical and analytical legal literature. The fact that judicial proceedings are 
1open to the general public, and that judicial decisions are reported, also helps 
to instil public accountability .108 
The tendency by members of the judiciary to frown upon fair criticism by the 
1press or commentators does not foster judicial accountability. 109 Section 
1
15(1) of the Constitution specifically entrenches the right to freedom of speech 
and expression, which includes freedom of the press and other media; fair 
criticism of the judiciary should therefore not be frowned upon. The public 
should be made aware of, and be allowed to comment on, the judicial office 
10
'lbid. at 560-561. 
109See for an example the criticism of Mr Justice Steyn ("Regbank en 
Regsfakulteit" 1967THRHR101), Mr Justice Ogilvie Thompson ("Address 
on the Centenary Celebrations of the Northern Cape Division" 1972 SAW 
30) and Mr Justice Rabie ("Regbank en Akademie" 1983 De Jure 21), 
Jevelled at comments on judicial performance by academics. 
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and its functioning. 
No doubt freedom of expression, like any other freedom, has its limits; were 
lit not so, judicial independence would be threatened by undue and 
unreasonable disparages and denigrations. 110 Proper and disciplined criticism 
of judicial performance is the best way in which the exercise of judicial power 
1can be subjected to scrutiny and the judiciary be made accountable to the 
'Society it serves. 
'cappelletti111 has constructed a useful system of models of judicial 
accountability. The first two models, namely the repressive or dependency 
model and the corporative-autonomous or separateness model, represent 
:extreme models of accountability which, in one way or another, pose a 
1danger in respect of the exercise of judicial power. The first model places the 
1
control of judges in the hands of the political branches of government and, 
therefore, poses a danger of undue political interference, which may lead to 
I loss of judicial independence; the second model places the control over judges 
in the hands of the judiciary itself and, therefore, poses a danger of unchecked 
judicial power, which may result either in an excessive or improper exercise 
i 
iof that power or in abdication or neglect of duty. 
The third model, which Cappelletti advocates, is the responsive or consumer-
:oriented model. It is a mixed model which places the control of judicial power 
<neither exclusively in the hands of the political branches of government nor 
!exclusively in the hands of the judiciary itself but moderately in the judiciary 
' titself, the political branches and society. The obvious attractiveness of this 
! 
!model is that it 
I "combines a reasonable degree of political and societal responsibility, without, however, 
leither subordinating judges to the political branches, to political parties, aud to societal 
110See Chapt. 5. 
111Cappelletti op cit. at 570-575. 
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organizations, or exposing them to the vexatious suits of irritated litigants" 112• 
[This model is useful because it shows that the role of the judiciary demands 
responsiveness to the needs, ideals and aspirations of society and that the 
'politicisation' and 'socialisation' of the judiciary in a modern democratic state 
is unavoidable; 113 it also shows, more importantly, that the judicial role is 
.limited by judicial, political and societal considerations. 
I 
5. Interpreting and Applying the Bill of Fundamental Rights: 
.A Suggested Framework and Approach. 
lit is neither practical nor desirable to construct an all-embracing interpretive 
approach, one which would be uniformly applicable to all constitutional 
disputes. The resolution of legal disputes depends on the circumstances of the 
lease, and the way in which the court ought to interpret and apply the 
lprovisions of the Constitution may vary from case to case. Constitutional 
interpretation, in particular, ought not to proceed on the basis of a uniform 
mechanical framework but on the basis that the values, ideals and aspirations 
,of society must be given effect to, regardless of the approach that is adopted. 
It is possible, however, to construct a general flexible framework and 
approach to the interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution. 
Such a framework and approach can never be exhaustive and all-inclusive; it 
would merely, at best, provide some guidelines to the interpretation of the 
1
provisions of the Constitution. 
To conclude this thesis, the following framework and general approach, 
extracted from the previous analysis of the role of the judiciary in a modern 
112Ibid. at 574. 
113ldem. 
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state, are suggested. However, in the final analysis, no framework or 
theoretical approach, however well constructed, can ever sufficiently meet the 
'unique practical realities of real disputes. The administration of justice lies not 
iso much in theoretical frameworks and pre-determined approaches as in the 
' liudge's preparedness and ability to administer it; theoretical frameworks and 
lapproaches, whether good or bad, are merely intended to help to point the 
!way to justice. 
5.1. Proposed Framework. 
1) The challenger must prove 
a) that the legislative or executive act complained of infringes or threatens 
,to infringe or limits one or more of his constitutionally entrenched rights 
lor 
I b) that he has been denied one or more of his constitutionally guaranteed 
I rights. 
i 
This step involves factual proof of a statutory or executive infringement or 
threat of infringement or limitation or denial of one or more of the 
constitutionally entrenched rights and establishing that one or more of the 
provisions of the Constitution protects a legitimate interest or activity of the 
challenger. 114 
;It is not sufficient simply to prove that the wording used in a law prima facie 
1exceeds the limits imposed in the Constitution; the challenger must prove an 
:actual infringement or threat of infringement or limitation or denial. Where 
ia law is capable of a more restricted interpretation which does not exceed 
lconstitutional limits, the Constitution directs the court to adopt the more 
,restricted interpretation. 115 
114See Beaty 1992 SALJ at 411. 
115Section 35(2). 
I 
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If the challenger cannot prove that the act complained of infringes or threatens 
to infringe one or more of the constitutionally guaranteed rights, and establish 
that the Constitution protects a legitimate interest or activity of his, the case 
should be dismissed and the act or law complained of upheld. 
2) The nature and extent of the infringement or threat of infringement, 
limitation or denial must be established. This requirement is necessary in 
order to ensure that only constitutionally recognised infringements or 
behaviour which is worthy of constitutional protection should give rise to 
!unconstitutionality. In essence, constitutional protection of a right does not go 
·1beyond the nature and the purpose of the right. Not all unequal treatment, for 
example, is unconstitutional; the law does not always, for various cogent 
reasons, treat adults and children or citizens and foreigners alike; such 
·unequal treatment clearly does not fall within the scope and purpose of the 
, section 8 right to equality. 
I, 
:3) Once the challenger establishes that one or more of his constitutional rights 
' has been infringed or limited or denied to the extent that the infringement or 
limitation or denial is covered by the scope or purpose of the right in issue, 
it must be established whether the Constitution permits such an infringement, 
limitation or denial. At this stage the onus of justifying the constitutionality 
of the infringement, limitation or denial rests on the party who alleges that it 
,is constitutional, usually the government or one of its organs. The provisions 
iof section 33, and section 34 to some extent, of the Constitution are 
i paramount during this stage of the inquiry. 
Section 33 makes provision for five criteria to determine whether any 
limitation of any of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 is permissible. It must 
be shown that 
3.1) the law complained of is of general application; 
3.2) the limitation is reasonable; 
3.3) the limitation is justifiable in an open and democratic society 
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based on freedom and equality; 
3.4) the limitation does not negate the essential content of the right in 
question; and, 
3.5) when the rights listed in section 33(1)(b)(aa) or in section 
33(1)(b)(bb), in so far as the right relates to free and political 
activity, are in issue, the limitation is necessary. 
IThe requirement that the law complained of must be of general application 
1was interpreted in Smith v Attorney-General, Bophutbatswana11• 
:to mean that such law must not be confined to individuals or a class of 
lindividuals. 117 Article 19(1) of the German Basic Law not only requires that 
1the law must apply generally but also adds the words "and not for an 
individual case". 118 This article suggests that the phrase "law of general 
application" means a law which does not seek exclusively to regulate a 
concrete instance or an isolated group of concrete instances, or "to speak to" 
a particular addressee only; if it can be applied in many instances it applies 
1generally and not for an individual case. 119 
I 
i 
The idea that a law which limits any of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 
:must apply generally seems to be related to the principle of equality as 
!entrenched in section 8 of the Constitution; in essence, it implies equal 
application of the law. It may be argued, therefore, that a law which applies 
specifically to any one of the class or group of persons identified on the basis 
of the grounds specified in section 8 will not be a law of general application 
1161984(1) SA 196 (BSC). 
117At 2020-E. 
118See L. Du Plessis & H. Corder Understanding South 
Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 124; J.D van der Vyver 
: "Limitation Provisions of the Bophuthatswanan Bill of Rights" 1994 
:THRHR 47 at 55. 
119See van der Vyver 1994 THRHR at 55-56. 
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for the purpose of section 33(1). 
,The reasonableness criterion involves an inquiry into the weight of the interest 
I 
underlying the limitation and the proportionality of the limitation in relation 
to the objective which it seeks to achieve. The limitation would be permissible 
if it is sufficiently important or compelling or proportional to the objective it 
seeks to achieve. Proportionality implies that the limitation must (a) be 
rationally connected to its objective; (b) impair the rights and freedoms of 
individuals as little as possible; and (c) have an effect which is proportional 
to the importance of the objective which it seeks to achieve. 
In determining whether a limitation is justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality, the court must first seek guidance from 
1the democratic character of the Constitution itself, its values, and the ideals 
! and aspirations which it is intended to express. It can then also seek guidance 
I 
from the practice in other comparable democratic societies and the position in 
international law. 
In the Zimbabwean case of Woods and Others v Minister of 
I 
!Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others120 
IGubbay CJ explained the concept of reasonable and justifiable in a democratic 
society as follows: 
11 What is reasonabJy justifiable in a democratic society is an elusive concept. It is one 
that defies precise definition by the Courts. There is no 1egal yardstick, save that the quahty of 
reasonableness of the provision under attack is to be adjudged on whether it arbitrarily or 
!excessively invades the enjoyment of the guaranteed right according to the standards of a society 
jthat has a proper respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual. " 
The requirement that the limitation must not negate the essential content of the 
1201995(1) BCLR 56 (ZS) at 59C. 
! 
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right in question121 may appear to be the most difficult requirement in the 
section 33(1) inquiry. However, this is not necessarily the case. By the time 
the court turns its attention to the question whether a limitation is permissible 
in terms of section 33(1) it would have already determined the content of the 
right in issue; 122 this will usually be at the stage the nature and extent of an 
alleged infringement is examined. As Marais J pointed out in Nortje and 
Another v Attorney-General of the Cape and Another123, the 
iquestion whether a limitation negates the essential content of a right or not 
11
should ordinarily be the first matter for consideration. Not only because it is the 
iuJtimate criterion which is applicable to every single fundamental right in Chapter 3, but because 
iit would be pointless to examine such questions as reasonableness, justifiability in an open and 
I 
, democratic based on freedom and equality, or even necessity, if the proposed limitation negates 
I 
I the essentia1 content of the entrenched right 11 • 124 
The content of a right simply means the value or values which are embodied 
in it; these can be established by ascertaining the meaning of the words and 
phrases which are used to express it125 , by determining the purpose it is 
designed to serve and by having regard to the larger purpose of the 
Constitution. In the Nortje case126 Marais J said the following with regard 
to the essential content of a right: 
11 The test of whether or not the essential content of a right has been negated may 
121Section 33(1)(b). 
122See S. Woolman "Riding the Push-me Pull-you: Constructing a Test that 
Reconciles the Conflicting Interests which Animate the Limitation Clause" 
1994 SAJHR 60 at 71. 
1231995(2) BCLR 236 (C). 
124At 258G-H. 
125See P.M Bekker "Interpretation of the Right to Bail (Section 25(2)(d)) 
land the Limitation Clause (Section 33) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
!South Africa 200 of 1993" 1994 THRHR 487 at 491. 
126Supra. 
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sometimes be quantitative, sometimes qualitative, and sometimes both. Everything tu.ms ... on the 
nature of the right and its raison d'etre. 11127 
In Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana128 Hiemstra CJ 
'referred to the German concept of Wesensgehalt or essence (of a right) and 
the related principle of Wechselwirkung or interplay of forces as important 
,factors in a determination of the essential content of a right. The judge said: 
11 The 'Wesensgehalt' or essence wilJ assume its own characteristics in relation to each 
1fundamental right or 'Grundrechf, according to its particular weight and meaning within the 
!totality of the system. Before the court will strike a law down because it seems to encroach upon 
the es.sence of a fundamental right, it will apply the process of an interplay of forces, or 
'Wechselwirkung' as the Germans call it -nicely rendered by "wisselwerking' in Afrikaans. When 
an infringing law admittedly, taken on the wording as such, encroaches upon a fundamental right, 
the Court will in tum interpret such a law restrictively, 'in the light of the meaning of the Bill of 
Rights'. If the Court can achieve such a synthesis of the two opposing forces, it would prefer to 
127In S v Makwanyane and Another 1995(6) BCLR 665 (CC) the 
Constitutional Court left open the meaning and appropriate interpretation of 
1'the essential content of the right'. Chaskalson P gave an exposition of the 
subjective and objective approaches but did not decide which approach is the 
appropriate one; he held that, at the very least, section 33(l)(b) evinces a 
concern that a right should not be taken away altogether. According to 
Chaskalson P's formulation, whereas the subjective approach is concerned 
with the content of a right from the point of view of the challenger, the 
objective approach is concerned with its content from the viewpoint of a 
constitutional norm. While Kentridge AJ appears to have preferred the 
!objective approach, Ackerman J did not endorse Chaskalson's formulation of 
:the objective approach. Mahomed J suggested a third approach which focuses 
on a distinction between the essential content of a right and some other 
content. According to the judge "this distinction might justify a relative 
approach to the determination of what is the essential content of a right by 
distinguishing the central core of the right from its peripheral outgrowth and 
subjecting a law of general application limiting an entrenched right to the 
discipline of not invading the core, as distinct from the peripheral outgrowth. 
In this regard, there may conceivably be a difference between rights which are 
!inherently capable of incremental invasion and those which are not" (at 7680). 
128Supra. 
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uphold the infringing law under a truncated meaning rather than declare it unconstitutional. 11129 
, In German constitutional law a determination of the essential content of a right 
involves, in the first place, a determination of the meaning of the right in the 
light of the values and practices of a free and democratic society (objective 
I 
!content) and, secondly, its meaning in the light of the values and practices of 
·particular individuals or groups who have a specific interest in the exercise of 
the right (subjective content).130 This approach is preferable because it seeks 
to strike a balance between the interests of the state to promote the democratic 
and social processes and those of individuals or groups to pursue their ends 
within prescribed legal limits. 
The requirement that a limitation of any of the rights enumerated in sections 
33(1)(b)(aa) and 33(l)(b)(bb) must, in addition to being reasonable, also be 
necessary, is an indication that their limitation must be scrutinised strictly. If 
a limiting law is to survive this higher level of scrutiny it must be shown that 
1
the limitation is not only reasonably connected to its objective but also 
I necessary or essential to achieve that objective; the distinction between a 
permissible limitation of the rights enumerated in sections 33(l)(b)(aa) and 
33(l)(b)(bb) and other rights entrenched in Chapter 3, therefore, is that the 
!while the latter is based on reasonableness only, the former is based on both 
reasonableness and necessity. 
In relation to a declaration of a state of emergency in terms of section 34, the 
suspension, limitation or infringement of the entrenched rights would be 
permissible only if the circumstances prescribed in section 34(1) exist; the 
1--------
129 At 202. Hiemstra CJ' s approach is consistent with the provisions of 
section 35(2). 
I 
130See Woolman 1994 SAJHR at 72. Woolman (at 73) suggests that the 
court can determine the content of a right by simply determining the 
junderlying values at stake and whether government restrictions frustrate the 
jpoint of the right generally, or with respect to the particular challenger. 
I 
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suspension of certain rights, enumerated in section 34(5)(c), is not 
permissible. 131 
The proposed framework accords with that suggested by Erasmus J in S V 
iShuma and Another132: 
"Jn applying any of the fundamental rights in Chapter 3 of the Constitution to a given 
set of facts, the Courts, I think, should reason in the following way. The first enquiry is whether 
lthe behaviour comp1ained of does in fact amount to a restriction or limitation of a fundamental 
:right. If such limitation is found, the extent thereof is then set out. However, right~ rarely operate 
lin pure form, but frequently are found to exist in a baJance, or in conflict even, with other rights 
and laws. In order to strike the correct balance between constitutional rights and other laws, a 
third enquiry is required: the procedure which is laid dowu in section 33(1) of the 
Constitution. 11133 
's.2. Proposed Approach . 
. In applying the suggested framework, the following principles should be borne 
fo mind: 
1) The Constitution is the supreme law against which all other law or conduct 
must be tested; its provisions override the provisions of ordinary law. It is an 
instrument of a special nature which is intended to regulate the affairs of 
lpresent and future generations. The primacy of the Constitution, as opposed 
to the primacy of the intention of the legislature in ordinary statutes, and its 
!special nature are paramount considerations in the interpretation and 
!application of its provisions. 
2) Interpreting the provisions of a supreme Constitution is not the same as 
131See supra. 
1321994(2) SACR 486 (E). 
133At 493b-c. 
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interpreting ordinary statutes. The human rights provisions of a Constitution, 
in particular, are deliberately enacted expressions of the norms, values and the 
ideals and aspirations of the nation which bind and discipline the government; 
they should be creatively but responsibly interpreted in accordance with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution and be capable of growth and 
development to meet new social, political and economic challenges and 
realities; ordinary statutes, on the other hand, are enacted to regulate specific 
instances. 
3) The human rights prov1s10ns of the Constitution should be given a 
:purposive and, where the language permits, generous construction. The larger 
object of constitutionally entrenched rights is fully to guarantee the individual 
a life of freedom and equality under the law and an enjoyment of universally 
recognised fundamental human rights; more importantly, the Constitution 
itself, in the postamble, identifies its ultimate purpose as the creation of an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, a society which 
is characterised by an accountable and constitutional exercise of governmental 
power. A purposive and generous approach implies that individuals should be 
given the full benefit of the human rights provisions in the light of their 
specific purpose and the larger purpose of the Constitution; the wider 
I teleological approach, in particular, places emphasis on the purpose and 
]function of law in society and a harmonisation of this purpose and function 
lwith the protection of fundamental human rights and a recognition of the 
!fundamental values of justice, fairness, equality and good government. 
' 
:4) The values and ideals expressed in the Constitution and the generally held 
lnorms, moral standards and aspirations of society should be objectively 
!identified, articulated and given effect to. 
I 
Is) Cognisance should be taken of the prevailing social, political and economic 
conditions and the experiences, sensitivities and perceptions of the people. 
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;6) The provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted impartially, 
fearlessly and courageously; more importantly, however, since constitutional 
,adjudication is concerned with the determination of justiciable disputes, it must 
be objective and principled. 
iln the final analysis, it is not the judiciary alone which can turn the new 
I 
!Constitution into a 'living document' and make it a success; its success will 
I ja!so depend on the attitudes of the society it is intended to serve, the 
!veneration with which it is held and the ability and willingness of the 
! 
igovernment of the day to respect its great outlines. The hope it holds for 
i 
!South Africa does not lie so much in its lifeless provisions; it lies in South 
' !Africans, who must turn it into a 'living document'. 
I POSTSCRIPT: 
I 
The thesis was completed just after the new (final) Constitution of the 
!Republic of South Africa, 1996 was formally adopted by the Constitutional 
Assembly. It was not possible to refer to and analyse the provisions of the 
new Constitution because of the stage at which the thesis was. 
!Since the focus of the thesis is judicial approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, the analysis, the submissions and the conclusions made remain 
relevant. The judgments analysed provide a foundation for the further 
development of constitutional jurisprudence under the new (1996) 
Constitution. 
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